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 Session 2-B • Communicative 
Disorders and Sciences and  
Psychology 
Session Chair: Robert Owens, Communicative 
Disorders and Sciences 
 
Pages 1-13 
Resilency and Intervention for Children  
Alice Brunet 
Faculty Sponsor: Ganie DeHart, Psychology 
The presentation will be a general summary of an in-
dependent psychological review on resiliency and 
intervention. The primary basis of the literature review 
will be developing programs that promote resilient 
skills in children. The beginning of the presentation 
will be an overview of the extensive literature on resil-
ient children and the skills they acquire during diffi-
cult times. Then, the most common skills that resilient 
children use will be the basis of looking at different 
intervention programs that are specifically designed 
for children. At the end of the presentation, an analysis 
of each intervention program will be made and future 
intervention programs that promote resiliency will be 
suggested. 
 
Session 3-E • English  
Sexualities and the 
 Prison-House of Gender 
Session Chair: Emily Plessas 
Faculty Sponsor: Maria Helena Lima, English 
 
Pages 14-18 
"Creating Womanhood" 
Chelsea Rives 
A close reading of Jennifer Finney Boylan’s She’s Not 
There, a transition from male to female memoir, makes 
the author question every perception of gender differ-
ences held until that moment: Why are some people 
born into the “wrong” body? What causes gender 
“dysphoria” [for lack of a better name]? Can we recre-
ate ourselves? What exactly happens during a sex 
change procedure? What does it mean to BE a woman? 
 
Pages 19-24 
"Sexualizing Black Women in America" 
Lindsey Wiltse 
In current media depictions of African-American 
women, including rap music, they are most likely de-
scribed as overly sexual, flaunting shapely bodies to 
men who are willing to be pleased by women who 
have no other function than pleasing them. Since the 
Biblical creation story, in the official reading, Eve sets 
a precedent for all women to be sexual temptresses, 
regardless of race or class. When and why have black 
women alone begun to bear the brunt of a hyper sexu-
alized culture on their bodies? 
Session 4-E • Foreign Languages  
& Literatures  
Session Chair: Emily Borghard 
 
Pages 25-30 
The Provinces of Central France: A Study in 
Geography, History, Industry, and Culture 
Erinn Kehoe 
Faculty Sponsor: E.R. VanVliet, Foreign  
Languages & Literatures 
This paper examines the distinctive quality and char-
acteristics of the central provinces of France. This area 
is unique in its diversity: a mix of scenic mountains and 
fertile valleys, agriculture and industry, contemporary 
life and ancient customs, rural countryside and mod-
ern cities. Although the population density of this re-
gion is lower than in other parts of France, the culture 
and industry of these provinces have a strong impact 
on the rest of the country. This area also holds an im-
portant place in the history of France, beginning with 
the influence of the Romans and continuing through 
the modern day. An examination of the diverse geog-
raphy, industry, and culture of the central provinces 
presents a view of life in France as a whole. 
 
Pages 31-37 
Un Voyage en France 
Amy Lafleur 
Faculty Sponsor: E.R. VanVliet, Foreign  
Languages & Literatures 
This presentation (in French) will describe cultural 
and historical facts about France, in the form of a tour. 
The tour is the second half of a hypothetical voyage to 
France. It leaves from Montpellier and explores 
Provence and the French Riviera. It then continues 
north through Burgundy and Alsace-Lorraine, then 
progresses west to Normandy, while stopping in many 
notable sites on the way. 
 
Pages 31-46  
The Arhuacos: The Struggle 
Alice Brunet 
Faculty Sponsor: Cristina Rowley, Foreign Lan-
guages & Literatures 
The Arhuaco people are descendants of the Tairona, 
who like the Inca and the Aztec, had a highly devel-
oped civilization. Some aspects of Tairona civilization 
included development of advanced irrigation systems, 
impressive architectural knowledge, and commerce 
with other native peoples over great distances. Their 
culture also had a strong connection to the earth and 
nature which was an integral component of their be-
liefs, customs and traditions. The Tairona inhabited 
what is today northern Colombia well before the arri-
val of the Spanish conquistadors. They resisted and 
fought against the Spanish conquest, but in the end the 
few remaining survivors had to retreat to the moun-
tains, where they lived in isolation and developed 
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  what is known today as the Arhuaco cul-
ture. Ever since then, the Arhuaco have 
continued to resist an outside world that 
demands they integrate themselves into mod-
ern Colombian society at the cost of their own 
culture and beliefs. This presentation will de-
scribe the culture, beliefs, and traditions that the 
Arhuaco people are fighting to preserve. It will 
also detail their struggle to protect and foment 
their culture among their youth, who are more sus-
ceptible to the influence of the outside world. 
 
Pages 47-52 
Relief du Sol et Climat 
Stephanie Murdock 
Faculty Sponsor: Richard VanVliet, Foreign Lan-
guages & Literatures 
A 15 minute presentation, in French, on the climate 
and geography of continental France. 
 
Session 2-G • English  
Shakespeare 
Session Chair: Daniel Carroll 
Faculty Sponsor: Eugene Stelzig, English 
 
Pages 53-57 
Looks Can Be Deceiving: Angelo's  
Intentions in MEASURE FOR MEASURE 
Michael Langen 
Angelo’s Intentions in Measure for Measure Reputa-
tions are important, especially for those in positions of 
power. In Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, some 
readers see Angelo as deserving the reputation of a 
moral man who is earnestly trying to clean up Vienna, 
but happens to take things too far in his strict treat-
ment of Claudio’s case. They believe that, by the 
play’s end, Angelo truly repents for succumbing to the 
temptation of Isabella. Other readers, however, see 
Angelo as a power -hungry tyrant who is hypocritical 
in his preaching of strict morality, and view him as 
being ill-intentioned all along, pursuing his selfish 
agenda at the expense of Isabella and others. I will 
argue that while Angelo tries to dupe others into see-
ing him as a well-intentioned, just, and pious leader, 
the truth is that he is ill-intentioned, selfish, and unjust. 
 
Session 4-I • Political Science &  
International Relations  
State Responses to Terrorism 
Session Chair and Faculty Sponsor: Victoria 
Farmer, Political Science & International Relations 
 
Pages 58-109 
POWs in the War on Terror 
Andrew Petracca 
The mistreatment of prisoners in U.S. custody between 
September 11, 2001, and January 2009, including in-
definite detentions, unfair trials, the use of interroga-
tion techniques amounting to torture, and the deporta-
tion of prisoners to other countries for the purpose of 
torture, constitute violations of international law. Con-
trary to what the Bush administration and its support-
ers have argued, these policies are illegal and have 
not been more effective at protecting the United States 
than legal methods. In fact, by reducing the moral 
standing of the country and alienating individuals 
throughout the world, especially Muslims, they have 
strengthened anti-American extremism and increased 
the danger of terrorist attacks against the United 
States. 
 
Pages 110-132 
Imposing Democracy: State Building and 
the War on Terror 
James Maxfield Duhe 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamen-
tally reprioritized US foreign policy. In this environ-
ment, the Bush administration crafted what came to be 
known as the “Bush Doctrine.” Though a precise defi-
nition of the Bush Doctrine remains contested, defini-
tions typically include the idea that the US may pre-
emptively attack countries harboring terrorists and 
that the US should support the spread of democracy. 
But, after eight years, the United States is still not safe. 
This paper analyzes democratization as an element of 
the Bush Doctrine through case studies of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. US attempts to democratize these coun-
tries have angered local inhabitants, locked the United 
States into situations where withdrawal is difficult, and 
damaged relations between the United States and 
other countries. Overall, the Bush administration’s 
efforts to impose democracy in these countries have 
been ineffectual and counterproductive at combating 
terrorism. I conclude with policy prescriptions for the 
Obama Administration; namely, America must remove 
itself from the political processes of Iraq and Afghani-
stan, rebuild ties with the international community, 
and develop a strategy for complete US withdrawal 
from these areas. 
 
Pages 133-159 
State Capacity, Social Mobility, and  
Terrorist Groups in Thailand and the  
Philippines 
Sarah McDonald 
Thailand and the Philippines face similar security is-
sues; including separatist violence in their Southern 
provinces. However, the developmental paths of the 
two countries and the governments’ reactions to the 
minority ethno-religious separatist movements, the 
Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines, 
have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government’s 
desire to create a singular national identity from 
mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds has created 
periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at 
conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued 
colonial policies of economic and political oppression 
of the Moro but created the institutions necessary for 
social pluralism. The differing policies of the Thai and 
Filipino governments have shaped the orientation of 
the separatist movements within the countries.  
 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
III 
4
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
  Currently, the size and power of MILF in 
the Philippines has forced the government 
to attempt peace talks with the group. How-
ever, in Thailand the reclusive nature of the 
BRN C remains hinders communications with 
the Thai government. This paper demonstrates 
that the actions taken by the governments of 
Thailand and the Philippines have fostered cur-
rent separatist and terrorist movements. Address-
ing these problems will require state policies that 
reflect pluralism and institutions that support social 
aspirations. 
 
Session 1-J • Honors  
Honors Capstone II:  
From Places Apart 
Session Chair: Olympia Nicodemi 
Faculty Sponsor: Olympia Nicodemi, Mathematics 
 
Pages 160-170 
Sir Thomas Roe at the Mughal Court:  
Seventeenth Century and English  
Cultural Assumptions 
Katherine Schwartz 
Faculty Mentor: Joseph Cope, History 
This paper seeks to explore how, although in reality 
the inferior partner in trade, the English in India 
thought of themselves as superior. To do this, I will 
analyze the journal of Sir Thomas Roe, the first official 
English ambassador to the Mughal Court, in light of 
English and Mughal history, English cultural construc-
tions, and the works of contemporaries such as Ed-
ward Terry and the Emperor Jahangir. This paper will 
show that Roe judges the people of the Mughal court 
by English cultural standards, and uses these assump-
tions to claim English superiority. Furthermore, the 
paper will show that, while not intentionally written 
with imperialist aims, Roe's journal does demonstrate 
that the basic attitudes of the later imperialist 
 
Pages 171-204 
Front and Center: As Anthropological 
Analysis of Drag Queens in  
American Culture 
Seth Palmer 
Faculty Mentor: Rose-Marie Chierici, Anthropology 
Judith Butler’s concept of gender performativity revo-
lutionized the way that academics conceive of gender, 
and has subsequently become a critical perspective 
for feminist and queer analyses in a variety of disci-
plines. The new anthropology of genders and sexuali-
ties uses this theoretical framework and focuses spe-
cifically on “institutions of ambiguity” that challenge 
gender dichotomies across the globe. Such institutions 
highlight the importance of understanding gendered 
and sexualized categorizations as cultural construc-
tions embedded in a specific historical, spatial and 
cultural context. Continuing in that tradition, this paper 
is an examination of drag queens in contemporary 
American culture, with a specific focus on the politics 
of drag performance. With historical roots that can be 
traced back to Shakespearian theater, the practice of 
drag performance in the United States has evolved 
over time, yet it continues to challenge traditional no-
tions of masculinity and femininity in American cul-
ture. Data collected from literature, fieldwork experi-
ences, interviews, film, and social networking and 
video sharing websites will be utilized to examine the 
meaning of drag and the lives of those who perform in 
it.  
 
Session 1-M • Political Science &  
International Relations  
International Security Policy  
in the 21st Century 
Session Chair and Faculty Sponsor: Jeremy Grace, 
Political Science & International Relations 
 
Pages 205-247 
Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy in  
Latin America 
Lucy Coates 
Strengthened by increased revenues from the oil 
boom of the 2000s, Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez has pursued a much more extensive foreign 
policy than his predecessors, cultivating relations with 
numerous countries throughout Latin America and the 
world. Analysis of Chávez’s Latin American foreign 
policy reveals that he, like the petro-state decision-
makers before him, has used petrodollars to fund 
large, long-term projects and agreements intended to 
further his goals of promoting a leftist agenda, mini-
mizing foreign dependence, and increasing Venezue-
lan influence in the region. However as the oil boom 
ends, Chávez is likely to fall into a petro-state trap by 
overextending Venezuela’s oil revenues, rendering 
him unable to sustain his capital-intensive projects. 
This paper will begin by analyzing Chávez’s regional 
foreign policy, its effectiveness in accomplishing his 
goals, and the implications that his policy has had 
throughout the region. In the context of the ending oil 
boom, this analysis can be used to predict the effects 
of the failure of Chávez’s foreign policy in Latin Amer-
ica. Analysis of Chávez’s foreign policy and his reac-
tion to the decrease in the value of oil should serve as 
an example when analyzing the foreign policy deci-
sions made by other petro-states. 
 
 
 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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 Session 2-M • Political  
Science & International  
Relations Politics and Policy 
in American Government 
Session Chair: Marilyn Klotz, Political Science 
& International Relations 
 
Pages 248-250 
Political Process as Envisioned  
by the West Wing 
David Lombardo 
Faculty Sponsor: Marilyn Klotz, Political Science & 
International Relations 
The challenge of illuminating people about the politi-
cal process, how we elect our leaders and how they 
govern, is tackled by The West Wing. During its ten-
ure it educated people bored with C-Span, unable to 
appreciate George Will, and possessing a fetish for 
snappy dialogue. The main critique of the show was 
that it presented an idealistic version of a world that is 
generally grimmer and less eventful. Regardless, the 
show used story lines straight from real life and even 
foretold events that later occurred. The show dealt 
with issues in a manner unfamiliar to a casual political 
observer, pulling aside a curtain that hindered full 
comprehension of events, and therefore provided an 
accurate picture of how politics is played. For my 
presentation I will address certain issues dealt with on 
The West Wing, which have traditionally been out of 
reach to the public, and assess how accurately the 
show portrays the developments compared to their 
unfolding in reality. Specifically, I will touch on the 
Presidential election process, which becomes the ma-
jor focus of the last two seasons, the art of crafting a 
public message, and a general look at the legislative 
process, with a focus on political gamesmanship. 
 
Session 1-P • School of Education  
The Denial of Universal Human 
Rights: An Exploration of Examples 
and Justification 
Session Chair: Lwam Tecleab 
Faculty Sponsor: Jane Fowler-Morse, Ella Cline 
Shear School of Education 
Pages 251-256 
Tomorrow Will Shine 
Geoff Griffiths 
Student Commentator: Lwam Tecleab, 
Prophets are those people who speak up against injus-
tice and call for social change. This paper examines 
the Prophets Hosea, Amos, and Jonah from the 8th 
Century BC and how they speak out against corruption 
in their time period. They argue for an end to misfor-
tunes and injustices. It will also argue that Martin Lu-
ther King Jr. is a modern prophet. In his “Letter from 
Birmingham Jail,” King calls for an end of the suppres-
sion of civil and natural rights. King asserts that, 
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to Justice Everywhere.” 
This is the calling of prophets to speak up for those 
that may not be able to speak up for themselves. With 
their help, tomorrow holds a brighter future for every-
one. 
 
Teaching & Learning Center 
and Leadership Education 
Development & Training 
 
Pages 257-260 
The Ghana Project 
Jesse Parent, Rejoyce Owusu, Ben DeGeorge, Han-
nah Schmidt, and Clark Driscoll 
Faculty Sponsors: David Parfitt, Teaching &  
Learning Center, and Tom Matthews, Leadership 
Education, Development & Training 
The Ghana Project is a civic engagement and service 
learning project. This poster presentation will be 
about the happenings of the project, which is in its first 
year, starting last semester (it is to be a long term pro-
ject). Born out of GOLD’s civic engagement efforts, 
The Ghana Project was created with two main goals: 
the first being to share Ghanaian culture, help educate 
others on life in Ghana, and share experiences with 
another country; the second, long term goal, is to raise 
money to help build a school in Ghana. The first year 
of The Ghana Project has been one of getting people 
used to Ghana, introducing them to the blossoming 
African country. The poster will review the events of 
the Project – such as the educational model of last se-
mester, and the cultural events & speakers of this year 
– as well as discuss the nature of the project itself. It 
will also talk about the fundraising efforts of the Pro-
ject, and relate them to the goal of assisting develop-
ment in Ghana by means of building a school. Finally, 
there will be mention of the future plans of the Project, 
continuing into next year. (See Dance Performance at 
5:30pm.) 
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This paper was completed as part of an in-
dependent directed study mentored by  
Dr. Ganie DeHart. 
 
Abstract 
There have been many psychological stud-
ies that sought to explore the specific skills 
that resilient children develop in adverse 
situations. This literature review is an at-
tempt to provide an overview of the results 
of previous resilience research that focuses 
on children. From these results a general 
theory of resiliency will be discussed. Next, 
different types of implemented intervention 
programs that aim to promote resilient skills 
in children will be reviewed and analyzed. 
Lastly, suggestions for future resilience re-
search studies and intervention prevention 
programs will be made. 
 
General observations of children in 
potentially at-risk situations have suggested 
to researchers that there are a group of 
highly at-risk children who seem to be less 
negatively affected by their adverse situa-
tion and sometimes may even demonstrate 
positive effects. From these observations, 
researchers have sought to understand why 
certain children in adverse situations are 
more capable of overcoming and prospering 
than their peers in similar situations. Even 
though there has been no definite answer, 
resilience research has indicated a general 
trend of skills that these thriving children 
develop in order to overcome their situation. 
Furthermore, research has also attempted to 
promote these certain skills in intervention 
programs in an attempt to assist children 
through potentially adverse situations. The 
focus of this paper will be to provide an 
overview of the resilience research and its 
results, discuss a potential theory, review 
and analyze current intervention programs, 
and then suggest future research studies and 
intervention prevention programs. 
 It is important to note that the term 
resiliency was not always used to define 
children who thrived through adverse situa-
tions. Initially, researchers classified these 
children as “invulnerable” (Anthony, 1974) 
or as “stress-resistant” (Garmezy, Masten, 
& Tellegen, 1984). It was thought that these 
children had a unique quality that other chil-
dren did not possess to help them endure 
their adverse situation. Further research on 
these children indicated that this unique 
quality turned out to be something more de-
velopmentally mundane. For example, Gar-
mezy, Masten, and Tellegen (1984) initially 
researched children who were potentially 
vulnerable to develop schizophrenia. This 
research provided data on the development 
of children born to schizophrenic mothers 
over a 12-year period of time. The primary 
purpose of the research was to observe if 
children who had schizophrenic mothers 
were at-risk to have developmental deficits, 
which also could potentially contribute to 
the development of schizophrenia. Despite 
the initial focus of the research, results of 
the study indicated that there was a group of 
at-risk children who were grouped into a 
“stress-resistant” category. These stress-
resistant children were defined as children 
who were exposed to stressful situations, 
but were still able to maintain a normal if 
Submitted by Alice Brunet 
A Literature Review of  
Resiliency and Intervention for Children 
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 not higher developmental level of 
competence. Conversely, their at-
risk peers who were not classified as 
stress-resistant tended to have more 
developmental problems. Many vari-
ables were used to measure the child’s 
development level to determine if an at-
risk child was developmentally comparable 
to their peers not in an at-risk situation. Re-
sults indicated that IQ was the highest and 
most significant predictor of achievement 
scores, even when controlling for socio-
economic status. Also, a significant interac-
tion was found that indicated when children 
had high achievement, stress had little effect 
on their IQ score; however if children had 
low achievement, low stress did not signifi-
cantly influence their IQ scores, but high 
stress correlated with a significant drop in 
IQ score. This interaction suggests that even 
though children may have achievement, a 
stressful environment may have the potential 
to hinder their performance and develop-
ment.   
 These results suggest that children 
who have high achievement are more fo-
cused on obtaining a goal and not letting 
their stress level influence their perform-
ance. Further research was conducted on 
competence in children to better understand 
how competence can predict future success. 
For example, Masten, Coatsworth, Neeman, 
Gest, Tellegen, and Garmezy (1995) ob-
served 191 children in a longitudinal study 
that focused on competence across child-
hood and adolescence. Competence was ex-
amined because it is a long term, complex 
developmental process that has direct ob-
servable behaviors. Throughout the study 
there was a focus on academic competence, 
conduct competence, and peer and social 
competence. For only the adolescents, there 
was also a focus on job competence and ro-
mantic competence. Results indicated that 
childhood academic success predicted ado-
lescent academic attainment and job success. 
Also, childhood conduct competence 
strongly predicted later conduct competence 
and also predicted job and academic success. 
Furthermore, childhood social competence 
predicted both social and romantic compe-
tence. In general, the relationship between 
academic conduct and social competence 
from childhood to adolescence was mediated 
by the consistent stability of academic con-
duct and social competence across childhood 
to adolescence. These results suggest that it 
is important for children to have a stable en-
vironment throughout adolescence in order 
to develop proper competence levels that 
have the potential to predict future success.  
 A similar study was then conducted 
to examine if serious adversities can affect 
the development of competence in children. 
Therefore, Masten, Hubbard, Gest, Tellegen, 
Garmezy, and Ramirez (1999) observed how 
adversities may threaten the development of 
competence. Differences were examined be-
tween resilient adolescents and their mal-
adaptive peers who had not successfully de-
veloped in the face of adversities. Resilient 
children were also compared to their compe-
tent peers who had developed successfully 
but had not experienced any serious adversi-
ties. Resilient children in this study were 
defined as children who were developmen-
tally sound even though they were facing 
long-term adversities that had great potential 
to disrupt regular development. This study 
focused on competence in relation to adver-
sity by examining academic competence, 
conduct competence, and peer and social 
competence. A longitudinal study was con-
ducted using 189 children from two urban 
schools. Measures were taken when the chil-
dren were eight to twelve years old, fourteen 
to nineteen years old, and seventeen to 
twenty-three years old.  
 Overall, results indicated that the de-
velopment of competence is related to the 
availability of psychosocial resources, chil-
dren facing adversities are not as likely to 
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 have as many available resources. 
The results also indicated that if 
children in adverse situations do 
have access to reasonably good re-
sources then they are more likely to 
have generally good outcomes even in 
the face of adversity, and maladaptive 
adolescents tend to be stress-reactive and 
have a history of adversity, low resources, 
and problems with the development of a 
broad range of competencies. Furthermore, 
the combination of low IQ and high adver-
sity was also related to conduct problems 
that were evident in childhood and worsened 
over time. Interestingly, resilient adoles-
cents’ intellectual functioning had no signifi-
cant differences when compared to their 
competent peers. Also, all competent adoles-
cents regardless of adversity level reported 
similar levels of availability to resources and 
psychological well-being. In general, few 
differences were found between competent 
and resilient individuals other than adversity 
level. These findings suggest that resources, 
such as cognitive skills, are general advan-
tages for development that can possibly as-
sist children in succeeding in both adverse 
and non-adverse situations. 
 Research has indicated that develop-
ing competence can predict future success in 
many different domains. Furthermore, re-
search has also indicated that resilient chil-
dren, unlike their peers who are also facing 
adverse situations, are able to adapt and be 
developmentally comparable to their compe-
tent peers. Therefore, this research suggests 
that one way that resilient children adapt and 
succeed is by having sufficient resources, 
such as cognitive skills, as a way to buffer 
against their adversity. However, the previ-
ous studies mentioned are unclear as to what 
specific resources or skills resilient children 
use to assist them through their adverse 
situation.  
 Other longitudinal studies in the re-
silience literature have been conducted that 
focus more specifically on the potential 
skills and resources that resilient children 
may use, as well as noting overall general 
trends. For example, Werner (1994) con-
ducted a 30-year longitudinal study on the 
entire birth cohort of 698 children in the year 
1955 on the island of Kauai. Approximately 
one-third of the children in this cohort 
(n=201) were designated as high-risk be-
cause they were either born into poverty, had 
experienced moderate to severe degrees of 
prenatal stress, and/or lived in a family envi-
ronment troubled by chronic discord, paren-
tal alcoholism, or mental illness. From this 
high-risk cohort, approximately two-thirds 
(n=129) of these children did develop seri-
ous learning or behavior problems by age 
ten that continued to worsen by the age of 
eighteen. These children also had signifi-
cantly higher rates of developing mental 
health problems, having a delinquency re-
cord, and/or being directly involved in a 
teenage pregnancy.  
   However, one-third of these high-
risk children (n=72) did develop into compe-
tent and successful young adults. Further-
more, no one in the resilient group devel-
oped any serious learning or behavior prob-
lems in childhood or adolescence. In this 
study, they were categorized as resilient be-
cause they had successful outcomes despite 
their adverse situation, sustained normal 
competence levels under stress and success-
fully recovered from trauma. These observa-
tions are important to the resilience literature 
because they provide support of resiliency 
using unobtrusive measures in a naturalistic 
setting. 
Interestingly, in this study there was 
evidence of a genetic predisposition for 
these resilient children to be able to success-
fully overcome their situation. For example, 
as infants, these children elicited positive 
attention, were very active, and expressed 
fewer negative habits. Furthermore, pediatri-
cians and psychologists who examined 
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 them as toddlers noted their alert-
ness, autonomy, their tendency to 
seek out novel experiences, and 
their positive social orientation. De-
velopmentally, in concurrence with pre-
vious research, these resilient toddlers 
were more advanced than other non-
resilient children and were on the same de-
velopmental path as their peers not facing 
adverse situations. In elementary schools, 
their teachers reported that the resilient chil-
dren were socially accepted among their 
peers. In high school they were observed to 
be nurturing, responsible, achievement-
oriented, assertive and independent. 
These resilient children were also 
noted of developing specific skills and be-
coming involved with certain activities that 
fostered their resilient nature. By the end of 
high school, resilient adolescents had devel-
oped a positive self-concept and an internal 
locus of control and had found emotional 
support outside of their own family; also, 
their self-esteem and self-efficacy increased 
when they participated in a responsible posi-
tion such as a job. They tended to participate 
in extracurricular activities that were enjoy-
able to them and also acted as a place of ref-
uge when things were bad at home. They 
were also noted to participate in volunteer 
work that was focused on preventing others 
from going through their current adverse 
situation. In a way, these resilient children 
had a specific disposition that led them to 
have stability over development and the de-
sire to seek environments that promoted 
positive outcomes and reinforced their resil-
ient nature. Even though resilient children 
may have some biological factors that influ-
ence them to become resilient, these findings 
may also suggest that there are certain skills 
that resilient children develop, such as posi-
tive self-concept, internal locus of control, 
and the ability to find social support groups, 
to help them through their adverse situation. 
These results were further supported 
by Cowen, Work, Wyman, Parker, Wannon, 
and Gribble (1992) in a study conducted on 
10- to12-year-old urban children who were 
classified as either stress-affected or stress-
resilient. To qualify for either of these two 
groups, the child needed to have at least four 
stress-related events that were reported by 
their parents using the “Life Events Check-
list”. Furthermore, to classify as stress-
affected, the child had to score in the bottom 
one-third on at least two of the three adjust-
ment measures used in the study and score 
no better than the middle one third on the 
third measure. To classify as stress-resilient 
the child had to place in the top one third on 
two of the three adjustment measures and no 
worse than the middle one third on the third 
measure. These three adjustment measures 
were based on three different evaluations 
indicated by their parent, former teacher, and 
current teacher. Overall, the stress-resilient 
children exceeded the stress-affected chil-
dren on all measures of adjustment. A non-
classified group was also included in this 
study that was demographically matched to 
the other two groups, but did not have four 
or more stress related events reported by 
their parents. The non-classified group had 
consistently higher scores on all adjustment 
measures than the stress-affected group, but 
lower scores than the stress-resilient group. 
The purpose of the study was to compare the 
stress-affected, the stress-resilient and the 
non-classified groups on a variety of levels 
using data that were collected over two 
years.  
 Results of the study indicated that 
there was a tendency for the stress-resilient 
group and the non-classified group to sig-
nificantly exceed the stress-affected group 
on test scores, but they tended not to differ 
from each other. Also, for measures of obey-
ing rules and reading and math achievement, 
the stress-resistant group significantly ex-
ceeded the non-classified group and the non-
classified group significantly exceeded the 
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 stress-affected group. Overall, 
stress-resilient children reported 
significantly higher levels than the 
stress-affected group on all compe-
tence and esteem measures except ath-
letic competence, five of six self-rated 
adjustment scores, all empathy scores, 
problem-solving strategy measures, and 
both internal and realistic control expecta-
tions. These results are consistent with pre-
vious research, suggesting that even though 
resilient children are going through an ad-
verse situation, developmentally they are 
comparable to their peers who are not cur-
rently dealing with an adverse situation. 
 The results of the study were repli-
cated by Hoyt-Meyers, Cowen, Work, and 
Wyman (1995) in a similar study conducted 
on 7- to 8-year-olds. The methodology of 
this study was identical to the previous study 
on stress-affected and stress-resilient chil-
dren; however, some factors of the study 
were adjusted to compensate for the partici-
pants’ younger age. Results indicated that IQ 
scores were significantly higher for stress-
resilient children than for stress-affected 
children. Overall, results of the study sup-
ported previous research; however, the re-
sults were less robust. These findings are 
important because they support findings of 
previous research that resilient individuals 
are consistently at a significantly higher 
competence level that their non-resilient 
peers in similar adverse situations at differ-
ent stages of development. 
 The resilience literature indicates that 
there is a significant difference between re-
silient children and their non-resilient peers 
who are also in adverse situations. Even 
though it is hard to define resiliency based 
upon each individual situation, the culmina-
tion of research indicates that there is a gen-
eral trend that resilient children follow in 
order to cope and succeed through their ad-
verse situation. According to Masten (2001), 
even though there is some indication in the 
research that resilient children may have a 
specific genetic disposition, resilience is pri-
marily a common phenomenon that results 
from normal development being put to the 
test in extreme situations. In order to be re-
silient, children need to first face a signifi-
cantly adverse situation that tests their devel-
opment and adaptational resources. There-
fore, it is suggested that non-resilient chil-
dren who are also in adverse situations are 
not fully developed and do not have suffi-
cient adaptational resources. Their develop-
mental impairments are exposed and pro-
longed because of their stressful adverse 
situation. It is suggested then that if these 
non-resilient children had comparable access 
to resources and the opportunity to develop 
the necessary resilient skills, they would also 
have the ability to become resilient in their 
adverse situation. Furthermore, if children 
not currently in an adverse situation were 
also equipped with resilient skills and had 
access to resources, then potentially it would 
help them through future adverse situations. 
 In order to successfully promote re-
silience skills in children, intervention pro-
grams need to first consider promoting some 
of the skills that resilient children use. Some 
of these resilience skills include: self-
regulation, self-esteem, self-efficacy, inter-
nal locus of control, emotional intelligence 
and resourcefulness (Luthar 2005). In gen-
eral, the adaptation skills that resilient chil-
dren use are potentially universally helpful 
for different adverse situations. Therefore, 
interventions need to be able to be specific 
enough to focus on individual problems but 
also be broad enough to cover a wide range 
of adaptation skills that work in different 
adverse situations. Also, according to Sale, 
Bellamy, Springer, and Want (2008) it is 
also important that the intervention instruc-
tors are carefully selected. Results indicated 
that participants who perceived higher levels 
of trust, mutuality and empathy in their in-
structors had significantly greater  
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 improvements in their social skills. 
  Furthermore, it is important 
for future research to explore what 
stage of development is the prime 
time for an intervention teaching adap-
tation skills. According to Simmons, 
Burgeson, Carlton-Ford and Blyth (1987), 
the transition between 6th and 7th grades is 
difficult for children because of personal life 
changes and school transitions (e.g., moving 
into junior high, going through puberty, dat-
ing). Results of the study indicated that from 
6th to 7th grade there was a significant drop 
in GPA and extracurricular participation. 
Therefore, it may be important to equip chil-
dren with resilient skills before 7th grade in 
order to prepare them for their potential life 
changes.  
 Some interventions that currently 
exist are focused on helping the high-risk 
population of children to teach them how to 
cope and introduce them to resilient skills. 
For example, the Penn Resiliency Program 
focuses on children who are at risk of devel-
oping depression and/or anxiety through in-
ternalization of their emotions. The main 
purpose of this program is to reduce inter-
nalization of problems in high-risk children 
to avoid future potential negative conse-
quences. This is accomplished by teaching 
the children how to use more accurate cogni-
tive styles, problem-solving skills, and how 
to seek out positive, supportive relation-
ships. 
 This cognitive-behavioral interven-
tion is primarily designed for adolescence. 
The program is conducted in 12 90-minute 
sessions by school counselors and teachers 
who have been trained in the intervention 
program and are supervised while conduct-
ing the program. There is an emphasis in the 
program to help students use specific skill 
sets to improve their problem solving skills 
and enhance their ability to cope with daily 
stressors in life, as well as preparing them to 
deal with and overcome future major set-
backs. The primary skills that are taught in 
this program are: emotional regulation, im-
pulse control, causal analysis, realistic opti-
mism, self-efficacy, empathy, and the ability 
to reach out to others for help. Participants 
learn how to recognize their personal 
thoughts and reactions in certain situations 
and how to change their reaction to some-
thing more positive and optimistic by taking 
the time to analyze their situation before re-
acting. 
 A longitudinal study was conducted 
to analyze the effectiveness of this program. 
The intervention group was compared with a 
control group of randomly assigned young 
adolescents who did not receive the inter-
vention. Results indicated that participants 
in the intervention condition significantly 
improved their explanatory styles, which 
was still significant even after a three year 
follow-up. Furthermore, after three years of 
follow-up the intervention group also re-
ported lower levels of depressive symptoms 
and were less likely to report moderate to 
severe levels of depressive symptoms when 
compared with the control group (Reivich, 
Gillham, Chaplin, & Seligman, 2005). These 
results indicate that providing at-risk chil-
dren with resilient skills may potentially 
help them succeed through their adverse 
situation. 
 Another intervention program that 
was developed with a focus on high-risk 
youth is the Resolving Conflict Creatively 
Program. The program was founded in 1985 
in New York City with a focus of reducing 
the high levels of violence found within the 
school systems. Prior to the intervention, 
teachers who were going to be the instruc-
tors for the intervention received a 25-hour 
course to introduce them to concepts and 
skills in social and emotional learning and 
how to teach using an interactive approach. 
Teachers were also given regular classroom 
coaching by staff developers. Regular in-
struction was used to teach at least one  
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 lesson from the curriculum with 
duration and content varying de-
pending on the age of the children. 
The primary techniques taught within 
the intervention were emotion identifi-
cation, active listening, assertiveness, 
emotional regulation, negotiation, media-
tion, empathy development, active listen-
ing, conflict resolution skills, and under-
standing and respecting inter-cultural differ-
ences. 
 Because the primary focus of imple-
menting this intervention was to reduce the 
high levels of violence in the New York City 
school system, the Resolving Conflict Crea-
tively Program was not evaluated until close 
to ten years after implementation. When an 
evaluation was finally conducted, a quasi-
experimental design was used to test the ef-
fectiveness. However, it is difficult to com-
pletely assess this program due to the vary-
ing types of programs used based on adjust-
ments made during the intervention for age 
appropriateness. Results did indicate that 
high rates of instruction in this intervention 
across two years were significantly related to 
positive changes in children’s academic 
achievement and social and emotional devel-
opmental trajectories. Furthermore, results 
also indicated that there was a significant 
decrease of violence within the targeted 
schools by using the intervention model. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the Resolv-
ing Conflict Creatively Program was suc-
cessful in its primary goal of reducing vio-
lence in the targeted school system by teach-
ing children resilient skills (Brown, 
Roderick, Lantieri, & Aber, 2004). This 
gives further support that it may be possible 
to influence resiliency in children by helping 
them develop the necessary skills. 
Another school based intervention 
program that promotes similar skills that re-
silient children have been noted to use is the 
Penn Optimism Program. The program is a 
12-week, school-based intervention that is 
facilitated by a trained leader for groups of 8
- to 12-year-old children. The intervention is 
based upon cognitive-behavioral therapies 
that allow participants not to only learn 
about new skills, but also to participate and 
engage in hypothetical situations using these 
new skills. It is hypothesized that if the chil-
dren have practice in hypothetical settings 
using these new skills, then they will be 
more likely to continue using them in their 
everyday life. Participants in the intervention 
are children in fifth and sixth grade who 
were selected because of their self-reports to 
be at risk for depression and their perception 
of family conflict and cohesion at home. The 
intervention is divided into three separate 
phases. During weeks 1-5 children learn 
about cognitive base strategies such as hav-
ing a more optimistic outlook, being able to 
problem solve, and understanding emotions 
by how they develop and are expressed. 
During weeks 6-9 the children are taught 
more behaviorally-oriented skills such as 
assertiveness, negotiation, relaxation, coping 
strategies, dealing with procrastination, en-
hancing social skills and decision making. In 
weeks 10-11 there is a focus primarily on 
different aspects of problem solving. Finally, 
in week 12 there is a review of everything 
that the participants have learned during the 
intervention.  
 In one empirical study to test the ef-
fectiveness of the program, children were 
randomly assigned to either an intervention 
or a control condition. After the intervention 
was completed, every six months for two 
years all participants completed a question-
naire that assessed what they had learned 
from the intervention. Results indicated that 
participants in the intervention condition ex-
perienced significantly fewer symptoms of 
depression and were more optimistic than 
the control group across the two-year 
evaluation period. These results suggest that 
the intervention promoted a sense of hope, 
which buffered against developing an  
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 increased risk for depression 
(Shatte, Gillham, & Reivich, 
2000). 
 The three aforementioned in-
terventions that promoted skills similar 
to those of resilient children were suc-
cessful in helping at-risk populations to 
overcome and/or succeed through their ad-
versity. However, research has also indi-
cated that these intervention-based programs 
are also useful for all children. For example, 
Greenberg, Kusche, and Riggs (2004) inves-
tigated the effectiveness of PATHS 
(Promoting Alternative THinking Strategies) 
which has existed for over 20 years. Under 
this program it is believed that schools 
should include emotional and social devel-
opment in their curricula; furthermore, 
teachers need to be better educated as to how 
to improve children’s emotional and social 
development. The program is designed to be 
taught by elementary school teachers from 
kindergarten through 5th grade through a 
curriculum that includes lessons that pro-
mote both cognitive-academic and social-
emotional development. Some skills in-
cluded in the program are self-regulation, 
practicing self-control, self-talk, emotional 
regulation, behavior control, emotional iden-
tification, and proper emotional expression. 
The schools implementing this program also 
promote a supportive and nurturing school 
environment. Lessons are designed to be 
flexible in different situations but still have 
the ability to teach specific skills and/or les-
sons. 
 Effectiveness of the PATHS program 
was evaluated for both the regular education 
curriculum and for the fast track program. 
The regular education study was conducted 
on second and third graders participating in 
the PATHS program and also a control 
school not implementing the PATHS pro-
gram; schools were randomly assigned to 
conditions. There were no significant differ-
ences between the groups on outcome meas-
ures at the beginning of the intervention. At 
the end of the intervention, results indicated 
that the intervention group demonstrated sig-
nificant improvements in social problem 
solving skills and emotional understanding. 
Furthermore, intervention participants were 
also significantly less likely to provide ag-
gressive solutions, were more likely to be 
prosocial, and had lower rates of conduct 
problems, anxiety and depression. 
 The PATHS fast track program was 
a large, randomized intervention used to re-
duce serious aggression and conduct prob-
lems in schools. The program was conducted 
in four different American location; in each 
location approximately fourteen schools 
were randomized equally to either interven-
tion or control conditions. The main purpose 
of the program was to integrate a set of pre-
vention programs that served the entire 
school as well as selective programs that tar-
geted children entering first grade with high-
risk behavior. The study was conducted in 
three successive years with three different 
cohorts of first graders. Results indicated 
that schools in the intervention condition 
had a significant improvement in social ad-
aptation with lower peer ratings of aggres-
sion and disruptive behaviors, lower teacher 
ratings of disruptive behavior, and improved 
classroom atmosphere as assessed by an ob-
server. 
 Both the normal PATHS intervention 
and the fast-track program had significant 
positive results when implementing inter-
ventions that promote resilient skills in all 
children. This possibly suggests that by pro-
viding an environment that promotes these 
skills, children will be able to develop the 
necessary age-appropriate skills to overcome 
adversities. Furthermore, this may suggest 
that current school systems may eventually 
need to implement similar programs in 
which children learn about more than just 
scholastic competence, but also about emo-
tional and social competence. 
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 Another school-based intervention 
program that promotes similar 
skills that resilient children use is 
the Seattle Social Development Pro-
ject. The program combines three pri-
mary components of improving the 
teachers’ classroom management and in-
structional practices, introducing an instruc-
tional program teaching self-control and so-
cial competencies using cognitive behavioral 
methods of instruction, and providing school
-based workshops for parents of participat-
ing students. The purpose to the program is 
to promote positive social development 
through a prosocial pathway by strengthen-
ing the child’s bonds to both school and 
family in order to prevent adolescent health 
and behavior problems. 
Beginning in 1985, 18 elementary 
schools in Seattle participated in the study. 
Participants were interviewed nine times 
through the age of 21. Four different types 
of interventions were implemented to ob-
serve which type of intervention would have 
the most long-term effects. The different in-
terventions were: full intervention, which 
received the full intervention from first 
through sixth grade; late intervention, which 
received the full intervention but only from 
fifth to sixth grade; parent-training only in-
tervention, in which only the parent portion 
of the intervention was conducted from fifth 
to sixth grade, and a control that received no 
intervention.   
Teachers in the assigned intervention 
classrooms completed a five-day training 
course on proactive classroom management, 
effective direct instruction strategies, and 
promoting cooperative learning. The main 
purpose of the teacher training was to create 
a classroom environment that is conducive 
to learning with minimal disruption to class-
room activities and promoting prosocial be-
haviors (e.g., problem solving, emotional 
identification, conflict resolution). Parents 
who had with children in the full and late 
intervention condition or who participated in 
the parent-only intervention were offered 
courses to learn about child behavior man-
agement skills (offered first through second 
grade), skills on how to support their child’s 
academics (second through third grade), and 
skills on how to reduce their children’s risk 
of drug use (fifth through sixth grade). Only 
the parents with children in the full interven-
tion participated in the courses when their 
children were in first through sixth grades; 
parents in all other interventions, except for 
the control group, only participated in the 
course when their children were in fifth 
through sixth grade. 
Results of all interventions indicated 
a significant positive improvement in social 
behavior after the intervention was com-
pleted; however, after conducting follow-ups 
when the participants were ages 18 and 21, 
only the full intervention participants had 
significant positive life changes when com-
pared to the control group. For example, the 
follow-up at age eighteen indicated that only 
the participants in the full intervention were 
significantly more attached and committed 
to school, had significantly better grades and 
achievement, and had less misbehavior when 
compared to the control group. Furthermore, 
significantly fewer participants in the full 
intervention condition reported using violent 
behavior, heavy use of alcohol, sexual activ-
ity, and having multiple sex partners when 
compared to the controls. The late interven-
tion participants also reported positive out-
comes after completion of the intervention 
program; however results were not as robust 
or consistently significant when compared to 
the controls. Furthermore, at age 21 follow-
up participants in the full intervention were 
significantly more likely than the controls to 
have graduated from high school, to have 
completed two or more years of college, and 
to have been employed in the past month; 
they were also more committed to their pre-
sent jobs. Self-reports of emotional health 
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 at age 21 were also significantly 
better for the full intervention par-
ticipants, who reported better emo-
tion regulation, fewer social phobia 
symptoms, and fewer suicidal thoughts 
(Hawkins, Smith, Hill, Kosterman, & 
Catalano, 2007). 
 The results of this study are impor-
tant because it suggests that interventions 
may need to start at an earlier age, for exam-
ple first grade, and continue for a few years 
in order to have any successful long-term 
resilience effects. The previous studies men-
tioned did not have more than a two-year 
follow-up after the intervention was com-
plete. It would be interesting to study if 
these interventions have any long-term ef-
fects in predicting the success of individuals 
who participated in the intervention. It is 
important to this body of research that fol-
low-ups are included until at least the end of 
adolescence to indicate long-term effects. 
Without these results, it will be hard to de-
termine if the intervention is useful in pro-
viding resilient life skills for the child for 
more than a few years. Even though the 
aforementioned interventions are not neces-
sarily focused on promoting resilience in 
children, the skills they are promoting are 
very similar to the skills that resilient chil-
dren develop. Adding long-term follow-up 
studies to these interventions will help us 
understand if it is possible to promote resil-
ience by simply equipping children with the 
necessary tools and skills. It will also help to 
understand which specific resilient skills and 
tools that are promoted in the study demon-
strate significant, long-term effects. 
 Another noted skill that resilient chil-
dren develop is to seek out healthy, suppor-
tive relationships. One intervention that pro-
motes the development of healthy peer rela-
tionships is the Youth Relations Project. 
Early adolescence is the beginning stages of 
dating, and because these teens have no pre-
vious experience of healthy dating relation-
ships, this may become a time of self-
exploration and experimentation with their 
romantic identity. During this time, it is hy-
pothesized that adolescents who are in an 
adverse situation and have no understanding 
of a positive and intimate relationship be-
cause of childhood maltreatment are at high 
risk for becoming involved in violent and 
abusive dating relationships. Furthermore, 
peer pressure may encourage adolescents to 
get involved in dating relationships even 
though they may not necessarily feel ready, 
which could also potentially result in a vio-
lent and abusive dating relationships. 
 The purpose of the Youth Relations 
Project was to give direction during this ex-
perimental time with the potential that this 
learning will have long-term effects of help-
ing adolescents seek out positive and healthy 
intimate relationships. This prevention-
based program was targeted at both males 
and females ages fourteen through sixteen 
who were considered to be at-risk of devel-
oping abusive relationships due to their own 
history of maltreatment. The program was 
conducted in 18 sessions that focused both 
on preventing abusive behavior and on pro-
moting healthy and non-violent relationships 
by equipping adolescents with necessary 
tools to make informed choices and enhance 
relationship competence. The program is 
based on aspects of  attachment theory and 
social learning theory and includes feminist 
explanations of relationship violence. Some 
of the things that adolescents are taught 
within the program are the differences be-
tween a healthy and abusive relationship, 
how to get access to useful resources, exam-
ples of good and bad dating patterns, proper 
emotional expression, and how to actively 
listen, have empathy, and problem solve. 
 Results indicated that when com-
pared to controls who did not participate in 
the intervention, adolescents who were ran-
domly assigned to the intervention demon-
strated a significant decrease in all forms 
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 of victimization and physical and 
emotional abuse perpetration. Fur-
thermore, a two-year follow-up in-
dicated that the intervention partici-
pants were significantly less abusive 
toward their dating partners and reported 
less, physical, emotional, and threatening 
forms of abuse by their partners. These re-
sults suggest that the intervention was suc-
cessful in providing the necessary tools for 
adolescents to avoid becoming involved in 
unhealthy and abusive relationships (Riley, 
& Masten, 2005). However, it would be in-
teresting if the study also examined whether 
the quality of the participants' intimate rela-
tionships was significantly better than the 
controls and whether these skills were also 
used to seek out an intimate relationship 
with a mentor. This would help to under-
stand if this intervention promoted the de-
velopment of relationships similar to the 
kind that resilient individuals find that are 
healthy and supportive through difficult 
situations. 
 Overall, the research on resilient 
children has indicated that even though they 
may be experiencing different adverse situa-
tions, resilient children generally use similar 
skills and resources to overcome and suc-
ceed. Furthermore, it is theorized that these 
children are resilient because they are fully 
developed for their age and are simply using 
their developmental skills in extreme situa-
tions. Therefore, it is suggested that non-
resilient children, whether they are currently 
in an adverse situation or not, are also capa-
ble of becoming resilient if they are 
equipped with the proper developmental 
skills and resources. Interventions that pro-
mote resilient skills for both at-risk and not 
at-risk children support this idea in that there 
were significant positive changes for partici-
pants in the intervention condition of all of 
the studies. This suggests that with the cor-
rect intervention program, children may be 
able to learn how to better adapt to their ad-
verse situations or to be prepared for future 
adverse situations. 
 However, before the proper interven-
tion is developed, more research needs to be 
conducted on how to promote resiliency in 
children. Current interventions need to in-
clude long-term follow-up studies to better 
understand if the intervention program has 
long-term effects. This will help to deter-
mine what age is the best time to start the 
intervention, how long it should last, what 
specific skills to promote, and how to imple-
ment the program most effectively. It may 
be useful to first use an experimental design 
to better control for and test what specifi-
cally will contribute to a successful interven-
tion program. One way this could be accom-
plished would be to design a study that in-
cludes two or more separate controlled 
workshops that have identical curriculum 
and comparable environments. However, in 
the intervention workshops, things such as 
teaching specific resilient skills and different 
intervention methods would also be included 
within the curriculum. After the workshops 
are completed, evaluations of the interven-
tion workshops can be made by comparing 
results to the control workshops.  
Finally, it is important that research 
continues to search for the most effective 
way to promote resiliency in children. It may 
be possible to develop a program in which 
children learn about these resilient skills and 
resources as a part of everyday life. Previous 
research has suggested that it may be possi-
ble to incorporate these skills into classroom 
instruction by equipping teachers with the 
necessary tools and guidance. Based upon 
previous research, further research on this 
topic may indicate that an intervention to 
promote resilient skills may just mean incor-
porating emotional and social learning into a 
school’s curriculum. Providing these chil-
dren with constant exposure and practice to 
resilient skills in a supportive atmosphere 
may assist all children to become resilient 
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 in the face of any adversity.  
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 What does it mean to be a woman?  
Why are some people born into the right 
body, while others aren’t?  What is the 
cause for this?  Do we create ourselves?  
Endless questions run through my mind as I 
reread She’s Not There.  For every question 
answered, another is formed.  Jennifer Boy-
lan’s transition from male to female has, 
without a doubt, forever changed my per-
spective on womanhood. 
 
I. Out of the Closet and Into the Spotlight 
 Jennifer Finney Boylan, author of 
She’s Not There, is one of the most inspira-
tional women I have ever come across.  I 
can honestly say that while researching her 
for this paper, I fell in love with her.  Jenni-
fer’s raw honesty and bravery is a goal all 
women should strive to reach.  Jenny was 
fortunate enough to have the resources, 
namely the love and support of her family 
and friends, as well as the money necessary 
to undergo the transition from male to fe-
male.  She was also blessed to be born in the 
era that she was.  The end of the century 
was a wonderful time for the trans-
community.  As Riki Wilchins reminds us, 
the 1990s saw gender advocacy reaching 
new heights (Wilchins 21).  We can thank 
Virginia Prince for this.  In 1960 Virginia 
held the first convention for cross-dressers 
in a discreet hotel room.  This convention 
was an anonymous way for people to ex-
press themselves in a shame-free environ-
ment (Wilchins 22).  Since then a vast social 
network has been forming, making it possi-
ble for cross-dressers, transgendered and 
transsexual people alike to enter the realm 
of visibility.  By 1996 trans issues started to 
be covered by the gay media (Wilchins 26).  
Recognition is spreading as each year 
passes, with the help of people like Jennifer 
Boylan willing to step into the spotlight.  
Jenny volunteers her private life to the pub-
lic in order to further understanding and ac-
ceptance.  As she tells Christopher Muther, 
“I think most people are surprised that we 
don’t sit around talking about sex changes 
all day.  We talk about homework and prac-
ticing trumpet, radical and revolutionary 
things like that.  We’re changing the world 
by living a quiet, normal life” (Muther).  
Just today, while flipping through the chan-
nels, I saw an ad for a new television series 
on WE entitled “Sex Change Hospital.”  It’s 
these seemingly small steps that will change 
the world. 
 
II. Let’s Talk About Sex(ual Reassignment 
Surgery) 
 In 2000 Jennifer began her transi-
tion.  Although it would have been possible 
to transition prior to the new millennium, it 
would have been significantly more diffi-
cult.  According to Alison Oram, the first 
documented sex change was performed in 
Germany of 1930.  The patient was Lili 
Elbe.  The most publicized sexual reassign-
ment surgery is the former US soldier Chris-
tine Jorgenson in 1952 (Oram 278).  As hos-
pitals began shying away from sex change 
procedures, private doctors took over, this 
shift made sex-reassignment surgeries much 
easier to access, as well as more affordable 
(Wilchins 23). 
  
Submitted by Chelsea Rives 
Creating Womanhood 
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
14 
20
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 While reading of Jennifer’s transi-
tion my curiosity was peaked.  
What exactly happens during a sex 
change procedure?  Reluctantly I put 
down She’s Not There and ventured 
over to my computer.  After about ten 
minutes I found a website that looked le-
gitimate.  Dr. Chettawut Tulayaphanich is a 
doctor in Thailand who performs sexual re-
assignment surgeries.  The standard proce-
dure costs nine thousand American dollars.  
Dr. Tulayaphanich requires his patients to be 
diagnose with gender dysphoria by a psy-
chiatrist, or someone equally qualified.  The 
patient must have lived exclusively in the 
opposite sex role, as well as take hormones, 
for the six months prior to surgery (Dr. Tu-
layaphanich).  According to Richard Wass-
ersug, hormone treatment has two main 
physiological aims.  The first being to elimi-
nate the secondary sex characteristics as 
much as possible.  The other, to induce the 
secondary sex characteristics of the desired 
sex.  This is done through various combina-
tions of estrogen and anti-androgen 
(Wassersug 102).  The results include fat 
redistribution, the diminishing and softening 
of body hair, breast development, nipple 
sensitivity, softening (and typically the dry-
ing) of skin, and occasionally the loss of en-
ergy and vitality (Wassersug 103). 
 Dr. Tulayaphanich replicates the va-
gina in its entirety, from the clitoris to the 
vestibule of the vulva.  The scrotal skin is 
the most favorable material for the vaginal 
wall, although tissue from the anus can also 
be used.  If this is used the procedure is typi-
cally more expensive.  After surgery the 
most important thing for a patient to do is 
vaginal dilation.  This is done under the su-
pervision of a nurse until the patient is 
deemed ready to proceed on her own.  Using 
vaginal stents of varying sizes, the goal is to 
gain and maintain maximum depth, which is 
approximately six inches.  This will be done 
for the rest of the patient’s life under a set 
schedule.  Two months after surgery the pa-
tient can have intercourse; the majority of 
Dr. Tulayaphanich’s patients are able to 
reach orgasm within a year (Dr. Tu-
layaphanich). 
 
III. Biting Your Own Teeth 
 “And part of it is – ready for this? – 
still learning what it means to be a woman, 
and feeling content, even excited by what I 
learn and feel” (Boylan, home page).  Now 
fifty, Jennifer is still learning about what it 
means to be a woman.  I’d like to argue that 
this is not because she used to be a man, be-
cause she never was a man.  “I always had to 
choose to be James.  Being Jenny, though, 
isn’t like that.  I just am” (Boylan, She’s Not 
There 162).  Yes, she once had the body of a 
man, but it is important to remember that a 
body is nothing more than a vessel.  Jenni-
fer, like so many others, is still finding her-
self.  After all, human beings are nothing 
more than ever changing, ever evolving 
works of art.  We are born blank canvases 
that are continuously painted and repainted 
until the day we die.  (And who knows, 
maybe long after.)  As a young child Jenny 
would play “girl planet.”  Walking through 
the woods pretending she was stranded on a 
planet whose atmosphere transformed her 
into a girl, Jennifer always knew she was 
truly female.  “Remember when you woke 
up this morning – I’d say to my female 
friends – and you knew you were female?  
That’s how it feels.  That’s how I 
knew” (Boylan, She’s Not There 22). 
 The Merriam-Webster dictionary has 
numerous definitions for woman.  The first 
being “an adult female person” and another 
being “of a distinctively feminine na-
ture” (Merrian-Webster).  Following the first 
definition, to be a woman she would have to 
possess the female reproductive organs.  But 
following the second, she would simply 
need to act and feel like a woman.  So what 
is it that makes us who we are?  Why was I 
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 born into the “right” body, while 
Jenny was not?  It’s clearly not 
biological, so then is it psychologi-
cal?  Some have argued that gender is 
a social construct.  Up to this very mo-
ment, as I type these very words, I have 
whole-heartedly agreed.  But under that 
argument, how would you explain trans-
sexuals?  They are quote obviously not so-
cially geared towards being females.  If this 
was the case, then there would be no such 
thing as transsexuals, or only a handful.  We 
have ruled out biology and psychology/
society.  So, my dear reader, what is left?  
What makes us, all of us, who we are?  Why 
are some people female and some male, and 
still others are another sex that language, and 
far too many people, have ignored?  Is there 
some force out there decided what game we 
will play?  I believe gender is too complex 
for one answer.  Maybe it is part social con-
struction, part biological; maybe it’s another 
factor that we haven’t even dreamt of yet.  
We are young, and we know little, no matter 
what many would like to believe.  Maybe 
we’ll never have an answer to this mind-
boggling question, but it’s certainly wroth 
the thought.  As Alan Watt’s has declared 
“trying to define yourself is like trying to 
bite your own teeth” (Moncur). 
 
IV. “This is nothing we can fix.” 
 Now let us look at the initial journey 
– maybe you can find the answers that evade 
me.  As I mentioned earlier, Jenny knew 
from a very young age that she was not a he. 
“Although my understanding of exactly how 
much trouble I was in grew more specific 
over time, as a child I surely understood 
enough about my condition to know it was 
something I’d better keep private.”   Early 
on, she was faced with this incalculable bur-
den, a frightened child knowing that there 
was something seriously amiss, knowing 
that it must be kept a secret.  “By intuition I 
was certain that the thing I knew to be true 
was something others would find both im-
possible and hilarious” (Boylan, She’s Not 
There 21).  Imagine, if you will, a toddler 
clutching a safety blanket.  Look into that 
child’s eyes.  Do you see fear?  Do you see 
sadness?  Most would assume these emo-
tions are caused by something trivial, such 
as a thunderstorm or a strange face.  Would 
you even think of the possibility that this 
child was thinking, in a toddler’s limited 
language, that she was not in the right body?  
Imagine the confusion Jenny must have felt.  
Imagine the turmoil.  How could a parent 
know?  And if that child expressed her 
thoughts, how would the news be taken?  
Would it be shrugged off as a child’s game? 
 It isn’t uncommon for a transwoman 
to now at a young age.  Take Hanna Rosin’s 
article about Brandon for example.  
“Brandon, God made you a boy for a special 
reason,” his mother Tina told him one night.  
“God made a mistake,” he replied.  From 
toddlerhood he gravitated towards “girly” 
activities, such as playing with Barbies and 
dressing up in his mother’s heels.  In fact, 
his first full sentence was “I like your heels.’  
Never having heard the word transgender 
until Brandon was eight, Tina was lost.  She 
believed Brandon was the only boy who 
dealt with these issues.  But eventually she 
connected with an internet community of 
parents of transgendered children.  Shortly 
after this she brought Brandon, his step-
father Bill, and her two other children to the 
Trans-Health Conference in Philadelphia.  
Here Tina found the support she needed, and 
became convinced that Brandon’s issues 
were real.  “This is nothing we can fix.  In 
his brain, in his mind, Brandon’s a girl.”  
This realization was emphasized b the con-
versation Brandon, who was then introduc-
ing himself as Bridget, unbeknownst to his 
parents, had with a fellow child.  “Are you 
transgender?” asked his friend.  “What’s 
that?” replied Brandon.  “A boy who wants 
to be a girl.”  “Yeah.  Can I see your  
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 balloon?”  The stark simplicity of 
this dialogue says it all.  To 
Bridget, there is no question.  She is 
a girl.  Rosin explains that “before 
they have much time to be shaped by 
experience, before they know their sex-
ual orientation, even in defiance of their 
bodies, children can know their gen-
der” (Rosin 1). 
 It is vital that these communities and 
conventions exist.  Without them, countless 
numbers would be floundering, drowning in 
their own troubles.  Thousands would feel 
even more isolated than they already do.  
And this doesn’t only go for the transsexuals 
themselves, but their friends and families as 
well.  These outlets help people accept the 
truth that transsexualism is not a choice that 
can be reversed, and that steps can be taken 
to help those who suffer.  Now, if only there 
were more awareness campaigns centered on 
this issue.  In good time?  Maybe, but I’d 
rather not wait. 
 
V. Maddy Wasn’t Cured 
 Years pass, the toddler matures into a 
preteen.  Jennifer, then James, is now ten.  
“The first time I remember trying to come 
up with some sort of solution to the being 
alive problem was about 1968” (Boylan, 
She’s Not There 22).  James goes for a long, 
solitary walk, and contemplates his life.  
How many ten year olds delve into such 
heavy, philosophical questions such as this?  
“And then I thought, Maybe you could be 
cured by love” (Boylan, She’s Not There 
23).  Fast forward, James is in graduate 
school, and is living his private life as a fe-
male, feeling afraid and secluded.  “I was 
sitting on top of a mountain of secrets so 
high that it was impossible to see the earth 
anymore” (Boylan, She’s Not There 70).  
Her struggles would have been greatly less-
ened if she had the support of a trans-
community, if acceptance was something 
she could have fathomed.  Later, while liv-
ing in Baltimore, James, like so many oth-
ers, gathers all the girls clothing he has, in-
cluding makeup and accessories, and throws 
them away (Boylan, She’s Not There 83).  
He has been seeing Grace, and is falling in 
love with her.  But he is not cured by love.  
Nor is he cured by marriage and a family. 
“I often woke up and lay there in the 
dark…I’m the wrong person, I thought, I’m 
living the wrong life, in the wrong 
body” (Boylan, She’s Not There 102).  At 
age forty two she realizes that the time for 
self acceptance has come.  The time to speak 
to Grace has come.  “The burden that had 
been mine alone for all these years was now 
Grace’s, and in the weeks that followed she 
walked through her days broken and 
crushed” (Boylan, She’s Not There 127).  
Jennifer is an extraordinarily lucky woman.  
Grace, after a long journey of her own, never 
leaves Jenny.  She sticks with Jenny, and is 
with her to this very day (Harkavy).  The 
parents tell their two young boys, and Jenni-
fer is dubbed “Maddy,” a combination of 
mom and daddy (Boylan, She’s Not There 
159).  Jennifer tells her friends, some in per-
son, some through a letter, and begins her 
transition.  She is shown an amazing amount 
of love and support from all.  Of course 
there are questions and confusion, all of 
which she handles very well, and with much 
humor. 
Has Jennifer’s journey been made 
any easier because she is a writer and profes-
sor of literature?  Was it any easier for her to 
imagine her life in a different body?  Maybe 
it was easier to imagine herself in the correct 
body, but I don’t think there is any way to 
ease such a journey.  I don’t believe Jenny 
ever had a choice.  Yes, getting the surgery 
was a choice, but being a woman wasn’t.  
Some factor other than her own desire made 
that a non-choice.  What was that factor?  I 
haven’t the slightest idea.  I have no idea 
what makes us who we are.  Society plays a 
major role, of course, but how big of a role 
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 when it comes to what sex you are?  
Dear reader, I regret that I cannot 
give you a set answer.  What I have 
presented is a pallet, quite like She’s 
Not There, a base work to identify ques-
tions for you to answer. 
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Girl, what makes you wanna fuck with me now?                                                                            
I’ve been wantin’ to fuck wit’ you for quite a while                                                                          
Is the money makin’ you wanna fuck with me?                                                                           
Whoa…if money’s gonna make me slam these 
hoes…then alright.                                            
“Fuck Dat Bitch” by 50 Cent 
“God damn lil’ buddy take off your 
clothes and let me see that apple bottom and 
that brown booty,” croons Crime Mob in 
their song “Rock Her Hips.” Being an obvi-
ous jab at black female sexuality, “apple 
bottom” is modern slang for a large, shapely 
rear end, calling out the “brown” aspect of 
her behind. In current media depictions of 
African American women, and specifically 
rap music, they are most likely described as 
overly sexual, flaunting shapely bodies to 
men who are all too willing to be pleased by 
women eager to please them.  I have noticed 
advertisements for clothing where white 
women are being suggestive, showing a bit 
of skin or biting their lips for a come-hither-
and-you-will-see look, while black women 
are more likely to be half-clothed, legs 
open, and laying on a bed, inviting the 
viewer to her body.  I have noticed that Af-
rican American women are indeed more 
likely to be sexualized in American society.  
In the Biblical creation stories, revered in 
our culture, Eve, when eating the fruit of the 
Tree of Knowledge, sets a precedent for all 
women to be sexual temptresses, regardless 
of race or class. When did black women 
bear the brunt of a hyper sexualized culture 
on their bodies, and why are they picked out 
over others? 
 Born in the eighties and early nine-
ties, this generation has grown up in some-
thing referred to as “hip hop culture.”  Hip 
hop culture, as I have learned, was started 
by black and Latino youths in the Bronx and 
consist of four distinct elements: rapping, 
deejaying, break-dancing, and graffiti. The 
culture evolved in response to white su-
premacy in American society. Following the 
Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Move-
ment, minorities were looking to success-
fully migrate into mainstream white society. 
Moving away from a perceived lack of indi-
viduality in New York City at that historical 
moment, hip hop allowed men to make a 
significant name for themselves in their 
communities. In the time since it hit the 
mainstream airwaves in 1979, hip hop cul-
ture has grown to dominate the media. Rap-
pers and the lifestyles they promote bring in 
an enormous amount of money to produc-
ers, fashion designers, artists, and the execu-
tives in charge of television, radio and ad-
vertising. As a significant creative force in 
modern society, hip hop continues to posi-
tively reinvent itself. According to rapper 
KRS-ONE, “creativity is seen as feminine. 
In these single families that many of us 
grew up in, we didn’t have any fathers, so 
we were missing the analytical sides of our-
selves. Instead, we are creative and  
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 intelligent, and this comes from 
our mothers. There is creativity in 
graffiti, in b-boying” (qtd. in Gold-
blum). Many lower-income families, 
the ones directly impacted by hip hop, 
are mother-led, single parent households, 
according to KRS-ONE. He admits that hip 
hop is based on a feminine creativity experi-
enced by these men without fathers in their 
lives. If the very thing that causes their indi-
viduality and expression is a feminine char-
acteristic, one attributed to their own moth-
ers, then the exploitation of women preva-
lent within the culture is difficult to explain.  
MySistah’s contributor Ayanna be-
gins to offer an explanation as to the role 
and status of women in hip hop culture. She 
states: 
All women, but mostly black women 
in particular are seen in popular hip-
hop culture as sex objects. Almost 
every hip-hop video that is regularly 
run today shows many dancing 
women (usually surrounding one or 
two men) wearing not much more 
than bikinis, with the cameras focus-
ing on their body parts. These im-
ages are shown to go along with a 
lot of the explicit lyrics that com-
monly contain name calling to sug-
gest that women are not worth any-
thing more than money, if that. 
Women are described as being only 
good for sexual relations by rappers 
who describe their life as being that 
of a pimp. In many popular rap 
songs men glorify the life of pimps, 
refer to all women as they think a 
pimp would to a prostitute, and pro-
mote violence against women for 
'disobeying.' (1) 
Within this interpretation, the ideals 
of creativity lauded by KRS-ONE that are 
passed through the mother become lost in 
chauvinism. While it started out as a way to 
relieve frustrations and stake an identity 
within a white supremacist society, hip hop 
culture in the twenty first century has 
shifted slightly from its original goals. In-
stead, what I see are rappers obsessed with 
sex, women, masculinity, and capitalism. 
Since the emergence of so-called “gangsta 
rap,” mainstream hip hop culture promotes a 
lifestyle of money hungry men and women 
which, seen just in its media portrayals, 
leads to stereotyping of black women as in-
satiable sexual creatures. The images of vo-
luptuous, gyrating women, circling their 
rear on a man’s groin does not convey crea-
tivity, but instead, objectifies African 
American women.  
Significantly, the origins of the 
South Bronx inspired music and lifestyle 
found markets in the suburbs of the same 
city it emerged in. The mostly white popula-
tions that moved out of the city after World 
War II enjoyed this form of art and music 
enough that the appeal to white audiences 
influenced the corporate white interests. In 
fact, without the large numbers of suburban 
and rural audiences, the lasting power of hip 
hop music would not exist. In 2008, without 
getting into too much detail, I will say that 
through product endorsements and corpo-
rate funding, hip hop is largely fueled by 
white CEOs.  In this capitalist and patriar-
chal nation, the people in power provide 
capital to the rap artists and their record 
companies to produce a particular image.  
This same image appeals to the audiences 
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 who see mainstream rap on televi-
sion.  While I am not saying that 
African American men do not have 
any role in the production, I am willing 
to note the strong hand of white influ-
ence that goes into the making of rap mu-
sic. The hypermasculinity associated with 
hip hop culture would not exist if it were not 
for the hypersexualization of black women. 
Key historical aspects that cause white pro-
ducers of music to encourage, consume, and 
portray African American women in such a 
manner need to be identified. Since there is 
this influence, the images projected of Afri-
can American women in this culture are ma-
nipulated by not only those who endorse it 
(white men) but also those who consume it 
(a largely white population). Kobena Mer-
cer believes that “certain types of imagery 
are responsible for causing actual violence 
and abuse in society at large” (133), stating 
that “music is a key site in everyday life 
where men and women reflect on their gen-
dered and sexual identities” (141) . I will 
focus on the role white America plays in the 
oversexualization of black women currently 
manifested in a popular music form and life-
style that exists today. 
 Bell hooks states that “white su-
premacist ideology insisted that black peo-
ple, being more animal than human, lacked 
the capacity to feel and therefore could not 
engage the finer sensibilities that were the 
breeding ground for art” (67). If African 
Americans cannot, under white supremacist 
ideology, connect with a white aesthetic ap-
peal, then what they produce in their view is 
not “art.” What their music is, then, is some-
thing outside of art, some sense of 
“otherness.” This suggests the reasoning 
behind a white push behind a hip hop mar-
ket and the portrayal of the women within it. 
Not only are African Americans made into a 
social other in regards to artistic creation, 
but African American women, specifically 
in hip hop culture, are placed on a different 
spectrum of “other.” Women, as a gender, 
are perceived as closer to nature due to our 
ability to birth children and men are seen as 
closer to civilization since they are seen as 
the ones making buildings and government 
systems. Since women as a whole are per-
ceived as closer to nature, black women in 
particular are even more so. Black slave 
women were brought over from Africa, 
where they were seemingly taken from the 
jungle. By living in a “natural” setting in-
stead of a civilized world, they were not 
ranked on par with white women, who lived 
in “civilization.” They would be more natu-
ral, and unbridled sexuality is not a trait as-
sociated with the whiter, Western world, but 
more seen with the darker people overtaken 
by colonialism. Under a white system, black 
women in hip hop culture are contrasted to 
white women; black individuals are ranked 
more deviant than white individuals. Black 
women, being seen as an Other, are inher-
ently different than white women, therefore 
allowing her to be depicted as more sexual 
than others.  
In the strand of thought that linked 
black women with animalistic, unbridled 
sexuality comes the Jezebel stereotype cre-
ated in Antebellum American society. Rupe 
Simms suggests that the “preeminent fea-
tures of the dominant ideology that justified 
their exploitation of female slaves…that 
contributed substantially to the social con-
struction of African women’s  
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 gender” (880). The supremacist ide-
ology maintained that slave women 
were able to be sexually exploited, 
thereby leading to numerous African 
American women being raped and 
treated solely as sexual objects by their 
white masters. Simms defines the Jezebel 
stereotype:  
The sex-starved woman, who was 
childishly promiscuous and con-
sumed by lustful passions. Her sex-
ual aggression, fertility, and libidi-
nous self-expression were consid-
ered limitless. The Jezebel image 
concretized Black female subordina-
tion, justifying the rape of African 
women by white men. According to 
this portrayal, the African woman 
truly enjoyed being ravaged by her 
master…so that abusing her was 
simply satisfying her natural de-
sires…the Jezebel image sustained 
the domination of white men. (882)  
The Jezebel image allowed for white men to 
relate to black women in a more primitive 
manner than they would their white counter-
parts. If slave women loved being ravaged, 
then indeed they differed from the white 
women whose bodies were not used for 
pleasure. This relates to the images seen in 
hip hop videos. While using different inten-
tions, the dozens half naked women allow-
ing men to place dollar bills underneath 
their thong underwear for a good look at 
their rear end allude to this antediluvian 
stereotype; black women are rendered in 
this image of limitless libido by a continu-
ally supremacist society. Again, this com-
pares to the black women as a socialized 
Other because it places her as differing from 
white women. Black women only want sex, 
according to the Jezebel stereotype, and in 
such a framework, white women are defined 
as not wanting sex. Hip hop portrayals of 
women as a Jezebel type figure identify to 
the white consumer base that African 
American women are inherently more sex-
ual than white women.   
 Rape, as noted by Edward Shorter, 
is not only a way for men to prove their sex-
ual dominion over women but for all men to 
keep all women in a state of fear in order to 
triumph over them. In this manner, the 
women are seen as a dispensable sex object 
and remain protective over their genitals at 
all time. Simms suggests that the Jezebel 
image, beginning in the nineteenth century, 
sustained the domination of white men over 
black women. The Jezebel imagery de-
scribed by Simms directly relates to 
Shorter’s definition of rape. When black 
women are accused of being insatiable sex 
creatures, then indeed the power structure is 
maintained; white men remain in control 
over the bodies of women, and most espe-
cially, black women. In the antebellum 
south, “no law existed to forbid the rape of 
female slaves by their masters. The rape of 
an enslaved woman by someone other than 
her master was considered trespass, a prop-
erty crime against the slave  
owner” (Sitomer 10). What this rape with-
out consequence attitude does is relegate 
black women to a status of property, to be 
used as how their white owner saw fit. Al-
though there is no legalized ownership of 
black bodies anymore, there is the objectifi-
cation of black bodies. If they are being por-
trayed in a sexualized manner, then it in-
vites a voyeurism of their sexuality by 
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 consumers. If their consumers are 
mostly young, suburban, white 
males, then their bodies are being 
controlled by these same men that in-
fluence their media portrayal, which 
will coincide with eventual negative and 
consequential stereotypes.  
Mercer is sure to pronounce that 
“patriarchal culture constantly redefines and 
adjusts the balance of male power and privi-
lege, and the prevailing system of gender 
roles, through a variety of material, eco-
nomic, social and political structures” (137). 
Slavery is one such institution where sexual 
power, due socioeconomic and political in-
fluence, can cause an individual to become 
a body instead of a person. A capitalistic, 
racist and patriarchal culture can lead to the 
imagery seen in the lyrics and videos of 
mainstream hip hop artists to be pervasive 
and influential. Before the Civil War, black 
women were often forced into polygamy 
and polyandry, with black men mating with 
other black women as decreed by a slave 
master in order to produce children with 
traits the slaveholder desired. In polyga-
mous systems, one man would be made to 
mate with a variety of women or one 
woman would mate with a few males. Now, 
multiple women dance upon, lick their lips 
and shake their hips at the one man, usually 
the man rapping into the microphone. In 
Kristen Gentry’s “Hip Hop Culture and 
Contemporary American Literature” class, 
we have spoken of a few clips shown of 
documentaries where many of the men 
speak of them and their friends either trying 
to get physical with one girl, or having pride 
that they all have gotten physical with her. 
In polygamous situations, the woman will 
be seen as wanting sex, and desiring all of 
these men to have her, or willing to compete 
with other sexual women for one man by 
putting herself out there more than they 
have. Although there is a significant differ-
ence between forced sexual intercourse and 
the willingness of girls to submit to this 
viewing of their bodies, the images in main-
stream media bring up an idea reminiscent 
of polygamous situations. This stereotype 
reaching back to Antebellum America is not 
something that should continue over a hun-
dred years later. 
 Magnus Hirschfeld, in his 1932 arti-
cle entitled “Racism” explains sexualizing a 
group of people in a way that sums up, in an 
obvious manner, any predilection anyone 
may have to stereotype, as is done with Af-
rican American women. He says, “sexual 
peculiarities…are so equally distributed 
among the nations and among every stratum 
of the population that there can be no ex-
cuse for assigning what are merely individ-
ual characteristics to groups or races, and to 
parties or the advocates of specified opin-
ions” (230). An objection would be to say 
that the women who are portrayed in these 
videos and the media know what they are 
getting into when they sign on to appear 
scantily clad or overly sexual. That would 
be a fair argument, but what is not fair is 
when the millions of women who do not 
make a conscious decision to appear in this 
manner in mass media are assigned the 
characteristics and behavior of the few who 
do. It becomes an issue when certain people 
in power make the decisions of who and 
what will appear in what form, while in do-
ing so, harm a plethora of women who 
should remain unaffected.  It is not the 
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 women who are grinding in bikinis 
that become the problem, but the 
fundamental flaw is when hypersex-
ualization is attributed to all African 
American women, not solely the ones 
who profit from making themselves out 
to appear so.  
White Americans, and most specifi-
cally white men, have a fascination with the 
bodies of women, especially black women. 
Instead of the use of African American 
women’s bodies through forced rape during 
slave times, the hypersexualization of 
women through hip hop culture allows for a 
white gaze on black female sexual bodies. 
bell hooks later writes that “consumer capi-
talism has not been able to completely de-
stroy artistic production in underclass black 
communities” (67). In opposition to what is 
seen on television, there is a huge under-
ground rap and hip hop scene where hyper-
sexualization of women does not occur. 
This is where hip hop is created without 
white influence, and calls to its roots in jazz 
and reggae, both black art forms. It is the 
mainstream attitude of black women being 
more sexual than white woman is ham-
mered into the minds of the American pub-
lic through the media. To me, this is a pecu-
liar social phenomenon. This is a continua-
tion of slavery mindset in the twenty-first 
century that is being perpetuated not only by 
black rappers, but many of the white audi-
ences who fuel the consumer base. There is 
nothing inherently sexual about black 
women, but instead, there is a sexuality 
placed upon their bodies, first by colonizers, 
then by the slaveholders, and now by the 
popular media. I think there needs to be an 
understanding on the meaning placed on the 
space of other people. With this meaning, 
these perceptions and stereotypes can be 
overturned and African American women 
would not be unnecessarily targeted for con-
sumption in today’s society. 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
24 
30
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
Les provinces centrales de la France 
sont une région intéressante et variée qui 
s’étende à couvrir une bonne partie de la 
superficie de ce pays. Ces provinces, qui 
incluent la Touraine, l’Orléanais, le Berry, 
le Nivernais, Le Bourbonnais, l’Auvergne, 
la Marche, et le Limousin, offrent un peu de 
tout. Quant aux éléments géographiques, on 
y trouve des montagnes, des plateaux, des 
fleuves, et des vallées – même des volcans 
éteints. Il y a  des industries variées et de 
l’agriculture de beaucoup de genres, du 
monde contemporain mélangé avec la vie 
du passé, de la plus rurale campagne et de la 
ville moderne. On rencontre dans cette ré-
gion des gens de tous les parcours de la vie, 
et une étude des provinces diverses du Cen-
tre donne une petite vue de la vie en France. 
 Aujourd’hui, les provinces du Centre 
font partie des régions modernes du Centre, 
du Limousin, et de l’Auvergne. La plupart 
de cette région est sur le grand Plateau Cen-
tral, mais un peu (partie de la Touraine, le 
Berry, et l’Orléanais) fait partie du Bassin 
Parisien1 et l’Auvergne et le Limousin ap-
partient au Massif Central (Evans 134). L’é-
lévation augmente du nord-ouest au sud-
est;2  l’Orléanais et la Touraine sont les plus 
basses, tandis que l’Auvergne est la plus 
montagneuse (la plus haute élévation de cet-
te région se trouve en Auvergne à Mont Do-
re qui arrive à 6188 pieds [Evans 133]). Ce 
territoire est arrosé par plusieurs fleuves 
(comme la Loire et le Rhône) et par des ri-
vières (comme le Cher, l’Indre, la Vienne, 
la Saône, et l’Allier) (Evans 105, 134). On y 
trouve beaucoup de terres qui sont bonnes 
pour l’agriculture, mais aussi avec beaucoup 
de brandes et de forêts de châtaigniers en 
abondance (Evans 135). A cause de la diffi-
culté de traverser ce pays et de communi-
quer aux époques d’autrefois il n’y a pas de 
grand centre de commerce et d’industrie 
dans ce local ; au lieu d’un seul, plusieurs 
centres ont développé (Evans 135). Ces cen-
tres se trouvent souvent à un lieu qui leur 
permet de relier les gens des montagnes et 
les gens de la basse terre. 
 Aujourd’hui, les provinces du Centre 
font partie des régions modernes du Centre, 
du Limousin, et de l’Auvergne. La plupart 
de cette région est sur le grand Plateau Cen-
tral, mais un peu (partie de la Touraine, le 
Berry, et l’Orléanais) fait partie du Bassin 
Parisien et l’Auvergne et le Limousin appar-
tient au Massif Central (Evans 134). L’élé-
vation augmente du nord-ouest au sud-est ;  
l’Orléanais et la Touraine sont les plus bas-
ses, tandis que l’Auvergne est la plus mon-
tagneuse (la plus haute élévation de cette 
région se trouve en Auvergne à Mont Dore 
qui arrive à 6188 pieds [Evans 133]). Ce 
territoire est arrosé par plusieurs fleuves 
(comme la Loire et le Rhône) et par des ri-
vières (comme le Cher, l’Indre, la Vienne, 
la Saône, et l’Allier) (Evans 105, 134). On 
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 trouve beaucoup de terres qui sont 
bonnes pour l’agriculture, mais aus-
si avec beaucoup de brandes et de 
forêts de châtaigniers en abondance 
(Evans 135). A cause de la difficulté de 
traverser ce pays et de communiquer aux 
époques d’autrefois il n’y a pas de grand 
centre de commerce et d’industrie dans ce 
local ; au lieu d’un seul, plusieurs centres 
ont développé (Evans 135). Ces centres se 
trouvent souvent à un lieu qui leur permet 
de relier les gens des montagnes et les gens 
de la basse terre. 
 La Touraine est une assez petite pro-
vince à l’est de cette région, connue comme 
« le jardin de la France » (Evans 104-5). La 
Loire, le fleuve qui coule de l’est à l’ouest à 
travers la province, est le plus long et le 
moins navigable de la France3 Tours, une 
ville industrielle et commerciale, est la capi-
tale de la Touraine et se trouve au bord de la 
Loire. On y trouve une école préparatoire de 
médecine et de pharmacie. Près de Tours, il 
y a beaucoup de châteaux construits pendant 
la Renaissance dans la vallée de la Loire qui 
sont maintenant de grandes attractions tou-
ristiques (Denoeu 268). Par exemple, le châ-
teau de Chambord qui se trouve à 40 kilo-
mètres au sud-est d’Orléans était bâti pour 
François 1er par l’architecte Pierre Neveu 
(Denoeu 268). Ce château, qui était le préfé-
ré de Louis XIV, est le plus vaste des châ-
teaux de la Loire (Denoeu 269). Il y a d’au-
tres châteaux qui sont plus petits qui Cham-
bord, comme Blois, qui n’est pas loin de 
Chambord (Denoeu 269) et qui était le pré-
féré de Catherine de Médicis et de Louis 
XII (Denoeu 270-1), et Amboise, qui est 
perché sur une falaise au-dessus de la Loire 
et est connu comme le lieu de la mort de 
Léonardo da Vinci en 1519 (Denoeu 272). 
Chenonceau, un des plus célèbres châteaux 
de la région, est connu comme « le château 
des dames » parce que c’était la résidence 
de la maitresse d’Henri II, Diane de Poitiers, 
et de sa femme, Catherine de Médicis (mais 
à temps distincts, bien sûr) (Denoeu 272). 
Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale plus 
de 2000 blessés français y étaient soignés 
(Denoeu 272). Maintenant ce château appar-
tient à Menier, le chocolatier célèbre 
(Denoeu 272). Ce n’est pas pour rien que la 
Touraine est souvent appelée « le pays des 
châteaux » (Denoeu 272). 
 Un autre surnom commun pour la 
Touraine est « le jardin de la Fran-
ce » (Denoeu 272), à cause de la grande 
productivité de la région. Cette fertilité est à 
cause de la proximité de la Loire et du bon 
sol que le fleuve y dépose quand il y a des 
inondations fréquentes (Evans 104). Cet en-
droit est renommé pour ses produits agrico-
les, comme les vins, les eaux-de-vie, et les 
fruits secs. Un vin célèbre qui vient de cette 
région est le vouvray, une boisson légère et 
pétillante produite à Vouvray (Denoeu 32). 
La Touraine produit aussi des rillettes de 
Tours, un produit alimentaire spécial. On y 
trouve aussi la production des tissues com-
me des soieries, des lingeries, et des tapis. 
Cette région a des industries comme l’im-
primerie, la fonderie, et la production de 
produits chimiques et de meubles. On y ex-
ploite les ressources minières comme le tuf-
feau, une pierre blanche qui était utilisé 
pour construire les châteaux de la Loire 
(Denoeu 46). En plus de toutes ces indus-
tries et touts ces produits la Touraine est 
connue comme la patrie de nombreux pein-
tres comme Clouet, Fouquet, de Boucicaut, 
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 et Destouches. Un autre fils impor-
tant de cette région est l’écrivain 
Honoré de Balzac, écrivain des ro-
mans, des essaies, des critiques littérai-
res, et des articles journalistiques. Cet 
auteur, qui est un des plus célèbres de la 
France, a écrit les romans comme Eugénie 
Grandet, Le Père Goriot, et d’autres. La 
Touraine est divisée en trois départements 
aujourd’hui : l’Indre-et-Loire, le Loir-et-
Cher, et l’Indre.4 
 L’Orléanais est la province la plus 
au nord du Centre ; elle se trouve au nord-
est de la Touraine. Le capitale de l’Orléa-
nais est Orléans. Cette ville a été fondée par 
les Romains sur la Loire et appelée Cena-
bum Aureliani (Evans 100). Les sièges de 
cette ville par les Anglais en 1423 et 1429 
restent célèbres, et c’était à  Orléans que 
Jeanne d’Arc a inauguré sa mission merveil-
leuse qui devait sauver la France de la do-
mination anglaise. Aujourd’hui, Orléans est 
sur une grande route importante et est 
connue comme un important marché central 
à cause de son déplacement dans le tournant 
de la Loire ; elle ne se trouve pas trop loin 
du plus grand centre d’affaires et de culture 
de la France, Paris (Evans 100). Chartres est 
une autre ville importante dans l’Orléanais, 
connue pour sa cathédrale ancienne qui a été 
construite à l’époque gothique.  Les produits 
de l’Orléanais incluent des vinaigreries, du 
chocolat, des pépinières (Denoeu 38), des 
fruits, des grappes de raisin, et des légumes 
(« Provinces »). Ce pays a aussi de l’indus-
trie dans le domaine des constructions mé-
caniques. Aujourd’hui, l’Orléanais est divi-
sé en plusieurs départements modernes : le 
Loiret, le Loir-et-Cher, l’Eure-et-Loir, et 
une partie de l’Essonne et de la Sarthe 
(« Provinces »). 
 La province du Berry est au sud de 
l’Orléanais et à l’est de la Touraine. La ca-
pitale de cette région est Bourges, connue 
pour une magnifique cathédrale gothique du 
XIIIe siècle. Cette cathédrale célèbre a des 
détails exaltants, comme cinq grandes por-
tes de façade et des vitraux complexes 
(Denoeu 263). Autrefois, le Berry était un 
grand corridor entre la Bourgogne et l’Aqui-
taine, mais quand les modes de transport ont 
changé son emploi s’est réduit aussi (Evans 
104). Ce pays est renommé pour ces pro-
duits agricoles, comme le blé, les moutons, 
les vins, et le fromage, et pour la gastrono-
mie berrichonne (Evans 104). Le Berry a de 
l’industrie dans les domaines de la lingerie 
et de la confection et il produit aussi de 
l’houille et du fer, qui est utilisé dans la fon-
derie de canons (Denoeu 47). Cet endroit est 
la patrie de George Sand, l’auteur de nom-
breux romans, contes, et pièces de théâtre. 
Elle a raconté des histoires de la vie rustique 
de son pays natal dans les romans comme 
La Mare au Diable, François le Champi, et 
Les Maîtres Sonneurs (Denoeu 218). Main-
tenant, le Berry est divisée en quelques dé-
partements ; les deux principaux sont l’In-
dre et le Cher (« Provinces »). 
 Si on continue vers l’est du Berry, 
on trouve la province du Nivernais. La capi-
tale, Nevers, se trouve sur la Loire et est 
connue pour son palais ducal et pour sa fer-
ronnerie (Evans 139). En 1429 Jeanne d’Arc 
a pris cette ville du contrôle des Anglais en-
vahissants (Denoeu 22). Cette région, qui 
est assez rurale et très boisée, a servi comme 
route entre Lyon et Limoges et entre la 
Bourgogne et le sud-est de la France, mais 
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 aujourd’hui ses routes de commu-
nication et de voyage ne sont pas si 
importantes qu’autrefois (Evans 139). 
Les célèbres produits du Nivernais sont 
des vins et des faïences. Cette province 
est aujourd’hui connue comme le dépar-
tement moderne du Nièvre (« Provinces »). 
  Une autre province du Centre est le 
Bourbonnais, qui se trouve au sud du Berry 
et du Nivernais. La capitale de cette région 
se trouve sur l’Allier et s’appelle Moulins. 
Le Bourbonnais est connu comme le siège 
de la maison des Bourbon, qui a pris son 
nom du château qui se trouve près de Mou-
lins, le Château Bourbon (« Provinces »). 
Plusieurs membres de la dynastie des Bour-
bon étaient des rois de la France du XVIe 
siècle au XIXe siècle, quand la monarchie a 
été abolie en France (« Provinces »). Cette 
province est un pays de bocage ; elle est as-
sez pastorale et rustique (Evans 139). Le 
Bourbonnais fait des produits dans les in-
dustries de la confection et du cuir. Au-
jourd’hui, la région du Bourbonnais est le 
département moderne de l’Allier 
(« Provinces »).  
 L’Auvergne se trouve le plus au sud 
des provinces du Centre. La capitale, Cler-
mont-Ferrand, est un centre important pour 
tout le plateau central ; les activités agrico-
les de cette région se situent autour de la 
ville (Evans 138). Une des plus célèbres ca-
thédrales de la France, Notre-Dame-du-Port, 
est à Clermont-Ferrand (Denoeu 256) ; aus-
si, une des plus importantes universités de 
ce pays s’y trouve (Denoeu 336). Cette ca-
pitale est un centre de fabrication de pneus 
(les usines de Michelin s’y trouvent) 
(Denoeu 43) et de la construction de voitu-
res (Evans 138). La géographie de ce lieu 
est intéressante et variée. L’Auvergne com-
prend la région de la France qui s’appelle 
« le Massif Central », qui est une chaîne de 
volcans éteints (Evans 134). Ces montagnes 
étaient faites quand, à l’époque tertiaire, des 
laves noires ont coulé des fissures dans le 
plateau central à cause des convulsions de la 
terre (Denoeu 6). Les volcans éteints sont 
appelés « puys », duquel le plus haut (à 
4800 pieds) s’appelle le Puy-de-Dôme 
(Evans 138). La Limagne, une grande plaine 
du Massif Central, fait partie de l’Auvergne. 
Cet élément géographique est le fond d’un 
ancien lac et fait maintenant partie de la val-
lée de l’Allier (Evans 138). La grande et 
fertile plaine, arrosée par l’Allier, est un bon 
lieu pour cultiver des céréales, des bettera-
ves à sucre, et des fruits ; on y trouve aussi 
des vignobles (Evans 138) et l’élevage du 
bétail est y répandu (« Provinces »). Avec 
toute cette fertilité, ce n’est pas étonnant 
que l’Auvergne soit connue pour ses pro-
duits alimentaires, comme le chocolat de 
Royat, les pâtes-alimentaires, les fruits 
confits et les fromages (« Provinces »). L’é-
levage de brebis est idéal dans les monta-
gnes rocheuses de la région, et le fromage 
qui s’appelle « le roquefort » y est fait du 
lait de ces brebis.5 Le lait est ramassé, 
chauffé, mis en moules, et ensemencé avec 
le penicillium roqueforti. Puis, le fromage 
est séché et vieilli dans les caves célèbres de 
Roquefort-sous-Soulzon (« Fabrication »). 
Beaucoup de gens de cette région travaillent 
dans cette industrie importante 
(« Fabrication »). Il y a aussi de l’industrie 
dans les secteurs des pneus, de la métallur-
gie, et de la houille blanche (Denoeu 47). 
 L’Auvergne est une célèbre région 
touristique. Une grande attraction est ses 
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 nombreuses stations thermales, 
comme celles à Royat, à la Boubou-
le, et à Mont-Dore. Les sources chau-
des des stations thermales viennent du 
volcanisme de la région (Evans 138). 
L’Auvergne est aussi distinguée pour être 
la patrie de Blaise Pascal. Ce physicien, 
philosophe, et écrivain est mort avant d’a-
voir achevé son apologie de la religion chré-
tienne dont les fragments ont été publiés 
posthumes sous le titre de « Pensées ». On 
rappelle souvent une de ses phrases célèbres 
à propos de  l’homme : « L’homme n’est 
qu’un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, 
mais c’est un roseau pensant ». Aujourd-
’hui, la province de l’Auvergne est divisée 
entre les départements de l’Allier, du Can-
tal, de la Haute-Loire, et du  Puy-de-Dôme 
(« Provinces »). 
 Le Limousin et la Marche sont les 
provinces au sud-ouest de la région centrale 
de la France. La Marche, qui est quelquefois 
considérée comme faisant partie du Limou-
sin, a sa capitale à Guéret. Cette région pro-
duit des bijoux et du granit. Le Limousin, au 
sud de la Marche et considéré comme une 
partie du Massif Central, résonne encore 
avec l’impact de ses habitants d’autrefois. 
Par exemple, la province était nommée d’a-
près les « Limovaces », une tribu gallique 
qui y habitait avant que les Romains aient 
envahi. Limoges, la capitale du Limousin, a 
été fondé comme « Augustoritum » par les 
Romains, d’après le gué à Limoges sur la 
Vienne (« ritum » qui veut dire « gué » en 
latin) (Evans 137). Au fil des années, Limo-
ges est devenu un grand centre chrétien et a 
attiré beaucoup de pèlerins (Evans 137). Un 
bâtiment célèbre à Limoges est la cathédrale 
de Sainte Étienne, édifice gothique construit 
entre 1273 et 1520 (« Provinces »). Deux 
autres établissements importants sont un 
musée des céramiques et l’Université de 
Limoges (« Provinces »). La capitale est 
connue pour la littérature des troubadours 
en plus de ses bâtiments romains diverses 
(Evans 137). Limoges est actif dans plu-
sieurs industries, y compris la fabrication 
d’émail, de l’équipement électrique, des piè-
ces d’auto, du papier, et des chausseurs 
(« Provinces »). 
 Le Limousin en général est connu 
pour l’agriculture et la production de cuir. 
L’élevage de bétail est répandu dans toute 
cette région (Denoeu 38) ; les bœufs des 
boucheries de Limousin sont célèbres 
(« Provinces »). Les fermiers élèvent aussi 
des chevaux et des volailles et ils cultivent 
des châtaigneraies pour le bois et pour les 
fruits (Evans 136-7). Du seigle, du sarrasin, 
et des pommes de terre sont des récoltes 
communes du Limousin. On y trouve des 
distilleries et des fabricants de porcelaines 
fines et des chaussures. Le Limousin a une 
industrie du lainage (Evans 137) et il pro-
duit des tissus et des tapisseries 
(« Provinces »). Aujourd’hui, cette région 
est divisée entre les départements actuels du 
Corrèze, de la Creuse, et de la Haute-Vienne 
(« Provinces »). 
 Les provinces du Centre sont vrai-
ment intéressantes et variées. Il y a un grand 
contraste entre les hauts puys de l’Auvergne 
et les rivières aux vallées de la Touraine et 
entre la vie agitée et moderne de la ville de 
Clermont-Ferrand et la vie rurale et calme 
du Berry. On trouve toutes sortes d’indus-
tries dans ces provinces : vins, soieries, lin-
gerie, imprimerie, fonderie, produits chimi-
ques, chaussures, meubles, cuirs, pneus, et 
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 d’avantage, tous de la région cen-
trale de la France. C’est aussi un 
bon lieu pour la production des pro-
duits agricoles, avec ses sols riches et 
ses nombreux fleuves et rivières. L’in-
fluence des Romains est forte dans ces 
régions, et il y a beaucoup de beaux bâti-
ments et d’impressionnantes constructions 
d’autrefois. Les provinces du Centre sont 
importantes dans l’histoire et la culture de la 
France, et elles continuent de l’être jusqu’à 
nos jours. 
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Nous recommençons notre tour de la 
France à Montpellier et nous partons de cet-
te ville.  Nous continuons vers l’est et vers 
la Côte d’Azur.  Notre premier arrêt est à 
Arles.   Nous restons dans cette ancienne 
ville avec son histoire romaine et sa culture 
artistique.  C’était la résidence de Vincent 
Van Gogh.  Bien que Van Gogh ait été née-
derlandais, il a passé beaucoup d’années de 
sa vie en France.  Il a ajouté beaucoup au 
mouvement artistique en France, parce qu’il 
a peint les paysages de la France.  À Arles, 
on peut voir quelques scènes des tableaux 
de Van Gogh.  Par exemple, on peut voir le 
café dans lequel Van Gogh a peint « Café 
du Soir ».  En réalité, ce café a été remodelé 
pour avoir l’air d’être comme celui dans la 
peinture.1 Une autre caractéristique impor-
tante d’Arles est sa riche histoire.  À Arles, 
il faut jeter un coup d’œil aux vestiges de 
l’Empire Romain. 
D’Arles, nous faisons des excursions 
à d’autres sites importants.  Nous allons 
vers l’ouest au Pont du Gard.  Cet ancien 
pont était un aqueduc qui a été bâti par les 
Romains.  Cette région australe de la France 
a été conquise par les Romains au deuxième 
siècle av. J.-C. et elle faisait ensuite partie 
de l’Empire Romain.  Après avoir vu cet 
aqueduc célèbre, nous retournons à Arles.  
Le jour suivant, nous allons faire une autre 
excursion, cette fois-ci à Avignon. 
 Avignon était très important dans 
l’histoire européenne et l’histoire française, 
toutes les deux.  Au quatorzième siècle, de 
1309 à 1377, les papes habitaient à Avi-
gnon.  C’était « l’exil babylonien ».2  De 
nos jours, nous pouvons voir le Palais des 
Papes à Avignon.  À  Avignon, il y a un au-
tre pont célèbre.  C’est le Pont St.-Bénezet 
qui est plus connu comme le Pont d’Avi-
gnon de la chanson pour les enfants.3  Ce 
pont est très vieux, mais la moitié du pont 
existe seulement de nos jours.  L’autre moi-
tié du pont a été détruite en 1668.4 
 Nous finissons notre séjour à Avi-
gnon et nous continuons le long de la Côte 
d’Azur.  Notre point d’intérêt prochain est 
Marseille.  Pour aller à Marseille, nous tra-
versons le Rhône.  Ce fleuve vient de la 
Suisse et du nord et elle se jette dans la mer 
Méditerranée.  Sur la rive orientale du Rhô-
ne est la province de Provence.  La Proven-
ce a une histoire très longue.  Les Romains 
ont conquis cette partie de la France.  Plus 
tard, beaucoup d’artistes et écrivains habi-
taient en Provence,  par exemple, ce sont les 
peintres : Paul Cézanne, Vincent Van Gogh, 
Pablo Picasso et Henri Matisse qui ont tous 
choisi d’habiter en Provence. 
 La Provence est une belle province à 
côté de la mer Méditerranée.  Cette région 
est connue pour ses plages et son histoire, et 
aussi pour son architecture.  Plusieurs mai-
sons en Provence, particulièrement à la 
campagne, sont faites en pierre.  Les toits  
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 en général ont des tuiles romaines 
rondes.5  Les maisons sont bâties 
pour les protéger contre le mistral.6  
Ce vent froid et sec est très violent et il 
se passe souvent en hiver.7   
Nous arrivons à Marseille.  Marseille 
est la deuxième ville de la France et c’est 
aussi un port important.8  Cette ville a été 
fondée par les Grecs qui l’appelaient 
« Massalia ».  C’est une vieille ville.  À 
Marseille, nous pouvons voir le Château 
d’If,  le site de la prison du Comte de Monte 
Cristo et l’Homme du Masque de Fer dans 
les romans d’Alexandre Dumas père, située 
dans une île qui n’est pas loin de la côte de 
Marseille.  Cette prison est célèbre à cause 
du livre Le Comte de Monte Cristo par 
Alexandre Dumas, dans lequel le protagonis-
te a été emprisonné au Château d’If.    
 Un autre point d’arrêt est Nice.  Cette 
ville sur la Côte d’Azur est très connue pour 
ses plages.  Nice était située en Italie jus-
qu’en 1792 quand les Français l’ont saisi.9  
Nice est restée une partie de la France jus-
qu’en 1814.  De 1814 à 1860, Nice apparte-
nait à l’Italie.10  Puis la France a regagné le 
contrôle de Nice en 1860 et Nice continue à 
être une ville française en ce moment.   C’é-
tait la résidence de deux peintres impor-
tants : Henri Matisse et Marc Chagall.11   
 Nous voyageons de Nice à Monaco.  
Monaco est une principauté autonome qui 
est située à l’intérieur des frontières de la 
France.  C’est une principauté francophone.  
Monaco est peut-être connue aux États-Unis 
à cause de l’actrice américaine Grace Kelly, 
actrice célèbre des années 50 qui s’est ma-
riée avec le prince Rainier de Monaco ; et 
ainsi elle est devenue princesse.  La Princi-
pauté de Monaco est aussi connue pour le 
Grand Prix de Monaco et Le Rallye de Mon-
te Carlo, seule ville de Monaco.12  À Mona-
co il y a de bons exemples d’architecture de 
la Belle Epoque.  Par exemple, il y a l’Opéra 
de Monte Carlo et le Grand Casino de Mon-
te Carlo qui est mondialement connu.13  Tous 
les deux ont été conçus par Charles Gagnier, 
architecte français, célèbre pour avoir fait 
l’Opéra Paris, le Palais Gagnier.14  Après 
avoir vu Monaco, nous retournons à Nice et 
nous y resterons la nuit. 
 Le jour suivant, nous voyageons de 
Nice à Lyon.  Lyon est une ville qui est si-
tuée à la convergence du Rhône et de la Saô-
ne.  À Lyon, le Rhône change de direction et 
il coule vers le sud vers la mer Méditerranée.  
Lyon est aussi située dans la région du Rhô-
ne-Alpes.  À  Lyon, nous voyons beaucoup 
d’histoire.  Il y a des bâtiments qui datent de 
la Renaissance à Lyon.15  Surtout important, 
nous pouvons voir les traboules sous la cité.  
Ces tunnels ont été utilisées tout au long de 
l’histoire, originairement pour la livraison 
plus vite de la marchandise en soie, puis, 
plusieurs années plus tard ces traboules ont 
été utilisées par la Résistance française pen-
dant l’occupation allemande.16  Ayant explo-
ré la ville de Lyon, nous goûtons la cuisine 
lyonnaise, mondialement connue.  Nous 
goûtons des plats du porc et de la tripe.17  
Les personnes aventureuses peuvent goûter 
le sabodet, une saucisse qui est faite de la 
tête de cochon ou aussi un autre plat : la tête 
de veau.  Ce sont des spécialités de la cuisi-
ne lyonnaise.  Nous pouvons aussi goûter du 
vin lyonnais comme le vin du Beaujolais.18  
Après deux jours à Lyons, nous continuons à 
Dijon en Bourgogne. 
 La Bourgogne est une région très 
importante.  Il y a de bons vins et  
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 des fromages qui viennent de la 
Bourgogne, et il y a des sites im-
portants de la civilisation mondiale 
en Bourgogne.  À Dijon, nous pouvons 
goûter la cuisine bourguignonne, com-
me les escargots, spécialité de la Bourgo-
gne.19  La Bourgogne, en particulier Dijon, 
offre le jambon avec persil.20  Dijon est aussi 
connue pour la moutarde.21  De Dijon, nous 
faisons des excursions à la campagne bour-
guignonne pour aller à Autun, à Vézelay, et à 
Cluny, tous sites religieux très anciens. 
 La première excursion est faite à Au-
tun, connue pour sa cathédrale de Saint-
Lazaire.  Cette cathédrale, qui a été bâtie de 
1120 à 1146, était faite par un artiste qui 
s’appellait Gislebertus.22  Elle est notée pour 
son architecture, parce que Gislebertus a si-
gné son travail,23 et en plus Gislebertus a 
sculpté toute la cathédrale.24  Nous admirons 
la cathédrale, mais puis nous voyageons à 
Cluny.  À Cluny, nous voyons l’ancienne 
abbaye qui date du dixième siècle au Moyen 
Âge.25  L’abbaye est tombée en ruine mais 
ces vestiges démontrent la grandeur de l’É-
glise au Xe siècle.26  Cluny a aussi servi com-
me modèle architectural pour d’autres lieux 
religieux comme St. Pierre à Rome.27  Ensui-
te, nous retournons à Dijon pour y rester la 
nuit. 
 Le lendemain, nous voyageons à Vé-
zelay où nous visitons la Basilique Ste.-
Madeleine.  Cette basilique était très impor-
tante dans l’histoire parce que beaucoup de 
pèlerins y ont voyagé pour visiter les reliques 
de St. Marie de Magdalen.28  L’architecture 
remarquable de Vézelay est aussi à noter et 
c’est un bon exemple du changement du sty-
le romanesque au style gothique.29  Puis, 
nous retournons à Dijon pour passer la nuit.  
Au matin, nous quittons Dijon et nous voya-
geons à Strasbourg. 
 En continuant vers le nord-est, nous 
nous trouvons en Alsace et plus tard en Lor-
raine.  Cette région de la France était très im-
portante dans l’histoire de la France.  Les 
Français et les Allemands se sont battus pen-
dant longtemps pour obtenir le contrôle des 
deux provinces.  L’Alsace et la Lorraine sont 
connues pour ces changements de contrôle 
franco-allemands et pour l’influence alle-
mande dans ces provinces.  La proximité de 
l’Allemagne influence la culture de l’Alsace 
et celle du nord de la Lorraine.  Quand on 
pense à la choucroute, on pense à Allema-
gne, mais en Alsace et en Lorraine cette 
nourriture est aussi une spécialité.  En Alsa-
ce, qui est plus près de l’Allemagne, on man-
ge de la choucroute avec du jambon, mais en 
Lorraine, on mange de la choucroute avec du 
poivre noir et avec du genièvre.30  L’Alsace 
et la Lorraine sont aussi connues pour leur 
foie gras  qui est dans des pâtés et dans des 
terrines.31  Une autre nourriture que les deux 
régions préparent est la quiche, une tarte 
avec des œufs, du lait, et de la crème.32    On 
peut y ajouter d’autres ingrédients pour créer 
des variétés de quiche.  Vous connaissez pro-
bablement la quiche lorraine qui ajoute du 
jambon.  Il faut  
goûter ces nourritures particulières de ces 
régions. 
 Nous entrons premièrement en Alsa-
ce, la région plus près de l’Allemagne.  Elle 
partage une frontière avec l’Allemagne.  Un 
fleuve qui s’appelle le Rhin sépare les deux 
pays.  Notre point d’arrêt suivant est Stras-
bourg, ville française située près du Rhin et 
près de la frontière allemande.  Strasbourg 
est une ville très importante à la France et à 
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 l’Europe.  C’est la capitale de 
l’Europe dans laquelle le parlement 
européen se situe.  
 Nous finissons notre séjour à 
Strasbourg et nous voyageons vers 
l’ouest en Lorraine.  Nous visitons à 
Metz, ville en Lorraine.  La Lorraine est 
connue pour une fille paysanne qui enten-
dait les voix des saints qui lui ont dit qu’elle 
devait sauver la France.  Cette fille était 
Jeanne d’Arc et bien qu’elle ait été « la Pu-
celle d’Orléans », elle est originaire de la 
Lorraine.  Jeanne d’Arc est née à Domrémy 
(connue maintenant comme Domrémy-la-
Pucelle).  Nous restons la nuit à Metz et 
nous faisons une excursion le jour suivant à 
Domrémy-la-Pucelle, lieu de naissance de 
cette héroïne française.  Domrémy-la-
Pucelle est situé à peu près quatre-vingts 
kilomètres au sud de Metz, sur la rivière La 
Meuse.33  Dans le village, on peut voir la 
maison natale de Jeanne d’Arc et la vieille 
Église de Domrémy-la-Pucelle.34  Nous ex-
plorons la campagne lorraine dans laquelle 
Domrémy-la-Pucelle est situé.  Puis nous 
restons la nuit dans une petite auberge qui 
est à côté de l’église.35 
 Le matin suivant, nous retournons à 
Metz et nous prenons le train pour Reims 
que nous trouvons dans la province de la 
Champagne.  Cette province est peut-être le 
plus connu pour sa boisson qui prend son 
nom de la province.  C’est le champagne !  
Cette boisson est un vin mousseux, gazeux 
et pétillant.36  C’est une caractéristique im-
portante de la Champagne, mais c’est n’est 
pas la seule caractéristique à noter de la 
Champagne.  En Champagne, nous trouvons 
un point d’intérêt : Reims.   
 À Reims il y a la cathédrale dans 
laquelle les rois de la France ont été couron-
nés.  Cette cathédrale importante s’appelle 
la Cathédrale de Notre-Dame.37  C’était dans 
cette cathédrale qui est pleine de grandeur 
que tous les rois français ont été sacrés de-
puis Clovis.  La tradition a continué jus-
qu’en 1825.38  Notamment, nous nous sou-
venons que Jeanne d’Arc avait dû emmener 
le dauphin à Reims pour qu’il puisse rece-
voir sa couronne.  Nous visitons la cathédra-
le et nous apprenons tout au sujet de la pro-
duction du champagne.  À Reims, nous pou-
vons aussi voir le chef-d’œuvre de Jacques-
Louis David qui démontre la mort de Marat 
dans sa baignoire.  Cette peinture, célèbre et 
importante, est dans le Musée des Beaux-
Arts de Reims.  
Le jour suivant nous continuons no-
tre tour de la France.  Nous traversons une 
autre région, la Picardie, en chemin pour 
Rouen.  Rouen est une ville qui est située en 
Normandie.  La Normandie est connue pour 
sa proximité de la mer, La Manche ; Guil-
laume le Conquérant et pour le débarque-
ment de la deuxième guerre mondiale des 
alliés le 6 juin 1944.   
 La Normandie est aussi connue pour 
ses nourritures.  En particulier, la Norman-
die est connue pour son fromage.  Le ca-
membert, un fromage doux, à pâte molle de 
vache, vient de la Normandie.39  La Nor-
mandie est aussi connue pour ses pommes et 
son cidre.40  Nous goûtons tous les deux. 
Notre premier arrêt en Normandie 
est à Rouen.  Dans cette ville-ci, nous ap-
prenons davantage du sujet de la vie de 
Jeanne d’Arc.  C’était dans cette ville que 
Jeanne d’Arc a été brûlée vive en 1431.   
Les Bourguignons qui l’avaient capturée, 
l’avaient vendue aux Anglais.  L’Église, 
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 sous de l’influence des Anglais, a 
trouvée Jeanne d’Arc coupable de 
l’hérésie et l’a condamnée à la mort.  
Plusieurs années après la mort de Jean-
ne d’Arc, on l’a trouvée innocente et 
elle est devenue sainte de l’église catholi-
que en 1920.  Aux années 70, l’Église de 
Jeanne d’Arc a été bâtie au même endroit où 
Jeanne d’Arc a été brûlée vive.  Nous visi-
tons aussi la tour dans laquelle Jeanne d’Arc 
a été emprisonnée.  Cette tour est en ce mo-
ment un musée dédié à Jeanne d’Arc.41 
 Nous quittons Rouen et en conti-
nuant vers l’ouest, le long de la côte, nous 
voyageons à Caen.  Nous quittons la Haute 
Normandie dans laquelle Rouen est située et 
nous entrons dans la Basse Normandie, dont 
la capitale est Caen.42 Guillaume le Conqué-
rant venait de Caen.  Avant de conquérir 
l’Angleterre, Guillaume le Conquérant était 
chef de la région.43  Nous visitons l’Abbaye 
aux Hommes, bâtie par Guillaume le 
Conquérant au onzième siècle.  Le jour sui-
vant, à Caen nous pouvons aussi apprendre 
tout au sujet de la deuxième guerre mondia-
le.  Il y a eu une grande bataille à Caen en 
1944 dans laquelle la plupart de la ville a été 
détruite à cause d’un feu qui a duré onze 
jours.44  La bataille de Caen et les horreurs 
de la deuxième guerre mondiale ont été 
commémorés dans un monument qui sert 
aussi de musée.45  Après avoir vu le mémo-
rial, cette visite, nous voyageons à Bayeux. 
 Bayeux était la première ville à être 
libérée pendant la deuxième guerre mondia-
le.46  Néanmoins, elle est très connue pour 
la Tapisserie de la Reine Mathilde, la fem-
me de Guillaume le Conquérant, et on croit 
que la reine et ses dames d’honneurs l’ont 
faite.47  Cette grande tapisserie célèbre dé-
montre la conquête d’Angleterre par Guil-
laume le Conquérant.  Nous visitons le mu-
sée et nous voyons cette tapisserie remar-
quable.  Après avoir vu la tapisserie et après 
avoir appris tout au sujet de Guillaume le 
Conquérant, nous faisons une petite excur-
sion aux plages de Normandie.  Ce n’est pas 
une excursion de loisir à la plage ; au 
contraire c’est une excursion pendant la-
quelle nous apprenons tout au sujet de la 
deuxième guerre mondiale, et en particulier, 
au sujet du débarquement des alliés en Nor-
mandie.  Nous voyageons à la plage Omaha 
qui est probablement la plus connue des pla-
ges du débarquement allié en Normandie.  
C’est près de Bayeux.  Le 6 juin 1944, les 
soldats alliés ont essayé de saisir la batterie 
de la Pointe du Hoc, qui était située entre la 
plage Utah et la plage Omaha.48  C’était une 
bataille très violente.  Plusieurs soldats sont 
morts avant la prise de la batterie.  À la pla-
ge, nous avons un moment de recueillement 
de ce qui s’était passé.  Il y a plus de soixan-
te ans et nous pensons surtout au courage 
des soldats.  Après avoir vu les plages du 
débarquement normand, nous retournons à 
Bayeux pour y rester la nuit. 
 Le jour suivant nous voyageons à 
d’autres plages du débarquement de la Nor-
mandie.  Nous visitons les musées qui sont 
situés le long de la côte pour apprendre tout 
au sujet des événements du 6 juin 1944.49  
Nous visitons les cimetières qui sont aussi 
situés le long de la côte près des plages.50  
Puis nous retournons à Bayeux pour y rester 
la nuit. 
 Au matin, nous voyageons de 
Bayeux à Mont St. Michel, une île située au 
large de la côte de la Basse Normandie.  De 
la côte, nous pouvons traverser le sable 
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 aller à Mont St. Michel.  Il faut 
suivre le ou la guide car les marées 
sont très dangereuses.51   Nous tra-
versons le sable et nous visitons l’ab-
baye de l’île historique du Mont St. Mi-
chel.52  Nous y restons la nuit.53  Au ma-
tin, nous partons de l’île et nous prenons 
le train pour Paris.  Nous passons nos der-
niers jours de vacances à Paris en se déten-
dant avant de partir de la belle France. 
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 Today, the indigenous societies of 
Latin America are not very well known in 
the modern world. However, there are many 
lessons that these indigenous societies can 
offer to help improve all societies.  One in-
digenous society that is very interesting and 
still exists today is the Arhuacos.  This 
group has a great deal of knowledge of na-
ture and they believed that they know how 
to maintain the equilibrium of the world.  In 
general, the lessons that can be learned from 
the Arhuacos have the potential to improve 
many different areas of daily life. 
 The Arhuacos were decedents of the 
nomadic tribe called the Chibchas, which, 
because of their size, later divided into two 
groups, the “Musicas” and the “Taironas”.  
The Taironas are the direct ancestors of the 
Arhuacos.  In fact, the survival of the Tai-
rona society was threatened when the con-
quistadores arrived in South America.  In 
order to preserve their knowledge and be-
liefs, survivors from the Tairona society fled 
up the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, Co-
lombia, the highest coastal mountains in the 
world (“Arhuacos”).  It was important to the 
Taironas that their society continued to exist 
in order to maintain the balance of the 
world.  Even though it was impossible for 
the surviving Taironas to reconstruct their 
original society, they developed four new 
societies based on their belief system: the 
Kogis, the Kankuamos, the Wiwas, and the 
Arhuacos (“Tairona”).  Fortunately, the 
Spanish never colonized this land and these 
four indigenous societies still exist today 
(Ereira 142).  However, these societies, in-
cluding the Arhuacos, continue to fight in 
order to protect their cultural identity from 
the influence of outside cultures and to 
maintain the balance of the world. 
 The Arhuacos continue to live like 
their ancestors in the Sierra Nevada located 
in Santa Marta, Colombia.  Because of their 
isolated location high up in the coastal 
mountains, the area is very biologically di-
verse (“Arhuacos”).  It is not surprising with 
this great biological diversity that the Ar-
huacos are very interconnected with nature.  
According to the Arhuacos, Santa Marta is 
the center of the world and contains all the 
knowledge of the world.  They believe that 
it is still important to continue maintaining 
the balance of the world in order to preserve 
the knowledge of the mountains (“We 
Live”). 
 Like the Taironas, the Arhuacos 
have leaders within their society called 
“mamos”.  The mamos have the responsibil-
ity to keep order and balance within the so-
ciety and with nature; the mamos are the 
priests, the unbiased judges, the elected 
politicians, and the chiefs of their society.  
Furthermore, the mamos preserve the 
knowledge of their history, culture and wis-
dom that gets passed on to each new  
Submitted by Alice Brunet 
The Arhuacos 
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
38 
44
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 generation.  It is determined at 
birth if a boy is to become a mamo 
and if he is chosen, he goes through 
an extensive training to learn all of the 
knowledge that has been learned 
throughout the centuries (Lizarralde 43). 
 Even though the Arhuacos live in an 
isolated area because of their location in the 
mountains, between 1870 and 1880 coloniz-
ers and priests started to invade their land 
and purposely tried to change their culture 
(“The Thought”).  This was the beginning of 
a continuous battle to preserve their culture 
that the Arhuacos still face today.  Luckily, 
in 1890 a law was passed in Colombia that 
allowed the Arhuacos to participate in the 
national government.  Because of this, the 
Arhuacos had the opportunity to learn about 
the economic, political, and social aspects of 
the Colombian government.  To this day, the 
Arhuacos continue to be very politically 
savvy and involved in modern day politics.  
Although it has not been easy for the Arhua-
cos to gain governmental support, their con-
sistent and respectful persistence has pro-
moted some positive changes for their cul-
ture (Lizarralde 45). 
 An example of the Arhuacos' strug-
gle to protect their culture and land is when 
the Capuchin mission was established in 
1908.  This was a mission established by 
Christians who wanted to domesticate the 
indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada.  The 
Christians believed that the indigenous tribes 
were savages and they needed to be Christi-
anized.  In order to achieve this goal, the 
Christians constructed churches on their land 
and began to teach the Arhuacos the Spanish 
language and the teachings of Catholicism.  
The Arhuacos were very respectful to the 
Christians even though the Arhuacos did not 
want them on their land, but were stubborn 
about changing their belief system.  This 
made it impossible to convert the indigenous 
population.  Because of this, the Christians 
decided to concentrate on converting the Ar-
huaco children.  In order to do this, the out-
siders would kidnap the Arhuaco children 
and place them in an orphanage where they 
would teach them their ways (“The 
Thought”).  When the Arhuaco children ar-
rived at the orphanage, they did not have 
access to the world outside of the orphanage 
walls.  The Christians prohibited the Ar-
huaco children in the orphanage to speak 
their native language, cut their hair, and 
dressed them in modern day clothing 
(Lizarralde 46). 
 In order to avoid the invasion of out-
side groups like the Capuchin mission and 
repair the damages caused to their society by 
these outside influences, the Arhuacos in 
1930 decided to have the highest mamos talk 
with the Colombian government.  After 
much persistence, the Arhuacos eventually 
convinced the Colombian government to 
give the Arhuacos complete rights to their 
land, but this did not last long.  In 1962 the 
Arhuacos had to fight for their land again 
because, against the request of the Arhuacos, 
the government constructed a public road in 
order to facilitate military observation of the 
land (Lizarralde 46-47).  The Arhuacos were 
very mad about this because these new mili-
tary bases were located on Arhuaco sacred 
land.  This made it impossible for the Arhua-
cos to continue their ancient tradition of hav-
ing sacred rituals that preserved nature and 
the balance of life. 
 The Arhuacos had to once again 
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 fight for their land because the Co-
lombian government claimed that 
they did not have proper documenta-
tion for the land rights of the indigenous 
people.  It is believed that Simon Boli-
var approved the decision to give exclu-
sive possession of the Sierra Nevada to the 
indigenous group.  Even though the mamos 
had kept documentation of this decree, the 
Colombian government did not recognize 
their records as appropriate documentation 
of their rights to the land.  To fight against 
this, the Arhuacos decided to rally with other 
indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada.  For 
many decades the battle continued, fighting 
against the missionaries and the government, 
and fighting for their rights to the land.  Fi-
nally on March 14th, 1984 the Arhuacos ter-
ritory was proclaimed a reservation (“The 
Thought”). 
 Despite their success, the Arhuacos 
continue to have problems with the mission-
aries who are trying to convert them and in-
fluence their culture.  One reason why this is 
still occurring is because the Arhuacos be-
lieve that everything and everyone in the 
world is free and cannot be controlled.  The 
Arhuacos also believe that everything in the 
world is equal and there is no hierarchy of 
power.  Because of this, it is very difficult 
for the Arhuacos to assert any authority over 
others, including over the missionaries (“The 
Thought”).  Interestingly, the Arhuacos to-
day do not desire any reparations for any of 
the negative events that have occurred be-
cause of the influences of outside groups 
such as the missionaries. The Arhuacos only 
desire that these groups leave their land.  
Furthermore, the Arhuacos state that they 
are willing to put behind them these negative 
experiences if these outside groups would 
simply respect the Arhuaco culture (“We 
Can”). 
 Because of the Arhuacos respectful 
mentality to outside groups, there have been 
many changes to their traditional lifestyle 
due to these outside influences.  One exam-
ple of this is evident in the Arhuacos' educa-
tion system.  The Arhuacos believe that all 
school subjects, like science, cannot simply 
be taught through a structured system (“The 
Thought”).  Instead, they believe that every-
thing in nature has significance and can 
teach the most important life lessons (“Our 
Family Tree”).  Before the arrival of outsid-
ers, none of the Arhuacos had the ability to 
read and they did not have a modern system 
of education.  However, during this time the 
Arhuacos believe that there was more or-
ganization, more respect for everything, and 
more harmony with nature (“We Suffer”).  
When the missionaries arrived, they con-
structed their own schools and forced the 
Arhuacos to learn their language and relig-
ion in their structured system.  Furthermore, 
if the Arhuacos did not obey and if they did 
not learn their lessons, the Arhuacos were 
punished. 
 These new schools hindered the Ar-
huacos’ ability to preserve their culture and 
wisdom.  Therefore, the Arhuacos needed to 
develop a more organized system of educa-
tion in order to continue teaching within 
their society their native language and cul-
ture (Lizarralde 45).  Now, in order to pre-
serve their culture, a dictionary of their lan-
guage has been written and their oral stories 
that have been passed down from genera-
tions also have been written down.  Further-
more, today the majority of the Arhuacos 
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 can speak their native language be-
cause in all of the twenty-eight Ar-
huaco towns, the Arhuaco children 
are learning their native language in 
schools (“Arhuacos”).  Despite these 
new-age changes, the mamos still do not 
like using a structured school setting.  The 
mamos question if the children are really 
paying attention and learning.  The mamos 
desire to continue teaching in a more tradi-
tional way, but they realize that the threats 
of outside influences must be met with this 
new structure in teaching (“We Suffer”). 
 Another problem that the Arhuacos 
have due to the influence of the western 
world is with illegal drugs, specifically as it 
relates to coca.  For the Arhuacos coca is 
called “ayu” and it is their most sacred plant 
because it facilitates a connection with na-
ture.  Furthermore, coca is an essential part 
of their sacred rituals and also of their daily 
life in general (“We Can”).  For example, 
the Arhuacos maintain friendships by ex-
changing coca with each other.  Because the 
coca plant is very sacred to the Arhuaco so-
ciety, there are many restrictions related to 
the use on this plant.  For instances, selling 
coca for money is not allowed, only the ma-
mos know how to properly cultivate coca, 
and permission from the mamos is needed in 
order to be able to use coca (“Ayu and Cri-
sis”).  Typically, when an Arhuaco man 
turns twenty years old it is then allowed for 
him to have coca in his possession at any 
time (“We Can”).  It is important to note that 
the Arhuacos do not use the coca plant as a 
narcotic; they chew the plant in order to 
minimize fatigue and hunger, improve their 
memory and increase their energy (Elsass 
51). 
 According to Colombian laws, only 
indigenous groups are permitted to cultivate 
coca for personal use.  For the rest of the 
Colombian population, the cultivation of 
coca is considered to be illegal (“We Can”).  
Nonetheless problems with the Colombian 
drug trade, especially with cocaine and mari-
juana, have persisted since 1982.  That same 
year all non-indigenous groups were sup-
posed to leave the Sierra Nevada because the 
land was decreed a reservation under Co-
lombian law.  However some of the mission-
aries and colonizers continued to live on the 
land. With the help of some mestizos, the 
missionaries and colonizers who stayed 
started to grow illegal plants (“We Live”).  
The Arhuacos knew that these illegal coca 
plantations were used to produce and sell 
cocaine.  Not only was this a grave violation 
of this sacred plant, but these illegal planta-
tions also created many problems for the Ar-
huacos (“Ayu and Crisis”).  In order to pre-
vent the production of these illegal plants the 
Colombian government, with the help of the 
United States, had planes spray herbicides 
and pesticides on these lands (“We Can”).  
These chemicals also destroyed the Arhua-
cos' crops and contaminated their water, and 
as a result the Arhuacos started to become 
increasingly sick.  The Arhuacos also suf-
fered because their most important and most 
sacred plant no longer received the respect 
for its great quality to connect the Arhuacos 
with nature (“Ayu and Crisis”). 
 In general, the Arhuacos continue to 
have many problems that are caused by the 
influence from other cultures.  Tourism to 
the Sierra Nevada is destroying the natural 
life and is negatively influencing the daily 
life of the Arhuacos (“‘Pagmentos’ and  
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
41 
47
: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009
Published by KnightScholar, 2010
 Balance”).  Now, some Arhuacos 
are wearing baseball caps, expen-
sive watches, driving Jeeps, drinking 
excessive amounts of alcohol, and lis-
tening to modern music.  What is most 
important is that this contact with the out-
side world has negatively effected the 
younger generation of the Arhuacos because 
they no longer desire to live as traditional 
Arhuaco and want to be a part of the modern 
world (“Arhuacos”).  Also, the tourism in-
dustry has been promoting a more commer-
cialized system in the Sierra Nevada to at-
tract more tourism.  For example, Archuaco 
women are encouraged to sell their hand-
crafted bags and clothes (“We Head To-
wards”).  In order to fight against this out-
side pressure to modernize their society, the 
mamos organized the “Gonavindua Tairona” 
in 1987 (“Arhuacos”). 
 However, the only way in which the 
Arhuacos will be able to completely protect 
their culture is with the help of the Colom-
bian government.  Because of this, the Ar-
huacos and especially the mamos, continue 
to educate themselves on the Colombian 
government system and frequently go to Bo-
gotá in order to fight for their rights.  The 
Arhuacos have also contacted ministers, for-
eign ambassadors and philanthropic groups 
that fight for human rights to help assist 
them in gaining their rights.  At this point, 
the Arhuacos want more than anything to be 
able to declare the Sierra Nevada a reserva-
tion where only indigenous groups can live 
and where they will be able to preserve their 
society and their natural environment 
(“Arhuacos”).  The Arhuacos have had some 
success in achieving this with the help of 
political groups, but it has not been enough 
to completely gain back their land. 
 And, even though the Arhuacos have 
received some political help and have im-
proved their situation, the Arhuacos have 
had to be stubborn and persistent because 
sometimes the government only creates 
more problems. One example is when the 
army established military bases on the Ar-
huaco territory (“‘Pagmentos’ and Bal-
ance”).  Furthermore, the government does 
not always try to resolve the problems that 
the Arhuacos are trying to address.  For ex-
ample, when the Arhuacos tried to reclaim 
their land as a reservation, the government 
instead focused on creating health and edu-
cation programs and promoting Christian 
teachings.  Disappointingly, instead of help-
ing the Arhuacos, sometimes the govern-
ment only focuses on modernizing the Ar-
huacos (“Regaining the Land”).   It is almost 
impossible for the Arhuacos to defend them-
selves and each year their territory is becom-
ing smaller because the government is con-
tinuously dividing their land (“The 
Thought”). 
 Unfortunately the Arhuacos have 
also become innocent victims of the violence 
in Colombia. For example, according to eye-
witness testimonies, on November 29, 1990 
heavily armed men in national uniforms 
forced three mamos traveling to Bogotá off 
the bus.  Later, on December 13, the same 
three bodies were found dead with many in-
dications that the men had been tortured 
(“Three”).  Another example occurred in 
2003 when two Arhuacos were found be-
headed (“Indians Beheaded”).  It has be-
come a constant battle for all of the indige-
nous groups of the Sierra Nevada to avoid 
these unjust persecutions. 
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  Interestingly, it was agreed 
amongst the Arhuacos that none of 
them would fight in Colombia’s inter-
nal war or be associated with any of the 
guerrilla groups.  Even though the Ar-
huacos know it is a dangerous time not to 
defend themselves, they have decided to 
solely focus on preserving the natural envi-
ronment and maintaining the equilibrium of 
the world (“We Live”).  In reality, the Ar-
huacos realize that this war has the potential 
to completely destroy their society.  It has 
become more and more common that mem-
bers of FARC, a guerrilla group of Colom-
bia, force the indigenous people to become 
soldiers.  If they refuse, the guerrilla group 
kills them.  Many of the indigenous groups 
that lived near the Arhuacos needed to flee 
into the jungle in order to survive.  The Ar-
huacos are very fearful that their society will 
soon end in a mass genocide if no drastic 
changes are made.  But the Arhuacos do not 
desire to fight.  They only want to continue 
living their sacred way of life (Forero). 
There are many groups, like Amnesty Inter-
national, Survival International, and Tairona 
Heritage Trust, that are trying to preserve the 
indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada, but 
their efforts have not brought enough change 
to protect the Arhuacos from the negative 
consequences of this internal war. 
 The Arhuacos have tried to improve 
their situation during this crisis, but the au-
thority of even the highest mamo in the 
modern government is no longer as powerful 
as it was in the past.  Despite this fact, the 
Arhuacos have decided that they will no 
longer negotiate with the government.  They 
want all of their demands met. The Arhuacos 
realize that a stronger centralized govern-
ment is needed to be able to improve their 
situation and because of this, the Arhuacos 
have become very stubborn in order to sur-
vive, protect the natural environment and 
preserve the balance of life in their region 
(“We Suffer”).  It is very interesting that 
even today the Arhuacos continue to be very 
loyal to nature, just like their ancestors. 
 Sadly, only 25 percent of the Ar-
huaco sacred forest has been preserved (“We 
Live”).  The forest has been destroyed by a 
multitude of causes such as: contamination 
from herbicides and pesticides, deforesta-
tion, overpopulation, pollution, a decrease of 
the cultivation of traditional crops, and the 
increase of illegal plantations.  There is no 
longer enough forest to maintain the biologi-
cal diversity of the Sierra Nevada.  Because 
of this, the Arhuacos believe that very few 
people in the modern world respect nature as 
well as they should or take enough responsi-
bility in protecting nature (“Our Family 
Tree”).  Just like the modern population 
needs to pay for electricity in their house, 
the Arhuacos believe that they also need to 
respect nature in order to protect their planet 
(“Ayu and Crisis”). 
 The connection that the Arhuacos 
have with nature has allowed them to see the 
negative changes that are currently occurring 
within nature.  For example, they have ob-
served that plants are flowering prematurely, 
bees are disappearing and are no longer pol-
linating plants, birds and butterflies are 
changing their migration patterns, the snow 
on the mountain peaks are melting, there is a 
decrease in humidity, the rainfall pattern is 
changing, and the rivers are drying before 
they connect to the sea. Even though the Ar-
huacos are not familiar with the phrase 
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 “global warming”, they are well 
aware that the flora and fauna are 
being effected by the lack of focus on 
preserving the environment. The Arhua-
cos know, without the help of modern 
day sciences, that the average temperature 
of the world has increased and that it is a 
negative result of practices within modern 
societies (Cycon). 
 If these problems are not resolved 
soon, the Arhuacos believe that there could 
be an increase in sicknesses worldwide and 
plagues of insects that will cause much de-
struction (“We Live”).  In general, there has 
been an increase in developing preservation 
programs in order to improve the current 
situation.  However the Arhuacos could be a 
key asset in assisting this cause since they 
have many centuries of experience and the 
desire and will to protect the natural envi-
ronment (“We Suffer”).  An important start, 
according to the Arhuacos, should start with 
their land.  They believe that the Colombian 
government should buy all the territory in 
the Sierra Nevada that is currently owned by 
non-indigenous people and give it back to 
the Arhuacos.  In their opinion, this is the 
best solution to improve the environmental 
balance of the territory and would also pro-
vide the Arhuacos with the opportunity to 
preserve their society (“We Live”). 
 The Arhuacos have survived for 
more that twenty-five centuries and have 
consequently acquired a substantial amount 
of knowledge.  There are many lessons, in-
cluding how to preserve nature, which we all 
can learn from the Arhuacos.  Other impor-
tant lessons can be learned from the Arhua-
cos’ daily life and general philosophy.  For 
instance, the Arhuacos do not grow more 
food than they need; instead, all of the crops 
in the Arhuaco territory are for all of the Ar-
huacos.  Each family has many crops, but if 
an Arhuaco needs a plant that they do not 
have in their own crop, they simply can walk 
to another Arhuaco crop and take the plants 
they need (Elsass 47).  The Arhuacos have a 
lifestyle that is very communal and non-
materialistic.  It is a society where neighbors 
freely share all of their possessions and 
knowledge. 
 However, the Arhuacos are competi-
tive with regard to acquiring knowledge.  
They will constantly challenge each other to 
determine who is the most knowledgeable 
person.  It is a very friendly competition and 
it does promote the acquisition of informa-
tion (Elsass 49-50).  The Arhuacos have re-
alized that an obsession with acquiring prod-
ucts or being materialistic in general does 
not promote happiness.  Materialism is 
something very important in modern society, 
but recent psychological studies tend to 
agree with the Arhuacos that this lifestyle 
does not promote happiness. One thing that 
does promote happiness is obtaining more 
knowledge.  Even when the conquistadores 
were settling in the Americas in search of 
power and gold, the Arhuacos had the men-
tality to live a simple, non-materialistic and 
purposeful life.  It is possible that modern 
day objects are distracting the world from 
the most important things in life and thus 
preventing a simple, but very purposeful life. 
 The Arhuacos also know how to 
maintain the balance of power within their 
society thanks to the mamo leaders.  The 
Arhuacos always need to obtain advice from 
the mamos and receive permission for any-
thing that is not part of the traditional  
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 lifestyle (Elsass 47).  Furthermore, 
when the mamos help other Arhua-
cos, the mamos are required to be un-
biased (Elsass 48).  The mamos have 
essentially all of the power within the 
society.  However the mamos do not have 
any special privileges for having this role.  
They need to be a model of how to obey the 
sacred laws and because of this, the mamos 
are very respected within the community.  It 
is very interesting that the Arhuacos have 
had a successful society with impartial and 
effective leaders and have survived for many 
centuries.  In general, the mamos have a 
very important role because they also have 
the responsibility of learning, remembering, 
and passing on the history, knowledge and 
wisdom that have been compiled for many 
centuries. 
The modern world has much to learn 
from the Arhuacos’ model of society, from 
their desire to acquire knowledge, their re-
spect for one another, and the unbiased lead-
ership of the mamos. 
 The attitude of the Arhuacos toward 
tradition has led them to become opponents 
of the dominant society's development ideol-
ogy, which regards the Indians as poor peo-
ple who  need to develop and take in new 
things. The Indians have often rejected de-
velopment experts who come in to the area, 
because they do not believe they need to be 
developed. On the contrary they have 
stressed that Indian culture is a prerequisite 
for white civilization. (Elsass 63) 
 In a way, the Arhuacos are the oldest 
ecologists in the world because of their inti-
mate relationship with nature (“We Live”).  
The modern world can learn a lot from the 
Arhuacos' persistent and respectful nature 
that has lasted more than twenty-five centu-
ries.  Especially important is how to live in 
harmony with both nature and each other. 
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Résumé  
 Après avoir lu, on devrait être ca-
pable de localise la France précisément sur 
la carte du monde, remarquer quelque chose 
à propos de ses frontières et leurs effets sur 
l’histoire de la France, de généraliser le re-
lief de la France et identifier ses traits im-
portants suivants.  
Où se trouve la France? 
 France est un pays en forme d’un 
hexagone qui se trouve dans la partie ouest 
du continent européen.  Elle est au sud de la 
Grande Bretagne (avec qui elle ne partage 
aucune frontière) et nord de l’Italie et l’Es-
pagne. Elle couvre la superficie entre le mer 
Méditerranée et la Manche de sud à nord, et 
entre le Rhin jusqu’à la mer atlantique de 
l’ouest à l’est. Elle n’est pas vraiment isolée 
comme une île, mais aussi n’est pas vrai-
ment continental. Comme M. Michaud dé-
crit, “Elle apparaît plutôt comme un isthme 
fortement rattaché au continent.”1 
 La France est située entre le 40e et 
le 50e parallèle nord, et entre le 5e méridien 
ouest et le 8e méridien est (Michaud 8).  
Pour orienter un sens de ces faits, on peut 
imaginer une ligne de latitude que traver-
se l’océan Atlantique entre l’Europe et les 
Amériques.  La France se trouve presque 
exactement à l’est de la frontière entre les 
Etats Unis et Canada, vers 3,000 miles loin 
de NY. La frontière septentrionale de la 
France partage la même latitude que la Baie 
d’Hudson. Au sud, elle est sur la même li-
gne que Détroit. Mais, à cause du Gulf 
Stream, qui réchauffe les littoraux de Fran-
ce, le climat est bien diffèrent des villes aux 
mêmes latitudes aux Etas Unis.  
 Malgré les obstacles à ses frontiè-
res, la situation de la France sur la carte du 
monde a fait que la France est un endroit 
important pour l’échange des idées et aussi 
pour le commerce (Michaud 9). Elle est 
comme un carrefour pour l’Europe, avec un 
lien a l’est avec le contient d’Europe et aus-
si un front avec l’océan Atlantique et la Mé-
diterranée.  
 Avec une superficie de 551,670 
kilométrés carrées2, la France est le plus 
grand pays d’Europe, sauf la Russie.  Pour 
un sens de ces chiffre, la France est quatre-
cinquièmes la taille de Texas.3 Si on multi-
plie l’état de New York quatre fois, le résul-
tat est à peu près la taille de la France 
(Denoeu 4).  
Les Froniters 
 La France partage une frontière 
avec les huit pays suivants; la Belgique, 
l’Allemagne, la Suisse, l’Italie, l’Espagne, 
le Luxembourg, l’Andorre et Monaco. La 
plupart de ses frontières sont naturelles, sauf 
la frontière du nord-est avec la Belgique et 
le Luxembourg. (On y trouve le fôret des 
Ardennes dont quelques-uns rappellent une 
frontière naturelle, mais, historiquement, 
elle n’est pas bien pour protéger la France). 
Submitted by Stephanie Murdock 
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 Trois du six frontières sont mariti-
mes. A cause de ses littoraux plutôt 
naturels, au cours des siècles du dé-
veloppement, la France a eu moins de 
difficulté de unifier ses peuples sous 
une compréhension commune de leur 
nationalité, pas comme autres pays 
(l’Allemagne, la Tchécoslovaquie, etc.).  
 Les frontières naturelles de la Fran-
ce sont ses montagnes et ses littoraux. Au 
nord-ouest, (et un petite peu, vers l’est - 
près de Belgique - le Mer de Nord et) la 
Manche protège la France.  Trouvant le mê-
me littoral plus au sud, autour de la Breta-
gne, on trouve la frontière avec l’océan 
Atlantique. A la frontière espagnol-
française, il y a les Pyrénées. Au sud-est, en 
Provence et au Languedoc, la mer Méditer-
ranée crée une frontière naturelle  (et en 
plus des plages magnifiques).  Plus vers 
l’est, on trouve les Alpes, la frontière natu-
relle avec l’Italie. Les Alpes sont bien 
connues autour du monde, parce que ce sont 
les montagnes plus hautes de l’Europe. Pour 
plus de détail sur les Alpes, voir la section 
“Montagnes”. 
 La France a 5.200 kilométrés de 
bordures, de ce chiffre 3.100 kilomètres 
sont des côtes littérales (Denoeu 16).  En 
comparaison, 3.100 kilomètres sont deux-
cinquièmes de la taille du littoral des Etats 
Unis (Denoeu 16). Donc, c’est un chiffre 
vraiment impressionnant étant donné la tail-
le relatif de chaque pays. La France touche 
trois (certaines affirment quatre) étendues ; 
l’océan Atlantique, la Mer Méditerranée, la 
Manche et la Mer du Nord. La Manche est 
un canal qui se trouve entre la France et 
l’Angleterre. Elle limite la France au nord-
ouest. Un peu plus loin à l’est se trouve la 
Mer du Nord, qui aussi touche une petite 
partie de la France au nord-ouest. A la fron-
tière de l’ouest, la France baigne 
dans l’océan Atlantique. Et au sud, entre la 
France et l’Afrique, on a le littoral célèbre 
de la Méditerranée. On trouve des plages 
magnifiques et célèbres sur toutes les côtes, 
de la Mer Méditerranée, la Manche et l’o-
céan Atlantique. 
 La seule frontière artificielle fran-
çaise se trouve au nord-est de la France, 
avec la Belgique, le Luxemburg et l’Alle-
magne. Elle est toujours le point la plus vul-
nérable d’attaque.  Depuis les Gaulois et 
jusqu'au 19ème siècle (l’invasion d’Allema-
gne pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale) 
c’était ici ou la plupart des envahisseurs 
sont entrés dans la France. Pendant l’époque 
entre-deux-guerres la ligne Maginot, une 
ligne de fortifications,  y a été créée comme 
une tente de protection de la France d’inva-
sion.4  
 Le tunnel sous la Manche a été fini 
en 1994, donc depuis la France est aussi 
connectée à Angleterre. Il est important 
pour le transport des produits et aussi pour 
les voyageurs. Mais ce n’est pas une vraie 
frontière géographique.  
Relief du Sol  
 Le relief de la France est composé 
des montagnes, de collines, de fleuves et de 
gorges. En bref, Michaud décrit le relief de 
la France ainsi, “l’aspect d’un théâtre anti-
que, dont la scène serait le bassin de Paris et 
dont les gradins s’élèveraient progressive-
ment du nord à l’ouest et au sud à l’est”(11). 
Si nous faisons une ligne entre le nord-est 
de la France, près de Belgique, jusqu'au sud
-ouest de la France, et nous coupons en 
deux le pays, nous trouvons deux parties 
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 distinctes. A gauche, au nord-est 
de la France, on trouve un relief 
plutôt plat, sauf quelques collines. En 
Bretagne on trouve ces collines, mais 
elles n’ont pas plus de quatre cents mè-
tres en hauteur (Deneou 5). Dans l’outre 
partie, à droite, le sud-est de la France, on 
se trouve de vraies montagnes : les Pyré-
nées, le Massif Central, les Vosges, le Jura 
et les Alpes. Elles se trouvent, pour la plu-
part, aux frontières à l’exception du Massif 
Centrale qui (comme il se nomme) se trouve 
vers le milieu de la France.  
Montages 
 Les Alpes est les plus célèbres de 
montages d’Europe, comme ce sont les 
montages les plus hautes en Europe. Elles 
sont aussi les montagnes plus jeunes de la 
France (Denoeu 11). Elles sont situées dans 
le sud-est de la France, à la frontière entre la 
France et l’Italie. Dans les Alpes, on trouve 
Mont Blanc, le point le plus haut d’Europe 
avec 4.087 mètres, ou 15.781 pieds (Denoeu 
11). Le versant des Alpes francophones est 
moins raide que l’autre, donc elle est plus 
navigable. Les Alpes sont aussi connues 
pour leur beauté. M. Denoeu raconte, 
“Citions…les Alpes de Savoie où Saint 
François de Sales, évêque de Genève au de-
bout du dix-septième siècle, s’y disait plus 
près de Dieu que partout ailleurs”(11). Cette 
citation illustre la magnificence des Alpes à 
travers les siècles. Un fait intéressant sur les 
Alpes, c’est l’historie du son nom. Le mot 
‘alpe’ signifie à l’ origine, “pâturage de alti-
tude haute” (Denoeu 11). Dans les pentes 
les plus hautes des Alpes, on trouve du 
feuillage. En conséquence, les Alpes sont se 
nomment telles qu’elles le sont.  
 Le Massif Central est un grand 
plateau qui se trouve au centre de la France. 
M. Deneou a remarqué qu’il “est le plus 
vaste et plus varie des massifs montagneux 
français” (6).  Il illustre son point avec le 
fait que le Massif Central, “occupe le septiè-
me de la superficie de la France” (6). Il a le 
sobriquet du Plateau Central.  
 Un peu moins connues, mais quand 
même une chaîne de montagnes célèbres 
sont les Pyrénées qui sont situées à la fron-
tière franco-espagnol. Denoeu dit que, 
“Leur arêtes sont vives et nues ; leurs crêtes 
sont aigües, en dents de scie et fort éle-
vées”(10). Le point le plus haut des Pyré-
nées se trouve en Espagne, le pic d’Aneto 
avec  3.400 mètres en hauteur, ou 11.000 
pieds (Denoeu 10). En contraste des Alpes, 
le versant français des Pyrénées est plus rai-
de que la côte espagnole (Denoeu 10). Ce 
fait est intéressant pour son influence sur le 
cours du fleuve la Garonne. L’histoire des 
Pyrénées est riche et fameuse. C’était au col 
de Roncevaux, ou Roland a été tué en 778 
après J.-C. “avec toute l’arrière-garde de 
l’armée de Charlemagne” (Denoeu 10). Cet 
événement est devenu célèbre à cause de la 
“Chanson de Roland” (qui a été écrit sur le 
sujet) et est la plus vieille œuvre de littératu-
re française qui survie jusqu'à nos jours. 
Une autre histoire intéressante s’est passé 
dans les Pyrénées pendant le mi-19eme siè-
cle, au Lourdes (au bord nord des Pyrénées). 
C’est là, on croit que le Vierge Maire a ap-
paru à Bernadette Soubirous, et encore au-
jourd’hui cette grotte est un lieu de pèlerina-
ge (Denoeu 10). 
 Entre les Alpes  et les Vosges, à la 
frontière de l’est (avec l’Allemagne et la 
Suisse) se trouve le Jura. Son sommet at-
teint 1.723 mètres (5,600 pieds), une figure 
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 à 160 mètres moins que la hauteur 
du puy de Sancy dans le Massif 
Central (Denoeu 10).  
 Encore au nord des Alpes et du Ju-
ra, et toujours sur la frontière de l’est, 
sont les Vosges, qui se trouvent en Alsa-
ce-Lorraine, à la frontière avec Allemagne. 
Son sommet est le ballon de Guebwiller, 
avec plus de 1400 mètres (Denoeu  8). 
Fleuves 
 Il y a cinq fleuves importants en 
France : la Seine, le Rhône, la Loire, le Rhin 
et la Garonne. Ils traversent la France et 
sont des sources d’eaux importantes à l’inté-
rieur de la France. Les peuples anciens s’ont 
installés près de l’eau, donc même aujourd-
’hui on trouve beaucoup de villes sur ces 
fleuves.  
  La Seine est le fleuve le plus célè-
bre de France, parce qu’elle traverse Paris, 
la ville la plus célèbre de France. Elle coupe 
Paris en deux parties, la rive gauche de la 
Seine (partie sud) et la rive droit (partie 
nord). C’est le plus lent des cinq grands 
fleuves et aussi c’est le plus régulier 
(Denoeu 20).  Sans la Seine, la Paris que 
nous connaissions, n’existerait aujourd’hui. 
Elle est très navigable, un trait important 
pour l’histoire de Paris à propos des inva-
sions et du commerce. Sa source se trouve 
sur le plateau de la Cote d’Or, et elle se jette 
à la Manche, au Havre (Denoeu 20). La Sei-
ne vide l’eau de la cuvette de la région de 
Paris. Le nom ‘la Seine’ est dérivé du nom 
d’une divinité d’eau celtique, Sequana 
(Denoeu 20). Le Havre, l’embouchure de la 
Seine, est une autre grande ville sur la Seine 
(Hendrix et Walter, 13-14). Elle coule vers 
le nord et au Havre se jette dans la Manche. 
 La Rhône est située au sud-est de 
la France. Elle coule de sa source dans les 
Alpes Suisses, traverse la Lac de Genève, et 
entre la France. Puis, près de Lyon, elle 
tourne vers le sud et coule dans cette direc-
tion jusqu'à elle se jette dans la mer Médi-
terranée (Hendrix et Walter, 20).  
 Le plus long des fleuves français à 
1.000 kilomètres (620 milles) de longueur,  
un quart de la longueur de la Mississipi, 
c’est la Loire (Denoeu 22). La Loire est un 
fleuve très irrégulier. Elle grandit en prin-
temps, et “souvent déborde malgré les hau-
tes digues qui la langent, surtout à partir 
d’Orléans” (Denoeu 22). En été, le niveau 
d’eau diminue et dans beaucoup d’endroits 
on peut la traverser sans perdre pied 
(Denoeu, 23). Son estuaire est très impor-
tant pour le commerce. Sa source est dans la 
Massif Central, dans les Cévennes, et elle 
coule vers le nord jusqu’à Orléans, où elle 
tourne (avant le Bassin parisien) vers 
l’ouest. Elle se jette dans l’Atlantique à 
Saint-Nazaire, près de Nantes. Entre Nantes 
et Orléans se situe Tours, une autre ville im-
portante développée à cause de sa proximité 
du fleuve.  
  Le Rhin constitue une partie de la 
frontière qui sépare la France de l’Allema-
gne. On peut l’appeler une frontière naturel-
le, mais celle qui est plus difficile à défen-
dre car les fleuves sont plus faciles à traver-
ser que les montagnes.  Le Rhin a  une im-
portance dans le domaine du commerce 
(Hendrix et Walter, 10). C’est un fleuve 
grand et profond (Hendrix et Walter, 10).  
 La Garonne est la plus courte des 
cinq fleuves, avec 12km de largeur et 30 
mètres de profondeur, mais elle est très vite 
(Deneou 24). Sa vitesse de débit est égale à 
la somme de la vitesse de la Seine et la  
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 la Loire ensemble (Deneou 23). Sa 
source se trouve dans les Pyrénées 
espagnoles et elle coule vers le nord-
ouest dans la direction de la France. 
Car le versant française des Pyrénées 
est très raide, “elle descend en tor-
rent” (Deneou 23). Elle passe des villes 
célèbres comme Toulouse, Agen et Bor-
deaux. Près de Bordeaux, la Garonne rejoint 
son estuaire, la Gironde, qui coule vers le 
nord et se jette dans l’océan Atlantique  
(Hendrix et Walter, 20).  
Les Régions Bas  
 Le Bassin Parisien est au nord de la 
France. Au fond de cette cuvette se trouve 
Paris. La partie extérieure du Bassin est 
composée de la falaise de Champagne et à 
l’ouest les collines de Normandie 
(Deneou,12).  
 Les Gorges Verdon sont la deuxiè-
me plus grande gorge du monde. Avec 50 
kilomètres en longueur  et jusqu’à 700 mè-
tres profondeur, c’est reconnu comme étant 
le plus haut canyon d’Europe. Elles se trou-
vent au sud de la France, près de Nice.  
Climat 
 On ne peut pas généraliser le cli-
mat en France. Bien que tempère en général, 
toutes les  régions ont des différences de 
climat distinctes. On peut diviser le climat 
de France en quatre parties ; le climat mari-
time, le climat continental, le climat monta-
gnard et le climat méditerranéen (Michaud 
12).   
 Dans les régions près de l’océan 
Atlantique, (compris le nord, le Bassin pari-
sien, la Normandie, la Bretagne, l’ouest et le 
sud-ouest) le Gulf Stream règle le climat 
maritime. Le Gulf Stream est un courant 
qui port d’air chaud des trophiques aux par-
ties à l’ouest du hémisphère. Donc, il sert à 
réchauffer ces régions et à modérer le cli-
mat. Le climat maritime n’est ni trop froid, 
ni trop chaud.  Les mêmes régions sont ha-
bituées aux pluies, mais elles ne durent pas 
trop longtemps ni versent en grande quanti-
té.  
 Trop loin à  l’est pour être effectué 
par les effets modérant du Gulf Stream, on 
trouve le climat continental. Au Massif 
Central, le Jura et les Alpes, on a les hivers 
plus froids et plus rudes, et les étés chauds, 
“avec des pluies d’orages” (Deneou 14).  
Mais, malgré les températures basses en hi-
ver, cette région est populaire avec les gens 
qui aiment faisant du ski.   
 Le climat montagnard est sem-
blable à celui du climat continental. Il se 
trouve dans les Alpes, le Jura, les Vosges et 
le Plateau Central. Ce climat est caractérisé 
par trois points, “hivers longs et rudes, étés 
court et pluvieux, [et] pluies et neiges en 
toutes saisons” (Michaud 12).  
 Le climat méditerranéen (bien 
sûr, dans la zone méditerranéenne au sud de 
la France) est célèbre et connu surtout au 
monde. Là, le climat est souvent très favora-
ble, et en conséquent, c’est une région très 
populaire avec les touristes. La région médi-
terranée est caractérisée par des étés chauds 
et secs, et des hivers tempérés (Deneou 14). 
En automne, on a des pluies, souvent à tor-
rents. Ce climat est aussi connu pour ses 
vents forts, le plus célèbre d’entre eux c’est 
le mistral, un vent sec qui a des effets posi-
tifs et d’autres négatifs. On croit qu’à cause 
du mistral, l’air et la lumière de cette région 
est très claire. (Il faut se souvenir que cette 
région est aussi connue pour ses artistes im-
portants, qui ont été attirés à cette région 
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 la beauté de la lumière).  Mais 
de l’autre côte, le mistral produit 
des incendies de temps en temps.  
 Comme capitale et ville célèbre, on 
va parler un peu plus en détail du cli-
mat de Paris. Il se trouve dans la région 
du climat continental, donc avec des hivers 
froids et des étés chauds. La température 
moyenne en janvier à Paris est 2 dégrées 
celsius, ou 36 fahrenheit, selon une étude de 
1993.5 M. Deneou présent un exemple qui 
illustre le climat de l’hiver du Paris, “Les 
Parisiens ne peuvent patiner sur les lacs et 
étangs… que quelques jours par an” (14). 
En juillet, la température moyenne de Paris 
est 18 dégrées celsius, ou 36 dégrées fahren-
heit (Noin).  
DOM-TOM 
 Il faut mention un peu les DOM-
TOMS (les départements et les territoires 
d’outre-mer) qui aussi constituent une partie 
de la géographie de la France. Ce sont la 
Corse, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, Saint Mar-
tin, Saint Barthélémy, la Guadeloupe, la 
Martinique, la Guyane Française, la Polyné-
sie Française, la Mayotte, la Réunion et la 
Nouveau Calédonie. Leurs reliefs du sol et 
leurs climats sont bien variés selon leurs 
emplacements sur le globe et leurs traits 
physiques.  
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 In Shakespeare’s Measure for Meas-
ure, there are two common interpretations 
for Angelo’s character. The first interpreta-
tion sees Angelo as a moral man, who is 
earnestly trying to clean up Vienna, but hap-
pens to take things too far in his strict treat-
ment of Claudio’s case. He succumbs to the 
temptation of Isabella—a temptation he had 
never known before—but he repents for it 
by the play’s end. The second interpretation 
sees Angelo as power-hungry, and hypo-
critical in his preaching of strict morality. 
He is ill-intentioned and pursues his selfish 
agenda at the expense of others. Angelo 
tries to dupe the other characters into inter-
preting him the first way, but in truth, the 
second interpretation is more accurate. 
 Angelo appears modest when he, at 
first, refuses the Duke’s offering of the rul-
ing position. He says: “Let there be some 
more test made of my mettle / Before so no-
ble and so great a figure / Be stamped upon 
it” (Measure 1.2.49-51). Despite his humble 
appearance, Angelo is actually quite excited 
about receiving such a position of power. 
The way he uses the power given to him 
proves this. He immediately begins using 
his power to enforce the law to an unprece-
dented extreme; he sentences Claudio to 
death for sleeping with Juliet out of wed-
lock, even though Claudio was engaged to 
marry her. Angelo is told to clean up the 
city, but he takes it too far. His steadfastness 
in sticking to extremes demonstrates his 
love of power, and his refusal to give any of 
it up. Angelo even refuses the advice of the 
more experienced Escalus, who advises An-
gelo that he might regret being so strict 
(2.2.10-13). Angelo ignores him, asserting 
that he is the only one who will have any 
say in the matter. 
 One could argue that Angelo is not 
power-hungry, and must be well-
intentioned, since the Duke trusts him with 
his position upon his leave. There is evi-
dence, however, that the Duke does not ac-
tually trust Angelo to do a good job, and 
that he knows that Angelo is going to be 
corrupt. After the Duke gives up his power, 
he does, after all, stick around in disguise to 
keep an eye on things. The fact that he does 
not let Angelo rule on his own, without be-
ing secretly monitored, suggests that he 
does not trust Angelo with power. When 
speaking to Friar Thomas, the Duke ex-
plains that “Lord Angelo is precise, / Stands 
at a guard with envy, scarce confesses / That 
his blood flows or that his appetite / Is more 
to bread than stone. Hence shall we see, / If 
power change purpose, what our seemers 
be” (Measure 1.3.50-54). The Duke sus-
pects that Angelo is more corrupt than he 
seems to be, and he is interested in seeing if 
giving him power will expose his corrupt 
nature. At the end of the play, the Duke tells 
Isabella to plead her case to Angelo, telling 
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 her: “Here is Lord Angelo shall 
give you justice. / Reveal yourself 
to him” (5.1.28-29). The Duke knows 
that Angelo will not give her justice, 
yet he seems to test him, like he does at 
the beginning of the play when he gives 
him power. The Duke’s words cannot be 
taken at face value, as he bears another face 
for most of the play. His true self does not 
consider Angelo to be a trustworthy leader 
any more than he thinks that Angelo will 
give Isabella justice at the end of the play. 
David Bevington agrees that “the Duke ob-
viously expects Angelo to fall” (415). 
 Angelo lives up to, or perhaps down 
to, the Duke’s expectations and fails as a 
leader. He abuses his power, and his moti-
vation is selfish, not moral. Angelo does not 
have ethical reasons behind his strict pun-
ishing of Claudio. He claims that he is using 
Claudio as an example in an effort to clean 
up the city and bolster respect for the law, 
but he proves to be uninterested in respect-
ing the law when he propositions Isabella. 
One could argue that he was merely tempted 
by sexual lust on that one occasion, and that 
his motivation for punishing Claudio is still 
that he wants to set an example so that the 
law will be respected and justice will be 
pursued. This, however, cannot be true, be-
cause he claims that he will pardon Claudio 
if Isabella sleeps with him. If Angelo par-
dons Claudio, then he discredits his stance 
that Claudio must be used as an example. 
He prioritizes selfish desires over what he 
claims Vienna needs. Personal motivation 
clearly influences his decision more than an 
honorable pursuit of justice does. His selfish 
motivations are further exposed when he 
threatens that, unless Isabella sleeps with 
him, he won’t only have Claudio killed, 
he’ll have Claudio tortured. He is clearly 
not chiefly concerned with justice, but in 
using his power to fulfill his own selfish 
desires, even at the expense of others. 
 Angelo’s treatment of Claudio can-
not be defended as just in any way. His in-
tentions are not to punish Claudio for un-
ethical behavior, nor to make an example 
out of him. He states that “He should have 
lived, / Save that his riotous youth, / with 
dangerous sense, / Might in the times to 
come have ta’en revenge” (Measure 4.4.28-
30). It is out of fear of revenge that Angelo 
upholds Claudio’s death sentence, not out of 
concern for justice. Angelo values himself 
and his power over any of the lofty ideals 
that he claims to stand for. John Simmons 
notices that it is “only when [Angelo] infers 
that there is some personal gain to be real-
ized that he adjusts any judicial deci-
sion” (283). Angelo explicitly states that he 
uses his power, not to uphold justice, but to 
promote his own personal pleasure. He ad-
mits to Isabella: “I give my sensual race the 
rein” (Measure 2.4.161). He also admits to 
being cruel. When Isabella refuses to sleep 
with him to save her brother, Angelo asks 
her: “Were not you then as cruel as the sen-
tence / That you have slandered 
so?” (2.4.110-111). Ruling with cruelty and 
prioritizing the fulfillment of personal 
wishes over justice are not the actions of 
good-intentioned leader.  
 If someone is power-hungry then he 
will not make a good ruler. His decisions 
will be clouded by the goal of attaining and 
retaining power, instead of making deci-
sions based on what is best for the people. 
Angelo is a bad and dangerous leader  
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 because of his “excessive appetite 
for power” (Simmons 284). At face 
value, he seems to be standing up for 
justice, claiming that he “must not 
make a scarecrow of the 
law” (Measaure 2.1.1). This is a noble 
goal, and it makes sense to enforce the law, 
but it would be wise to remove the laws that 
are unfair and unreasonable so that the law 
can be enforced with dignity and respect. 
Angelo does not, however, do away with 
nonsensical laws like the one that punishes 
Claudio for sleeping with his fiancée. Doing 
so would reduce Angelo’s power. Instead, 
he enforces that law to its full extent and 
sentences Claudio to death. Simmons recog-
nizes that Angelo “administers justice in its 
most severe form in order to establish him-
self as the hardnosed stand-in ruler he 
wishes to appear to be” (283). If Angelo 
were more interested in public service in-
stead of power, he might realize that by kill-
ing Claudio, he would be responsible for the 
very thing that he claimed to be trying stop 
in the first place—the creation of a father-
less child. This does not seem to bother An-
gelo, though. Instead, he seems only to be 
interested in doing things his way, and using 
his power to the maximum extent possible. 
And what greater show of power could there 
be than to suppress basic human instincts? 
 Angelo can only suppress others’ 
instincts because he is too weak, hypocriti-
cal, and corrupt to apply the same standards 
to his own behavior. Simmons recognizes 
Angelo as “a power seeker, unable to curb 
the very libidinous desires he so severely 
judges in others. He serves as a classic ex-
ample of hypocritical behavior” (284). An-
gelo claims that he would want the same 
treatment if he were he to commit the crime, 
as he says: “Let mine own judgment pattern 
out my death / And nothing come in par-
tial” (2.1.30-31). However, when it comes 
to the test, he does not stand by this noble-
sounding declaration. At the end of the play, 
when Isabella brings forth her case against 
him, he does not admit to his crime, but in-
stead tries to get out of it by trying to dis-
credit Isabella, saying that “she will speak 
most bitterly and strange” (5.1.38). Rosalind 
Miles observes that “Angelo desperately 
(and hypocritically) shores up his self-image 
in the eyes of the world, and of the 
Duke” (207). 
 At first, in the final act, Angelo tries 
to protect his image instead of accepting the 
punishment that, earlier in the play, he said 
he would deserve and accept. It is only after 
the Duke reveals himself, and Angelo 
knows that he is caught, that he kneels and 
begs for the death sentence (Measure 
5.1.374-382). I disagree with M.C. Brad-
brook, who contests that “in this alone An-
gelo is not a seemer; he has the consistency 
to sentence himself” (394). I see Angelo’s 
plea as a final, desperate attempt to avoid 
punishment. He does not actually hope to be 
killed in the name of justice. Instead, I think 
that he hopes to appear as if he has learned 
his lesson, and therefore does not need to be 
punished. The Duke may be the one in dis-
guise for most of the play, but Angelo is just 
as much a seemer, and deserves to be pun-
ished for it. I agree with Samuel Johnson, 
who believes that “every reader feels some 
indignation when he finds [Angelo] 
spared” (qtd. in Geckle 72). 
 One who argues that Angelo is an 
essentially good-intentioned person who 
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 happens to fall victim to tempta-
tion could point to the evidence that 
Angelo struggles with his lust for Isa-
bella. Miles points to Angelo’s 
“amazement, disgust, and grief ex-
pressed in the soliloquies of 2.2 and 2.4,” 
stating that they “almost invariably elicit 
an unconditionally sympathetic response 
from the audience” (199). I am one of the 
variants who do not feel sympathy for An-
gelo upon seeing his self-examination. Just 
because Angelo is surprised by his lust for 
Isabella does not mean that he is a good-
intentioned ruler. One can abuse authority 
and still feel surprised at feeling sexual lust 
if one has never felt that before. His surprise 
over his sexual lust does not excuse his 
other corruptions, and by acting on that lust, 
he only adds to his moral corruptness. As 
Miles points out, “He is undoubtedly suffer-
ing as he wrestles with his conscience, but 
he is still using his every means to save 
himself from exposure… the establishing of 
this blind and destructive self-interest is 
hardly to be regarded as a sympathetic 
stroke of characterization” (211). 
 If one were to still argue that Angelo 
is ultimately good-intentioned, but falls vic-
tim to temptation, one could point to the fact 
that Lucio instructs Isabella to charm An-
gelo into changing his mind. He says that 
when women “weep and kneel, / All 
[men’s] petitions are as freely theirs / As 
they themselves would owe them” (Measure 
1.4.81-83). In addition, Lucio tells her to 
“touch him” (2.2.75) in an attempt to per-
suade him into giving in to her. Further, one 
could point out that Angelo is not the only 
one tempted by Isabella, as she also charms 
the Duke when she kneels and begs him not 
to give Angelo the death sentence. The 
Duke suggests that Isabella has seductive 
power because he grants her wishes and par-
dons Angelo from death, and then he ex-
presses his love for her by proposing mar-
riage. This evidence alone certainly makes 
Isabella seem, in some way, seductive, and 
Angelo seem like a victim of manipulative 
flirting—but Angelo quickly shows that it is 
Isabella, not he, that is the victim. Angelo 
exploits his power and propositions Isabella 
because he thinks that he can get away with 
it. If she were to try to expose him, nobody 
would belief her word over his, due to his 
high status. William Lawrence points out 
that “[Angelo’s] readiness not only to put 
Isabella in her dreadful predicament in order 
to satisfy his lust, but also to break faith 
with her and to kill her brother, do not point 
to native virtue” (113). If one still tried to 
claim that Angelo is originally good-
intentioned, and only falls to evil measures 
due to his temptation for Isabella, I would 
refer to Lawrence’s statement: “One further 
piece of evidence seems to point to An-
gelo’s native baseness: his flat refusal to 
temper justice with mercy, and spare Clau-
dio, long before the dishonorable proposal is 
made to Isabella” (114). 
 It is surprising that Angelo is not 
more merciful toward Claudio, since he rec-
ognizes that “we are all frail” (Measure 
2.4.122). Angelo says: “Blood, thou art 
blood” (2.4.15). Bevington explains that 
Angelo is saying that “no position of author-
ity or birth, no matter how lofty, can protect 
a person from the instinctual power of de-
sire” (431). I would expect Angelo to have 
more sympathy for Claudio’s situation, 
since he, too, acted on lust. But instead of 
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 showing Claudio mercy, Angelo 
asserts that one cannot write “‘good 
angel’ on the devil’s horn” (Measure 
2.4.16). Angelo does not actually serve 
justice, though, because he punishes 
Claudio for personal, not ethical, reasons. 
Simmons points out that Angelo “does not 
apply the law in any consistent manner. In 
his application of the laws, people suffer 
unequally depending on his arbitrary, biased 
perceptions of them” (283). 
 One could still argue that Angelo 
must have been good-intentioned, though, 
or else Isabella would not have begged the 
Duke to pardon him. Isabella claims that she 
partly thought that “A due sincerity gov-
erned his deeds, / Till he did look on 
me” (Measure 5.1.454-455). It is important 
for one to remember, though, that Isabella 
only asks for him to be pardoned after 
Mariana begs her to do so, so that she won’t 
be left without a husband. Isabella, being 
the devout Christian that she is, is of course 
willing to forgive Angelo, especially at the 
request of poor Mariana, whom Angelo 
quickly left when she lost her dowry in a 
shipwreck. The fact that Isabella has sympa-
thy for Mariana and forgives Angelo does 
not relieve him of the guilt that he has ac-
quired from his selfish, menacing dealings. 
 While Angelo appears pious by pun-
ishing lechery, he forgets that his God is 
merciful. Angelo certainly does not engen-
der this quality. Through his treatment of 
Claudio, Isabella, and Mariana, Angelo 
demonstrates that his own selfish interests 
are more important to him than anyone else. 
Angelo is greedy, power-hungry, and un-
just. He abuses his authority and takes ad-
vantage of other people. From the beginning 
of the play on, his intentions are solely to 
gain and demonstrate power, and to look out 
for his own interests, at the expense of oth-
ers if necessary. If one is tempted to inter-
pret Angelo as good-intentioned, one should 
consider that his selfish, hypocritical, and 
corrupt ruling pushes Isabella to run to the 
Duke, begging for “justice, justice, justice, 
justice!” (Measure 5.1.26). 
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I. Introduction 
       The foundation of civil liberty in 
modern democratic societies is the due proc-
ess of law, the guarantee that no person shall 
be deprived of his or her freedom without a 
just cause, nor receive any punishment not 
duly and legally prescribed, nor suffer any 
punishment that would be inhumane or de-
structive of dignity.  In the United States 
equal justice for all people before the law, 
during times of peace and war, is enshrined 
not only in the Constitution but also in the 
international laws that bind us and connect 
us with the rest of the world.  The promise 
of fair and equal justice is one of the princi-
ples our country was founded upon and an 
ideal that should earn us the respect and ad-
miration of the world.     It is, however, an 
ideal, one that Americans and citizens of 
other free nations have done too little to 
make an everyday reality.  Arbitrary arrests, 
unfair trials, torture and degrading treatment 
are not remnants of the distant past, and nei-
ther are they the sole province of oppressed 
countries controlled by strongman dictators.  
For democratic societies they are not entirely 
new, either.  In the United States, for exam-
ple, the use of torture in correctional facili-
ties and by police officers throughout the 
country has not been uncommon in the last 
several decades (Conroy 33).  The torture of 
captured enemies during wartime by Ameri-
can soldiers occurred as well, during the 
Vietnam War (Greer 372). 
 These violations, however shameful, 
do not approach the scope or scale of the 
most recent assault against the principle of 
due process in the United States.  Beginning 
during the immediate the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, 
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 and ending only with its departure 
from power in January 2009, the 
administration of President George 
W. Bush placed suspected terrorists un-
der arrest for indefinite periods of time 
in a manner contrary to the laws of war, 
denied those prisoners fair trials, authorized 
the use interrogation techniques, such as 
stress positions and simulated drowning 
(also called “waterboarding”) that are tortur-
ous or degrading to human dignity, and sent 
suspected terrorists overseas for the purpose 
of interrogations where torture had a high 
likelihood of occurring (the so-called 
“extraordinary renditions”).  The Bush ad-
ministration asserted that these acts are le-
gally justified by presidential military au-
thority and beyond the ability of any law to 
prevent (Greer 384).  One effect of these ac-
tions was to reduce the importance of obey-
ing international law and respecting the hu-
manity of prisoners in the minds of Ameri-
can personnel, leading to situations where 
abusive behavior went beyond the original 
intent of the administration, such as the infa-
mous abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
Prison in Iraq by American military police 
(Gourevitch 103).    
  It is tempting, in times of great na-
tional crisis, to act with less restraint than 
the principles of justice would otherwise al-
low.  Let it not be said that Al Qaeda is not a 
serious threat, because it does pose a grave 
danger, and in a way that the United States is 
not used to fighting against.  It is true that 
international terrorist networks cannot be 
defeated with conventional military doctrine, 
but that doesn’t mean that Americans have 
to abandon these principles, especially not 
for the sake of measures which may seem 
very effective and “tough” but are actually 
counterproductive.   The closest historical 
analog to the behavior of the Bush admini-
stration towards prisoners is the internment 
of Japanese-American citizens during the 
Second World War, supposedly to prevent 
sabotage, a decision which was ordered by 
President Roosevelt and backed by the Su-
preme Court.  It is well-known today that the 
danger of sabotage was very small and the 
internment is considered one of the great 
shames of the United States’ history. The 
mistreatment of detainees and disregard for 
international law over the past several years 
has not only been unnecessary but may have 
actually strengthened our enemies, and there 
is little doubt that the attempts to institution-
alize and legally justify the use of torture 
will also go down as one of the most shame-
ful parts of American history. 
 Other countries that have tried to cir-
cumvent the rule of law during times of war 
or national crisis have suffered for it.  The 
experimental tactics used by the United 
Kingdom against Irish Catholics only exac-
erbated the threat of the Irish Republican 
Army and left a black mark on British his-
tory.  The Israeli government’s attempts to 
institute legal coercive interrogations in a 
limited manner led to a spiraling pattern of 
systemic abuse.  Both cases illuminate dif-
ferent ways that ignoring international law 
can and has harmed the interests of the 
United States. 
 The indefinite detention of so-called 
“unlawful enemy combatants,” denying such 
persons access to impartial courts when they 
are in custody, and the use of certain interro-
gation techniques amounting to torture and 
degrading treatment are all violations of 
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 multiple instruments of interna-
tional law.  They have also hurt the 
interests of the United States by dam-
aging its reputation and moral authority 
abroad and encouraging ordinary people 
of foreign nations to take up arms against 
us.  It will benefit the United States to ob-
serve international law in all future endeav-
ors. 
II. Overview of International Law  
Regarding Prisoners 
1.Introduction 
 International law comes in many 
forms; unlike municipal (i.e., domestic) law, 
there is not an orderly hierarchy of official 
law-making bodies in international politics, 
and for that reason international law arises 
from the consensus of states.  Treaties are 
written agreements among two or more 
states, and in modern times they are proba-
bly the most important type of international 
law (Shaw 89).1 A large number of treaties 
that regulate state behavior towards prison-
ers are binding on the United States, many 
of which reflect broader principles and ide-
als.  For that reason, it will be sufficient to 
focus on treaties in an analysis of what inter-
national laws regulate how the United States 
must treat detainees in the war on terror. 
      There are two major types of interna-
tional law that affect how states must treat 
those in their power: humanitarian law and 
human rights law.  International humanitar-
ian law, more formally known as jus in 
bello, regulates state practice in times of 
war; it prescribes how states must treat pris-
oners of war and civilians in occupied terri-
tories, among other things (Shaw 1055).  
International human rights law regulates the 
way states treat people in their power in gen-
eral; in many cases such law explicitly for-
bids the derogation of certain rights even 
during wars or emergencies (256).  Treaties 
representing both types of law are binding 
on the United States and thus are relevant to 
its conduct in the war against terrorism.      
2. Categories of protected persons 
      The Four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and their Additional Protocols are the 
core of international humanitarian law, and 
are universally recognized as law (ICRC).  
They prescribe legal protections for any 
imaginable class of person who may come 
under the control of a belligerent power in 
the course of an armed conflict.  The Third 
1949 Geneva Convention (hereafter GC III) 
protects prisoners of war.  Its provisions ap-
ply during any period of international armed 
conflict, regardless of the existence of an 
official declaration of war or recognition of 
a state of war by any party to the fighting.  
GC III defines “prisoners of war” to include 
regular soldiers of a party to the conflict, 
duly authorized civilian crews, laborers, cor-
respondents, and mechanics that accompany 
military units, and members of the merchant 
marine. Also included are members of mili-
tias or resistance movements that follow cer-
tain rules: having a clear command structure; 
wearing a distinctive mark that can be distin-
guished from a distance; carrying arms 
openly; and obeying the laws and customs of 
warfare. Also included are soldiers of a gov-
ernment not recognized by a Detaining 
Power, which don’t necessarily need to meet 
all the same conditions as militias to qualify 
for POW treatment.   Furthermore, belliger-
ent captives whose status under GC III are in 
doubt must be treated as if they qualify as 
prisoners of war until a “competent 
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 tribunal” can determine otherwise.   
      The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion (hereafter GC IV) protects civil-
ians not otherwise protected by the 
other three conventions and who are in 
the power of a foreign state during a war 
or occupation, if they are nationals of a 
state belligerent to the conflict.  Persons that 
participate in a conflict without qualifying 
for protection under GC III would, if they 
are nationals of a state party to the conflict, 
be entitled to the protections of GC IV 
(Dormann 50).  The First Additional Proto-
col to the Geneva Conventions (hereafter AP 
I) provides additional rules for the conduct 
of international conflicts. It has not been 
ratified by the United States, but some of its 
provisions, notably Article 75, are com-
monly regarded as reflecting customary in-
ternational law and are thus binding regard-
less (Sands 150).  Article 75 describes 
“Fundamental Guarantees,” the basic rights 
accorded to anyone in the power of state 
party to a conflict who is not otherwise pro-
tected by another provision of AP I or any of 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Civilian 
nationals of a state that is not a party to a 
given conflict, for example, would not qual-
ify for protected person status under the 
Conventions and would therefore fall under 
Article 75’s protection.  Article 75 (or more 
precisely the customary law it reflects, in the 
case of the United States) thus makes it im-
possible for anyone to be in the power of a 
state without having some guarantee of pro-
tection under international humanitarian law 
(Dormann 73). 
     In the early days of the United Na-
tions two legal instruments were created 
which were vital to the later development of 
major human rights treaties. The first is the 
UN Charter itself, which states that the UN 
should support universal observance of hu-
man rights in Article 55. The second is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, which proclaimed a universal standard 
of rights that should be observed and pro-
tected.  At the time these were not enforce-
able in any meaningful way, although they 
may have become binding to an extent since. 
Their chief importance lies in the road they 
paved toward more concrete legal instru-
ments later on (Shaw 261). 
       The major human rights treaties 
which regulate state behavior towards de-
tainees are the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) 
and the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture, both of which the United States has 
ratified (OHCR).  According to General 
Comment 31 of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, states parties to the ICCPR have an obli-
gation to ensure the rights of all people in 
their jurisdiction or effective control, even if 
they are outside said state’s territory.  Article 
5 of the Torture Convention likewise enjoins 
all state parties to outlaw torture in any terri-
tories under their jurisdiction. 
3. General rights and treatment 
        Part II of GC III describes in gen-
eral terms the rights of POWs, in that they 
are to be treated humanely, given appropri-
ate medical care, and treated without undue 
discrimination.  Part III, which includes Ar-
ticles 17-107, describes POW rights in 
greater detail.  Prisoners of war are only re-
quired to provide accurate information about 
their identities, including, name, rank, and 
social security number or equivalent.  Their 
quarters must be as good as those of  
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 soldiers of the Detaining Power in 
the same area, particularly regarding 
space and bedding allowed, and must 
not be deleterious to the health of pris-
oners, and are not to be located in a 
place that is especially close to combat 
zones.  Food and water must be provided 
sufficiently to keep the prisoners healthy and 
prevent weight loss, and clothing suitable for 
the local climate must be given to the prison-
ers and repaired or replaced as is necessary.  
Camps must be clean and sanitary, and have 
necessary facilities for the medical treatment 
and monthly inspection of prisoners.  All 
prisoners must be allowed to practice their 
religion, and if there is no clerical official to 
provide appropriate services among the pris-
oners then one must be provided by the De-
taining Power.  Discrimination based on 
race, religion, nationality, or language is 
prohibited.  Prisoners must be able to write 
letters to their families informing them of 
their situations whenever they are captured, 
transferred to another camp, or hospitalized, 
and they must be allowed to receive letters 
and send at least two letters of their own per 
month, barring difficulties in procuring 
translators and censors.   
      GC IV allows for the internment of 
persons protected by its provisions only if 
necessary to military security, and guaran-
tees internees largely the same set of rights 
that prisoners of war have under GC III.  It 
states in Article 5 that, unlike GC III, a pro-
tected person engaged in or definitely sus-
pected of hostile activities may be detained 
without being entitled to certain rights other-
wise guaranteed if they would be harmful to 
the security of the occupying power, such as 
the right to communication, although full 
protection must be restored as soon as possi-
ble. 
      Part III of the ICCPR, covering Arti-
cles 6-27, guarantees the right to life, protec-
tion against degrading treatment, discrimina-
tion, and slavery, the right to freedom and 
practice of religion, the right to recognition 
as a person under the law, and the right hu-
man treatment and respect for their dignity 
to everyone under the jurisdiction of a state 
party to the Convention.  According to Arti-
cle 4 certain derogations may be made from 
the Convention only if required by an emer-
gency situation; Article 4 also states that 
such derogations can not be applied toward 
the rights to freedom from torture and dis-
crimination, or the right to free exercise of 
religion. 
4. Fair trial rights 
      GC III provides that prisoners of war 
who are accused of crimes must have fair 
trials in regularly constituted, independent, 
and impartial courts, by the same procedures 
under which soldiers of the detaining power 
would be tried.  Proceedings must be held as 
quickly as possible, and if it is necessary to 
confine a prisoner before said proceedings 
such confinement must last no longer than 
three months.  POWs on trial have the right 
to a qualified advocate,  meet said advocate 
in private, call witnesses in their defense, 
and appeal decisions.  POWs convicted of 
crimes must have their sentences served in 
the same facilities and in the same manner as 
soldiers of the Detaining Power in equiva-
lent situations.  Persons who are protected 
by GC IV have largely the same trial rights 
as prisoners of war, and if convicted should 
be kept separate from other detainees.  Arti-
cle 75 of AP I prohibits any sentence or 
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 punishment from being carried out 
“except pursuant to a conviction 
pronounced by an impartial and regu-
larly constituted court respecting the 
generally recognized principles of regu-
lar judicial procedure…” 
      Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits 
arbitrary detention, mandates that anyone 
charged with a crime be “entitled to a trial 
within a reasonable time…,” and states that 
anyone under arrest has the right to have a 
court review the lawfulness of the arrest and 
order him freed if it is illegal.  Article 14 
guarantees the rights of all persons facing 
criminal charges to a legally established, in-
dependent, impartial court, to be presumed 
innocent before being found guilty, to sum-
mon witnesses in his defense, and to exam-
ine witnesses against him. 
5. Prohibitions against torture and other 
degrading treatment 
      GC III prohibits the use of torture as 
an interrogation method in Article 17 and as 
a method of punishment in Article 87, and in 
Article 130 lists torture as a “grave breach” 
of the Conventions requiring state parties to 
find and bring to trial anyone accused of 
committing it.  Article 32 of GC IV prohibits 
causing physical suffering of protected per-
sons, including torture, and like GC III lists 
torture as a “grave breach” in Article 147.  
Article 75 of AP I prohibits torture and de-
grading treatment under any circumstances 
whatsoever.   Article 7 of the ICCPR prohib-
its torture and degrading treatment, and Arti-
cle 4 lists this as a right that may not be 
derogated in a time of national crisis or 
emergency. 
      The Convention against Torture, as 
might be expected, goes into much greater 
depth on this issue than other relevant trea-
ties.  It defines torture in Article 1 as: 
any act by which severe pain or suf-
fering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. 
 
      Article 2 requires state parties to 
take effective measures to ban torture and 
states that nothing whatsoever, even a public 
emergency, can justify torture.  Article 3 
bans sending a person to another country 
where there is a real danger of that person 
being tortured.  Article 5 declares that the 
illegality of torture must extend to all territo-
ries under the jurisdiction of the state parties 
or onboard ships and aircraft registered to 
the state parties.  Article 10 states that any-
one involved in the treatment of detainees 
should be educated on the prohibition of tor-
ture, and Article 11 requires state parties to 
review rules and practices of detention and 
interrogation with an eye toward preventing 
torture.  Article 16 additionally requires state 
parties to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment 
which do not amount to torture as defined in 
article 1” from being committed by public 
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 officials in territories under their 
jurisdiction. 
6. Execution and enforcement 
a. The Red Cross 
 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC or Red 
Cross) is an international non-governmental 
organization that has provided assistance to 
prisoners and the wounded in times of war 
for since the mid-nineteenth century.  It has 
been closely involved with the creation, im-
plementation, execution, and enforcement of 
most instruments of international humanitar-
ian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and their predecessors (Shaw 1163).   
      International law provides the 
ICRC a special legal mandate to perform 
humanitarian functions during times of inter-
national armed conflict.  GC III guarantees 
the ability of the ICRC to act as a neutral 
protecting power during a conflict; this en-
tails the authority to ensure the shipments of 
mail and relief to and from places of intern-
ment, receive reports about the labor condi-
tions of prisoners, and propose the creation 
of a Central POW Information Agency, 
among others.  Article 125 of GC III com-
mits state parties to assist charitable organi-
zations, especially the ICRC, deliver relief to 
POWs.  Article 126 states that ICRC dele-
gates must have the ability to visit any place 
where prisoners of war are held, employed, 
or transported without restriction and to hold 
interviews with prisoners in private. These 
liberties are not contingent on the ICRC be-
ing recognized as a protecting power by the 
detaining power in question.  GC IV pro-
vides similar powers to the Red Cross re-
garding inspections, relief, and insurance of 
shipments to and from places where persons 
under its protection are detained.   
      Unfortunately, the ICRC is limited 
in its ability to publicly protest against viola-
tions that it observes because of its tradi-
tional stance on confidentiality.  It maintains 
neutrality in order to more fully guarantee its 
access to prisoners, refugees, and other per-
sons that may require its help, so the ICRC 
has very rarely made public its knowledge of 
transgressions against international humani-
tarian law (Shaw 1079). 
b. Prescriptions for domestic enforcement 
    The Geneva Conventions also place 
certain responsibilities on state parties with 
respect to their enforcement.    Both GC III 
and IV require the dissemination of the text 
of the conventions in both peace and war, as 
well as the inclusion of their study in 
courses of military and civil instruction.  
Personnel that have responsibility for pro-
tected persons must have access to copies of 
the conventions at all times and receive spe-
cial instruction as to their provisions.  State 
parties are also required to provide effective 
legal sanctions against committing grave 
breaches,2 bring any person accused of a 
grave breach to trial regardless of national-
ity,3 and to otherwise suppress all acts con-
trary to the Conventions that are not grave 
breaches.   
 The ICCPR requires state parties to 
protect each right guaranteed by its provi-
sions by the force of domestic law.  Articles 
4 and 5 of the Convention against Torture 
require state parties make torture illegal un-
der domestic law and do whatever is neces-
sary to establish jurisdiction over torture in 
any territory under is control.  Articles 6 and 
7 mandate that states parties must arrest any 
person alleged to have violated the  
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 convention and either extradite that 
person or put the case to its own au-
thorities for the purpose of prosecu-
tion.4 
c. Treaty mechanisms 
 Since there was no pre-existing 
organization like the ICRC to manage is-
sues of human rights law, the ICCPR and the 
Torture Convention both set up special com-
mittees with enforcement duties.  Part IV of 
the ICCPR, comprising Articles 28-45, man-
dates the creation of a Human Rights Com-
mittee, whose members are elected by and 
from the states parties to the Covenant.   
State Parties are required to submit reports 
on their efforts to guarantee the rights listed 
in the CCPR one year after it enters into 
force, and the Committee has the power to 
request further reports at any time after-
wards.  The Committee may also receive 
complaints from one state party about an-
other’s alleged failure to fulfill its obliga-
tions under the CCPR and attempt to solve 
any such dispute by mediating negotiations 
between the parties involved if it decides 
that all domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted or unreasonably delayed.5  In cases 
where the Committee is unable to resolve 
and issue it may appoint an ad hoc Commis-
sion to further attempt to create an amicable 
solution.   The Committee also has the re-
sponsibility to submit an annual report of its 
activities to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.  The Committee can issue 
General Comments that explain and interpret 
the Covenant’s provisions; General Com-
ment 31, mentioned above, is an example of 
such a comment.   
      Article 17 of the Convention against 
Torture prescribes the creation of the Com-
mittee against Torture, a body consciously 
modeled on the Human Rights Committee of 
the ICCPR (Nowak 586).  State parties must 
submit reports to this Committee not just 
one year after the Convention enters into 
force for them but every four years thereaf-
ter as well, in addition to whatever other re-
ports the Committee requests.  In cases 
where well-founded evidence indicates the 
possibility of torture being carried the Com-
mittee can invite the state party concerned to 
cooperate in examining the evidence and 
making observations based upon it.  If it is 
warranted, the Committee may also make a 
confidential inquiry into the matter, which 
may involve visiting the territory of the state 
party in question.  It has similar powers to 
the Human Rights Committee regarding the 
power to mediate disputes between state par-
ties if domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted, and it may also receive communica-
tions from individuals claiming to be victims 
of violations of the Convention if a state 
party with jurisdiction over said individuals 
recognizes the competence of the Committee 
to do so.      
d. UN organizations 
     There are also other organizations 
that are outside of the specific framework of 
the relevant treaties, which are important to 
monitoring and investigating the way prison-
ers and detainees are treated throughout the 
world, including official bodies of the 
United Nations.  One such organization is 
the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (hereafter OHCHR), which is 
the primary executive body of the United 
Nations responsible for human rights.  It co-
ordinates and organizes the efforts of all the 
UN groups with some responsibility for  
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 human rights (Forsythe 4). 
       The Human Rights Council, 
a subsidiary body of the United Nations 
General Assembly, was created in 2006 
in order to more effectively address hu-
man rights violations throughout the world. 
It took over the task from its predecessor, 
the Human Rights Commission, which came 
under intense criticism for the poor human 
rights record of some of its members.  The 
institution of the Council, a body with largely 
similar powers, intended to ameliorate that 
problem by having its members elected by the 
General Assembly (76). It is tasked with per-
forming “Universal Periodic Review,” a proc-
ess that entails the cooperative examination of 
human rights situations in all member states of 
the United Nations.  The Council may also 
receive and discuss credible communications 
regarding “consistent patterns of gross and 
reliably attested violations of all human rights 
and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any 
part of the world and under any circum-
stances,” if domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted. The Human Rights Council also has 
the power, inherited from the Commission, to 
establish “special procedures,” which are man-
dates that empower their holders (who are usu-
ally expert individuals) to investigate, advise, 
and make public reports on specific areas of 
their expertise.  Such mandates may be as-
signed either to specific countries or to the-
matic issues relating to human rights (Shaw 
283). 
      There is such a mandate regarding tor-
ture; the title of the person holding that man-
date is “Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”  According to the official web 
page on the OHCHR’s web site, the Special 
Rapporteur has the responsibility to transmit 
appeals and other communications regarding 
torture to state governments, perform fact-
finding missions, and make annual reports to 
the Council and the UN General Assembly.  
He or she can act with far more independence 
than most other legally established human 
rights entities, including the Human Rights 
Council itself, because he or she is not bound 
by the constraints of the usual exhaustion of 
domestic remedies rule (Weissbrodt 693). 6 
e. NGOs 
      There are, of course, many important 
organizations dedicated to protecting human 
rights and investigating breaches of interna-
tional law that are not affiliated with the 
United Nations or any government at all.  Two 
of the most important non-governmental or-
ganizations (or NGOs) that concern them-
selves with the treatment of prisoners and de-
tainees are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International. 
      Human Rights Watch has a relatively 
small membership, made up of about 230 ex-
perienced and influential professionals.  It 
works to promote human rights by conducting 
investigations into alleged abuses of all sorts 
throughout the world, publishing their findings 
publicly (unlike the Red Cross) in order to 
shame and embarrass abusers through media 
attention, and encouraging them to make re-
forms (Korey 309). Through its fact-finding 
and lobbying it also seeks to influence govern-
ments and international organizations through-
out the world, especially the United States 
government (344). 
      Amnesty International, by contrast, is 
a mass-movement organization that draws its 
influence from large grassroots membership.  
Amnesty International performs many activi-
ties draws its influence from large grassroots 
membership.  Amnesty International performs 
many activities  
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 similar to those of Human Rights 
Watch, such as fact-finding, observa-
tion, appealing to governments and re-
porting its findings publicly and widely;  
it also mobilizes its large numbers for 
other tasks, such as large-scale demonstra-
tions, petitions, letter-writing campaigns, 
and protests against policies that infringe on 
human rights (Clark 9).  Amnesty Interna-
tional focuses special attention on prisoners 
that have been illegally detained or abused 
while in custody, although it deals with other 
human rights issues as well (12). 
f. Legal prosecutions and punishments All of 
the aforementioned executive bodies, commit-
tees, and NGOs perform vital tasks such as 
fact-finding, publishing, and engaging with 
abusive actors to change their policies.  Let it 
not be said that what they do is unimportant; 
their operations are necessary to uncovering 
and preventing illegal abuses of detainees.  
None of them, however, have the responsibil-
ity or the power to enforce international law 
the way “enforcement” is commonly thought 
of in domestic law: arresting, charging, trying, 
and punishing individuals that make transgres-
sions against the law.  Historically, that task 
has fallen, for better or for worse, to state gov-
ernments.  
      If an individual commits or orders to 
be committed an act of abuse against a pris-
oner of war, then obviously the government of 
the state to which he is a national has the right 
and duty to put that individual on trial for the 
crime.  If the abuse is ordered or condoned at 
the highest levels of government then, of 
course, there is little chance of such a prosecu-
tion actually taking place.  There is no univer-
sally applicable system of sanction and pun-
ishment in international law as exists in do-
mestic law (Shaw 4).  Therefore, in such situa-
tions the responsibility for capturing and 
prosecuting alleged abusers has usually fallen 
to some other state or group of states, accord-
ing either to the principle of prosecuting of-
fenses committed against themselves or the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. 
      Two of the most important examples 
of the former principle at work are the Tokyo 
and Nuremberg trials of German and Japanese 
leaders and soldiers after the Second World 
War.7  That a state has a legitimate right to 
prosecute those who are alleged to have com-
mitted war crimes against them or their nation-
als, so long as fair trial standards are applied, 
is a longstanding principle of international law 
appealed to by the Allies to justify the trials.   
The “victors’ justice” challenge, the assertion 
that a court is illegitimate because it has been 
created by the winners of a war to judge the 
defeated, was presented by the defendants at 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other ad hoc interna-
tional courts throughout history, but never 
with any success (Boister 32).  The claim that 
the Allies were legally unable to combine their 
jurisdiction and form a single court, which was 
presented by the defendants at the beginning 
of the Tokyo trials, was unanimously dis-
missed out of hand by the court (178).  
      State governments clearly have a legal 
right to prosecute alleged war criminals, in-
cluding POW abusers,8 and may combine their 
jurisdictions into a single court. These rights 
were exercised in the post-World War II trials.  
The manner in which those rights were used, 
however, left much to be desired regarding 
fairness.  The trials were conducted as military 
tribunals, even if they were of an international 
character, and therefore would probably not 
pass the requirements for a fair and independ-
ent court required by the ICCPR and the Ge-
neva Conventions.  The charters which estab-
lished the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
allowed them to ignore “technical rules of 
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 evidence” and admit anything they 
deemed to have relevance to the 
case in Articles 19 and 13, respec-
tively.9  The Tokyo Tribunal in particu-
lar suffered from a host of problems, 
including inter alia political and ethnic 
bias on the part of the judges, the dispro-
portionately high rejection rate of the de-
fense’s evidence, the abnormal length of the 
trial, and the relative lack of time and re-
sources available to the defense.  It did not 
come close to meeting fair trial standards, 
even at the time when it took place (Boister 
89-114).  Regardless of the importance of 
these trials to the development of modern 
international law, as a model for carrying out 
that law today they are sorely lacking. 
      The latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury has seen the increasing adoption of the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which 
holds that certain crimes are so heinous that 
any court may charge, try and convict an 
offender regardless of the territorial limits of 
its jurisdiction.  War crimes, including grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, have 
fallen under universal jurisdiction since 
1945 (Shaw 595).  Article 7 of the Conven-
tion against Torture arguably gives states 
parties the authority to prosecute alleged tor-
turers even when they are not nationals and 
the alleged crimes are claimed to have oc-
curred outside the territory state in question.  
During the famous Pinochet extradition 
hearings, British judge Lord Millet even 
claimed that the prohibition of torture by 
custom afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to national courts even without taking into 
account treaty law (599).  The application of 
this principle relies on alleged offenders be-
ing within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state government that is willing to prosecute 
them, and some governments are more sup-
portive of the doctrine than others.  Belgium, 
for example, has made universal jurisdiction 
an explicit part of its national law. Several 
world leaders accused of crimes against hu-
manity have been charged by its courts, in-
cluding Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon and Paul 
Kagame, and Belgian courts have convicted 
several Rwandans of participating in geno-
cide (Macedo 3).  The United States govern-
ment, on the other hand, has been generally 
hostile toward the concept.  Some influential 
political and legal experts argue, not without 
some merit, that universal jurisdiction could 
be abused by state governments in order to 
threaten or punish foreign political oppo-
nents that would otherwise be protected by 
state sovereignty (6).  Many state govern-
ments will probably refuse to endorse uni-
versal jurisdiction because of such concerns, 
and so as a solution to the problem of pun-
ishing transgressors against international law 
the doctrine will be, by itself, inadequate. 
      In 2002 an institution was created 
that seeks, if not to solve, then at least to 
ameliorate some of the problems involved in 
enforcing international law by providing the 
services of a permanent and independent tri-
bunal, namely the International Criminal 
Court (hereafter ICC).  According to Article 
5 of the Rome Statute, the international legal 
instrument which created the ICC, it has ju-
risdiction over crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.  Article 6 defines “crimes 
against humanity” to include torture, mur-
der, rape, and imprisonment in violation of 
international law, while Article 7 defines 
“war crimes” to include grave breaches of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.   
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 Unfortunately, the United States 
has not ratified the Rome Statute, 
arguing that the independent prosecu-
tor may bring politicized charges 
against Americans who, since the 
United States is so heavily involved in 
world affairs, are more exposed than citi-
zens of other countries (Eleas 7).  Since 
2002 the U.S. government has actively op-
posed the ICC in a number of ways.  Con-
gress has passed an act that prevents federal 
agencies from cooperating with the ICC and 
prevents U.S. participation in peacekeeping 
missions where there is any danger that 
American personnel will be prosecuted by 
the ICC (11).  Therefore, it is unlikely be 
involved in the resolution of the issue of de-
tainees in the war against terrorism. 
7. Conclusion 
      Between the Geneva Conventions, 
their Additional Protocols, and the afore-
mentioned human rights treaties, there is no 
person, of any category, at any time, in any 
situation, anywhere in the world, during war 
or peace, who is not protected to some de-
gree by international law.  There can be no 
detainees or prisoners outside the law as far 
as the treaty obligations of the United States 
are concerned, regardless of their status as 
terrorists or criminals, and no matter 
whether they are held within or outside of 
U.S. territory. 
III. Violations Committed by the Bush 
Administration 
1. Introduction 
      Since the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, President Bush has authorized 
a series of military and intelligence opera-
tions known collectively as “the war against 
terrorism.”  In the course of this war mem-
bers of the United States military and intelli-
gence services have continuously, willfully, 
and systematically violated the rights of 
thousands of prisoners under both humani-
tarian law and human rights law, under the 
orders and condoning of top officials includ-
ing generals, members of the Cabinet, and 
the President.   
      American personnel have consis-
tently failed to perform adequate back-
ground checks needed to accurately deter-
mine whether detainees are POWs, crimi-
nals, or innocent civilians who were arrested 
by mistake or falsely implicated in military 
or terrorist activity.  The rights of habeas 
corpus and access to regularly established 
courts have been denied to prisoners in Iraq 
and Guantanamo Bay based on specious le-
gal reasoning, and hundreds of innocent peo-
ple have been detained for years before be-
ing released without charges.  Conditions in 
prisons run by Americans throughout the 
world have been inhumanely unhygienic and 
dangerous, sometime through neglect and 
sometimes as part of a deliberate plan to 
weaken the morale of prisoners prior to in-
terrogation.  Detainees have been subject to 
torture and inhuman, degrading treatment by 
Americans in the course of both interroga-
tions and disciplinary actions.  Some prison-
ers have also been subject to so-called 
“extraordinary renditions,” where they have 
been transported to other countries for the 
purpose of being interrogated and tortured 
by non-Americans.  In some cases American 
forces have extra-judicially killed prisoners 
or allowed them to be killed by allied forces.  
All of these actions are both morally outra-
geous and strictly prohibited by international 
law. 
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 2. Arrest without just cause  
a. Afghanistan 
     Even during the initial combat op-
erations in Afghanistan during 2001 
there were significant problems with the 
identification and processing of prisoners.  
A major element of these difficulties was 
the U.S.’s reliance on the Northern Alliance, 
a group of anti-Taliban militias.  The Alli-
ance provided the bulk of the ground troops 
during this period so that large numbers of 
American soldiers would not have to be 
committed, even though their forces had a 
history of brutality that rivaled their foes in 
the Taliban (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
5).  In the chaos and confusion of the war, a 
number of people were captured by Northern 
Alliance soldiers and then turned over to the 
Americans for interrogation who had very 
little or no connection at all with the Taliban 
or Al Qaeda, including travelers, relief 
workers, low-ranking foot soldiers, refugees, 
and religious teachers (30-38).   
     Pakistan was another nominal ally of the 
United States in the war against the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda. Pakistani soldiers and gov-
ernment officials proved themselves just as 
haphazard and careless in rounding up pris-
oners to be turned over to the United States 
as the Northern Alliance forces.  Thousands 
of refugees fled across the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border during the course of the war, 
and Pakistani soldiers arrested hundreds of 
them, mainly foreigners, and turned them 
over to the Americans on extremely spurious 
grounds.  As with the prisoners captured by 
the Northern Alliance, there were few peo-
ple of any real intelligence value among 
these prisoners, only a diverse mix of foot 
soldiers, religious scholars, and civilian refu-
gees (49). 
     The unreliability of American allies to 
adequately screen prisoners was exacerbated 
by the United States’ own policy of offering 
bounties for alleged members of the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda.  Numerous prisoners have 
testified that they were falsely accused of 
working with or for terrorist groups and then 
“sold” to the Americans (46).  For example, 
one Saudi Arabian explained that he crossed 
into Pakistan and was denied access to the 
Saudi embassy by Pakistani soldiers until 
they handed him over to the United States in 
exchange for money (Sebaii 45-46).  There 
is also evidence that Afghani warlords from 
the Northern Alliance have earned money 
for transferring suspected terrorists and low-
ranking Taliban fighters into American cus-
tody (Raman). 
     American personnel also made their own 
blunders when it came to identifying and 
capturing suspected terrorists in Afghani-
stan, the most incomprehensible being the 
arrest of five political prisoners that had pre-
viously been held by the Taliban.  Because 
these men were foreigners, the Northern Al-
liance forced them to remain in prison even 
after the Taliban had been driven off, sup-
posedly for their own safety.  Even though 
they had been imprisoned by the Taliban for 
being suspected anti-fundamentalist spies, 
American agents later took them prisoner 
and sent them to the Guantanamo Bay 
Prison (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
114).  
     Given the chaotic nature of war in gen-
eral, the especially disorganized nature of 
Afghanistan, and the obvious risks that 
unlawful and unwarranted arrests would 
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 arise from offering these bounties, 
the United States should have been 
extremely careful in examining the 
backgrounds of prisoners and checking 
the stories of those who claimed inno-
cence.  In fact, American officials were 
incredibly lax in this regard, assuming as a 
matter of course that most or all of the de-
tainees in U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan 
were guilty of committing or conspiring to 
commit acts of terrorism.  The tribunals 
mandated by GC III to determine whether a 
belligerent belonged to a protected category 
of persons were completely absent at this 
point in time (90). Without any legally-
prescribed mechanisms for determining who 
belonged in prison, the United States has 
held hundreds of people prisoner without 
any legally justifiable reason for unaccepta-
bly long periods of time before discovering 
or deciding that they are not threats and sub-
sequently releasing them without charge.   
     An example of the stubborn refusal of 
United States government officials to con-
sider that a prisoner might not be a terrorist 
during this time is the case of Mohammed 
Sadiq.  He was a civilian who was over 80 
years old when he was arrested by American 
soldiers, apparently because one of his fam-
ily members was suspected of working for 
the Taliban. Even he, as obviously harmless 
as he was, spent several months under arrest 
before the United States released him 
(Raman).  Many others whose innocence 
could have been determined by a brief inves-
tigation immediately after their capture were 
held prisoner in Afghanistan and Cuba for 
years before being released without charge. 
There was, for example, Khalid al Morghi, 
the son of a senior Saudi Arabian military 
officer, who took a leave of absence from 
his white-collar job to perform charitable aid 
work in Afghanistan – hardly the portrait of 
a hardcore terrorist, or any sort of combatant 
at all.  He was still held, first in Afghanistan 
and later in Guantanamo Bay, for over four 
years before being released (Worthington 
Guantanamo Files 54). 
     The “competent tribunals” required by 
GC III to determine the eligibility of prison-
ers for protection under humanitarian law 
did not appear until years after the war be-
gan, and even then they were too little, too 
late.  The Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nals that were announced in July 2004 suf-
fered from tremendous difficulties for a sev-
eral reasons.  First, the prisoners were de-
nied access to lawyers during the tribunals.  
Second, the court was allowed to hear secret 
evidence to which the prisoners had no ac-
cess.  Third, the tribunals were held far away 
from the battlefield and a long time after the 
persons in question had been captured, mak-
ing it very difficult for the defendants to call 
witnesses who might have known them to 
testify on their behalf. Finally, even when 
prisoners did provide addresses or telephone 
numbers for people that might have testified 
for them, the court apparently made no effort 
whatsoever to find them (267). 
     To sum up, the United States exhibited 
extreme negligence and willful disregard for 
international law in the way it processed al-
leged terrorists and criminals during the 
early part of the fighting in Afghanistan.  
The shocking thoughtlessness with which 
prisoners were initially assumed to be guilty 
and subsequently held in custody for months 
or years without an investigation was in di-
rect contravention of international  
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 humanitarian and human rights 
law10 and also offensive to common 
moral sensibilities.  The Bush admini-
stration and U.S. military and govern-
ment officials should have anticipated 
the possibility of wrongful arrests during 
a confusing and complicated war, but in-
stead displayed an attitude of unwarranted 
confidence that anyone under arrest must 
have done something to deserve it, an atti-
tude which it would carry into its handling 
of the long-term detention, trial procedures, 
and treatment of prisoners outside of Af-
ghanistan.  
b. Iraq 
     The Abu Ghraib prison facility was taken 
over by the United States in 2003, initially 
as part of the creation of a new Iraqi crimi-
nal justice system; most of the other prisons 
in the country had been ransacked beyond 
salvation by looters, and there were few 
other options available.  It was not intended, 
at first, to be used for detention operations 
by the American military (Gourevitch 19).   
     The increasing frequency of insurgent 
attacks in Baghdad caused American au-
thorities to change that policy.   Iraqis ar-
rested by American soldiers on patrol were 
put into Abu Ghraib because there was liter-
ally nowhere else for them to go, even 
though the prison’s location in a hostile area 
meant it came under mortar attack fre-
quently.  GC III provides that POW camps 
or other internment areas should not be lo-
cated in especially dangerous places, and the 
Red Cross determined that American per-
sonnel had not taken sufficient measures to 
offer protection from shelling to the prison-
ers (Greenberg 403).  Military prisoners and 
civilian prisoners were supposed to be han-
dled separately from each other, and offi-
cially there was an attempt to do that, with a 
temporary tent encampment meant specifi-
cally for the civilians.   However, the dis-
tinction between the two types of prisoners 
became less and less meaningful to the 
guards and administrators as the number of 
prisoners continued to increase beyond what 
they had been prepared to handle 
(Gourevitch 23).   
     Many prisoners were arrested on little 
evidence and were held long after they 
should have been released.  In 2003 Red 
Cross inspectors were told by intelligence 
officers that they believed well over half the 
prison population of Iraq was kept there mis-
takenly (Greenberg 388).  It was not uncom-
mon for American soldiers on patrol to ar-
rest anyone and everyone who was around 
during the aftermath of an attack.  Firing 
weapons in celebration was a fairly common 
practice in Iraq, and according to a member 
of the Justice Department’s Iraq rebuilding 
team, people were arrested for doing it 
(Gourevitch 23).  The biggest problem was 
that it was difficult for these people to get 
released from Abu Ghraib even after it was 
fairly apparent that they did not belong.  
Even when judges and lawyers arranged for 
a prisoner to be released, the military would 
sometimes prevent it from happening.  Some 
of the delays were probably just the result of 
bureaucratic errors, but the increasing de-
mand for useful intelligence about insur-
gents also started to contribute as well; often 
prisoners that would otherwise have been 
released were kept in the prison  because of 
supposed “intelligence value,” assessments 
that the top on-site civilian administrator put 
little stock in (24). 
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 The system of notification and in-
formation dissemination in Iraq was 
extremely flawed in 2003 as well.  It 
was rare for those making arrests to 
properly inform suspects or their fami-
lies of why they were being arrested or 
where they were taken, and the military 
usually failed to notify the families of sus-
pects detained while away from their homes 
that they had been arrested at all.  The 
ICRC, which otherwise would have helped 
notify families as quickly as possible, often 
received no or improperly completed paper-
work from the United States military, result-
ing in unnecessary delays (Greenberg 389). 
     Among all the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, 
the ones that arguably least deserved to be 
there were the mentally ill ones, of which 
there may have been as many as ten.  Many 
were delusional or schizophrenic, engaging 
in violent and unhygienic behavior that was 
unsafe for other prisoners, the guards, and 
themselves.  These people should have been 
in a mental hospital instead of a military 
prison, or at least under the care of qualified 
mental health professionals.  There were 
none at Abu Ghraib, and even though many 
potentially helpful drugs were available at 
the facility, without doctors to prescribe 
them guards just gave the mentally ill pris-
oners Benadryl and tried to deal with their 
behavior as best as they could (Gourevitch 
145). 
     Many prisoners who were not obviously 
innocent civilians, including insurgents and 
some former members of Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraqi military, which had been officially dis-
banded after the capture of Baghdad, were 
held by the United States officially as non-
POWs because they were not members of a 
military force of a State Party to the Geneva 
Conventions.  According to one interrogator, 
a senior intelligence official reported that 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had told him 
that insurgents were not protected by the Ge-
neva Conventions and all interrogation tech-
niques were usable, including dogs (211).  
Rather, their detentions were justified as the 
necessary imprisonment of those suspected 
of spying, sabotage, or other hostilities.  Ar-
ticle 5 of GC IV does allow such detentions, 
but the ICRC has always held that its provi-
sions should only be applied to exceptional 
cases and on an individual basis (33).  Ap-
plying it to the detention of thousands of 
prisoners at the same time may, arguably, 
have been within the letter of the law, but it 
was most certainly in violation of its spirit.   
     The American soldiers in Baghdad can be 
excused for being aggressive with initial ar-
rests; however, that people with no apparent 
connection to insurgents or terrorists were 
kept imprisoned instead of released quickly 
is unacceptable.  Especially in a war zone 
with a shortage of space for prisoners, there 
seems little rationale for detaining more peo-
ple than absolutely necessary.  The same 
overly confident attitude from Afghanistan, 
the idea that anyone who was put in jail by 
an American must have done something 
wrong, was combined with the chaotic state 
of the country, its new justice system, and 
the American command structure to create a 
situation where many innocent civilians 
were put in prison for far longer than they 
should have been. 
3. Indefinite Detention and Unfair Trials 
     The prison at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base, Cuba, has held over 750 prisoners 
since it opened in January 2002 (CBC).  
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 None of them had a fair trial or 
easy access to an impartial court 
while they were there, a situation that 
has famously been called a “legal black 
hole” (Steyn).  The legal basis for their 
imprisonment was President Bush’s Mili-
tary Order of November 13, 2001, which 
stated that any non-citizens of the United 
States could be detained, without any speci-
fied time limit, if the President believed they 
were involved in terrorism or if it was in the 
interests of the United States that they be 
detained (Greenberg 26).   
     The Bush administration chose Guan-
tanamo Bay as the location of the prison spe-
cifically to prevent the detainees from ever 
having access to an independent court in 
which they could challenge their detentions, 
complain about their treatment, or have a 
fair trial.  A memorandum submitted to the 
General Counsel of the Department of De-
fense on 28 December 2001, written by John 
Yoo and Patrick Philbin, who were both 
Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals at the 
time, demonstrates that quite clearly.  The 
memo argued that federal courts should not 
and probably would not find that they could 
exercise jurisdiction over an alien detained 
in Guantanamo Bay, and that chances were 
small that a judge would decide to grant a 
habeas corpus hearing in response to a peti-
tion filed by such a person (37).   
     Why was the administration so intent on 
preventing federal courts from having access 
to the detention camp?  Apparently, top offi-
cials had already decided that all of the pris-
oners were guilty, and they didn’t need or 
want any independent court to get involved 
and potentially challenge their decisions.  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for 
example, stated publicly in January 2002 
that the Guantanamo prisoners were 
“committed terrorists,” and later that same 
month said that the prisoners were among 
the worst, most violent criminals in the 
world.  American generals gave statements 
to similar effect about the prisoners as well 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 127).  
These statements were being made about 
people who had never appeared in a court of 
law, much less been convicted in a fair trial.     
     The simplest solution to preventing the 
detainees from filing for habeas corpus or 
otherwise justifying their release would have 
been to classify them as prisoners of war, 
which Secretary of State Powell indeed ar-
gued should have been done (Greenberg 
123). However, for reasons which will be 
explained below, the administration decided 
to classify them as “unlawful combatants” in 
an attempt to prevent the Geneva Conven-
tions from applying to them (Worthington 
Guantanamo Files 128).  The government 
was trying to have it both ways: locking up 
prisoners indefinitely and without putting 
them on trial as if they were POWs, but oth-
erwise behaving as if they were criminals. 
     The administration wasn’t entirely op-
posed to the idea of trials, but it wanted 
those trials on its terms and more or less un-
der its control.  The same Military Order that 
President Bush issued to justify the deten-
tion of suspected terrorists also provided for 
military tribunals to determine whether sus-
pected terrorists were guilty of war crimes, 
and that the danger to the United States 
posed by such persons necessitated that the 
rules of law and evidence in normal cases 
could not be applied.  According to the or-
der, appointments to said commissions 
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 would be made by the Secretary of 
Defense, and either he or the Presi-
dent could review and decide on the 
conviction or sentencing of a trial.  Fur-
thermore, any person subject to such a 
tribunal would be unable to appeal the 
decision in any American, foreign, or inter-
national court (Greenberg 25-28).  Because 
the judges would be military officers who 
take orders from the President they could 
never be truly independent of executive au-
thority (Koh “The Case Against Military 
Commissions” 339).  Military tribunals as 
prescribed by the President’s Military Order 
would almost certainly never meet the fair-
ness and independence requirements of ei-
ther the Geneva Conventions or the ICCPR. 
     One need not turn to hypothetical situa-
tions to see how unfair a trial by military 
commission would be, of course.  The first 
military trial of an “unlawful combatant” to 
be successfully concluded (in July 2008, 
more than six years after the Guantanamo 
prison opened) was the trial of Salim Ham-
dan, a man accused of working as a driver 
and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden.  (It 
was, in fact, because of his exclusion from 
parts of an earlier trial that the Supreme 
Court decided that military commissions 
violated the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld.)  The trial was riddled with 
problems, including the hearing of secret 
testimony behind closed doors, the accep-
tance of hearsay evidence of highly dubious 
validity, and the presentation of pointless, 
prejudicial evidence, supposedly meant to 
inform the jurors about the nature of Al 
Qaeda, but which served only as terrifying 
propaganda (Worthington “A critical over-
view”). 
     What’s worse, the court’s sentence seems 
to have no relationship with the reality of 
Hamdan’s detention.  A Pentagon spokes-
man has stated that even when Hamdan is 
finished serving his sentence,11  he may still 
be subject to potentially indefinite detention 
as an “enemy combatant”  (CNN).  This is 
nothing less than a mockery of justice and a 
demonstration of the paradoxical reasoning 
of the Bush administration.  Hamdan was 
deprived of prisoner of war rights for alleg-
edly violating the laws of war, but even after 
he has been convicted and punished accord-
ing to what passes for justice in Guan-
tanamo, the administration wants to hold 
him indefinitely as something other than a 
POW anyway.  This, at least as much as 
anything else, should prove that President 
Bush and his advisors did not care about jus-
tice or the rule of law, whether international 
or domestic, when it comes to the detainee 
victims of the war against terrorism. 
4. Torture 
a. Overview 
     Torture and activity degrading to human 
dignity have been used during the war on 
terror by the United States, at first, as inter-
rogation methods, in spite of the unequivo-
cal ban on such techniques by international 
law.  The use of such techniques was author-
ized at the highest levels of the civilian and 
military command structure (Greenberg 
360). 
b. Torture by American personnel 
i. Afghanistan 
     The use of torture and degrading treat-
ment began early on during military opera-
tions in Afghanistan, even before the official 
opening of any permanent prison sites.  No-
tably, in December 2001 John Walker 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
76 
82
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 Lindh, known colloquially in the 
U.S. media as “the American Tali-
ban,” was made to pose for humiliat-
ing photographs, threatened with death, 
taped to a stretcher while naked during 
interrogations, and denied medical treat-
ment for his injuries, including a bullet 
wound in his leg, for several days 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 82).    The 
office of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 
who was monitoring the interrogation 
closely, authorized the military interrogators 
in charge of Lindh to “take the gloves off” 
during the process (Roth and Worden 165).  
Another detainee who, like Lindh, immedi-
ately received extra attention from American 
soldiers and interrogators because of his race 
and nationality, was David Hicks, an Austra-
lian who fought for the Taliban.  Hicks has 
claimed in an official affidavit that shortly 
after he was handed over to American au-
thorities he had guns pointed at him and was 
threatened with death, and that later he was 
imprisoned onboard a naval ship where he 
was not given sufficient quantities of food.  
He also stated that he was transported to un-
known locations and forced to kneel in un-
comfortable positions for hours at a time 
while being struck by guards before being 
transported to the Kandahar prison (Bonner). 
     A permanent prison in Kandahar opened 
in January 2002, and for the first time a large 
number of prisoners were entered into the 
interrogation system.  At first the interroga-
tors tried to hew to the rules of behavior set 
by the Geneva Conventions and military 
regulations, but as the demand for useful 
intelligence increased they became more 
violent.  Many prisoners were physically 
beaten, restrained, had their fingers broken, 
or had hard objects thrown at their heads 
during interrogations.  Even these methods, 
brutal as they were, are relatively tame com-
pared to the most extreme techniques used 
by some interrogators outside the usual Mili-
tary Intelligence chain of command, includ-
ing Special Forces soldiers and agents of the 
CIA and FBI.  These extreme techniques 
included burning prisoners with scalding 
liquids and cigarettes, sexual violations, and 
application of electrical shocks.  Many pris-
oners asserted that these actions were often 
photographed and that those photographs 
were used in later interrogations to threaten 
prisoners (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
94-98).  
     The behavior of the prison guards was, if 
anything, even worse.  The relaxation of Ge-
neva Convention standards, combined with 
the general spirit of taking vengeance for the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, made the 
American guards especially prone to violent 
overreactions and arbitrary abuses.  Ameri-
can soldiers were told that their prisoners 
were “nobodies,” and at least one believed 
that if the Geneva Conventions had been ap-
plied and the prisoners labeled as “soldiers” 
then they would have been treated with more 
respect (Jehl).  Beatings were common re-
sponses to rule violations, and prisoners 
were often denied adequate amounts of sleep 
because of “inspections” during the night 
that forced them to stand outside in the cold.  
Even harsher exposure to extreme cold was 
not unheard of at Kandahar, either, as many 
prisoners stated that they were exposed to 
the cold while naked, and at least one had 
cold water thrown on his body during the 
night.  “Stress positions,” the binding of 
prisoners in a way meant to cause them 
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 physical pain, was also fairly com-
mon. 
     Psychological abuses also oc-
curred, often in tandem with the physi-
cal ones.  Prisoners were often forced to 
go naked while they were abused and 
were mocked and photographed in the proc-
ess.  Many had their beards, which are im-
portant to maintain for Muslims, shaved 
against their wills.  Although each detainee 
was given his own copy of the Koran, some 
guards damaged and desecrated the holy 
books in order to taunt them; yelling insult-
ing profanities about Islam and the Prophet 
Mohammed were fairly common as well 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 88). 
     The Kandahar facility was the main U.S.-
run prison in Afghanistan for only a few 
months, and in the spring of 2002 many de-
tainees were transferred from that location to 
the prison at Bagram Air Force Base, which 
has served as the central United States mili-
tary prison in the country ever since.  As a 
prison camp Bagram left much to be desired, 
with hastily thrown together cells and pens 
made from wood and barbed wire, and win-
dows boarded up with rusty sheets of iron 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 170). 
     The abuse from guards and interrogators 
did not improve during the transition from 
Kandahar, either.  Stress positions and sleep 
deprivation were incorporated into interroga-
tion routines as pressure to obtain intelli-
gence grew stronger.  Even the most well-
trained and ethical military interrogators 
went farther than they had before the move, 
keeping prisoners awake in long sessions for 
as long as the interrogators themselves could 
stay up, a process informally called 
“monstering.” The name reflected that these 
early interrogators considered it the worst, 
cruelest technique that they were willing to 
use.  When new, less experienced interroga-
tors were sent to work at Bagram they in-
creased the upper limit of sleep deprivation 
to 36 hours, ordered increased amounts of 
isolation and handcuffing outside of interro-
gation rooms, and generally allowed them-
selves to use other coercive techniques with 
greater frequency as time went by (Mackey 
471).  Unwarranted violence from the guards 
was as bad as it had ever been in Kandahar, 
if not worse, and the litany of beatings, hu-
miliations, religious insults, death threats, 
rapes, and electrical torture continued un-
abated (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
170). 
     The perhaps inevitable result of this cul-
ture of abuse was death; at least two Bagram 
inmates have died as a result of physical 
abuse from guards.  Both confirmed deaths 
were largely caused by reservists untrained 
in detention using powerful blows to the legs 
as disciplinary measures.  Mullah Habibul-
lah was shackled in a holding cell and struck 
in the legs repeatedly over several days be-
fore he succumbed to his injuries and died 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 188).  The 
second man, known only as Dilawar, was 
chained and beaten repeatedly for apparent 
non-compliance during an interrogation, and 
died after five days.  Official press releases 
ascribed the deaths only to heart attacks, but 
documentation from army doctors indicates 
that the damage to the legs was the most im-
portant factor (McCoy 126).  Two of the sol-
diers directly involved in the deaths were 
convicted of criminal abuse in 2005 and sen-
tenced to only a few months imprisonment; 
no officers were prosecuted at all (BBC 
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 News). 
ii. Guantanamo Bay 
     During most of the first year of its 
existence, interrogations at the Guan-
tanamo Bay detention facility were 
fairly mild.  During this time mistreat-
ment involved general conditions, like open
-air cages for living quarters and insufficient 
amounts of food, an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty leading to intense fear, and large 
amounts of verbal abuse from the guards 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 132).  The 
worst, most violent transgressions were 
committed by the Extreme Reaction Force, 
or ERF, a squad of soldiers in riot gear who 
would respond to minor or nonexistent mis-
behavior with incredible savagery.  Tarak 
Dergoul, a Guantanamo detainee that was 
frequently targeted by the ERF because he 
organized prisoner strikes, was so trauma-
tized by his experiences that he needed psy-
chological counseling after his release 
(Rose). 
     Conditions in Guantanamo became much 
worse in October 2002 when, due to frustra-
tions from the lack of good intelligence, Ma-
jor General Geoffrey Miller was appointed 
as the new commander of the base. His 
predecessor was considered “soft” for allow-
ing detainees to keep their Korans and criti-
cizing guards for committing verbal abuse 
(Goldenberg).  It was Miller that decided 
that the best way to obtain results was to co-
ordinate the activities of the Military Police 
guards and the Military Intelligence interro-
gators - as he put it, to “set the conditions.”  
This meant that every aspect of the lives of 
the detainees was geared toward making 
them “break” under interrogation.  In prac-
tice, this meant more beatings of 
“uncooperative” prisoners by guards, includ-
ing, the continued use of the ERF teams, and 
the institution of new interrogation routines 
involving prolonged exposure to extreme 
temperatures and sleep deprivation 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 193).  
     Miller’s appointment roughly coincided 
with high-level decisions to explicitly au-
thorize more violent forms of interrogation.  
In November 2002 Defense Secretary Rums-
feld responded positively to a request for 
new interrogation methods, explicitly allow-
ing such techniques as stress positions, sen-
sory and sleep deprivation, removing reli-
gious paraphernalia, the forced shaving of 
facial hair, and the use of dogs to frighten 
detainees.  Rumsfeld rescinded his authori-
zation several weeks later (Greenberg 237-
239).  According to an official log that was 
leaked to Time magazine, during that interim 
the harsh techniques were used against Mo-
hammed al-Qahtani, infamously known as 
the “twentieth hijacker” of the September 
11th attacks, including sleep deprivation and 
stress positions.  Additionally, female inter-
rogators would frequently invade his per-
sonal space in order to humiliate him.12  Re-
cently, the top legal military official in 
Guantanamo Bay has stated that she will not 
refer al-Qahtani to prosecution because the 
treatment he suffered amounts to torture 
(Woodward). 
     The administration was apparently 
pleased with the changes that General Miller 
had brought to Guantanamo Bay.  In Sep-
tember 2003, he was sent to Iraq in order to 
provide a similar overhaul to the interroga-
tion operations at the Abu Ghraib prison out-
side Baghdad, where the same practice of 
using the guards to constantly maintain an 
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 environment supposedly conducive 
to successful interrogations was in-
stituted and mentioned in the Army’s 
internal investigation of abuse 
(Goldenberg). 
iii. Iraq 
     An ICRC report released in 2004 and 
based on data gathered between February 
and November 2003 indicates that during 
that period in Iraq some level of brutality on 
the part of United States military personnel 
was present in every step of the detention 
process.  At the time of arrest soldiers would 
often threaten or strike suspects who had 
their hands cuffed behind their backs.  Dur-
ing transfers to prisons the treatment was 
even worse, as several severe beatings were 
reported, many resulting in serious injuries 
and a least one resulting in death.  At least 
two cases of major burns caused by forced 
contact with hot metal surfaces were also 
reported (Greenberg 390).  The very worst 
documented instances of mistreatment, 
which rose to the level of torture according 
to the Red Cross, occurred during interroga-
tions performed by members of the US 
Army’s Military Intelligence Corps. 
     The most common technique used by 
Military Intelligence (or MI) interrogators at 
Abu Ghraib was the solitary confinement of 
interrogation subjects in completely empty, 
totally dark rooms, for days at a time, while 
naked; cooperation with interrogators mer-
ited “rewards” such as beds, clothing, and 
light.  Other abusive methods observed by 
the Red Cross included sleep deprivation, 
binding of the hands in a manner that caused 
wrist wounds, and being forced to walk 
through the facility’s hallways while naked.  
The ICRC medical inspector discovered that 
several detainees had psychological prob-
lems, such as poor memory and suicidal ten-
dencies, which were judged to have resulted 
from the physical and mental stress of their 
interrogations (Greenberg 393). 
     Oddly enough, the report stated that the 
worst sorts of abuse mostly did not occur to 
detainees that were being held in regular 
prison facilities run by military police.  It 
noted that guards sometimes slapped or 
shoved detainees, and that one disciplinary 
measure used against detainees was forced 
exposure to the sun while handcuffed for as 
many as four hours, in addition to the more 
ordinary measures of temporary solitary 
confinement and withholding of cigarette 
rations (Greenberg 397).  That raises the 
question: Why was it that most of the sol-
diers charged and convicted with crimes in 
regard to the Abu Ghraib scandal were 
members of the Military Police Corps, and 
not MI personnel, when their behavior was 
relatively benign by comparison? 
     Part of the answer is that some MP 
guards were committing serious abuses that 
the ICRC apparently did not observe or col-
lect information about.  In accordance with 
General Miller’s transplanted Guantanamo 
policy the MPs took orders regarding pris-
oner treatment from interrogators, who con-
sisted mostly of MI personnel, but also 
anonymous officials thought to be working 
for the FBI or CIA, called OGA (for “other 
government agencies”) by the guards.  The 
MPs were responsible for maintaining the 
sleep deprivation of certain prisoners with 
yelling, door slamming, or loud music and 
taking away clothes from certain detainees 
and providing only women’s underwear for 
them to wear, in order to humiliate them.  
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
80 
86
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 Often the MPs were instructed to 
“soften up” detainees prior to inter-
rogations; how exactly was left to 
their discretion, but the most common 
method was forcing them to exercise for 
several minutes   (Gourevitch 98).  This 
behavior had psychological repercussions, 
not only for the prisoners but for the guards 
as well.  One MP guard described how the 
process had numbed him to the point where 
he was no longer shocked or repulsed by 
what he was asked to do. Torturing prisoners 
at the behest of interrogators had become a 
normal experience for him (104).  Given the 
deleterious effects on the moral sensibilities 
of the MPs, it is not surprising that they dis-
played unwarranted violence towards prison-
ers on their own later.   
     The best-known image of abuse from 
Abu Ghraib is a photograph of a man wear-
ing a poncho and hood, standing on a box 
with wires attached to his hands.  On No-
vember 3rd, 2003, the MPs had been told that 
this prisoner was lying about his identity and 
were instructed to make him to confess his 
real name.  At first his treatment was typical 
- sleep deprivation, yelling, stress positions, 
forced exercise.  Then, inactive electrical 
wires were tied to his fingers, and the pris-
oner was told he would be electrocuted if he 
fell off of the box he was standing on (177).  
It looks bad, and it is bad, but for all of the 
photograph’s infamy it doesn’t come close 
to being the worst abuse at the prison, even 
by the Military Police. 
     The most egregious acts carried out by 
MPs on their own initiative and not at the 
behest of interrogators took place a few days 
later.  A group of seven prisoners thought to 
have instigated riots out in the tents were 
transferred to the MI cells, and for several 
hours before the guards brought them to 
their cells they were stripped naked, beaten 
about the hands, feet, face and chest, ver-
bally assaulted, forced to form a “pyramid” 
or “dog-pile” while being photographed, and 
put in positions simulating sex and mastur-
bation.  The MPs had never committed 
abuse on that scale before, and they never 
did again (196).  It was unusual enough that 
several guards felt the need to report the in-
cident to superior officers, but none of them 
seemed to make much of it (200). 
     Because of reports of prisoner abuse, lax 
discipline, and prisoner escapes at Abu 
Ghraib, an investigation was launched.  The 
result was an Army document referred to as 
the “Taguba Report” after the general in 
charge of the investigation.  The report 
found that abuse of prisoners by guards had 
occurred; in addition to the aforementioned 
examples, improper use of military dogs, 
threatening detainees with rape and death by 
gunshot, and pouring phosphoric substances 
from chemical lights onto detainees were 
also described in the report.  Of the thirteen 
people named as suspects, two were civilian 
contractors, one was an MI sergeant, and the 
rest were all members of the Military Police, 
none above the rank of Staff Sergeant 
(Greenberg 417).  General Taguba also 
found that the guards at Abu Ghraib had in-
sufficient training in detention operations 
and the rules of international humanitarian 
law, and that copies of the Geneva Conven-
tions were not provided in sufficient num-
bers to American personnel or the prisoners, 
and that prison commander General Karpin-
ski had done too little to disseminate infor-
mation and prevent abuse.  He  
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 recommended an overhaul of oper-
ating procedures, training in deten-
tion and the laws of war for all per-
sonnel involved with prisons, and an 
inquiry into MI interrogators regarding 
their role in prison abuse (420).        
     When the shocking photographs of the 
abuse at Abu Ghraib taken by soldiers were 
leaked to the press and shown on national 
television some sort of action was necessary.  
Several Military Police and a few Military 
Intelligence soldiers were court-martialed 
and convicted of crimes such as assault, con-
spiracy, or dereliction of duty.  Only one 
commissioned officer, who was found inno-
cent, was court-martialed.  A few others 
faced fines and administrative reprimands, 
and Brigadier General Karpinski was de-
moted one rank and relieved of her com-
mand.  No one was charged with torture or 
war crimes.  No OGA or civilian interroga-
tors were ever brought to trial.  Brigadier 
General Jane Karpinski, the MP commander, 
was demoted one rank.  General Miller was 
never brought to account for his recommen-
dations, and senior officials were not held 
responsible for allowing the situation to de-
teriorate to such a level in the first place 
(270).  Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, 
who had authorized the use of extreme psy-
chological torture techniques that had been 
developed by the CIA without telling the 
MP commander or officers, faced no official 
consequences either (McCoy 134).  What 
the guards did in Abu Ghraib was wrong, 
and they should have been punished for it; 
using orders from a superior as a justifica-
tion for war crimes has been a non-starter 
since the Nuremberg trials.  However, that 
doesn’t mean that those who gave the orders, 
and those who created conditions where 
such orders could conceivable be given and 
carried out, do not bear any responsibility 
either. 
iv. Secret prisons 
     In addition to the major prisons in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Cuba, smaller prisons offi-
cially known as “black sites” that were oper-
ated by the Central Intelligence Agency ex-
isted in those countries and other places 
throughout the world, including Thailand 
and Eastern Europe.  These black sites were 
used for the purpose of detaining and inter-
rogating prisoners thought to possess espe-
cially important information about Al Qaeda 
or other terrorist organizations without any 
official oversight or acknowledgment of 
their existence.  The so-called “ghost” pris-
oners were held secretly, without access to 
lawyers, agents of the press, or representa-
tives of the Red Cross, and their CIA inter-
rogators were allowed to subject them to the 
same types of degrading and torturous meth-
ods that had been used in Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo (Priest “CIA Holds Terror Sus-
pects”).   
     Several “enhanced” interrogation tech-
niques were also officially authorized for use 
at the black sites in addition to what was 
standard elsewhere, including a severe form 
of stress positions that could be used on a 
prisoner for over forty hours at a time, con-
stantly dousing naked prisoners with cold 
water while locked in a cold cell, severe 
sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation and 
bombardment and, most infamously, water-
boarding.  This latter method involves bind-
ing a prisoner, covering his mouth, and 
pouring water onto his face in order to cause 
the same physiological and mental  
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 sensations as drowning.  These 
procedures were used against about 
a dozen prisoners believed to be sen-
ior members of Al Qaeda who pos-
sessed important information, including 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed (or “KSM”), 
who is regarded as the primary planner of 
the September 11th attacks (Ross).  Water-
boarding was used on three of these prison-
ers; KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri (Bradbury “Re: Applica-
tion of United States Obligations Under Ar-
ticle 16 of the Convention Against Torture” 
6).  Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times in 
August 2002, and KSM suffered it 183 times 
in March 2003, averaging out to approxi-
mately 3 and 6 waterboarding sessions per 
day, respectively (37). 
     The other ghost prisoners, while not sub-
jected to the most extreme “enhanced” tech-
niques, still suffered a great deal, especially 
the ones being held in the black sites of Af-
ghanistan.  Several prisoners who have been 
released from the secret prisons in that coun-
try reported multiple forms of torture and 
abuse, including sleep deprivation, starva-
tion, and exposure to extreme cold weather.  
One unidentified inmate of a secret prison in 
Afghanistan that was codenamed the “Salt 
Pit” had his clothing removed on the orders 
of a CIA interrogator and subsequently died 
of hypothermia in his cell during the night 
(Priest “CIA Avoids Scrutiny”). 
     The black sites represent the very worst 
excesses of the Bush Administration’s de-
tainee policy.  The level of torture, the se-
crecy and lack of accountability, and the to-
tal subversion of due process and interna-
tional law went beyond even the Guan-
tanamo Bay camp.  Fortunately, much like 
Guantanamo the black sites were ordered 
closed by an executive order of President 
Obama shortly after his inauguration.  Un-
fortunately, the fact that these senior Al 
Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed, underwent waterboarding and 
other forms of torture and degrading treat-
ment will immensely complicate their future 
trials. 
c. Extraordinary renditions 
     The term “extraordinary rendition” refers 
to the practice of secretly transporting a pris-
oner to another country, generally the same 
one where the prisoner in question was born, 
and giving him into the custody of that 
country’s security forces in order to be inter-
rogated and potentially prosecuted.  In itself 
the idea is not necessarily illegal, but since 
2001 the Bush administration has turned 
over many prisoners to foreign countries 
when there has been a high probability, or 
even an expectation, that they would be tor-
tured while in their custody, contravening 
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. 
     Renditions were practiced on a limited 
basis during the 1990s, exclusively for indi-
viduals with standing arrest warrants or in 
absentia convictions in foreign countries 
(usually Egypt), with safeguards to protect 
innocent people from rendition and some 
sort of assurance that torture would not take 
place, although even back then those assur-
ances were generally not worth much 
(Mayer).  As bad as the program was in the 
1990s, the flaws of the rendition program 
were magnified as its use was expanded af-
ter September 2001. 
     Under the Bush administration the CIA 
has renditioned several people only sus-
pected of terrorism, and in many cases the 
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 evidence connecting these persons 
with terrorist organizations was very 
weak.  For example, Maher Arar is a 
Canadian citizen who was born in 
Syria. He was arrested in an airport be-
cause he knew (vaguely) another man 
suspected of terrorism.  On that flimsy basis 
Arar was transported to Syria, where he was 
held for a year and tortured by security per-
sonnel before being released without 
charges; the Syrians had apparently not 
found any connection between him and any 
terrorist organization in that time (Mayer).   
     In addition to Egypt and Syria, prisoners 
were also renditioned to other countries 
where torture and prisoner abuse are known 
to be fairly common, including Uzbekistan 
and (to a lesser extent) Jordan.  CIA officials 
not only suspected that these countries were 
torturing the prisoners that they were receiv-
ing from the United States but expected it; 
the senior CIA operative in the Uzbek capi-
tal told the British ambassador that he knew 
that the Uzbek government was torturing 
prisoners for information (Grey).  At least 
one man was transported from Pakistan to 
Morocco expressly because the Moroccans 
were willing to use methods that the Paki-
stanis weren’t, including the infliction of 
small cuts all over the body over a long pe-
riod of time (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
230).  
     It is impossible to imagine that the threat 
of prisoners being tortured once sent into the 
custody of these countries is not substantial 
enough to qualify for Article 3 of the Con-
vention against Torture.  In carrying out ex-
traordinary renditions government agents not 
only neglected their responsibilities under 
the Convention against Torture but actively 
sought to violate its requirements. 
IV. Legal Justifications 
     Members of the Bush administration 
have presented a number of legal arguments, 
both internally and externally, which justify 
or excuse the abusive treatment of detainees 
suspected of involvement in terrorist activi-
ties and direct responsibility for committing 
the most unpalatable abuses away from top 
officials.  These arguments are severely 
lacking in a number of respects, although not 
to the point of being frivolous.  It is there-
fore necessary to examine them in some de-
tail in order to present thorough counterargu-
ments. 
1. Inapplicability of International Law 
     Starting in the early years of the war on 
terrorism, several legal advisors within the 
White House advanced arguments to the ef-
fect that the Geneva Conventions could be 
interpreted to not apply to prisoners sus-
pected of terrorist activity.  They also as-
serted that other elements of international 
humanitarian and human rights law could 
not restrict the decisions of the President re-
garding the matter of detainees who posed a 
potential security threat to the United States. 
     Deputy Assistant John Yoo drafted a 
memorandum for the United States Depart-
ment of Defense in January 2002 that put 
forth three reasons why members of Al 
Qaeda would not be protected by the Geneva 
Conventions if they were captured in Af-
ghanistan: Al Qaeda is not a State Party to 
the Geneva Conventions; the war in Af-
ghanistan is neither a war between states nor 
a civil war, and therefore is not under the 
purview of the Conventions; and Al Qaeda 
members do not obey the laws of war as 
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 required by GC III Article 4(a)(2), 
such as carrying arms openly and 
wearing uniforms or visible symbols 
to distinguish themselves from civilians  
(Greenberg 49).   
     This memo also argued that members 
of the Taliban would not need to be af-
forded protections under the Conventions 
even though Afghanistan is a State Party be-
cause Afghanistan was a failed state while 
the Taliban controlled it, and because the 
Taliban was connected so closely with Al 
Qaeda that the two organizations could not 
be legally distinguished from each other 
(50).  Even if international humanitarian law 
applied in Afghanistan, the memo argued, 
Taliban members would still not be pro-
tected by GC III because of their failure to 
meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements, and 
that competent tribunals required by Article 
5 would be unnecessary if the President de-
termined that all Taliban members failed to 
meet those requirements, thus supposedly 
removing “doubt” as to their legal status and 
obviating the need for the tribunals to elimi-
nate it (110).  It stated that even if the sub-
stance of the Geneva Conventions or other 
instruments of international humanitarian 
law were a part of customary international 
law, it would not matter because customary 
law is not the federal law of the United 
States and therefore is incapable of binding 
the powers of the President (112).   
     Shortly after receiving the memorandum 
described above, Alberto Gonzales sent his 
own memo to President Bush, advising him 
of the positive and negative ramifications of 
disregarding the Geneva Conventions in the 
Afghanistan war.13  In his arguments against 
the likelihood of the negative outcomes hap-
pening, Gonzales asserted that the Bush’s 
official orders to treat prisoners “humanely” 
would prevent severe backlashes from other 
countries and the undermining of American 
military culture (119-121).  On 7 February 
2002, President Bush gave orders to the ef-
fect that GC III did not apply to Al Qaeda 
and that all Taliban detainees were to be 
considered unlawful combatants instead of 
POWs, but that they should be treated hu-
manely anyway “[a]s a matter of policy” but 
not a matter of law (135). 
     An internal report on detainee interroga-
tion was largely informed by these Justice 
Department opinions, and also asserted that 
the United States has held that the ICCPR 
does not apply to international military op-
erations (243). 
2. Redefining Torture 
     Lawyers working in the Bush administra-
tion advanced extremely restrictive munici-
pal and international legal definitions of the 
word “torture” in a pair of controversial 
memos, both of which were dated 1 August 
2002 and were sent to Alberto Gonzales.  
The first, written by Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jay Bybee of the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, concerned the application of domestic 
legal prohibitions of torture.  The second, by 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John 
Yoo, was about international law and what it 
would allow in interrogations of Al Qaeda 
members. 
 The Bybee memo referred to the 
definition of torture that is found in the 
United States Code Section 2340, the opera-
tive words being “severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering.”  It attempted to refine that 
definition further, by showing that the 
phrase “severe pain” as used in other 
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 American statutes meant an indica-
tor of dangerous and permanent 
physical damage.  Bybee argued that 
this phrase meant the same thing in the 
legal definition of torture, and that 
therefore pain 
…must rise to a similarly high level - 
the level that would ordinarily be 
associated with a sufficiently serious 
physical condition or injury such as 
death, organ failure, or serious im-
pairment of body functions – in order 
to constitute torture. (Greenberg 176) 
          Section 2340 further defines “severe 
mental pain of suffering” as “prolonged 
mental harm” caused by certain intentional 
acts, such as the infliction of pain, admini-
stration of drugs, or threats to do the same.  
Bybee focused on the word “prolonged” in 
interpreting the statute, arguing that the 
strain from long interrogation would proba-
bly not qualify, whereas actions resulting in 
post-traumatic stress disorder or depression 
possibly could.  The memo also argued that 
any potential defendant must have intended 
to cause this prolonged mental harm in order 
to be guilty under the terms of Section 2340; 
if he acted with some other purpose in good 
faith with the belief that his actions would 
not result in that kind of mental damage, that 
should provide a sufficient defense against 
prosecution regardless of the actual outcome 
of his actions, according to this argument 
(178). 
     Regarding cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, the memo notes that the Conven-
tion against Torture calls only for state par-
ties to “prevent” such acts from being car-
ried out in areas under their jurisdiction.  
This is interpreted to mean that the CAT 
does not require such acts to be criminalized, 
further demonstrating that “torture” is at the 
farthest, most extreme end of the spectrum 
of methods of inflicting pain (185). 
     Ultimately, the Bybee memo concluded 
that the word “torture” legally referred to 
only the most extreme actions of inflicting 
physical and mental pain, and that there 
were many acts which would be cruel and 
degrading without actually being on the 
same level as torture (214). 
     The John Yoo memo noted that when the 
United States acceded to the Convention 
against Torture, the administration of the 
first President Bush included a reservation to 
the treaty to the effect that it understood 
“torture” as relating to the Convention to 
have the same definition as found in Section 
2340, and that it was ratified with this mean-
ing in mind.  Because treaties cannot affect a 
state without its consent, the memo argued, 
it is by this definition of torture that the 
United States is bound by the CAT (220).  
Taken together with the Bybee memo sent to 
Alberto Gonzales on the same day, this 
means that the same very narrow and ex-
treme definition of what constitutes torture 
also applies to the treaty obligations of the 
United States under the CAT. 
     Additionally, legal opinions regarding the 
legality of specific interrogation methods 
were also issued by the Justice Department.  
One was sent to the CIA’s General Counsel 
by Jay Bybee on 1 August 2002, the same 
day the memos regarding the general defini-
tion of torture were officially transmitted.  
This memo regarded techniques the CIA 
wanted to use in the interrogation of sus-
pected Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, in-
cluding forced standing, stress positions, 
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 physical blows, sleep deprivation, 
and waterboarding (Bybee 2).  It 
ultimately concluded that all of the 
techniques failed to qualify as “torture” 
under the international legal obligations 
of the United States (18).  Another memo 
concerning techniques that could be used 
on “a High Value al Qaeda Detainee” during 
CIA interrogations was issued in May 2005, 
covering a greater number of methods 
(including force nudity and dousing with 
cold water) that still encompassed stress po-
sitions and waterboarding (Bradbury “Re: 
Application of 18 U.S.C. 18 § § 2340-
2340A” 7-13).  As with the previous memo, 
the conclusions was that all the techniques 
were legal so long as they were monitored to 
prevent serious threats to the safety of the 
detainees (45). 
3. Shifting responsibility down the chain of 
command 
     The scandal regarding the treatment of 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib required, to a much 
greater extent than any other aspect of the 
Bush administration’s detainee policy, a 
public response and the punishment of the 
parties responsible.  At first the entirety of 
the blame was laid squarely at the feet of the 
individual soldiers who had personally com-
mitted the abuses seen in the publicly avail-
able photographs.  Later on, public reports 
and investigations forced some top officials 
to take some responsibility, at least verbally; 
as noted above, no one higher-ranking than a 
non-commissioned officer was ever con-
victed in a court of law for the Abu Ghraib 
abuses, and no one at the White House or the 
Pentagon was fired or forced to resign im-
mediately. 
     In May 2004, shortly after the photo-
graphs of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib 
were shown to the public, both Defense Sec-
retary Rumsfeld and President Bush at-
tempted to limit the blame to the relatively 
few American personnel seen in them.  In a 
press briefing, Rumsfeld decried the actions 
of those people and referred to their actions 
as “exceptional and isolated” (DefenseLink).  
Rumsfeld stated that he took responsibility 
for what had happened in Abu Ghraib during 
Congressional hearings a few days later, but 
considering that he did not resign and was 
not investigated his words seem to have little 
meaning (Shanker). 
     President Bush went on Arab television 
in early May to claim that he was appalled 
by the scandal, that it would be thoroughly 
investigated, and that all responsible would 
be brought to justice (Stevenson).  On 24 
May Bush called the abuses the actions of “a 
few” soldiers in an address that was tele-
vised in the United States (Roth and Worden 
146). 
     The investigations which followed were 
damning to upper-level military and civilian 
leaders, but not to the point where any sort 
of punishment was recommended or imple-
mented.  One panel, which was led by for-
mer Defense Secretary James Schlesinger 
and appointed by Rumsfeld to investigate 
the scandal, released a report in August 2004 
which blamed failures of leadership on the 
part of top officials at Central Command and 
the Pentagon for creating a climate and cul-
ture that was conducive to allowing abuses.  
It also accused them of having missed sev-
eral warning signs about what was happen-
ing at Abu Ghraib.  However, it also held 
that the scenes in the photographs were not 
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 the result of direct orders and were 
merely excesses of the prison “night 
shift” out of control.  Critically, the 
panel did not recommend that Secretary 
Rumsfeld or any other senior civilian or 
military leader resign or face some other 
punishment (Watson).   Other internal mili-
tary investigations came to similar conclu-
sions; that general policy errors had contrib-
uted to what had happened in Abu Ghraib, 
but that top policy makers should not be 
held accountable the way the actual guards 
were.  In spite of the involvement of Central 
Intelligence Agency interrogators at Abu 
Ghraib and their actions toward detainees 
there, no one recommended investigating 
CIA leaders (Roth and Worden 153). 
V. Refuting the Bush administration’s ar-
guments 
1. Why international law is applicable 
a. Reasons why Geneva should be applied to 
Afghanistan 
     The argument that Afghanistan was a 
failed state, that the Taliban was therefore 
not its legitimate government, and that it 
therefore was not a State Party to the Geneva 
Conventions, might have been valid had it 
been consistent with the practice of the 
United States and other countries.  In fact, 
however, although the Taliban had not been 
recognized as the de jure leaders of Afghani-
stan the international community, including 
the United States, had treated it as having 
obligations under Afghanistan’s treaties, in-
cluding the Geneva Conventions, as then 
Secretary of State Powell stated in a memo 
to Alberto Gonzales advocating the applica-
tion of international humanitarian law in Af-
ghanistan (Greenberg 124).  In fact, the term 
“failed state” carries no weight in interna-
tional law, and Afghanistan’s legal rights 
remained intact even through years of divi-
sive warfare (de Nevers 385).  The decision 
to treat Afghanistan as a failed state unable 
to live up to its treaty obligations was there-
fore not a reasoned decision based on the 
facts, but rather a loophole that the admini-
stration tried to use in order to carry out its 
favored detention policies with less resis-
tance from the international community. 
     Legal advisers from the Department of 
State agreed with Powell that the Geneva 
Conventions should have been applied in 
Afghanistan.  The United States had always 
recognized them whenever it brought its 
forces into conflicts in the past, which was a 
legacy the DOS was reluctant to break with.  
The UN Security Council had called on all 
parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to ad-
here to humanitarian law in a resolution 
from 1998, and not recognizing the applica-
tion of those laws would be inconsistent on 
the part of the United States. Furthermore, 
the DOS legal department held that it would 
not be possible to apply the Conventions to 
the Taliban but not to Al Qaeda; either eve-
ryone involved in the Afghanistan conflict 
was protected by law, or none of them were 
(Greenberg 129).   
     Other individuals and organizations, in-
cluding the ICRC and the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, have also criticized 
the rationale for not applying the Geneva 
Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan.  
They have argued that any prisoner must 
automatically be treated as a POW unless 
and until a court removes any doubt that he 
or she does not qualify for such protections.  
These critics have also argued that Taliban 
soldiers qualify as members of military 
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 forces loyal to “an authority not 
recognized by a the Detaining 
Power” as described under Article 4
(a)(3) of GC III.  Such fighters would 
thus need to be treated as prisoners-of-
war regardless of their obedience to the 
laws and customs of war as described in 4
(a)(2) (Greenberg 587). 
b. Need for competent tribunals 
     The legal argument that the President of 
the United States can decide that all mem-
bers of a fighting militia fail to meet the re-
quirements of GC III Article 4 (2) is weak 
for a number of reasons.  It ignores the pos-
sibility, however remote, that any units or 
individual members of that militia might 
meet the requirements for prisoner of war 
status in spite of general trends within the 
organization towards noncompliance.  Also, 
giving the executive branch the power to 
unilaterally decide that thousands of fighters 
are, essentially, in violation of the laws and 
customs of war, circumvents traditional stan-
dards of due process for accusations of 
criminal behavior.  Classifying thousands of 
people as criminals, or even alleged crimi-
nals, without the involvement of a single 
impartial judge violates the need for fairness 
in legal proceedings required by interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights law; 
an independent court is needed to ensure that 
justice is carried out correctly, even when 
dealing with potential war criminals cap-
tured on the battlefield.  
     Even accepting for the sake of argument 
that every single member of an armed militia 
can be classified as a war criminal at once, 
the need for tribunals to hear the cases of 
captured prisoners would still not be elimi-
nated.  Even without legal doubt that any 
member of a certain organization fails to 
meet the legal standards required by GC III, 
doubt may still remain whether a given indi-
vidual is, in fact, a member of said organiza-
tion.  It has been shown that civilians were 
arrested by United States military and intelli-
gence personnel in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
under the mistaken assumption that they 
were members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, 
and that many of them were imprisoned ei-
ther in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay for 
months or years afterward.  These errors 
would almost certainly have been reduced in 
frequency and duration if tribunals had ex-
isted to swiftly review the cases of detainees 
claiming to have been wrongly arrested.  
c. AP I Minimum Standards 
     The First Additional Protocol to the Ge-
neva Conventions has not been ratified by 
the United States; however, Article 75, 
which guarantees certain rights for prisoners 
involved in armed conflicts regardless of 
their status, is widely regarded as having 
entered or become customary international 
law regarding this matter (Sands 150).  John 
Yoo dismissed the importance of customary 
international law in his January 2002 memo, 
however, thereby attempting to negate AP I 
and other elements of the Geneva Conven-
tions that may have entered into custom.   
     It is true that customary law is not ap-
proved by the United States Congress; how-
ever, that does not mean that it should be 
ignored so flippantly.  That would overlook 
the historical and continued importance of 
custom to the development of international 
and domestic law throughout the world.  De-
claring that it has no power and can be 
safely ignored is disingenuous and self-
serving.  Moreover, it overlooks the fact 
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 that United States courts have ac-
cepted the validity of customary in-
ternational law regarding torture and 
degrading treatment (Greenberg 600), 
d. Human Rights Treaties 
     The prohibitions against torture in the 
ICCPR and the Convention against Torture 
apply wherever the States Party to them 
have jurisdiction.  The CAT specifically re-
quires its prohibitions against torture and 
degrading treatment to be a part of the rules 
and duties of any government officials of a 
State Party involved in the detention or in-
terrogation of prisoners anywhere in the 
world.  The UN Committee against Torture 
has found that several methods used by 
American interrogators constitute torture or 
degrading treatment under the terms of the 
CAT, including frequent beating, excessive 
binding of limbs, exposure to low tempera-
tures, long periods of sleep deprivation, and 
sensory bombardment (Greenberg 568).  
More specifically, the Committee against 
Torture found that the patterns of physical 
abuse and indefinite detention of prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay violated the Convention 
and called on the United States to close the 
prison (McCoy 219). 
     The prohibitions against torture and de-
grading treatment found in Article 7 of the 
ICCPR are absolute and do not countenance 
any exceptions for national security or any 
other purpose.  The Human Rights Commit-
tee has found in the past that methods in-
cluding sleep deprivation, hooding, and oth-
ers that have been used by American forces 
violate Article 7 regardless of how or why 
they are used (Greenberg 592), 
2. Why some techniques used by the U.S. are 
torture 
     Jay Bybee’s August 2002 memo went 
very far in asserting that the term “torture” 
could be legally applied only to an ex-
tremely narrow set of practices and that 
forms of interrogation that might be consid-
ered objectionable were legal under domes-
tic and international law.  The memo was 
fought by certain Justice Department law-
yers, generated a powerful backlash from 
legal experts after it became publicly avail-
able, and was also inconsistent with the 
practices of the United States regarding in-
terrogation methods in foreign countries.  
It’s definition of “torture” has been rejected, 
and many lawyers, politicians, and NGOs 
have since applied that word to American 
practices. 
a. Legal arguments  
     After its public release the arguments of 
the Bybee memo were roundly criticized by 
legal experts.  For example, in testimony 
given before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in January 2005, the Dean of Yale Law 
School Harold Koh called the opinion 
“clearly erroneous.”  He stated that the nar-
row definition of “torture” contained within 
it contradicted the ordinary and commonly 
understood meaning of the word, and that it 
would exclude many of the heinous actions 
carried out by Saddam Hussein’s security 
forces.  Dean Koh also argued that the 
memo’s interpretation of the Convention 
Against Torture to legally permit the use of 
cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment 
risked giving officials working for the ex-
ecutive branch license to abuse people in 
their custody. 
     Even lawyers who were working at the 
Justice Department objected to the reasoning 
of the Bybee memo.  Jack Goldsmith, who 
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 became the head of the Office of 
Legal Counsel in October 2003, de-
cided that this torture and interroga-
tion policy was legally problematic 
shortly afterward.  He worked with 
other OLC lawyers to have that policy 
overturned and the opinion withdrawn – 
which had almost never happened over the 
course of a single administration before – 
until he resigned in July 2004 (Klaidman).  
The OLC prepared a new opinion to replace 
the Bybee memo which was officially re-
leased in December 2004; this new opinion 
contained less restrictive definitions of 
“torture” and “physical and mental suffer-
ing” (Levin). 
b. U.S. government practices 
     The Department of State issues an annual 
report on the state of human rights practices 
in every other country throughout the world.  
It is generally written without undue partisan 
political input, and the 2003 report con-
demned as torture the use of interrogation 
methods in foreign countries. Unfortunately, 
the United States itself had been using these 
techniques against suspected terrorists held 
in its custody. 
     The types of techniques used by the 
United States which the State Department 
criticized foreign countries for using include, 
but are not limited to, stress positions, expo-
sure to extreme temperatures, sleep depriva-
tion, and waterboarding (Roth and Worden 
143).  Now, it would certainly be possible to 
make a serious argument that some of those 
methods are not, depending on how they are 
used, severe enough to constitute torture; the 
State Department isn’t an absolute authority 
on such things, after all.  However, that the 
DOS was willing to criticize these methods 
so strongly in an official, publicly available 
document means that these methods are le-
gally and morally objectionable, at least to 
the point where they rise to the level of 
cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment.  
Even saying for the sake of argument that 
the State Department is in the wrong and 
that some of the above techniques do not rise 
to the level of torture does not make them 
acceptable.  The use of such techniques by 
anyone, regardless of their exact legal classi-
fications, should never be tolerated. 
c. Severity of techniques 
     There are, on the other hand, certain in-
terrogation methods which unquestionably 
constitute torture according to the plain 
meaning of the world, the definition found 
in the ICCPR and the Convention against 
Torture, and even by the unreasonably se-
vere definitions of the Bybee memo.  Inter-
national human rights organizations have 
unequivocally denounced them, and their 
victims have been left with permanent physi-
cal injuries and disabilities, as well as dan-
gerous and long-lasting mental illnesses as a 
result of their treatment. 
     Several prisoners held at Guantanamo 
were driven to suicidal behavior by the con-
ditions of fear, uncertainty, and constant 
abuse at the prison camp.  During the first 
eighteen months of the camp’s operation 
there were twenty-eight officially recognized 
suicide attempts and over three hundred in-
stances of prisoners acting in a self-abusive 
manner.  A mass suicide attempt in 2003 
involving twenty-three prisoners led to only 
two attempts being officially reported, while 
the others were classified as merely “self-
injurious.” It seems that the use of that clas-
sification in Guantanamo should be 
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 with some suspicion (Worthington 
Guantanamo Files 271).  Less se-
vere instances of mental illness have 
also been disproportionately common 
among the Guantanamo prisoners, as a 
group of British citizens released in 2004 
reported that a fifth of the prisoners were 
taking anti-depressant medications and ap-
proximately a hundred had other clearly visi-
ble forms of mental illness (280). 
     Interrogations and abuse by American 
personnel in Iraq have also been known to 
cause severe mental and physical harm. Red 
Cross doctors that were part of the delega-
tion visiting Abu Ghraib concluded that cer-
tain prisoners they interviewed at the prison 
displayed signs of mental illness including 
memory loss, anxiety, problems speaking or 
the inability to speak, and suicidal tenden-
cies as a result of their interrogations by MI 
personnel (Greenberg 393).  Official United 
States military documents that had been sup-
pressed but later released also revealed that 
several Iraqi prisoners died while in custody 
at Abu Ghraib and secret CIA facilities; a 
dozen of these deaths were ruled either 
homicides or “unexplained” on death certifi-
cates. For example, an Iraqi air force general 
who surrendered to American troops in No-
vember 2003 died several days later as a re-
sult of beatings from CIA and MI interroga-
tors at a makeshift facility in the desert 
(McCoy 144). 
     The “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
used by the CIA at its secret locations have 
come under particularly harsh criticism by 
humanitarian organizations throughout the 
world, as most of them clearly constitute 
torture or extremely cruel and degrading 
treatment.  A leaked internal document from 
the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, for example, labeled these techniques 
“torture” based on interviews with prisoners 
who had experienced them.  Many prisoners 
reported that stress positions and forced 
standing were the most physically painful 
methods (Shane, “Book Cites Secret Red 
Cross Report”).  Severe sleep deprivation 
also qualifies as one of the approved 
“enhanced” methods that unquestionably 
qualifies as torture; the late Menachim Be-
gin, who experienced such methods while he 
lived in the Soviet Union, even wrote that 
the desire for uninterrupted sleep can feel 
even worse than hunger or thirst (Conroy 
34). 
     One method that has been the particular 
focus of controversy and debate is 
“waterboarding,” the “enhanced technique” 
that has been used on the smallest number of 
prisoners and arguably the most severe.  
“Waterboarding” can refer to variety of 
means for cutting off the victim’s air supply 
with water, all of which produce physical 
and mental sensations similar to drowning.  
The question of whether waterboarding con-
stitutes torture has been in the national con-
sciousness ever since its use on prisoners 
suspected of being high-ranking Al Qaeda 
members was first revealed; the past three 
Attorney Generals of the United States have 
been asked at their Senate confirmation 
hearings whether they believe the technique 
is illegal torture.  Neither Alberto Gonzales 
nor Robert Mukasey were willing to cate-
gorically and unequivocally answer the 
question, which is disconcerting when one 
considers the painful and debilitating nature 
of the technique. 
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 Waterboarding is undoubtedly tor-
ture, by any standard, even Jay By-
bee’s “death or organ failure” criteria, 
because of the extremely painful and 
terrifying feelings it elicits and because 
it does indeed feel very similar to death 
by drowning.  It has been known to cause 
long-lasting psychological damage14 result-
ing in years of anxiety and panic attacks, 
thus fulfilling even the strict criteria for 
“mental suffering” found in the Bybee 
memo.  American courts have even con-
victed Japanese soldiers of war crimes be-
cause they waterboarded prisoners during 
the Second World War (Amnesty Interna-
tional). 
     Other legal experts also consider it tor-
ture.  Daniel Levin, for example, served as 
an Assistant Attorney General in 2004 and 
wrote the more moderate legal opinion on 
the legality of interrogation methods which 
replaced the Bybee memo.  After volunteer-
ing to undergo waterboarding personally, he 
concluded that it would constitute torture 
unless done in a very restricted way, and that 
the Bush administration had not provided 
effective protocols for its application.  Levin 
was fired, perhaps unsurprisingly, after Al-
berto Gonzales became Attorney General 
(Greenburg and de Vogue).  The current At-
torney General of the United States, Eric 
Holder, declared unequivocally that water-
boarding is torture during his own Senate 
confirmation hearing, an indication of a for-
tunate reversal in interrogation policies from 
the Bush administration (Montanaro). 
3. Why abuse was systemic and a result of 
top-down authorization 
     From all the abuses that have been de-
scribed above it should be fairly clear that 
torture carried out by American personnel is 
far more wide-ranging than the mere pres-
ence of a few poorly supervised “bad ap-
ples” could account for.  The memos and 
orders regarding the lack of Geneva Conven-
tion rights for detainees, the authorization of 
indefinite detention and extreme methods of 
coercive interrogation, and legal justifica-
tions for permitting acts of torture and de-
grading treatment all draw a line of causality 
and responsibility between decisions made 
in the White House and mistreatment of 
prisoners throughout the world. 
     Because torture has been universally re-
garded as morally abhorrent for the past few 
hundred years, orders to commit it in the re-
cent past have often been couched in euphe-
misms and permissive messages instead of 
plain language.  Official declarations from 
top American civilian and military leaders, 
including the application of the term “enemy 
combatants” by President Bush and state-
ments from military leaders calling detainees 
“very dangerous” or “like dogs” served to 
dehumanize them and sent signals that inhu-
mane treatment for them would be accept-
able (Roth and Worden 162-164).  The 
President, the Secretary of Defense, or other 
leaders may not have given direct orders to, 
for example, the “night shift” at Abu Ghraib 
to beat, threaten, and humiliate the prisoners 
there, but their actions and words did create 
a tolerant environment that allowed them 
and many of their fellow service members 
throughout the world to consider such be-
havior acceptable.  They are responsible, at 
the very least, for not doing nearly enough to 
prevent these abuses, and possibly for the 
deliberate creation of a pro-torture atmos-
phere (170). 
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 There are also cases of torture and 
inhumane treatment by Americans 
that were approved and ordered by 
high-ranking American officials, like 
the aforementioned “take the gloves 
off” authorization from Rumsfeld to John 
Walker Lindh’s interrogators (165).  He 
also personally signed off on the use of 
stress positions and forced nudity on detain-
ees at Guantanamo Bay (Greenberg 237).  
Waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress 
positions were legally validated for use on 
Abu Zubaydah by an official Justice Depart-
ment opinion of which White House and 
CIA leaders were undoubtedly aware (Bybee 
18).  The specifics of the CIA’s “enhanced” 
methods were chosen and initially approved 
by select members of the National Security 
Council, including Vice President Cheney, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Na-
tional Security Advisor Rice.  Further re-
quests for permission to use the techniques 
in specific cases were consistently approved 
by this group (Greenburg, Rosenberg and de 
Vogue).   
     Prisoner abuse occurred in every theater 
of operations where the “War on Terror” 
was waged, and not because of a small num-
ber of soldiers who didn’t know any better.  
The most senior Bush administration leaders 
specifically condoned the use of illegal 
methods in several cases and fostered an at-
mosphere of disrespect for the rule of law 
and the human dignity of detainees that led 
to many other abuses.  
VI. Why Enforcing and Respecting Inter-
national Law is in the Best Interest of the 
United States 
     Obeying international law isn’t a point-
less endeavor which restricts our actions 
without generating any benefits.  On the 
contrary, adhering to the law would increase 
the standing of the United States throughout 
the world, discredit our enemies, protect our 
soldiers, and convince people all over the 
world to be more cooperative. 
1. Comparative Analysis 
     In discussing the effects of indefinite de-
tention, torture, and cruel, inhumane, or de-
grading treatment on a state’s ability to fight 
a war, especially one with a heavy focus on 
counterinsurgency operations, it will be use-
ful to briefly examine twp other cases of tor-
ture sponsored by democratic states in simi-
lar situations.  They are: first, the arrest of 
hundreds of Northern Irish Catholics and 
experimental torture of about fourteen of 
them by the United Kingdom in 1971; and 
second, the time from 1987-1999 where Is-
raeli security forces were legally allowed to 
use limited levels of coercive interrogation 
techniques against Palestinian detainees. 
a. The United Kingdom and Northern  
Ireland, 1971 
     In the early 1970s the violent unrest 
among Catholics in Northern Ireland was 
rapidly escalating, and the British govern-
ment felt that it had to take drastic measures 
to prevent further deterioration, starting with 
“internment,” indefinite detention with no 
need for evidence or courts.  Hundreds of 
Catholics suspected of membership or sym-
pathy with the Irish Republican Army were 
rounded up and “interned” in August 1971 
(Conroy 4).  The operation was poorly im-
plemented, and several internees were ar-
rested because of outdated intelligence or 
mistaken identity.  Beatings with clubs were 
standard for all the internees (Melaugh).  
Fourteen men were taken from the regular 
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 prison camps to secret locations 
where a course of experimental co-
ercive interrogation techniques focus-
ing on sensory deprivation15was applied 
to them over the course of eight days. 
     The men were forced to stand against 
a wall in a painfully uncomfortable position 
while hooded, beaten severely whenever 
they collapsed from this standing position, 
exposed to cold temperatures, deprived of 
sufficient amounts of food and sleep, and 
subjected to overwhelming sound recordings 
that prevented anything else from being 
heard.  After the end of this ordeal the pris-
oners were moved back to the regular intern-
ment camps (McGuffin 57-60).  During the 
course of these abuses many men suffered 
from both visual and audio hallucinations 
such as music, religious sermons, and fanta-
sies of escape and suicide (73).  In 1978 the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
the five techniques did not rise to the level 
of torture but did constitute inhuman, de-
grading, and illegal treatment, contrary to 
the opinion of the Republic of Ireland and 
Amnesty International.  No British soldiers 
or officials were prosecuted for their roles in 
the affair (Conroy 187). 
     Rather than improving the security situa-
tion in Ireland, the internment and torture 
caused a marked downturn.  Nonviolent 
Irish nationalists refused to participate in 
Northern Ireland’s government out of pro-
test, and Catholics gave more support to the 
Irish Republican Army, which stepped up its 
own level of violent action (Melaugh). 
     The parallels with the United States are 
striking.  In both cases, a government re-
sorted to extreme, extralegal and illegal 
methods of imprisonment and interrogation 
in order to eliminate a threat posed by a ter-
rorist group.  Also in both cases, the “tough” 
methods did relatively little to impede the 
actual extremists and instead hurt mostly 
innocent people, infuriating local popula-
tions and encouraging them to support the 
terrorists’ cause. 
b. Israel during the Landau Commission era, 
1987-1999 
     Israel has had well-known, chronic prob-
lems with its military and security forces 
mistreating Palestinian civilians for years, 
even up to the present day (B’Tselem 
“Absolute Prohibition”).  The problem of 
torture being used on prisoners was espe-
cially acute, however, during a twelve-year 
period when coercive interrogation methods 
were formally legalized. 
     After a pair of scandals concerning the 
lack of transparency and use of violence in 
Israel’s security forces, a commission 
headed by Justice Moshe Landau was ap-
pointed to investigate the matter.  The Lan-
dau Commission concluded in 1987 that the 
security forces should be provided with legal 
guidelines for the use of a “moderate” 
amount of force during interrogations, so 
that they could be effective without having 
to hide their actions from public scrutiny 
(Conroy 213).  The Commission’s proposal 
attempted to limit both the intensity of coer-
cive methods used through official regula-
tions and the number of suspects to which 
they could be applied by limiting their use 
only to prisoners who had knowledge of im-
minent attacks (the “ticking time bomb” sce-
nario) on civilians.  Both attempts failed 
completely 
     The methods used by the Israelis rou-
tinely exceed the limits set in the Landau 
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 Commission’s guidelines rose to 
the level of torture, and included 
sleep deprivation, exposure to ex-
treme temperatures, stress positions, 
sensory bombardment, and violent 
shaking.  At least one Palestinian prisoner 
died from being shaken too much (Roth and 
Worden 36-37).  Security forces also ar-
rested, harassed, and abused the wives of 
men being interrogated in order to force out 
confessions of wrongdoing or otherwise 
pressure the husbands (B’Tselem “Detention 
and Interrogation”). The security services 
also claimed far too many cases of detainees 
having vital information necessitating coer-
cion.  Activists, religious leaders, Islamic 
charity workers, and others – nearly every 
Palestinian interrogated by Israel during this 
time – was tortured by Israeli security during 
this time period, justified by the specter of 
the “ticking time bomb” (Roth and Worden 
40).  The Israeli justice system did not check 
these abuses until the High Court of Justice 
banned all the coercive techniques of the 
security services for violating domestic and 
international law in 1999. 
     The possibility of torture being legally 
allowable in a limited fashion is shown false 
by Israel’s example.  Without absolute legal 
and ethical prohibitions against torture, the 
torturers become desensitized to it and prac-
tice it routinely.  As in the United States, 
allowing limited amounts of violent coer-
cion, even with guidelines and requirements 
for authorization, caused a culture of abuse 
to spread throughout the system, leading to 
widespread violations of international law 
(41-42). 
2. The importance of Geneva Convention 
protections for American soldiers 
     Many military and legal experts have 
called upon the United States government to 
respect the Geneva Conventions, not out of 
love for esoteric, abstract legal principles, 
but for the simple fact that the Conventions 
make our troops safer.  International hu-
manitarian law often protects American sol-
diers when they are captured, and even when 
we are faced with enemies that do not re-
spect the law they should not be allowed to 
bring us to their level.  By placing conflicts 
in which we participate under the auspices 
of the Geneva Conventions and following 
the law we would make it easier to bring jus-
tice to those who would abuse captured 
Americans. Treating our enemies better than 
they treat us demonstrates American integ-
rity, improves our moral standing, and 
makes it more likely that others will follow 
our example in the future (De Nevers 387). 
     John Hutson, who is the President of the 
Franklin Pierce Law Center and a former 
admiral of the United States Navy, articu-
lated very clearly in Congressional hearings 
the importance of the Geneva Conventions 
to the safety of American troops.  He argued 
that war needs to be conducted in a way that 
will allow for peace, that the Geneva Con-
ventions lay out a way to accomplish that 
goal, and that only by complying with those 
laws itself will the United State be able to 
compel others to follow them too.  The pri-
mary concern of all the U.S. policymakers 
who adhered to GC III after 1949 was the 
well-being of Americans, and by deriding its 
requirements we would be removing safe-
guards from our soldiers and rejecting the 
community of nations.  Admiral Hutson 
points out that, as the United States has more 
soldiers deployed abroad than every other 
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 nation in the world combined, we 
should rightfully be the most con-
cerned about maintaining the integrity 
of international humanitarian law 
(Hutson). 
     No less an expert on prisoner of war 
abuse than Senator John McCain has also 
called on the American people to respect 
international law in the wake of the Abu 
Ghraib scandal.  Cautioning against the view 
that the ICRC were mere “do-gooders” and 
that obeying the law hinders our soldiers, 
Senator McCain argued that the Red Cross 
and the Geneva Conventions protect our sol-
diers, and that those who committed abuses 
increased the danger for American troops in 
this and future wars by undermining those 
safeguards.  He also asserted that the United 
States should seek to maintain its integrity 
and standing as a nation governed by the 
rule of law which meets universal standards 
of fair treatment towards prisoners 
(McCain). 
     Military veterans and legal experts alike 
believe that international humanitarian law 
is vital to the well-being of American sol-
diers abroad.  Those who sacrifice to protect 
us need and deserve the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
3. The ineffectiveness of coercive interrogation 
     The reasoning behind the acceptance of 
violent, coercive interrogation methods 
amounting to cruel, humiliating, inhuman 
treatment or torture relies on necessity and 
expediency.  Such methods may be thought 
necessary in order to obtain vital, life-saving 
information from recalcitrant terrorists, or at 
least to obtain it quickly enough to prevent 
an attack or effectively disrupt a terrorist 
network.  While this dilemma between com-
mitting universally reviled acts of brutality 
and possibly allowing thousands of civilians 
to be killed poses an interesting philosophi-
cal question, in actual practice no such di-
lemma exists.  There is no evidence that vio-
lently coercive interrogation yields accurate 
information, whereas there is much evidence 
that legal, non-violent techniques have pro-
duced good results even when used against 
modern terrorists. 
     A study of the effectiveness of interroga-
tion methods was published by the Center 
for Strategic Intelligence Research in De-
cember 2006.  This study crucially found 
that there was no rigorous research on 
whether coercive interrogation methods used 
in the fashion that American personnel had 
been applying them were effective, but that 
the majority of anecdotal information sug-
gested that such techniques were not effec-
tive.  It specifically concluded that the appli-
cation of pain to an uncooperative interroga-
tion subject would be more likely to reduce 
compliance than increase it, and that the use 
of stress-inducing methods impair the cogni-
tive functions of the brain of those subjected 
to them, thus potentially reducing the accu-
racy of subsequently acquired information 
(Fein 35). 
     Academic researchers are not the only 
ones who have claimed that torture does not 
reliably yield accurate information; Ameri-
can military interrogators who have operated 
on both fronts hold the same opinion.  One 
MI officer who served in Afghanistan, for 
example, wrote that degradation such as 
what took place in Abu Ghraib does not fa-
cilitate intelligence gathering, and that all 
the successes he and his unit achieved were 
accomplished without threats,  
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 beatings, or humiliation (Mackey 
xxv). 
     Colonel Steven Kleinman, an intel-
ligence and interrogation specialist of 
the United States Air Force, denounced 
the coercive interrogation as ineffective 
while testifying before Congress.  He ar-
gued that the perceived effectiveness of such 
techniques skewed the public debate over 
torture and that extreme physical or emo-
tional stress should not be viewed as neces-
sary for gathering information or appropriate 
for punishing terrorists.  He stressed that 
properly conducted interrogations induce 
cooperation between prisoners and interro-
gators, whereas coercive methods can only 
force compliance from a prisoner; commu-
nist interrogators often forced confessions of 
war crimes from American prisoners-of-war 
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, for 
example, but these were mostly false and 
therefore useless from an intelligence stand-
point.  Colonel Kleinman also noted, much 
like the aforementioned CSIR study, the 
“natural fragility of memory,” and that coer-
cive methods would not only make it more 
likely for prisoners to be unable to recall 
specific information, but also for them to 
unintentionally give out misinformation.  He 
concluded that coercive interrogation fails to 
extract information from prisoners fully or 
accurately. 
     The specific methods chosen as the 
CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” repertoire 
do not have a history of eliciting accurate 
information.  They were based on methods 
that some members of the United States 
militarily voluntarily undergo in a limited 
fashion during Survival, Evasion, Resis-
tance, and Escape (or SERE) training 
courses.  The reason these personnel are 
trained to resist the SERE techniques is that 
they were used against American POWs by 
the Chinese during the Korean War, a fact 
that high-level government officials who 
approved the enhanced interrogation meth-
ods were unaware of.  The Chinese used 
them mostly to extract false confessions of 
war crimes; a study of their effects published 
in 1956 stated that the Chinese methods led 
to suggestibility and memory loss, not truth 
(Shane and Mazzetti).  The SERE methods 
which became the “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” are more useful for making peo-
ple say what they are supposed to say than 
they are for acquiring accurate intelligence. 
     Debates are ongoing as to what informa-
tion exactly has been gained from using co-
ercive interrogation methods on Al Qaeda 
members.  Mohammed al-Qahtani, who was 
tortured at Guantanamo Bay, accused many 
other prisoners there of affiliation with Al 
Qaeda during his interrogations only to re-
cant, claiming he had lied to stop his suffer-
ing (Zagorin).  It is unclear exactly what in-
telligence was extracted from KSM and 
Zubaydah during the time when they were 
subjected to waterboarding.  Former CIA 
officials and Bush administration leaders 
have claimed that the use of the technique 
led to the acquisition of vital intelligence, 
whereas others (such as FBI Director Robert 
Mueller) have claimed that coercive interro-
gations did not yield intelligence that di-
rectly prevented a terrorist attack.  There are 
conflicting reports about when and under 
what circumstances Zubaydah and KSM re-
vealed information (Shane “Interrogations’ 
Effectiveness May Prove Elusive”).  Even if 
these torturous methods had been necessary 
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 to acquire the information these Al 
Qaeda leaders gave up, the high cost 
of using them16 probably negated the 
benefits of it.  In all likelihood, how-
ever, all the intelligence gained from 
the high value Al Qaeda detainees proba-
bly could have been elicited through legal, 
non-coercive methods. 
     The effectiveness of nonviolent interro-
gation methods has been borne out not just 
historically, but even during the current war 
against terrorists in Iraq.  Following the me-
dia exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, mili-
tary interrogators deliberately set out to use 
different methods, ones that wouldn’t debase 
or degrade prisoners and shock the con-
sciences of American citizens.  These tech-
niques involved respecting prisoners, their 
circumstances and their beliefs, establishing 
connections and incentives for cooperation, 
and compliance with the standards set by 
GC III (Alexander “How to Break a Terror-
ist” 6). 
     Treating prisoners humanely lead to sig-
nificant intelligence coups in Iraq, where 
obtaining information about the operations 
and command structure of Al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia was of paramount importance 
in preventing suicide bomb attacks and other 
disruptive, violent attacks.  By establishing 
relationships with prisoners and offering 
them (often false) hopes for solving the 
problems that had driven them to violence in 
the first place, military interrogators were 
able to extract vital details about safe houses 
and relationships between important figures 
(136).  On at least one occasion a prisoner 
offered an explanation for why and how he 
had been mistakenly arrested, and the inter-
rogators made an effort to verify his story 
instead of continuing to assume he was ly-
ing, the sort of effort that would have kept a 
lot of innocent people of Guantanamo Bay if 
it had been consistently applied by American 
personnel in Afghanistan earlier in the war 
(166). 
4. Effect torture and indefinite detentions 
have had had on international perceptions 
of the United States 
     The standing of the United States as a 
leader in morality, ethics, and upholding the 
rule of law has suffered tremendously be-
cause of the Bush administration’s illegal 
policies.  Negative reactions to indefinite 
detention and torture have been especially 
strong among Middle Eastern Muslims; 
many of them have been convinced to join 
extremist organizations and fight against the 
United States because of these policies. 
    Global perceptions of the United States 
declined significantly during the Bush ad-
ministration, especially among predomi-
nantly Muslim countries but in Europe as 
well.  How much of that is because of 
American policies regarding detainees 
would be difficult to pin down exactly, with 
other factors such as support for Israel or the 
unilateral invasion of and continued Ameri-
can presence in Iraq contributing as well.  
Regardless, positive views of the United 
States declined in over two-thirds of the 
countries where data was available (Pew 
Global Attitudes Project). 
     Images of the prison at Guantanamo Bay 
and its orange-suited inmates have become 
iconic in predominately Muslim countries.  
Stories of disrespect, abuse, and torture have 
spread through the media and the personal 
accounts of those who have been released 
and returned to their homes.  The sexual 
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 humiliation and abuse of detainees, 
as well as stories of American sol-
diers demeaning the religious tradi-
tions of Muslims, such as beards and 
the sacredness of the Quran, have 
strengthened the idea that the war against 
terrorism is just a front or disguise for a war 
on Islam itself (Sengupta).  This is important 
because research has shown that Muslims 
who believe that the United States is waging 
a war on Islam are more likely to support 
violence against American soldiers and ci-
vilians (Weber 1). 
     The severe worsening of violent attacks 
in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 after the Abu 
Ghraib scandal bears this out.  One veteran 
went so far as to blame half the casualties in 
Iraq on fighters who joined terrorist groups 
because of America’s torture policies, and 
that those policies led to the deaths of about 
as many people killed in the September 11th 
terrorist attacks (Alexander “I’m Still Tor-
tured”). 
VII. Conclusions 
     The illegal and counterproductive meth-
ods of the past must be completely elimi-
nated in order for there to be a chance for the 
United States to restore its reputation, repair 
the damage done to our ability to lead, and 
prevent lawlessness from taking over the 
country.  The Geneva Conventions should 
be applied to the all military operations 
against terrorists, and all military operations 
of the future in general, as both a matter of 
policy and law.  Torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and any other sort of 
coercive interrogation method must be 
banned absolutely for all U.S. personnel, 
who should be required to use nonviolent 
interrogation techniques instead.  The Guan-
tanamo Bay prison and the black sites 
should be closed, and all prisoners either 
treated as prisoners of war as GC III de-
mands, charged as criminals in a normal 
American court or released.  Those responsi-
ble for torture should be investigated and 
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. 
     Fortunately, many of these policies are 
already being carried out by the new Presi-
dent of the United States, Barack Obama.  
He has ordered the closing of the CIA black 
sites, banned waterboarding and other tor-
ture methods, and ordered the prison at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base closed and the 
prisoners’ files re-reviewed, a process which 
reportedly will take about a year. 
     Unfortunately, the new policies aren’t 
perfect.  Obama’s Justice Department has 
continued to try to deny prisoners at Bagram 
Air Force Base in Afghanistan the right to 
challenge their detentions (Savage).  Presi-
dent Obama has also stated that he doesn’t 
want the government to investigate people 
responsible for torture as the CAT requires it 
to, although Congressional Democrats may 
press on with that issue regardless.  Addi-
tionally, there will probably be difficulties 
finding places to put many of the released 
prisoners from Guantanamo.  The case of the 
Uighur prisoners, who face difficulties find-
ing new homes because of pressure from the 
Chinese, is probably the most extreme case 
of such problems (Spiegel and Demick). De-
spite this, the new administration represents 
a real possibility for redemption from this 
sordid affair. 
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 Endnotes 
 
1International law can also come from 
custom, which is based on traditions of 
state practice.  It is the oldest form of in-
ternational law, but it can be hard to define 
where customary law exists and exactly 
what its provisions are (Shaw 69).  Treaties 
may codify or reflect preexisting customary 
law, of course, and it is possible for treaty 
provisions to create customary law, depend-
ing on how widely adopted they are and 
other considerations (Shaw 90).     
 
2Article 130 of GC III defines grave 
breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhu-
man treatment, including biological experi-
ments, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, compelling 
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the 
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a pris-
oner of war of the rights of fair and regular 
trial prescribed in this Convention.”  And 
Article 147 of GC IV defines them as 
“wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a pro-
tected person, compelling a protected person 
to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or 
wilfully depriving a protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in 
the present Convention, taking of hostages 
and extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military neces-
sity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly.  
 
3See discussion of universal jurisdiction, be-
low. 
 
4Ibid. 
 
5The “exhaustion of domestic remedies rule” 
flows from the legal principle of state sover-
eignty; most human rights treaties explicitly 
include it as a provision (Shaw 254).  
 
6The current Special Rapporteur for torture 
is Manfred Nowak, an Austrian lawyer spe-
cializing in human rights, according to his 
official biography on the OHCHR website.  
 
7The 1949 Geneva Conventions, obviously, 
did not operate during the war.  However, 
the 1929 Geneva Convention afforded a 
largely similar set of rights to prisoners of 
war; that particular Convention definitely 
bound the German government, and the 
Japanese government made an agreement 
with the Allies near the opening of hostilities 
to observe the Convention.  A majority of 
judges at the Tokyo trial later decided this 
agreement was legally binding on Japan 
(Boister 184).  
 
8The Trial of Major War Criminals in Nur-
emberg  and the International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East in Tokyo both in-
cluded prisoner of war abuse among the war 
crimes with which they charged the leaders 
of Germany and Japan (North) (Boister 
196).  Other trials which followed focused 
on lower-ranking war criminals and also in-
cluded alleged POW abusers from both Ger-
many and Japan (Truman Library) (Kerr 
296). 
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 9The Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal established the 
rules and procedure for the Nurem-
berg Trials, and the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far 
East did the same for the Tokyo Trials.   
 
10Specifically, Article 42 of GC IV and Arti-
cle 75, paragraph 3 of AP I state that pro-
tected persons must not be held for longer 
than is necessary, and Article 9, paragraph 3 
states that anyone who is arrested with 
criminal charges must be brought before a 
judge and given a trial within a reasonable 
time frame  
 
11Hamdan was sentenced to five and half 
years of imprisonment, with time already 
spent in Guantanamo Bay counting toward 
it; his sentence will be up in January 2009.  
 
12This was part of a general pattern of at-
tacking men who practiced Islam by target-
ing their religious beliefs.  In addition to the 
aforementioned invasion of space by fe-
males and forced shaving of facial hair, the 
ICRC also gathered credible testimony from 
detainees at Guantanamo indicating that 
guards had physically disrespected the 
Quran, the holy book of Islam (Labott).  
 
13It was in the discussion of the positives of 
ignoring Geneva that Gonzales made the in-
famous comment about the nature of the war 
on terror making parts of GC III “obsolete” 
and “quaint.” 
 
14Because it simulates death by drowning, 
waterboarding is arguably a form of mock 
execution.  One study of the effects of tor-
ture found that psychological problems were 
significantly higher among victims who had 
experienced a mock execution (Conroy 180).  
 
15Specifically, a combination of sleep depri-
vation, starvation, forced standing, hooding, 
and bombardment with white noise, later 
referred to as “the five techniques” (Conroy 
6).  
 
16See section on international perception of 
the United States, below.  
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Abstract 
The terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US 
foreign policy. In this environment the Bush 
administration crafted what came to be 
known as the Bush Doctrine. Though a pre-
cise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains 
contested, definitions typically include the 
idea that the United States may preemp-
tively attack countries harboring terrorists, 
and that the US should support the spread of 
democracy. But, after eight years, the 
United States is not safer. This paper ana-
lyzes democratization as a theory and as an 
element of the Bush Doctrine through case 
studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. By tying 
the notion of victory in the War on Terror to 
democratization, the United States has an-
gered many Afghanis and Iraqis, wasted an 
enormous amount of resources, and dam-
aged its relations with other countries. Over-
all, efforts by the Bush administration to 
impose democracy in these countries have 
counterproductive at combating terrorism.  I 
conclude with policy prescriptions for the 
Obama administration, namely that America 
must remove itself from the political proc-
esses of Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuild ties 
with the international community, and de-
velop a strategy for complete American 
withdrawal from these areas. 
 
 
Since September 11, 2001 terrorism 
has been a chief concern of American na-
tional security. The days of US protection 
from foreign threats because of its geogra-
phy are long gone. Al Qaeda displayed not 
only its ability to attack the United States, 
but that it was capable of doing so from 
American soil.  From lone snipers to an-
thrax delivered through the mail, Americans 
became acutely aware of the potential for 
additional terrorist attacks. Fortunately, 
many experts agree that terrorists generally 
lack the logistical capabilities necessary to 
inflict mass casualties. Unfortunately, ter-
rorists are constantly working to overcome 
these obstacles.  Instead of conducting gran-
diose attacks, terrorists may use smaller, 
inexpensive strikes that require low levels 
of technical expertise and training.  Regret-
tably, states (especially liberal democracies 
like the United States) have great difficulty 
countering this approach toward violence. 
States are bound by international norms and 
laws.  Democracies like the United States 
are further constrained in the application of 
violence and surveillance in counterterror-
ism by popular consent.  Given the ability of 
terrorist organizations to adapt and over-
come state defenses, alternative methods are 
needed for states to preserve their national 
security from terrorist attacks.  
In this environment, the Bush ad-
ministration crafted what would later  
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 become known as the Bush Doc-
trine.  Although the precise defini-
tion of the Bush Doctrine is still in 
dispute, definitions typically include 
legitimizing preemptive strikes against 
perceived aggressors and using United 
States—supported democratization as a 
weapon in the “War on Terror” (for exam-
ple, see Monten 2005). American backed 
democratization is a particularly interesting 
element of the War on Terror because it was 
a subtle tool capable of changing both gov-
ernment and citizenry. However, despite at-
tempts by the Bush administration to use 
democratization to further its foreign policy 
agenda of eliminating terrorism, democrati-
zation in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved 
disastrous.  In this paper, I will show how 
despite rational theoretical backing, prob-
lems resulting from the pledge to democra-
tize Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly di-
minished America’s capability to wage the 
War on Terror. 
Definitions and Terms 
For this study, it is important that the 
language used be a clear as possible.  Thus, 
for the purpose of this essay, I must define 
several words.  Essential to my argument is 
democratization.   For this term, I borrow a 
definition from Edward Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder’s book Electing to Fight.  To democ-
ratize is to, “try to create favorable institu-
tional conditions in the sequence most likely 
to foster successful, peaceful democratic 
transitions” (2007, 16). This definition is 
exceptional because it identifies the essence 
of democracy (governance with popular sov-
ereignty rested in the will of the people); 
but, does not necessitate a successful transi-
tion to democracy.  This is important be-
cause, despite best intentions, there is no 
guarantee that democratization will actually 
result in the formation of a democratic state.  
This is very logical. Since it is impossible to 
predict the future, how can a reasonable 
definition of democratization be contingent 
on the emergence of a democratic state?  
Additionally, within the span of human his-
tory, no state is eternal. While the United 
States has been a relatively stable democracy 
for over the past 150 years, there is no guar-
antee that autocracy will not prevail in 100 
years.  It would be unfair to discount the 
long history of American democracy be-
cause of the potential emergence of an auto-
cratic state in the future. The central argu-
ment of this paper regards the problems as-
sociated with continued American presence 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Thus, to under-
stand the motivations for continuous Ameri-
can involvement in these two countries, it is 
vital to perceive democratization as a proc-
ess rather than a result. 
War on Terror is the next important 
term to define.  War on Terrorism, Global 
War on Terrorism, War on Terror, and ter-
rorist are terms that were widely used by the 
Bush administration to describe and define 
its counterterrorist activities since 9-11.  One 
of the largest obstacles to any serious study 
of US policy since this time has been the 
disambiguation of such confusing language. 
Discouragingly, the Bush administration 
made no effort to clarify its terms.  In fact, in 
the case of prisoner detentions at Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush ad-
ministration intentionally obfuscated these 
terms to provide leeway in gathering intelli-
gence (Hersh 2004, 264).   Thus, since the 
Bush administration has not identified  
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 precise definitions, we must there-
fore look towards a practical usage.  
For this paper, I adapt Bruce Hoff-
man’s definition and define terrorism as 
any attack conducted by a substate actor 
with the intent to cause fear in a given 
population achieve as an end (Hoffman 
2006, 33). A “terrorist” is any person who 
commits an act of terrorism.  Finally, terror 
is an emotion that can be evoked through 
acts of terrorism. 
The decision to limit terrorism to the 
attacks of substate actors is very intentional.  
Admittedly, this is a hotly debated topic in 
the field of counterterrorism.  Many argue 
some states have intentionally attacked civil-
ians with the intention of instilling fear just 
like a substate actor would. Proponents of 
this belief might argue that actions by Nazis 
in concentration camps during the Holocaust 
should be considered terrorism just like the 
actions of the 9-11 hijackers; all human suf-
fering caused by terrorism is equal. Thus, 
some might perceive separation between 
state—sponsored terrorism and substate ter-
rorism, as unnecessary, ultimately reducing 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism at com-
bating human suffering. However, allowing 
state sponsored terrorism into this discussion 
will becloud the topic at hand.  The states of 
interest in my investigation are Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Prior to the American invasion in 
these countries, governments were brutally 
authoritarian.  Both states would frequently 
commit horrible acts against citizens with 
the intent of inciting fear.  Thus, the two 
groups must be separated if only to distin-
guish the actions of the former Iraqi and Af-
ghani regimes from the actions of current 
substate groups currently in these countries.  
 Obviously Global War on Terror-
ism, and the War on Terrorism do not con-
note the same thing.  Furthermore, neither of 
these terms act45ually describes American 
counterterrorist policy since September 11, 
2001. To be at war with terrorism is to be at 
war with an action.  In this sense, an analo-
gous policy to the War on Terrorism is the 
equally ineptly named American War on Il-
legal Immigration.  Both illegal immigration 
and terrorism are abstract concepts.  Al-
though one might be able to identify a perpe-
trator of terrorism just as one may be able to 
identify an illegal immigrant, it is impossible 
to single out illegal immigration or terror-
ism.  Because it is intangible, terrorism can-
not be fought on a battlefield. One could at-
tack terrorism insofar as the causes of terror-
ism could be eliminated, but attacking ter-
rorism itself does not really mean anything.  
Because of this, neither of these terms will 
be used in my paper. 
It is worth mentioning that another 
problem with the phrase Global War on Ter-
rorism is that it alludes to US counterterror-
ist activity on a scale that it much larger than 
reality.  America has made no great effort to 
eliminate terrorist movements that do not 
threaten US interests.  For example, US ac-
tivity to destroy the PPK or the Tamil Tigers 
has been notoriously absent from the War. 
Some may argue that this absence is actually 
a tactic in itself (Byman 2009, 472).  By not 
going to war against all terrorism every-
where, the United States is less likely to 
draw the ire of terrorist groups that might 
otherwise have left America alone. Really, 
the War on Terror is with the terrorists who 
seek to harm to the United States.  For all 
these reasons, Global War on Terror is an 
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 inappropriate term to describe U.S. 
policy since 9-11.  
I argue that War on Terror is the 
most suitable term to describe current 
US action.  First, War on terror elimi-
nates ambiguity in distinguishing between 
a terrorist and a freedom fighter who em-
ploys terrorism. It treats both of these groups 
the same.  So long as a person uses terror to 
advance his agenda he is a terrorist and may 
be attacked by the United States.  Further-
more, war on terror does not imply intent to 
eliminate terrorism itself.  This is a neces-
sary element in any description of current 
US counterterrorist policy since terrorism, as 
was just discussed, is virtually impossible to 
eliminate.   
I would be remiss to ignore the re-
cent change in recent policy changes made 
by the Obama administration regarding ter-
minology.  In March 2009, the Obama ad-
ministration stated it was removing the term 
Global War on Terrorism and all similar 
terms from the lexicon of United States for-
eign policy (Baker 2009).  Interestingly, the 
phrase chosen to replace War on Terror is 
Overseas Contingency Operation.   Such a 
gesture was certainly intended to eliminate 
the implication that the United States is at 
war with Islam, and to break from the un-
ending dedication of American resources to 
counterterrorism.  As will be discussed later, 
I can certainly agree with these goals.  How-
ever, the new term the Obama administra-
tion has chosen is not particularly good ei-
ther. Breaking down the phrase, the first 
word is rather misleading.  While it may be 
true that many of the fronts in the War on 
Terror are across the ocean, this is certainly 
not always the case.  The idea to form the 
Department of Homeland Security, was cre-
ated immediately following 9-11, and was 
intended to “create a comprehensive and 
shared” national vision for the purpose of 
“defeating terrorism” (Office of Homeland 
Security 2002, i).  The Bush administration 
correctly viewed the need for both domestic 
and international efforts to eliminate terror-
ism.  By renaming the War on Terror as an 
overseas activity, appreciation for the utility 
of a two-pronged approach to fighting terror-
ists may be forgotten.  The word 
“Contingency” is mystifying.  For what ac-
tivity is the exercise of American might 
strength a contingency? Diplomacy against 
terrorist is not an option.  As stated, substate 
actors are less susceptible to the sticks and 
carrots of traditional diplomacy. The only 
word that accurately describes U.S. policy is 
Operation, which is really a meaningless 
term on its own. Since this term does a very 
poor job at actually describing American 
policy, I believe it would be best to continue 
using the term War on Terror. 
American Motivations 
Let us now turn to the reasons for US 
democratization.  After all, there must have 
been some purpose to the efforts that have 
now cost the United States almost $864 bil-
lion (United States Congress Congressional 
Research Service, 16).  A historical ap-
proach is best for understanding current mo-
tives.  Realpolitick has typically guided 
American efforts at regime change (Pie 
Minxin, Amin Samia, and Garz Seth 2006, 
64).   “Only [since the early twentieth cen-
tury has America’s political ideals and its 
need to sustain domestic support for] nation-
building compelled it to try to establish de-
mocratic rule in target nations.” (Pie et al. 
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 2006, 65) To look beyond such 
gross simplifications of US policy 
as, “blood for oil,” the Bush admini-
stration’s motives for invading and de-
mocratizing Iraq and Afghanistan cer-
tainly included security.  Afghanistan had 
been the safe haven for al Qaeda under the 
Taliban.  In fact, al Qaeda underwent much 
of its organizational development in Af-
ghanistan during the 1980s while fighting 
the Soviets.  In what turned out to be a tragic 
irony, much of al Qaeda’s development oc-
curred as a direct result of American arma-
ment and training of mujahedeen during the 
Soviet Invasion (Bhutto 2008, 112-114). As 
al Qaeda was discovered to be the principal 
organizer of the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, it was no surprise that the 
United States saw Afghanistan as a major 
battleground in the War on Terror.   
The case of Iraq was a bit more com-
plicated.  Initially, the United States claimed 
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass de-
struction (WMDs) it had acquired through a 
covert weapons development program 
(Galbraith 2006, 70).  Had this been the 
case, Iraq would have been in violation of 
numerous international laws; notably, 
United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 687, 678 and 1441 which all explicitly 
forbade Iraq from possessing or developing 
WMDs after the 1991 Gulf War.  This 
breach of international law is obviously seri-
ous, but even if Iraq had possessed such 
weapons, it lacked the delivery system nec-
essary to attack the U.S such as interconti-
nental ballistic missiles.   
Nevertheless, the Bush administra-
tion argues that the Iraqi government under 
Saddam Hussein had the potential for selling 
or distributing WMDs to enemies of Amer-
ica.  Admittedly, this was rather unlikely. 
The secular Arab-nationalist Ba’ath Party 
(Iraq’s governing party) would have been a 
strange bedfellow for the Sunni Islamist al 
Qaeda.  An example of this disconnect is 
exemplified by Osama bin Laden’s offer to 
Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud of 
the use of al Qaeda forces to defend Saudi 
Arabia from Iraq during the first Gulf War. 
Although the offer was not accepted, it un-
derscores the acrimonious relationship be-
tween Iraq and al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the 
Bush administration argued that an Iraqi alli-
ance with al Qaeda against the United States 
was possible, thereby exacerbating Ameri-
can fear of terrorism. Given the stakes in 
nuclear conflicts, the fear created by the 
Bush administration was strong enough to 
cull dissent, even from many Democrats in 
Congress (Althaus and Largio 2006, 4).  No 
American wanted to be responsible for op-
posing regime change in Iraq if the connec-
tion between the two groups were true.   
In both cases, United States policy 
was to effect regime change.  The Taliban 
was deposed because of the asylum it 
granted to al Qaeda operative.  Former Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein, the President of 
a country the United States believed was in 
contravention of international law and con-
spiring with terrorists, was removed from 
power as well.  But once the dust settled af-
ter the invasions, new governments were 
needed for the two countries.  To strengthen 
its national security, the United States 
needed to ensure that any successor govern-
ment would be friendlier towards the United 
States than its predecessor. One possibility 
was for American instillation of a  
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 dictatorship (as had been the hall-
mark of US foreign policy through-
out the Cold War).  However, Ameri-
can officials likely realized the danger 
in empowering dictators in already un-
stable countries particularly given the na-
ture of terrorism.  Arguably, support of dic-
tatorships and authoritarianism was what led 
to the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the first place.  Instead, the Bush administra-
tion turned to democratization as the answer 
to its security dilemma. 
 
Forging a Democratic Peace 
In his essay “Perpetual Peace” writ-
ten in 1795, the political philosopher Im-
manuel Kant outlined what he believed 
would be necessary to stop states from going 
to war with one another.  Although the ter-
minology differs slightly between Kant’s 
time and today, he essentially argued for 
three things: that all countries to democra-
tize, that the depth and number of involve-
ments of states in Intergovernmental Organi-
zations (IGOs) increase, and that interna-
tional trade increase (Kant [1795] 1970, 93-
98).  Kant reasoned that democracies only 
tend to go to war in self defense (Kant 
[1795] 1970, 98).  Thus, if all countries were 
democracies, there would be no war. 
A democratic Iraq and Afghanistan 
would certainly not have been the end to all 
war everywhere.  Nevertheless, the Bush 
administration reasoned that if these coun-
tries became democratic, they would absorb 
democratic ideals, and be likely to attack, or 
support attacks perpetrated against, the 
United States (Gause III, 2005).  Of course, 
changing the “hearts and minds” of potential 
terrorist was an important goal. A strictly 
state-focused approach would not necessar-
ily have influenced subgovernmental terror-
ist groups.  Theoretically however, encour-
aging democracy would also help diminish 
the potential for terrorism. The diminished 
potential would be through the growth of 
robust civil societies. The London School of 
Economics provides an excellent definition 
of civil society as, “the arena of uncoerced 
collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values. Civil society is theo-
retically divorced from activities of the state, 
though in practice, this relationship may be 
negotiated” (London School of Economics, 
2004).  This concept is certainly familiar to 
Americans.  From local religious groups to 
political action groups, Americans partici-
pate in many different manifestations of civil 
society.  Important to this discussion is that 
many groups in civil society seek to effect 
change. Civil society provides a medium 
through which citizens can express discon-
tent with the status quo without resorting to 
violence.  Furthermore, to extrapolate from 
the theories of Ashtoush Varshney, the asso-
ciations created by civil society might even 
help prevent the emergence of violence 
amongst Iraqis.  This was an important con-
sideration because of the deconstructed 
power relationship during the former Hus-
sein regime between ruling Sunni and the 
demographically dominant Shi’a (not to 
mention the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Thus, in 
the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
invasions, the United States began reestab-
lishing the two countries as democracies. 
To their credit, the Bush administra-
tion realized some of the serious roadblocks 
to democracy in these two states, and did 
attempt to remove them.  Immediately after 
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 the invasions, the Bush administra-
tion lifted many of its trade barriers 
with Iraq and Afghanistan.  Theoreti-
cally, this enabled more international 
trade for the two countries. Further-
more, the United States brought in the 
Army Corps of Engineers and hired over 
180,000 independent contractors to assist in 
the reconstruction of state infrastructure. As 
of August 2008 this has cost the United 
States Government over $100 billion for 
Iraq alone (United States Congress. Con-
gressional Budget Office 2008, 16).  Ironi-
cally much of the infrastructure had been 
destroyed either as a direct result of Ameri-
can attacks during the invasion or by indige-
nous pillaging immediately following them. 
Assisting in infrastructure projects supported 
the development of business, in turn, pro-
moting international trade.   Furthermore, by 
providing Iraqis with basic amenities, the 
United States was clearly reaching out to the 
Iraqi polity in the hopes that a future elected 
government would not be explicitly anti-
American. 
The situation in Afghanistan was 
even worse than the situation in Iraq.  Larry 
Goodson explains, “After conflict or regime 
change, societies usually require some de-
gree of reconstruction… but the destruction 
in Afghanistan in late 2001 was far beyond 
what is usually encountered in such dis-
rupted societies” (2006, 153).  Because of 
this major issue, the United States relied on 
anti-Taliban groups to establish a process for 
transitioning sovereignty of Afghanistan to a 
freely-elected Afghan government rather 
than a US led coalition force (Goodson 
2006, 157).  This process, as laid out in the 
Bonn Accords, was obviously a pivotal step 
in establishing democracy in Afghanistan.  
Democratic governance is impossible with-
out a democratically elected government.  
By relying on local Afghanis to establish 
democracy, the United States – specifically 
the military – was free to fighting Taliban 
forces in the Afghan countryside. However, 
the lack of benchmarks for successful de-
mocratization combined with the inability of 
the United States to eradicate the Taliban 
from Afghanistan has prolonged the Ameri-
can presence without any end in sight.  
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) 
may have been a feasible solution for stop-
ping terrorism, so long as it was executed 
properly.  Although invasion and subsequent 
democratization are inherently state-level 
actions, the Bush administration believed 
these methods better than the alternative of 
trying to root out specific terrorist organiza-
tions.  To a degree, they were correct.  It is 
very difficult to completely destroy a terror-
ist group. First, simply finding a group may 
prove problematic.  Obviously, as a subgov-
ernmental group, there is no terrorist “state.” 
Nor is there necessarily a need for one.  
With the advent of high-speed internet and 
the pervasiveness of telecommunications, 
terrorists can live virtually anywhere.  Nev-
ertheless, terrorist groups are attracted to 
weak and failed states such as Afghanistan 
or post-invasion Iraq (Gvosdev and Takeyh. 
2009, 80).  Weak and failed states may ei-
ther be too weak to eliminate terrorists, or 
may even collude with certain organizations.  
This relationship provides terrorists with of-
ficial documentation such as visas for travel, 
and provides a safe haven during the coun-
terterrorist offensives of other countries. 
This was certainly the case for Afghanistan 
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 which, under the Taliban, had 
worked with al Qaeda to train the 
Afghan military from 1997-2001 
(Wright 2006, 355). For countries like 
the United States, the protection af-
forded to terrorist groups in weak and 
failed states from international norms re-
spect state sovereignty can seriously infringe 
on effective counterterrorist campaigns 
(Patrick 2009, 102).  
Another problem for most counter-
terrorist activity is identifying the organiza-
tional structure of terrorist organizations.  
Unlike the hierarchical style of “old terror-
ism,” “new terrorism” is characterized by its 
nodal quality.  Cells operate independently, 
and there is no direct links up or down a 
chain of command.  Lacking the ability to 
link one terrorist to another, it is almost im-
possible to determine the size and leadership 
of a terrorist group.  Furthermore, since the 
cells operate independently, “leadership” 
may even be an antiquated concept in the 
organizational structure of terrorist groups.  
When the United States attacked Afghani-
stan, and killed or capture many of who it 
believed to be top al Qaeda leaders, the 
movement did not die. In fact, as of this 
writing, Taliban forces have conquered 
much of the Swat region, just over the bor-
der in Pakistan. Even with Osama bin Laden 
in hiding, branches of al Qaeda live on and 
continue to fight and recruit.  This resiliency 
combined with other qualities of new terror-
ism such as religious motivations and a de-
sire to maximize casualties calls for a non-
state focused response (Howard 2009, 113). 
Since terrorists do not control states, they 
cannot be dealt with through coercion or 
tribute.  To them, victory is zero-sum. Ad-
mittedly, the very notion of a “new” terror-
ism versus and “old” terrorism is debated.  
However, the characteristics of the terrorists 
fought in the War on Terror resemble “new 
terrorists” rather than “old terrorists.” This is 
why I distinguish between the two groups. 
It was not entirely unreasonable for 
the Bush administration to believe that its 
attempts to democratize Afghanistan and 
Iraq should have been successful.  Since 
WWII America has successfully democra-
tized two states: Japan and West Germany.  
Both of these democracies emerged from 
war-ravaged countries after having been pre-
viously ruled by authoritarian governments. 
Democratization occurred in both places de-
spite a recent cult-of-personality surrounding 
the former leader as well (particularly salient 
for Iraqi reconstruction).  Furthermore, since 
these countries democratized, neither had 
been involved in an international conflict.   
In fact, since WWII, Japan has not devel-
oped an official offensive military (albeit, 
this tradition sprang from provisions estab-
lished in a Constitution drawn up by Ameri-
can military officials (Ike 1950, 24)).  If the 
United States could harness the characteris-
tics of successful democratization in Japan 
and West Germany, perhaps it would be pos-
sible to turn Afghanistan and Iraq into de-
mocracies as well.   
 Taken at face value, the reasons for, 
the Bush administration’s invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan are fairly reasonable.  
States, unlike amorphous terrorist groups, 
are easily identifiable and targetable by the 
military.  The services these states provided 
to al Qaeda could be reduced or eliminated 
entirely through regime change. Democrati-
zation, had it been carried out properly, 
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 could have further reduced the po-
tential for terrorism. 
 
The Shortcomings of  
Democratization 
With such a theoretically sound the-
ory for democratization, why has democra-
tization in Iraq and Afghanistan been a hin-
drance to the War on Terror?  The answer is 
lies in how democratization has been shaped 
by political elites to define success in the 
two countries.  In Afghanistan, after the ini-
tial invasion, the United States spent most of 
its time fighting against Taliban in the hills 
of Afghanistan.  The United States correctly 
believed that by creating a secure environ-
ment in Afghanistan, it would be more likely 
that a democratic government could flourish 
(Fukuyama 2006, 234). However, neither the 
safe environment nor democracy ever 
emerged.  To this day that United States 
military continues to fight against Taliban 
and al Qaeda forces throughout Afghanistan.  
The fighting is so intense that in late March 
2009, President Barak Obama ordered an 
additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan to 
“partner with Afghan security forces and go 
after insurgents along the border” (Obama 
2009). Because of this instability, the Af-
ghan national government has yet to gain 
control over the whole country. Facing inter-
nal insurrection, a burgeoning illegal drug 
trade, and a lack of infrastructure, Afghani-
stan has been unable to develop into the de-
mocracy necessary for DPT to take effect.  
Democracy has become the single criteria 
for victory in Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, it 
has proven elusive.      
As discussed earlier, before the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the United States used the 
presence of WMDs and the association of 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as a 
casus belli.  So certain was the United States 
that it would encounter weapons of mass 
destruction during the invasion that media 
personnel were imbedded into American 
military squadrons (Galbraith 2006, 86—
87).  However, after the invasion, in an in-
ternational investigation by members of the 
Coalition of the Willing to determine if Sad-
dam Hussein possessed WMDs at the time 
of the invasion.  The report came back nega-
tive (Duelfer 2004). Internationally embar-
rassed and responsible for a failed state, the 
United States began to democratize Iraq.  
Admittedly, Iraq needed reconstruction inde-
pendent of the presence or absence of weap-
ons of mass destruction.  However, for lack 
of any other legitimate reason for the inva-
sion, the U.S. turned to democratization as 
the criteria for success.  Thus, democratiza-
tion, while a theoretically sound means of 
encouraging peace, has become an excuse 
for a continued American presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  It is this continued pres-
ence that has caused serious damage to the 
ability of the United States to wage the War 
on Terror. 
 
The Problems of Continued United States 
Presence 
 
Angry Afghanistan, Infuriated Iraq 
One of the most obvious problems 
resulting from a continued U.S. presence 
based on democratization has been the anger 
aroused in Iraqi and Afghani citizens. In-
stead of being greeted, as Vice President 
Richard Cheney predicted, as “liberators,” 
Coalition troops have been met with intense 
and overt hostility.  It is far outside the 
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 scope of this essay to discuss the 
legitimacy of this anger.  However, 
suffice to say that it exists, and it has 
a significant impact on how Iraq and 
Afghanistan have undergone democ-
ratic changes.  It should be noted that an-
ger is not necessarily just a negative ele-
ment in state building.  In fact, history has 
shown that anger can be used as a catalyst 
for regime change.  However, anger, particu-
larly when anger causes violence, makes the 
emergence of democratic institutions much 
less likely (Electing to Fight).  As the United 
States continues its stay in Iraq and Afghani-
stan on the grounds that a democratic state 
will eventually emerge, this anger is coun-
terproductive for achieving American objec-
tives.  
The emergence of religiously moti-
vated political parties and ethnic separatist 
movements must be considered regarding 
their impact on democratization.  Rather 
than address the specific goals of particular 
organizations, it is most useful to group 
them together when analyzing their impact 
on democratization efforts.   For example, 
while one group may want an Iraqi Sunni 
state while another may desire a free Kurs-
dish state, the most important aspect of these 
groups is that they all inhibit the ability of 
the US to engage in state-building, and have 
damaged Iraqi or Afghani conceptions of 
national unity.   
Although the amount of money and 
manpower spent on private contractors to 
rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan has been im-
mense, by far the United States military has 
played the largest role in reconstruction.  
Not only has the American military engaged 
in civil reconstruction, but its efforts to pro-
vide security to the two countries are indis-
pensible for the emergence of democratic 
states. Although there is no clear, universal  
answer as to precisely what is needed and in 
what order conditions need to emerge to cre-
ate democracy. Edward Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder (from whom my definition for de-
mocratization was taken) have written exten-
sively since 1995 regarding the ordering of 
democratic institutions necessary for democ-
racy to emerge. These two scholars argue in 
their book Electing to Fight that without the 
development of democratic institutions there 
can be no security, and thus, democracy, 
much less DPT, will not function.  Others 
may claim that without security there can be 
no democratic institutions, obviously inhibit-
ing democracy (Forman 2006, 196).  No 
matter which side of this chicken—egg de-
bate the reader falls, suffice to say that secu-
rity is an crucial element important part to 
the state building process. 
 Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier 
in this essay, terrorist attack methodology is 
remarkable for its simplicity, destructive ca-
pability and inability to be detected.  Thus, 
despite its superior weaponry and training, 
one of the greatest threats to the American 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan has been 
terrorist attacks. Roadside bombs and small 
arms fire are a constant problem for the 
American military, and the costs of carrying 
out these attacks as opposed to preventing 
them seriously favors the attacker over the 
victim (Howard 2009, 113). Thus, while the 
United States has pegged victory in the War 
on Terror on the emergence of democracy in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is attempting to cre-
ate democracy in an environment extremely 
hostile to the American presence.  
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 Now consider how all of this 
within the context of the emergence 
of religiously motivated political or-
ganizations and separatist movements 
on democratization.   These two types 
of organizations are considered linked in 
this essay because they share an important 
characteristic: they both tend to reject US 
involvement in state development.  In Iraq, 
separatist movements cannot support US 
efforts because, at present, the US is not at-
tempting to break up the Iraqi state.  Admit-
tedly, this is not always the case.  Until 
2006, prior to the Bush administration’s 
troop “surge” in which an additional 30,000 
troops were deployed to Iraq, the idea of a 
three state system was very possible.  This is 
exemplified by the January 2005 referendum 
in which Iraqis in the Northern Kurdish re-
gion voted for their independence from the 
rest of Iraq. (Galbraith 2006, 193) Even 
though the Kurds in Northern Iraq had been 
an invaluable asset to the United States dur-
ing the 2003 invasion, allowing the region to 
secede from the Iraqi state was an untenable 
solution for the Bush administration and the 
Maliki government.  To allow a portion of 
Iraq to remove itself from the negotiating 
table regarding Iraqi reconstruction could 
have opened the floodgates for secession by 
other groups. 
Afghanistan is in a different situa-
tion, but one no less hindered by separatist 
organizations.  To fully grasp the difference, 
it should be recognized that the American 
invasion in 2001 was done with significant 
assistance by native Afghanis.  The United 
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghani-
stan (UFI, and known to Western media as 
the “Northern Alliance”) had worked exten-
sively with the United States and Great 
Britian during the 2001 invasion.  Immedi-
ately following the capture of Kabul, the 
UFI packed government positions with its 
cadres (Weinbaum 2006, 127). However, the 
ethnic composition of the North Alliance 
was such that it was dominated by Tajiks, 
Panjshiris, and Uzbeks; all relative minori-
ties in Afghanistan.  Absent from the alli-
ance, and thus, the new government, were 
Pashtuns and Shia Muslim Hazaras which 
were the largest groups in Afghanistan, but 
whose members resided in eastern and 
southern parts of the country.  As the Af-
ghan bureaucracy became occupied by 
Northern Alliance loyalists, warlords from 
southern and eastern Afghanistan began to 
see perceive the newly formed Afghan gov-
ernment as illegitimate (Weinbaum 2006, 
129).  Thus, while the United States con-
cerned itself with security in Afghanistan, 
the Afghan national government proved in-
effective at governing in areas much beyond 
Kabul.    
As for the specific dangers posed to 
democratization by religiously motivated 
political parties, distrust among Sunni and 
Shiites in Iraq almost caused a breakup of 
the state (Galbraith, 2006, 181-208). Iraqis 
Shiites, the majority Muslim faction in Iraq, 
had been the dominant force in drafting the 
Iraqi Constitution.  Of course, Shiite domi-
nance of the constitutional process was un-
acceptable to Sunni Iraqis who, with the De-
Baathification of the Iraqi government, had 
already begun to see democratization as a 
not-so-subtle effort to remove Sunnis from 
the governing process. Furthermore, at-
tempts by the Sunnis to take control of the 
government through democratic reform 
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 were viewed by many former 
Ba’athists as a threat to their power. 
This caused Sunni representatives to 
object to “nearly everything that was 
proposed,” (Galbraith 2006, 194) Sub-
sequent attempts by the United States by 
the United States to pacify Sunni dissent 
ostracized the Shiite majority who felt that 
America was not really interested in forming 
a genuine democracy.  Religious political 
parties were the logical outcome.  They 
acted a the perfect venue for Sunnis to ex-
tend their political control over the process.  
As a minority group, political power was at 
a premium of importance. 
With power concentrated in a few 
groups, and with the groups competing for 
power, sectarian violence erupted on a hor-
rific scale.  Sunni groups attacked Shiia 
groups and vice versa.  With each attack 
came retaliations.  Bigger attacks yielded 
bigger retaliation. The massive upswing in 
sectarian violence after the 2006 bombing of 
the al Askari Mosque is an excellent exam-
ple of the blood feud that consumed Iraq Re-
taliations were common.  It is believed that 
the bombing was the immediate cause of as 
many as 165 deaths, and most likely contrib-
uted to the upswing in violence that occurred 
for the months after the attack where aver-
age deaths per day rose from 11 to 34. 
(Galbraith 2006, 246) The violence was so 
prominent, a US intelligence reports released 
as late as August 2007 noted the disturbing 
frequency of sectarian violence as a major 
obstacle in establishing peace in Iraq. 
Essentially, the political motivated 
religious groups and the separatist move-
ments were fulfilling the gap in civil society 
generated by the destruction of the old re-
gimes.  Civil society is the lifeblood of de-
mocracy.  Ashutosh Varshney , a scholar on 
ethnic conflict and civic life, defines civil 
society as “the part of our life that exists be-
tween the state on one hand and families on 
the other that allows people to come together 
on a variety of issues (2002, 4).  Without the 
connections made through civil society, 
Varshney posits that the potential for vio-
lence in communities will increase. Al-
though Varshney wrote these words of wis-
dom regarding the relationships between 
Hindus and Muslims in India, the same 
statement could easily be applied to Sunnis, 
Shi’a and Kurds in Iraq, or Tajiks and Pash-
tuns in Afghanistan.  Without civil society 
there is violence, and as violence increases, 
the likelihood of democratization decreases. 
The Poppy Production Dilemma 
The inability to administer govern-
ance on the part of the Afghan national gov-
ernment has enabled a massive upswing in 
the production of poppy in parts of Afghani-
stan.  Afghanistan possess little arable land.  
Rocky, dry, and lacking even basic infra-
structures in some regions, it is very difficult 
for Afghan farmers to scratch out a living.  
Because of the inhospitable climate, Af-
ghan’s main agricultural products are limited 
essentially to the few things that can grow 
easily.  Among these are certain types of 
nuts, figs, and poppy.  Poppy, a plant from 
which opium cam be extracted, is used in the 
production of many types of narcotics such 
as heroin and morphine.  These drugs are 
intensely lucrative, and their production 
poses a serious concern for the fledgling Af-
ghani government.  Lawlessness and poor 
infrastructure makes the logistics of curtail-
ing the production of poppy very difficult.  
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 Nevertheless, the unmitigated pro-
duction of these goods can be very 
harmful.  Drugs production and sale 
are a problem for any government, par-
ticularly those with poor domestic sup-
port facilities (rehabilitation centers, pub-
lic health care clinics, etc.).  Furthermore, 
the sale of poppy has been linked to narco-
terrorism, and is a chief element in terrorist 
funding (Weinbaum 2006, 133).  Ironically, 
during the reign of the Taliban, poppy pro-
duction had been outlawed.  However, after 
the Northern Alliance came to power, and 
certainly after the Northern alliance lost the 
ability to administer government across Af-
ghanistan, poppy production has reached an 
all-time high (Weinbaum 2006, 126).  Thus, 
the United States and the newly formed Af-
ghan government finds itself in the tenuous 
position of both needing to stop the produc-
tion of a crop that can by synthesized into a 
controlled substance, and the need for farm-
ers to subsist.  The United States has placed 
itself in a no—win situation regarding poppy 
production.  If the United States destroys 
poppy crops to discourage narco-terrorism, it 
harms the wellbeing of Afghan farmers 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of the 
emergence of a middle class and harming 
democratization (Moore 1966, xxii). If the 
United States allows the poppy crops to 
grow, previous efforts to stabilize Afghani-
stan are undermined.  No matter what it 
does, America is hemorrhages resources. A 
continued American presence based on the 
emergence of a democratic state will only 
prolong the bleeding.  
Unending Investment 
 The central theme of this paper is 
how continued American presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the name of democratiza-
tion has reduced the ability of the United 
States to wage the War on Terror.  A 
strained and previously engaged military, 
damaged American confidence in political 
leadership, and the accumulation of massive 
debt from invasion and reconstruction all 
reduced the ability of the United States to 
respond to future dangers. In this section, I 
will explore how and why these costs have 
accumulated.   
 Speaking in fiscal terms, the war has 
cost Americans a phenomenal sum of 
money.  In a Congressional report released 
October 15, 2008, Congress admitted to al-
locating almost one trillion dollars to fight-
ing the War on Terror (including all invasion 
and reconstruction activity in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) (United State Congress Congres-
sional Report Service 2008, 16).  This num-
ber is incredible.  It is almost one thirteenth 
of average annual American GDP 
(Purchasing Power Parity) in 2007 (World 
Bank, 2007).  Some critics of the War on 
Terror even claim this number is deflated.  
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel—prize winning 
economist, claims the costs of the war could 
actually be as high as $4 trillion 
(HERSZENHORN, 2008)  To appreciate 
these numbers, think of how this money was 
not used.  Even if the money was still only 
used to reduce the threat of terrorism, there 
were certainly other, better, uses for it.  By 
comparison, between 2003 and 2007, the 
United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) received appropriations 
from Congress in the amount of $5 billion 
dollars (United States Congress. Congres-
sional Budget Office 2008, 3).  This is not to 
suggest that economic development is a 
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 suitable alternative from democra-
tization in the War on Terror.  How-
ever, by providing humanitarian assis-
tance, the United States might at least 
have reduced the animosity many in 
Iraq and Afghanistan feel towards the 
United States.  Had Iraq and Afghanistan 
turned into model democracies, these costs 
may have been bearable.  However, this has 
not been the case. 
 The United States military has also 
suffered as a result of its democratization 
efforts. The U.S. military is engaged in tasks 
for which it was not designed.  American 
soldiers predominantly trained for combat 
environments, not the sort of peacekeeping 
missions necessary for state building and 
reconstruction (Dobbins 2006, 223). As 
mentioned earlier, the US military did pos-
sess a few resources that would be helpful 
for democratization such as the Army Corps 
of Engineers for assistance in creating civil 
infrastructure.  However, these efforts have 
obviously proven insufficient.  The sheer 
quantity of money that has been spent on 
private contractors and by Nongovernmental 
organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a 
testament to this deficiency. 
 The credibility of American political 
elites has also suffered immensely because 
of the continued American presence in these 
two countries. In the immediate aftermath of 
9-11, President George Bush experienced 
record approval ratings; what many consid-
ered to be a manifestation of the “rally 
‘round the flag” effect (Muller 2005, 47).  In 
the run up to the war in Iraq, the Bush ad-
ministration received another spike in ap-
proval.  However, as the conflicts dragged 
on, as American expenses and casualties 
mounted, and as the amount of time neces-
sary for successful democratization became 
clearer, American public opinion waned.  A 
poll conducted by CBS asked 844 American 
adults nationwide, "Do you think the result 
of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of 
American life and other costs of attacking 
Iraq, or not?"  In August 2003, 46% of those 
surveyed said that they believed the costs 
were worth the results while 45% thought 
the costs were not worth it with 9% unsure 
(CBS News Poll, 2009).  In March of 2008, 
CBS polled the same group and discovered 
that according to their survey, support had 
gone down significantly.  In March 2008, 
only 29% of those surveyed though the costs 
were worth it while those who believed the 
results were not worth the costs rose to 64% 
of those surveyed with 7% unsure.  This 
negative sentiment was directly reflected in 
American views of President Bush.  In a 
Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Sur-
vey Research Associates International asked 
1,003 adults nationwide, “. . . Do you ap-
prove or disapprove of the way Bush is han-
dling the situation in Iraq?"  In May 2003, 
less than one month after the initial invasion 
of Iraq, 69% of Americans said that they ap-
proved of the Bush administration’s han-
dling, while only 26% disapproved with 5% 
not sure.  In August 2005, over two years 
later, American views had obviously 
changed.  Again, Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International conducted the poll.  
This time, 34% of Americans approved, 
61% disapproved, and 5% were unsure.  At 
the end of the second Bush term, the same 
poll found 68% of Americans disapproved 
of Bush’s handling of Iraq (Newsweek Poll 
conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
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 Associates International, 2009).   
One popularly cited reason for why 
Americans stopped favoring the war 
and supporting American military lead-
ership is “casualty phobia”(Feaver 
Gelpi and Reifler 2009, 8).  This argu-
ment state argues that there may be initial 
support for the use of force, but the support 
evaporates rapidly and irrevocably at the 
sight of body bags.” (Feaver Gelpi and 
Reifler 2009, 8).  This certainly seems logi-
cal.  As the criteria for American victory in 
Iraq and Afghanistan was made unattainable, 
each life lost in the conflicts became more 
deplorable.  Obviously, as the United States 
prolongs its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
the sake of democratization, it is likely that 
the credibility of political elites may suffer 
further damage. 
But what has enabled the hemorrhag-
ing of American dollars, lives, and domestic 
credibility in the name of democratization?  
The answer lies in the epistemological ambi-
guity of important terms in the War on Ter-
ror.  Few American politicians stood against 
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  To do 
so would have been political suicide in a de-
mocratic society.  Similarly, in the weeks 
leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, few 
politicians stood against the Bush admini-
stration.  The stakes for being wrong were 
simply perceived as too high by most politi-
cians (Ravi 2005, 55).  Because of this uni-
form political support, the Bush administra-
tion introduced a number of terms into the 
discussion of the War on Terror.  Two of the 
most important terms for this discussion 
were “victory” and “democracy.”  On May 
2, 2003, U.S. President George Bush landed 
in full fighter regalia on the deck of the 
U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.  The purpose of 
President Bush’s visit to the Abraham Lin-
coln was to declare as the banner behind him 
said, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished.”  As 
is now known all too well, the mission was 
not yet finished. Nevertheless, the Bush ad-
ministration made wining military cam-
paigns against Iraq seem like the only crite-
ria for a successful invasion (Ravi 2005, 45).  
However, when weapons inspectors con-
cluded Iraq never possessed a WMD pro-
gram, the Bush administration changed 
“victory” again.  This time, victory took the 
current definition of a fully democratic Iraq. 
Of course, there no explanation was ever 
provided about exactly what a fully democ-
ratic Iraq meant.  Internationally accepted 
free and fair elections? High voter registra-
tion and participation?  The Bush admini-
stration never explained. Despite this ambi-
guity, in a November 30, 2005 address 
where he discussed strategy for the war in 
Iraq, George Bush used the term “victory” 
15 times, and even posed a sign that said, 
“Plan for Victory” next to his podium 
(Berinsky Drukman, 2007, 128) Even 
though the definition for victory had 
changed, it was clear that the Bush admini-
stration still expected it.  On a similar note, 
the Bush administration remained steadfast 
against the use of timetables for withdrawal 
from the two countries, and because of its 
precarious position, was unable to ensure the 
developing Iraqi government reached Wash-
ington-approved checkpoints.  When Af-
ghanistan’s parliamentary elections were 
postponed from 2004 until 2005, the United 
States could only watch (United Nations In-
formation Service 2005).  Removing support 
for the nascent Afghani national  
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 government would not have 
yielded faster democratization.  All 
that the United States could do was 
keep promoting security in Afghanistan 
and hope for better election conditions 
in 2005. 
Unfriendly Friends 
The Bush administration did a spectacular 
job of alienating U.S. allies throughout the 
War on Terror.  Immediately following 9-11, 
nations around the world flocked to Amer-
ica’s support.  From long time allies like 
Britain to countries with which the U.S. has 
had cooler relations such as Iran and Libya, 
international solidarity against the hijackings 
was astounding.  Immediately after the at-
tack, the nineteen members of NATO in-
voked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
stating, that “an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them 
all.”  The members of NATO went even fur-
ther by pledging action including the “use of 
armed force.” (Gordon 2002, 5)  However, 
two and a half years later, in the weeks lead-
ing up to the United States invasion of Iraq, 
relations between the United States and its 
allies soured. 
 Prior to the war, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 
had been investigating Iraq.  These organiza-
tions are international bodies charged with 
investigating countries possessing nuclear 
technology for their compliance with inter-
national law.  In the case of Iraq the IAEA 
and UNMOVIC were responsible for inves-
tigating Iraqi compliance with United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 1441. 
Resolution 1441 offered Saddam Hussein a 
final opportunity to have Iraq comply with 
previous United Nations Security Council 
resolutions restricting Iraq’s possession of 
both a nuclear material and certain prohib-
ited armament in the wake of the 1991 Gulf 
War (The United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1441, 2009).  However, the in-
vestigation of Iraq was not fast enough for 
the Bush administration.  Citing Iraqi un-
willingness to allow inspectors into certain 
areas, the Bush administration claimed that 
Iraq was not fully disclosing its weapons 
program and was therefore in contravention 
of Resolution 1441 (Galbraith 2006, 102). 
The Resolution contained no specific trig-
gers for military action.  Nevertheless, U.S. 
representative to the United Nations John 
Negroponte did comment that, “If the Secu-
rity Council fails to act decisively in the 
event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolu-
tion does not constrain any member state 
from acting to defend itself against the threat 
posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant UN 
resolutions and protect world peace secu-
rity.” It was Negroponte’s caveat that would 
later be used by the Bush administration as a 
justification for the Iraq invasion. 
 The international community was not 
supportive of U.S. military action in Iraq.  
Particularly after IAEA and UNMOVIC in-
vestigators presented evidence for Iraqi 
compliance to Resolution 1441, the interna-
tional community saw U.S. militarism as 
disconcerting (Wall, 125). Although the 
United States would claim that it assembled 
a “Coalition of the Willing” to support it 
during a war with Iraq, the coalition was 
strongly influenced by bribes and coercion 
by the United States (Anderson Bennis and 
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 Cavanagh 2003, 8—10).  Those 
countries that were not part of the 
“Coalition” were ostracized, in many 
cases by the American public itself. 
France in particular experienced Ameri-
can rancor through boycotts of French 
products, jokes focusing on French military 
cowardice, and even childish renaming of 
items that contained the word “French” (i.e. 
“french fries” became “freedom fries”).  
None of this is good for utilizing the interna-
tional goodwill created after 9-11.  For their 
part, “The French see a new aggressive 
strain of messianic universalism in U.S. pol-
icy, a willingness to impose democracy by 
use of the U.S. military.” which they see as 
deeply troubling (Wall 2004, 126). As the 
United States continues its presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan because of a dedication to 
the emergence of democracy, this view is 
unlikely to change.  
 
Policy Prescriptions  
Given these grotesque realities, what 
steps should the Obama administration take 
to correct America’s course in fighting the 
War on Terror?  The answer to this is in 
three parts.  First, the United States must 
extricate itself from the politics of Iraq and 
Afghanistan as much as possible. Secondly, 
the US must reducing instances of overt hos-
tility towards Muslims within US military 
practices.  Finally, the Obama administration 
needs to work to heal relationships between 
the US and the international community 
while convincing the international commu-
nity to share the burden of state building 
when necessary. These three tactics will ad-
dress the major obstacles to the War on Ter-
ror that have arisen as a result of attempts by 
the United States to democratize Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  These recommendations are a 
start.  Had the Bush administration under-
taken these policies in the early days of the 
two invasions, it is unlikely that conditions 
would have degenerated as seriously as they 
have.  Thus, the impacts of these actions are 
likely to carry repercussions that may not 
have necessarily have occurred if imple-
mented sooner.  The above prescriptions are 
likely to encounter serious problems in im-
plementation.  However, “obstacles on the 
ground” must be addressed one way or an-
other if the United States seeks to correct its 
mistakes 
It is important to mention that as of 
this writing, the Obama administration has 
taken several significant steps towards many 
of these goals.  However, much more work 
is needed before the ill—effects of attempts 
to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq can be 
eradicated.  As President, Barack Hussein 
Obama (a Democrat, America’s first black 
President, and a man with Muslim family) is 
in a unique position to shape how the United 
States fights the War on Terror.  Now, the 
only question that remains is if he is up to 
the challenge.  
American removal from Iraqi and 
Afghani governance is critical.  Without this, 
all other measures to fix the problems gener-
ated by these democratizations may be fruit-
less.  At a basic level, governments must 
concern themselves with two things: legiti-
macy and sovereignty.  Lacking either of 
these things will result in the devolution of 
society into lawlessness.  Without sover-
eignty, governments are unable to control 
citizens. Without legitimacy, constant inter-
nal power struggles will make a unified 
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 government impossible. While its 
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan 
may assist in governmental sover-
eignty (the United States military has 
extensively trained local Afghanis and 
Iraqis in combat and security measures 
(Obama, 2009)) it has hindered governmen-
tal legitimacy in the process. With separatist 
groups and religiously motivated political 
groups jockeying for power, such chinks in 
legitimacy of the new governments with 
weak civil societies may be fatal.   
While it may not be feasible for the 
United States to quickly and completely di-
vorce itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it can 
certainly start by removing itself from much 
of the politics of the two countries.  The 
Obama administration must develop a list of 
objectives the United States will pursue in 
these countries, and fulfill them at the dis-
cretion of the host governments.  Further-
more, these goals need to be apolitical and 
object goods for all Iraqis and Afghanis.  A 
good example of this is security.  Simultane-
ously, the United States must create a list of 
goals and it expects the Iraqi and Afghani 
governments to accomplish.  These goals 
must be reasonable and they also must be 
accompanied by reasonable timetables. De-
spite its weaknesses in fighting terrorism, 
the United States military is certainly more 
capable of upholding security than the infant 
governments.    Furthermore, if the United 
States enforces security everywhere equally, 
not just in areas that are friendly toward 
America, the potential for harming the legiti-
macy of indigenous governments may di-
minish. However, the Iraqi and Afghani gov-
ernments must work diligently towards de-
mocracy for American efforts to be fruitful. 
Interestingly, if this policy is undertaken, it 
is likely that American objectives and Iraqi 
and Afghani objectives may sync on a num-
ber of key issues.  Both the Iraq and United 
States governments want al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) agents apprehended.  Working with 
the Iraqi government may be the best way to 
achieve this, while simultaneously making it 
more difficult for AQI to gain supporters 
who are against the US presence.  By creat-
ing delineating responsibilities and goals, 
the United States will be providing strong 
support to democratization, but in such a 
way that it will more likely result in a full 
democracy. 
A serious blunder of the Bush ad-
ministration was the impact of American 
counterterrorist activity on the perceptions 
of Muslims around the world.  The problem 
was so significant that one of the major fo-
cuses of President Obama’s first trip abroad 
was to assure the “Muslim world” that the 
United States, “is not and will never be at 
war with Islam” (Cooper, 2009). Of course, 
soundbites from President Obama may not 
be sufficient to outweigh Muslim antipathy.  
Overt targeting of Islam and Muslims in the 
War on Terror have scarred American rela-
tions with many Muslims (Pew Global Atti-
tudes Project, Pew Research Center, 2009).  
To correct its course, the United States must 
not allow further cause to those who think 
the United States is at war with Islam.  
Obama has made significant strides in this 
regard.  Closing the infamous American 
military base and prisoner detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is an excellent first 
step.  As discussed, intentionally removing 
the phrase “War on terror” from the lexicon 
of American foreign policy is another step 
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 in the right direction.  These efforts 
must be continued if the United 
States is ever to win back the public 
opinion of Muslims around the world. 
Finally, the United States must work 
to reintegrate the international community 
into the War on Terror. America had wide-
spread international support after 9-11. 
However, the costs of involvement to Amer-
ica combined with American pomposity 
have made it unlikely for other countries to 
volunteer in the War on Terror.  Contribut-
ing to this unease is the knowledge that 
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain and 
chief supporter of the United States during 
the Iraqi Invasion, received so much domes-
tic backlash that he lost his position as PM. 
Similarly, politicians in countries like Aus-
tralia and Spain came to power with prom-
ises that they would remove their country 
from the Coalition.  This is obviously a 
problem for the United States which already 
supplies the majority of resources for the 
two conflicts.  President Obama’s charge 
will thus be twofold for reintegrating the in-
ternational community into the War on Ter-
ror. First, he will need to convince politi-
cians that they will not necessarily loose 
popular support just by assisting in the War.  
Second (although related), President Obama 
needs to impress upon the international com-
munity that fighting terrorists must be a con-
cern of every country.  If Barack Obama can 
get more countries in the world invested in 
the notion of preventing terrorist attacks, 
then proving that politicians will not lose 
domestic support will come naturally.  With-
out the international involvement in the War 
on Terror, costs to Americans will be much 
higher, and the likelihood for success will be 
much lower.    
Conclusion 
In this essay I have shown how de-
mocratization has harmed the ability of the 
United States to wage the War on Terror. 
Theoretically, democratization may have 
been the solution for rebuilding Iraq and Af-
ghanistan after the United States invaded. 
However, poor planning, and insufficient 
resources have stymied the emergence of 
democratic institutions in these two states.  
Despite this slowness in democratization, 
political elites have defined victory in these 
two countries as the emergence of fully de-
mocratic governments. This decision has 
angered many indigenous Iraqis and Af-
ghanis, necessitated enormous and continual 
resource investment from the United States, 
and has tarnished U.S. image internationally.  
Despite these issues, American policy can be 
corrected.  The Obama administration must 
work to differentiate the War on Terror from 
what many Muslims perceive as a “War on 
Islam.” Furthermore, the Obama administra-
tion must develop concrete criteria for vic-
tory and abide by those criteria for commit-
ting a judicious withdrawal from Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Finally, the Obama admini-
stration must involve other countries in the 
War on Terror.  This is important both be-
cause it will enable the United States to de-
fer some of the expenses of the War on other 
countries, but also because the goals of the 
War on Terror are beneficial to all states.  
These tasks will be difficult to achieve, but 
not impossible. By halting America’s tire-
less commitment to democratization in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, in the long run, the United 
States will be in a much better position to 
wage the War on Terror.  
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Abstract 
Thailand and the Philippines face similar 
security issues, including separatist violence 
in their southern provinces. However, the 
developmental paths of the two countries 
and the governments’ reactions to the mi-
nority ethno-religious separatist movements, 
the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the 
Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thai-
land, the government’s desire to create a 
singular national identity from mixed ethnic 
and religious backgrounds has created peri-
ods of forced assimilation tempered by at-
tempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Phil-
ippines continued colonial policies of eco-
nomic and political oppression of the Moro 
but created the institutions necessary for 
social pluralism. The differing policies of 
the Thai and Filipino governments have 
shaped the orientation of the separatist 
movements within the countries. Currently, 
the size and power of the MILF in the Phil-
ippines has forced the government to at-
tempt peace talks with the group. However, 
in Thailand the reclusive nature of the 
BRN‑C remains hinders communications 
with the Thai government. This paper dem-
onstrates that the actions taken by the gov-
ernments of Thailand and the Philippines 
have fostered current separatist and terrorist 
movements. Addressing these problems will 
require state policies that reflect pluralism 
and institutions that support social aspira-
tions. 
 
Glossary 
ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao 
Berastu – Unity, separatist group in Thai-
land 
BNPP - Barisan Nasional Pembebasan 
Patani 
BRN – Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National 
Revolutionary Front) 
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines 
CPT – Communist Party of Thailand 
Malay – ethnic minority group in Thailand 
MIM – Moro Islamic Movement formerly 
the Moro Independence Movement 
THE MNLF - Moro National Liberation 
Front 
MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
Moro - ethnic minority group in the Philip-
pines 
OIC – Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence 
PAO - Provincial Administrative Organiza-
tions (Thailand) 
PULO - Patani United Liberation Organiza-
tion 
SBPAC – Southern Border Provinces Ad-
ministration Centre 
SPCPD – Southern Philippines Council for 
Peace and Development 
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   Thailand Philippines 
Education Regulation of curriculum 
in punohs 
  
Forced assimilation 
Secularization of schools 
Reaction from govern-
ment 
Relied on military rather 
than political action to 
deal with violence 
Peace agreements and 
ceasefires 
  
Direct political action 
Separatist groups BRN and BRN-C 
  
Goals murky at best, 
leaders hide in country-
side 
MNLF and MILF 
  
Well known leaders and 
goals 
Size of groups Exact numbers unknown, 
estimated at times as low 
as 300 to 500 active 
members 
At peak 30,000 estimated 
members 
Focus of groups/ conflict Focus of group un-
known. 
  
The conflict is both relig-
iously and ethnically 
based 
MILF aimed for a 
broader political goal 
based on the ethnic/
religious identity of the 
Moro 
Class issues Low overall country out-
put/wages until industrial 
revolution in late 1980s 
Government reallocation 
of ancestral Moro land to 
Christians 
(cycle of poverty) 
Regional affect Malay have appealed to 
Malaysian government 
for aid in crisis 
Connection with Muslim 
community in Sabah and 
Borneo 
Outside funding Some claim Jamaa 
Islamiya connection to 
the BRN but the BRN 
and scholars deny these 
claims 
Malaysian government 
(weapons, transport, etc.) 
Aid from Libya under 
Kadaffi 
Organization of separa-
tist group 
Top down structure in 
the BRN-C, with a mili-
tary and political wing 
Loosely knit with some 
infrastructure including a 
central committee and 
the BMA (Bangsa Moro 
Army) 
Religious demographics 94% Buddhist 
5% Muslim 
<1% Christian, 
Hindu, Sikh, or Jewish 
90% Christian 
5% Muslim 
<1% Buddhist, 
Sikh, or animist 
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 Introduction  
 Thailand and the Philippines 
are currently experiencing similar se-
curity concerns, including separatist 
violence in their southern provinces. 
The violence stems from minority ethno‑-
religious groups, namely the Malay in Thai-
land and the Moro in the Philippines. De-
spite largely similar histories, the develop-
mental paths of the separatist movements 
and governmental responses of the two 
countries have greatly affected their reac-
tions and level of success with the separatist 
movements. The focus in Thailand on iden-
tity issues, and the government’s inability to 
create lasting and stable institutions through 
which to mediate identity issues, has left the 
Malay with few official avenues through 
which to express their problems. Due to this, 
some Malay have begun to work outside of 
the system in separatist groups. However, in 
the Philippines the government’s economic 
oppression has been tempered by a political 
readiness to mitigate societal issues. That 
has enabled separatist groups to be open 
about their leadership and aims, which has 
lead to negotiations and attempted peace 
treaties with the government. 
History before the Modern States  
 The creation of Thailand and the 
Philippines as unified states only occurred in 
the early twentieth century. Prior to this, 
Thailand was a series of provinces ruled by 
local leaders and the Philippines was a col-
ony of Spain. Even after the Philippines be-
came a unified state, it was a colony of the 
United States until 1946. However, the his-
tory of the Malay and Moro date back much 
further than the creation of Thailand and the 
Philippines, which has had an impact on the 
current separatist movements. 
Thailand  
The beginnings of modern Thai his-
tory can be traced to the eleventh through 
thirteenth centuries when the ethnic group, 
the Thai, began migrating south from China 
and controlling regions in China as well as 
in the Northern provinces of modern‑day 
Thailand (Wyatt 2003, 30). However, prior 
to the Thai arrival, three ethnic groups, the 
Mon, Khmer, and the Malay, resided in the 
area of Thailand and controlled independent 
provinces. Of these three ethnic groups, only 
the Malay in the south were animists, and 
the Mon and Khmer, sometimes placed to-
gether as the Mon-Khmer, were Buddhist 
(Wyatt 2003, 20). The Thai created local 
leadership similar to that already existing in 
the provinces. In time, the Mon and Khmer 
assimilated with the Thai, as they shared a 
common faith and Chinese heritage. Mean-
while, the southern provinces of Thailand, 
Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were con-
trolled under the local area of Malacca until 
1511 (Harish 2006, 50). At this point, the 
Portuguese had overtaken Malacca and all of 
the provinces were placed under the watch 
of the Kingdom of Siam (Thai government). 
This new arrangement included the pay-
ments of tribute to the king, but the prov-
inces were allowed to retain local leadership, 
often called rajas or kings (Harish 2006, 50). 
Around this same time, trade boomed in the 
southern provinces and with it brought the 
Islamic religion (Islam 1998, 443). It 
quickly became the dominant faith in the 
south by the late fifteenth century, and being 
Malay and being Muslim became synony-
mous.  For the next two centuries, the three 
southern provinces would continue to  
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 govern themselves, occasionally 
engaging in skirmishes with the 
Siam government but never being un-
der direct control. 
In 1785, after numerous rebellions 
and refusals to pay tribute, the King of 
Siam overthrew the raja of the provinces 
and placed them under direct Siam control 
(Islam 1998, 443). Despite being under the 
control of the Thai government, the raja re-
tained some local status and could be influ-
ential in the southern provinces. This would 
end when in 1901, when under pressure 
from the British government the Siamese 
government created an official administra-
tive body to rule the “area of the seven prov-
inces” (Harish 2006, 51). In essence this cre-
ated a “unified” Thailand (than called Siam), 
so that the king had official control over all 
of the provinces of Thailand – thus finally 
ending the power of local southern leaders. 
From this point until 1932, with the 
marginalization of the king and the creation 
of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay had 
virtually no representation in the govern-
ment. With the establishment of a democ-
racy in Thailand, the Malay won some mini-
mal spots in the National Assembly and Par-
liament (Harish 2006, 52). It would seem 
that Thailand was beginning a promising 
new government, including plurality in and 
representation from all provinces. However, 
in 1938, the fledgling democracy was de-
posed in a coup and Thailand was forced 
under the control of the military (composed 
mainly of Thai Buddhists). This would dras-
tically change the quality of life for the Ma-
lay in the south and affect relations between 
the Thai Buddhists and the Malay through-
out the twentieth century. 
The Philippines 
The Philippines faced a similar early 
historical path to that of Thailand. The is-
lands that compose the Philippines were in-
habited by many ethnic groups, collectively 
termed Malayo-Polynesian (Islam 1998, 
444). They were governed by local leaders, 
often termed sultans. The Moro resided 
largely in the southern province of Min-
danao. No unified state of the Philippines 
existed and outside influences from Malay-
sia remained a force in political life. Simi-
larly to Thailand, Islam was introduced in 
the southern provinces in the early four-
teenth century through trade (Islam 1998, 
444). Soon it too became the dominant relig-
ion, most closely associated with the Moro. 
Shortly after Islam was introduced in the 
Philippines, the Spanish gained control of 
the southern provinces of Mindanao and 
Sulu (predominately Moro in composition) 
in 1565 (Islam 1998, 444). The Spanish 
never officially gained a mandate over these 
provinces but governed them as a colony 
anyway. This is exemplified most predomi-
nately in the attempts by the Spanish to con-
vert the Moro to Catholicism. Their efforts 
were largely unsuccessful so the Spanish 
began to “reallocate” Moro land to Spanish 
Catholics (and those they are able to con-
vert) in an attempt to forcibly change the 
religious and ethnic composition of the 
southern provinces.  
Despite the fact that the Philippines 
were never officially a Spanish territory, and 
that Spanish control was maintained largely 
only in the southern provinces of Mindanao 
and Sulu, the Spanish relinquished control of 
the Philippines to the United States in 1899 
as part of the Bates Treaty that ended the 
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 Spanish-American War. The Phil-
ippines would not gain independ-
ence until 1946, until that time the 
United States created the Manila Gov-
ernment to rule over the Philippines. 
During American rule in the Philippines, 
there was occasional conflict between the 
government and the Moro. This led to the 
creation of the Moro Province, encompass-
ing the provinces of Sulu and Mindanao, a 
special administrative area created to pre-
emptively quell any growing dissidence 
(Magdalena 1977, 300). The Manila Gov-
ernment claimed that it was actively trying 
to redistribute land back to the Moro people, 
whose land was stripped from them under 
the Spanish and were working as tenant 
farmers on the land. However, in reality lit-
tle ancestral land was given back to the 
Moro and tenant farming remained the pre-
dominant practice until the 1960s, and not 
until the late 1980s did any significant land 
redistribution take place (Noble 1976a, 406). 
This created a system under which the Moro 
differed religiously, ethnically, geographi-
cally, and financially from the majority of 
Filipinos. 
Beginnings of Separatist Movements  
 Separatist tensions in both Thailand 
and the Philippines began to emerge in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, as a reaction to 
government policies. In Thailand, the mili-
tary coup in 1938 created an unstable politi-
cal atmosphere in which the pattern of at-
tempted forced assimilation by the govern-
ment on the Malay became an increasing 
issue. This included the eradication of the 
Malay language in schools, regulated cur-
riculum in punohs (religious schools), and 
government pressure for Malays to take Thai 
names (Harish 2006, 52).  Haji Sulong be-
came the leader of the first separatist move-
ment in Thailand, the Islamic Council of the 
Pattani Province, sending a list of demands 
to the Thai government in April 1947 
(Christie 1996, 183). Among the demands 
were a separate court that would recognize 
the Islamic faith for the basis of the law, for 
money derived from the southern provinces 
to be utilized in those provinces, and for the 
restoration of the Malay language in schools 
as well as for it to be the official language of 
the three southern provinces (Islam 1998, 
444). Sulong and some of his supporters 
were arrested in 1948 for treason, resulting 
in a steady stream of violence for the re-
mainder of the year ending with the declara-
tion of a state of emergency in the southern 
provinces that would last for a decade. In 
1959, as the emergency was ending, the 
BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan 
Patani) was being formed by Tengku Abdul 
Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong’s in the 
1940s (Islam 1998, 446). The BNPP was the 
precursor to the current separatist groups the 
BRN and the PULO, its aims included an 
independent Islamic state (Islam 1998, 446). 
 In the Philippines, the Magsaysay 
administration continued the policy of strip-
ping the Moro of their ancestral lands by 
hastening migration of northern Filipinos 
and Catholics into the southern regions 
(Noble 1976a, 406). The government 
claimed to undertake this movement to in-
crease production in the southern provinces, 
which were producing below capacity, and 
thus solve the problems that were arising 
from an increasing population and low pro-
ductivity levels (Noble 1976a, 406). How-
ever, this had a negative effect on the 
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 Moros, as the Catholics and north-
ern Filipinos soon became the ma-
jority in the south. A combination of 
Catholics and non‑Moro northerners 
thus gained control of the local govern-
ment positions and wealth in the region – 
and often over Moro land, as few of the 
Moros who lived and worked on their ances-
tral lands had legal documents to prove own-
ership (Noble 1976a, 407). This resulted in 
their land being taken by the Catholics and 
wealthier Filipinos who effectively con-
trolled the legal system in the south. The 
first coordinated separatist group formed as 
a reaction to the Corregidor Incident in 
1968. In March 1968, the Filipino govern-
ment was planning an attack on Sabah, Ma-
laysia. Sabah was a popular trading port that 
the government believed to be a smuggling 
area for Moros. In order to undertake the 
attack, the government constructed an all‑-
Moro military unit. However, as the Moro 
were actively engaged in trade in Sabah and 
many Moro had relatives there, the Moro 
soldiers refused their orders. The Thai offi-
cials claimed that the soldiers staged an up-
rising in which thirty Moro soldiers were 
killed. However, the incident was interpreted 
differently by the Moro, who believed that 
the government murdered the soldiers and 
purposefully attempted to send an all‑Moro 
unit to Sabah (Noble 1976a, 408). Following 
the incident, Udtog Matalam formed the first 
organized separatist movement, MIM 
(Muslim Independence Movement), which 
the government disbanded in 1970 (Noble 
1976a, 408). However, MIM was an impor-
tant precursor to a currently active separatist 
group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation 
Front). 
  The movements took different paths 
after this point in time. In Thailand, periodic 
uprisings were undertaken by various 
groups, but there was not consistent separa-
tist violence from one group until a larger 
undertaking in the 1980s and later the most 
recent violence occurring since 2004. Con-
versely, in the Philippines in the 1960s sev-
eral separatist groups emerged and became 
staples in the conflict until the present. 
Modern Separatist Groups in Thailand 
 The two main separatist groups that 
currently operate in Thailand are the BRN 
(National Revolutionary Front) and the 
PULO (Patani United Liberation Organiza-
tion). The BRN retained the religious under-
pinnings of the BNPP, as well as responding 
to economic issues developing in the south-
ern provinces. The decline in the rubber 
market in the 1960s disproportionately af-
fected the southern provinces and thus dis-
proportionately impoverished Muslims as 
compared to the rest of Thailand (Islam 
1998, 447). The BRN remains a largely se-
cretive group, the leaders are unknown and 
the group rarely discussed its goals until re-
cently, when it declared that it is attempting 
to create an independent state through revo-
lution.  The PULO, unlike the BRN, is secu-
lar in nature but still aims to create an inde-
pendent Pattani state. The group was formed 
by college graduates who had received their 
degrees abroad, only to come back to Thai-
land and be unable to work as no one would 
hire them (Tan-Mullins 2006, 146). This has 
caused some graduates to leave Thailand, 
and a marked absence of educated Malay in 
leadership positions in the Thai government. 
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 Modern Separatist Groups in the 
Philippines 
 Almost directly after the dis-
banding of MIM, the MNLF, the youth 
branch of MIM, came to the forefront. 
It directly outlined its political goals as 
well as the reasons for the formation of the 
group. Openness and clarity would remain a 
characteristic of the MNLF, as the leaders of 
the group are well known and have through-
out the struggle been in periodic discussions 
with the government. While the Moro iden-
tify based on religion as well as culture, the 
MNLF focused on broader shared goals, in-
cluding economic disparities in the southern 
provinces and government failures to re-
spond to inequality. In doing so, the MNLF 
created a larger scope and support base for 
their cause than did Thai separatist groups. 
As a result, when the government declared 
martial law in October 1972, the MNLF had 
support not only in the Philippines but also 
in Malaysia which actively funded the group 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Noble 1976a, 411). 
Differences in Separatist Movements  
 The separatist movements in Thai-
land and the Philippines share some similar 
qualities, including a minority Muslim eth-
nic group, movements originating at ap-
proximately the same time, and semi-defined 
goals for independent states/regions. How-
ever, the orientation of the modern dominant 
groups in each country has affected the na-
ture of the conflict within the country. The 
BRN retains a pure Islamic message, which 
has limited its membership (i.e. the PULO). 
Additionally, the relative silence and secrecy 
of the group has hindered the possibility of 
communication with the government. This 
has created an atmosphere of suspicion in 
the southern provinces of Thailand, where 
even Malays living in the southern provinces 
often remark that they are unsure of who is 
or is not a member of the BRN (Tan-Mullins 
2006, 145). Conversely, membership in the 
MNLF has exceeded the tens of thousands at 
its peak, with the names and faces of top 
leaders well known throughout the country. 
The broader message of the MNLF has al-
lowed for compromise, as seen in the recent 
peace talks with the government that re-
sulted in the signing of a peace treaty.  De-
spite the Filipino courts’ failure to approve 
the treaty and subsequent relapse of violence 
in August 2008, the leaders of the MNLF 
were willing and able to meet with and com-
promise on issues of importance to the 
Moro, Muslims, and people of the southern 
provinces. It is evident that the nature of the 
separatist organizations has influenced the 
level of success or failure the movements 
will have diplomatically; however, it has 
been the governments’ responses to the 
separatist movements that have influenced 
the severity of the groups and the violence 
that stems from them. 
Government Action in Thailand and the 
Philippines 
Action taken in part by the governments in 
Thailand and the Philippines has fueled 
separatist groups. In Thailand, the govern-
ment’s relentless pursuit of a national iden-
tity has caused the Malay to react by fighting 
relentlessly to maintain their cultural tradi-
tions. In the Philippines, the government’s 
misappropriation of land left the Moro un-
derrepresented politically and devastated 
financially. However, it is the capacity of the 
government to manage these issues that has 
most directly affected the ability of the  
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 government to mitigate separatist 
violence. 
Initial Government  Responses to 
Separatist Movements 
 In the Philippines, major separa-
tist organization began after the Corregi-
dor Incident of 1968 and the subsequent 
consolidation of President Marcos power in 
1972. One of Marcos’s first actions as presi-
dent was to declare martial law in the south-
ern provinces. This included a massive reas-
signment of troops, with over 70 percent sta-
tioned in the southern provinces. Addition-
ally, from 1972 through 1978 Marcos con-
solidated and strengthened his power as 
president. This included the firing of over 
2000 government positions, a referendum 
that allowed him to appoint local officials, 
and Marcos holding both the positions of 
president and prime minister (Noble 1976b, 
180). Despite the increased power of Mar-
cos, he chose to negotiate with the MNLF 
leaders. A ceasefire was quickly established 
and maintained. Beginning in 1975, the 
MNLF leaders presented their goals to the 
Islamic Conference in Jeddah (OIC). The 
MNLF wanted a politically autonomous re-
gion, which would be comprised of thirteen 
southern provinces including all of Min-
danao and the Sulu archipelago (Noble 
1976b, 181). President Marcos responded by 
offering autonomy but not full independ-
ence; instead, four regions would be con-
structed from the thirteen provinces. Each 
region would have a commissioner that 
would be directly under his (Marcos’s) au-
thority as well as the placement of Muslims 
in additional government positions focused 
on economic and social development (Noble 
1976b, 181). The general terms were ac-
cepted by both the MNLF and Marcos. 
However, as the fine details of the peace 
agreement were being negotiated, the MNLF 
called for full autonomy and the implemen-
tation of Muslim leaders and law in the 
southern provinces. The government refused 
to accept these terms since in some of the 
thirteen proposed regions Muslims did not 
constitute the majority. The reason that Mus-
lims did not constitute a majority in all of 
the southern provinces was a result of the 
Catholic “land reallocation” pursued by the 
government during Spanish colonization. 
Following a vote, only ten of the thirteen 
regions voted for autonomy and the Tripoli 
peace agreement subsequently fell apart. 
Hence, colonial policies continued to not 
only affect Filipino society but also hinder 
peaceful coexistence. 
Despite the failure to complete a 
peace agreement between the MNLF and the 
Filipino government, an important precedent 
was set by the Marcos administration. Even 
though Marcos governed the Philippines in 
an authoritarian manner and amassed exorbi-
tant control by undemocratic means, the 
government was willing to negotiate with 
the separatist groups in order to attempt to 
create peace in the Philippines. Working 
through the OIC created a positive dialogue 
between the government and the separatist 
leaders. Marcos was successful in establish-
ing a five‑year period of relative peace, es-
pecially following the 1976 ceasefire. This 
precedent allowed future negotiations and 
discussions between the government and 
main separatist groups in the Philippines, 
which has contributed to peace talks be-
tween the government and the MNLF for the 
last three decades. The value that Marcos 
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 placed on negotiations became in-
formally institutionalized in a sense, 
carrying through to future administra-
tions and creating what would become a 
mechanism for separatist groups to air 
their grievances and communicate their 
goals; in essence, this created additional 
political avenues for separatists as opposed 
to using purely violent means to communi-
cate with the government. 
Thailand, instead of responding both 
diplomatically and militarily as the Philip-
pines did, chose only military means to re-
spond to separatism. This resulted in a mark-
edly different outcome. With aid from the 
United States, Thailand began counterinsur-
gency efforts including the reassignment of 
troops to the southern provinces. In 1974, 
the ISOC (Internal Security Operational 
Command) was formed as a subdivision of 
the military to directly combat separatist ac-
tion; which continues to operate in Thailand 
and the southern provinces. During this 
time, Thailand was politically unstable; stu-
dent organization was squashed by the mili-
tary followed by a military coup in 1976 
(Morell and Samudavanija 1979, 319-20). 
This, along with increasing tensions between 
the military and the CPT (Communist Party 
of Thailand), created a government unable 
and unwilling to negotiate with separatist 
groups.  In response, separatist violence in-
creased throughout the 1970s, particularly 
among the PULO. Unlike in the Philippines, 
in which separatist leaders openly communi-
cated with the government and their names 
and positions were well known throughout 
the country, in Thailand an environment of 
secrecy abounded. This was evident not only 
in the main separatist groups, the PULO and 
the BRN, but also in other politically moti-
vated groups such as the CPT. Both the 
separatist groups and the CPT retreated into 
the hills of southern Thailand. Just as the 
peace talks with Marcos placed value on 
open communication, so too did the actions 
of the Thai military in the 1970s; however, 
the Thai government created an environment 
in which identifying, let alone negotiating 
with, separatist groups became elusive. 
Government Responses to Separatist 
Movements in the 1980s 
After the failed peace negotiations in 
the Philippines of the early 1970s, violence 
once again began to increase throughout the 
early 1980s particularly as corruption in-
creased in the Marcos administration and 
economic and social issues went unresolved. 
However, in 1986 Marcos was ousted during 
the four‑day February Revolution, also re-
ferred to as the EDSA (Epifanio de los San-
tos Avenue) Revolution (Villegas 1987, 
194). The end of the revolution was accom-
plished through the resignation of Marcos 
and a new democratically elected govern-
ment coming to power under President 
Corazon Aquino (Villegas 1987, 195). 
Aquino established a platform based on eco-
nomic growth and an end to the insurgency; 
she began to recreate the stability necessary 
for these two goals to be accomplished. This 
included the reinstatement of civil liberties 
such as the writ of habeas corpus, freeing of 
political prisoners, and face‑to‑face meet-
ings with the leaders of the MNLF (Villegas 
1987, 196-97). Additionally, Aquino made 
efforts to renegotiate the peace agreement 
originally proposed under Marcos. The Re-
public Act 6734 put the original peace 
agreement back up for vote in a referendum 
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 in 1989; however, only four of the 
provinces voted for the act (Rabasa 
and Chalk 2001, 92). Despite only 
four of the thirteen provinces voting in 
favor of the referendum, the ARMM 
(Autonomous Region of Muslim Min-
danao) was created in 1990. The ARMM 
operates as an autonomous government; the 
governments of the four provinces that voted 
in favor of inclusion are under the ARMM 
(Bertrand 2000, 40). It may appear as if the 
MNLF had reached its goal of an autono-
mous Mindanao and would subsequently no 
longer act as a separatist group. However, 
the group deemed the inclusion of only four 
of the thirteen provinces unacceptable and it 
continued to exist and communicate with the 
government. 
The new policies of the Filipino gov-
ernment in the 1980s focused on tempering 
the insurgency through means other than 
martial law or direct military involvement. 
Instead Aquino focused on issues of stability 
throughout the country that were necessary 
for a functioning democracy, including 
greater institutional capacity after the cen-
tralized power under Marcos. Within a year 
of the revolution, the economy in the Philip-
pines had improved and Aquino actively 
worked to improve the Philippines’ image 
abroad as well as to reduce the Philippines’ 
external debt (Villegas 1987, 201).  This 
policy was overall effective in reducing the 
amount of widespread violence from separa-
tist groups. While some violent outbreaks 
continued in the southern provinces, there 
was a clear reduction in the amount and se-
verity of attacks. 
During the 1980s, a secondary sepa-
ratist group came to the forefront in the Phil-
ippines, when the MILF (Moro Islamic Lib-
eration Front), an offshoot of the MNLF 
gained a following. This later complicated 
communication with the government, as the 
government was accustomed to negotiating 
with the MNLF and on several occasions 
failed to include the MILF in the discus-
sions, which only aided in fueling violence 
from the MILF. 
There was a significant decrease in 
violence in Thailand in the 1980s. This was 
due in part to the actions of General Prem 
Tinsulanonda as prime minister (1980 to 
1988) to liberalize and create institutional-
ized changes in Thailand (Melvin 2007, 34). 
These changes were facilitated by an ex-
panding economy and rapid industrialization 
in Thailand. Prior to the 1980s Thailand had 
relied on the export of agricultural products, 
resulting in Thailand having some of the 
lowest wages in the region and widespread 
poverty (Hussey 1993, 14). While the South-
ern Malay Provinces remained largely en-
gaged in agriculture, the significant gains 
Thailand made beginning in 1985, led it to 
be dubbed “Asia’s fifth tiger” (Hussey 1993, 
14). With expanding economic power came 
an increase in educational funding and po-
litical awareness, which had begun to be-
come evident in the 1970s during the Octo-
ber Revolution, with the increase in student 
political activity and the creation of the CPT 
(Paribatra 1993, 882). The media became 
freer to operate independently of the govern-
ment, political parties grew and expanded, 
and there was the creation of a middle class 
in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 883). These 
represent positive changes in Thailand, in 
which legitimate institutions existed through 
which Thai citizens could express their 
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 political beliefs. The freedom of 
the press is crucial in creating ac-
countability and transparency in a 
government. Additionally, increased 
political activity and political options 
(more political parties) allowed for a plu-
rality not yet seen in Thai politics. 
 In addition to political and social 
changes, changes were implemented to ad-
dressseparatist concerns in the southern 
provinces as well. A military-civilian court 
was established to allow Malay citizens to 
report crimes that occurred during the mili-
tary reign in the 1970s (Macan-Markar 
2006). This was done in an attempt to recon-
cile the egregious crimes committed during 
military rule including the “disappearance” 
of many Malay activists, the military impris-
onment of large groups of civilians, and the 
killing of suspected separatist sympathizers. 
The goal was to foster greater understanding 
between Thai Buddhists and Malays regard-
ing the political situation in the south. The 
creation of a court to address the problems 
of the Malay signified the changing role of 
the government in Thailand. The govern-
ment began to take political steps to institu-
tionalize the role of the southern provinces 
within the Thai government. 
 Prime Minister Tinsulanonda cre-
ated CPM 43, a new security taskforce. 
Unlike the security forces present in the 
south in the past, CPM 43 was subject to the 
constitution of Thailand and therefore could 
not hold civilians against Thai law (Melvin 
2007, 13). Not only had the manner in which 
the government ensured security in the south 
changed, but also the administration of the 
southern provinces was changed in 1981. In 
conjunction with CPM 43, the Southern Bor-
der Provinces Administration Centre, 
(SBPAC) was formed (Melvin 2007, 13). 
This allowed greater control of the southern 
provinces by local officials and established 
amnesty for former separatists. This was part 
of the new government push for political 
participation and legitimate institutions 
rather than focusing directly on the eradica-
tion of separatist groups. This was a clear 
sign of the increasing capacity of the gov-
ernment.  The Thai government had the ca-
pability not only to create institutions but 
also to ensure their success through nonmili-
tary means, a crucial aspect missing in state 
response prior to and after the 1980s. This 
had not been possible prior to this point in 
Thai history. However, the fragility of the 
emerging democracy was challenged in the 
early 1990s, when the plummeting economy 
in Thailand and a lack of full transparency 
by the government reversed the progress of 
the 1980s. 
Government Action in the 1990s 
 In 1988, Prem Tinsulanonda stepped 
down as prime minister and Chatichai 
Choonhavan became the first prime minister 
to be an elected member of Parliament 
(Neher 1992, 595). It appeared as if the de-
mocratic transition in Thailand would occur 
effectively and peacefully. However these 
prospects were set back in 1991 when a mili-
tary coup overthrew the elected Thai govern-
ment. The coup was unexpected and sur-
prised Thai government officials as well as 
the international community. There were 
several reasons why the coup occurred. With 
the increase in political parties and plurality 
in the 1980s came widespread factionalism 
in Thai politics. No one political party could 
hold a majority in parliament,  
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 so coalitions were necessary. How-
ever, coalition alliances changed 
quickly and the past problems of cor-
ruption still haunted Thailand. With the 
freedom of the press instituted under 
Tinsulanonda, the corruption was re-
ported on an almost daily basis. This, com-
bined with the frustration of the Thai public 
with the incapability/unwillingness of the 
government to institute policies to decrease 
the gap between the wealthy elites and the 
poor majority, led to discontent in the coun-
try. Thus, when the military coup occurred 
in 1991, there were no immediate protests to 
the overthrow of the elected government 
(Neher 1992, 596). 
The military coup was led by a group 
that called itself the National Peace Keeping 
Council, which appointed Anand Panyara-
chun as interim prime minister (Paribatra 
1993, 887). Panyarachun worked on creating 
a Thai constitution (which became effective 
in 1997) and economic reforms. Elections 
were scheduled for March 1992. The elec-
tions resulted in the appointment of General 
Suchinda Kraprayoon (a member of the Na-
tional Peace Keeping Council) as prime min-
ister. Tensions quickly flared as Kraprayoon 
was not an elected member of Parliament. 
The Prime Minister attempted to relieve ten-
sions by claiming that he would support an 
amendment to the constitution that Panyara-
chun had begun work on, that would make it 
necessary for the prime minister to be a 
member of Parliament. The coalition major-
ity supported the proposed amendment but 
stipulated that Kraprayoon should remain 
prime minister for the duration of his term. 
This resulted in what came to be known as 
Black May in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 
888). Black May began on May 17, 1992 
and continued until May 20. Hundreds of 
thousands of Thai citizens protested the pre-
miership of Kraprayoon. The military ini-
tially responded by trying to violently sup-
press the protesters, resulting in approxi-
mately fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests. 
Under clear public scrutiny the coalition de-
cided to enact the amendment that would 
stipulate that the prime minister had to be an 
elected member of Parliament, thus, ending 
Kraprayoon’s term as Prime Minister 
(Shenon 1992). Anand Panyarachun, the in-
terim prime minister from the military coup, 
reinstated himself as prime minister. The 
military leaders of the Kraprayoon admini-
stration were removed from their positions, 
and relative peace returned to Thailand for a 
time (Paribatra 1993, 890). However, the 
problems that reigned during Choonhavan’s 
premiership continued, namely widespread 
poverty in the southern provinces, which 
continued to be ignored due to the political 
instability in the central government. 
Thailand faced a severe economic 
downturn in the late 1990s, along with many 
other Asian countries. The growth that had 
begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
created largely through foreign investments 
and loans. When the bubble on growth 
“burst” in the late 1990s, investors pulled 
out of Thailand and the government owed 
large amounts of money to outside investors 
(Pempel 1999, 149-150).  In addition, the 
gap between the elite and the poor in Thai-
land was never adequately addressed during 
Thailand’s economic growth; as such the 
poorest in Thailand were most effected by 
the downturn. During this time separatist 
violence in Thailand was almost  
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 nonexistent, leading some to be-
lieve that the groups were no longer 
active. However, despite the signing 
of the new constitution in 1997, democ-
ratic initiatives in Thailand were over-
turned with the premiership of Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2001. 
Similarly to Thailand, the early 
1990s represented a time of relatively little 
separatist violence in the Philippines. After 
the February or People Power Revolution in 
1986, the subsequent administrations were 
considered to be legitimate by both the gen-
eral public in the Philippines as well as by 
the main separatist movements (the MNLF 
and the MILF) (Bertrand 2000, 38). Coin-
ciding with the precedent set by Marcos, the 
Ramos government attempted to reconvene 
peace talks with the MNLF. Despite the 
creation of the ARMM, the MNLF wanted 
more provinces to be included in the admin-
istrative region. Unlike Marcos’s administra-
tion, the new Filipino government was truly 
democratic and as such a lasting agreement 
seemed possible. Both the Filipino govern-
ment and the MNLF had confidence that the 
other would uphold their end of the peace 
talks. The Ramos government had shown 
that democracy was becoming entrenched in 
the Philippines and the MNLF gained legiti-
macy through their backing by the OIC 
(Bertrand 2000, 39).  These were the condi-
tions under which the 1996 Peace Agree-
ment was signed. 
The agreement was largely based off 
of the initial Tripoli Agreement set out by 
Marcos. An administrative council, the 
SPCPD was placed in charge of the execu-
tion of the agreement. The implementation 
of the agreement took place over a three‑-
year period in which members of the MNLF 
were given positions in the military as well 
as the police, in addition to top spots in the 
SPCPD. Then, after the establishment of the 
SPCPD, a consolidation of the SPCPD and 
the ARMM created one administrative body 
for the fourteen then‑independent provinces, 
after a vote by the fourteen provinces 
(Bertrand 2000, 42). In theory, the creation 
of these administrative bodies would create 
lasting institutions and a political framework 
through which separatist leaders could en-
gage politically. 
Problems began to emerge within the 
ARMM and the SPCPD shortly after their 
creation. Both have been plagued by mis-
management (in particular with regards to 
the budget), and the SPCPD had an uncer-
tain role. The SPCPD was set up to be a 
transitory organization; it was not created to 
remain a part of the administration of the 
ARMM. As such the SPCPD holds little real 
power; its function instead is to convene to 
make suggestions to the Filipino government 
(Bertrand 2000, 47). The ARMM has been 
accused of acting as the “implementing arm 
of the government” (Bertrand 2000, 48) as 
opposed to an administrative body that 
represents the interests of the local commu-
nities. 
There were several problems stem-
ming from the peace agreement that made 
the possibility of a lasting peace settlement 
unlikely. First, the MNLF has been steadily 
losing power in the southern provinces. With 
the relative peace of the 1990s and a legiti-
mate government, membership decreased. 
Additionally, the breakaway of the MILF 
(the military branch of the MNLF) left the 
MNLF with decreased military power as 
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 well as influence (due to decreased 
numbers). This made the MNLF 
eager to sign a peace agreement. Sec-
ond, only four provinces voted to join 
the ARMM in 1989 and the likelihood 
of the remaining provinces voting to join 
only a few years later was slim especially 
due to the decrease in separatist supporters. 
This limited participation made the creation 
of an actual autonomous region difficult. 
Also, the widespread corruption and ineffi-
ciency of the ARMM and the SPCPD made 
their success unlikely. These two factors to-
gether, a weakened MNLF and the limited 
number of provinces willing to join the 
ARMM, set the agreement up for failure. To 
complicate matters further, the MILF op-
posed the signing of the Peace Agreement. 
This was because the MILF claimed that the 
agreement failed to address the problem of 
the loss of Moro ancestral lands. Also, while 
they agree that it may have solved the prob-
lems of the MNLF, they believed that it did 
not address the true problems of the Moro 
people (which the MILF claimed to repre-
sent) (Bauzon 1999, 264). 
The Current State of Separatist  
Movements  
Amid the fallout of the problems of the 1996 
Peace Agreement, the 1998 elections were a 
large loss for the MNLF and a new president 
was elected, former Vice President Joseph 
Estrada. Estrada’s presidency set the back-
drop for the rising tensions in the Philip-
pines. Estrada stepped down as president in 
2000, facing allegations of payoffs from ille-
gal gambling. A resurgence in violence fol-
lowed, with an increase in violence and kid-
nappings in 2000. After Estrada stepped 
down as president, Vice President Gloria 
Arroyo became president of the Philippines 
(Montesano 2004, 94). Separatist violence 
continued to grow during Arroyo’s first 
term, with other political issues prohibiting 
the government from addressing separatist 
groups. The government was plagued with 
problems, including attacks by the Commu-
nist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on mili-
tary bases and continuing accusations of po-
litical corruption (Montesano 2004, 95-96). 
This corresponded with bombings by the 
MILF, the now more violent and powerful 
separatist group (Montesano 2004, 96). 
 Once again, peace talks were initi-
ated to try to put an end to the violence in 
the southern provinces. In late 2003 Arroyo 
met with the MILF, and not the MNLF, 
along with the OIC to attempt to put into 
place a ceasefire and initiate peace talks 
(Montesano 2004, 97). The peace talks re-
sulted in yet another peace agreement in the 
Philippines. In keeping with the pattern in 
the Philippines, in January 2005 the MILF 
fighters attacked government troops and the 
ceasefire was broken, resulting in another 
three years of violence (Montlake 2008).  
The most recent action in the Philippines 
maintains this pattern as well. In August 
2008, the Filipino government and the MILF 
leaders reached an agreement to expand the 
size of the ARMM. This would have solidi-
fied a “homeland” for the Moro. However 
the Filipino Supreme Court issued a ruling 
to block the signing of the agreement, as it 
was seen as possibly unconstitutional and 
called for a hearing in which both the gov-
ernment and the separatist leaders would 
speak (Montlake 2008). This action by the 
Supreme Court was deemed unacceptable by 
the MILF leaders and violence has once 
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 again marred the southern prov-
inces. Hundred of thousands of peo-
ple have been displaced and hundreds 
killed in the ensuing violence that con-
tinues as Filipino security forces at-
tempt to hunt down the MILF leaders. 
 Despite relative peace in the 1980s 
and 1990s in Thailand, the turn of the twenty
-first century saw a renewal of violence that 
had been dormant for thirty years. Following 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to appear as 
if separatist violence had ended in Thailand 
as the United States announced a war on ter-
ror. Clearly, this was due to a fear of a U.S. 
invasion in Thailand as part of this war on 
terror. Thaksin attempted to eradicate indica-
tions of past separatism within Thailand 
(Storey 2008, 36). This included the disman-
tling of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, some of 
the only successful political institutions re-
lated to separatist violence Thailand had 
been able to create and maintain. Thaksin 
than installed local provincial leaders who 
would respond directly to him (Storey 2008, 
37). These actions taken by Thaksin under-
mined the positive democratic changes that 
had taken place in Thailand and created in-
stability with the removal of key institutions 
(i.e. CPM 43 and the SBPAC). Thaksin re-
turned to the Thai tradition of centralized 
democracy, in an attempt to increase the 
power of his political party Thai Rak Thai, 
which had received little support from the 
south in the previous elections (Bajoria and 
Zissis 2008). Renewed violence emerged in 
the south in January 2004, including daily 
assassinations and kidnappings. Thaksin re-
sponded by declaring martial law in the 
southern provinces. 
Thaksin quickly lost support as vio-
lence continued to wreak havoc on the coun-
try and in 2006 he was replaced in a military 
coup (Bajoria and Zissis 2008).  An interim 
prime minister was appointed and the 
SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstalled. The 
Thai government attempted peace talks with 
separatist leaders for the first time. However, 
the government still does not know who the 
leaders or members of the BRN (BRN-C) 
and the PULO are, so secondary leaders of 
disbanded groups were consulted. Due to 
this, the peace talks did not occur with cur-
rent members of separatist groups, and as 
such the peace talks were not effective in 
resolving the current separatist violence. 
Violence continued and worsened in the 
southern provinces, peaking in 2007. There 
have been over 1,500 casualties since the 
fighting began again in 2004. Martial law 
continued in the southern provinces, with the 
military having full control of the region 
(Bajoria and Zissis 2008). This is a clear 
violation of the SPBAC, which is supposed 
to be in control of security in the south and 
has to follow Thai laws. Under martial law, 
the military does not have to comply with 
Thai laws and historically has not, instead 
committing heinous acts against the local 
Malay population. The most recent protests, 
in April 2009, exhibit the weakness of the 
Thai government. Thousands of protestors 
marched on the capital, Bangkok, disrupting 
the New Year festivities and inciting vio-
lence from the police. The protestors are not 
separatist members, but citizens frustrated 
by the corruption and political instability in 
Thailand. The attention now focused on the 
protests once again distracts the government 
from focusing on separatist violence. As 
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 government attempts to control the 
protests, violence mars the southern 
provinces. 
In Thailand, where institutions have 
been largely incapable of keeping up 
with the demand for response from the 
public, when attempts to institute policies 
that would aid the Malay were tried they 
have failed. This is evident historically, as 
no lasting political institutions were created 
in the sixty years since separatist violence 
began with the exception of CPM 43 and the 
SBPAC, and even they were dismantled for 
a period of time. A more recent example can 
be seen in the period following martial law 
in 2004, when the government held elections 
for Tambon councils (local administrative 
bodies) as well as PAOs (Provincial Admin-
istrative Organizations). In theory, this 
would have created power at the local level 
and representation for differing viewpoints 
(i.e. the Malay). Additionally, as 35 percent 
of budgets must be approved by the PAO, it 
would have allowed for Malay representa-
tion on financial matters (Albritton 2005, 
170).  However, by the end of the year the 
results had still not been confirmed by the 
government (Albritton 2005, 171). This pat-
tern of government repression followed by 
attempts at reconciliation, each time too 
weak to reach demands, had repeated itself 
throughout the twentieth century and contin-
ued into the twenty‑first century, each time 
eliciting an angered and violent response 
from the BRN. 
Conversely in the Philippines, insti-
tutions were in place to address the griev-
ances of the people. For example, beginning 
in the 1950s the Filipino government passed 
a series of Land Reform Acts that were 
aimed at ending the cycle of tenant farming 
that was impoverishing the Moro. The origi-
nal Land Reform Acts called for the tenant 
farmer to pay the taxes on the land in order 
to regain the land; however, the amount of 
the taxes owed per parcel of land was an un-
attainable amount for the Moro, and as such 
the acts as they stood aided fewer than 
50,000 people within the first thirty years of 
its passing. However, due to the strong insti-
tutions present in the Philippines there were 
committees and councils through which the 
Moro could explain their concerns. Recent 
Land Reform Acts, in the last decade, have 
been more successful as share tenancy has 
been outlawed and institutions such as the 
Department of Agrarian Reform were estab-
lished to monitor progress and work toward 
greater social justice. 
Analysis  
 After chronicling the development of 
the separatist movements and the govern-
ment responses to them, it is important to 
analyze how government action has affected 
separatist violence. There are two compo-
nents upon which the case studies will be 
analyzed: state capacity and crisis vs. non-
crisis transitions (a theory about democratic 
transitions). State capacity will be used to 
explain government action in Thailand and 
the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1970s, 
while crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used 
to explain government action in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (post–democratic transi-
tion), and both capacity and crisis vs. noncri-
sis theory will be used to explain the current 
separatist situation in each country. 
State capacity refers to the govern-
ments’ ability to enact change, create institu-
tions and infrastructure, and maintain  
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
148 
154
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 political stability within the coun-
try. The crisis vs. noncrisis transi-
tion theory, as proposed by Stephen 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman, will be 
applied not to the democratic transitions 
within Thailand and the Philippines 
(though they both fit the model), but instead 
as a guideline through which to characterize 
government responses to separatist violence. 
State Capacity   
 Before their democratic transitions, 
Thailand and the Philippines represented 
different levels of state capacity. Thailand 
had low state capacity, was politically unsta-
ble (frequent military coups) and lacked the 
ability to create meaningful and lasting insti-
tutions. However, the Philippines had high 
state capacity, with routine peace negotia-
tions occurring between the President of the 
Philippines and the leaders of the MNLF 
beginning in 1975. Additionally, the Philip-
pines began land reform acts in the 1960s 
and 1970s to restore the ancestral lands of 
the Moro. 
Thailand suffered from issues sur-
rounding low state capacity, which can be 
compared to theories that were presented in 
Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies. Huntington stated that 
as political consciousness increases, as a re-
sult of increased literacy, education, and in-
dustrialization, so too will political demands 
and participation. If a state, in this example 
Thailand, were to be unable to meet those 
expanding political demands, then the state’s 
ability to create new institutions as well as 
the integrity of the current political institu-
tions would be greatly undermined 
(Huntington 2006, 5). This can be seen in 
Thailand from the beginning of the govern-
ment’s reaction to the separatist movement. 
As an attempt at conciliation, the Thai gov-
ernment passed the Patronage of Islam Act 
in 1945. The Act was aimed at addressing 
the complaints of the southern provinces, 
namely the Thai government’s attempts at 
forced assimilation. The act created a posi-
tion within the Thai government for an Is-
lamic advisor, the chularajamontri, to the 
Thai king (Marshallsay 2008, 4). Addition-
ally, shortly after the passing of the Patron-
age of Islam Act, the Thai government al-
lowed Islamic law to be used in four of the 
southern provinces on issues related to heri-
tage and family affairs. However, the Malay 
people did not respond as the Thai govern-
ment expected. The Patronage Act incited 
anger among the Malay, as many thought the 
creation of an advisor on Islamic affairs to 
the king was yet another way for the govern-
ment to monitor and undermine the Malay. 
Additionally, the chularajamontri did not 
come from the southern provinces; instead 
often the chularajamontri came from the 
Bangkok area (Marshallsay 2008, 4). As the 
chularajamontri was in control of the local 
leaders in the southern provinces and was 
their liaison to the central government, this 
only confirmed the Malay suspicion that the 
chularajamontri was not created in order to 
represent their interests, but instead another 
mechanism through which Thai control 
could be established over the Malay.  
Low state capacity prohibited the 
government of Thailand from being able to 
make progress in reducing separatist vio-
lence. What action the government took 
seemed to only further the cause of the sepa-
ratist groups. Due to its low capacity and 
ineffective government action, Thailand 
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 largely relied on the military to 
control the terrorist actions of the 
separatist groups. This is evident by 
the decade‑long emergency called in 
response to the formation of the first 
separatist groups in 1949. Additionally, 
the relative strength of the military in Thai 
society (seven military coups since the be-
ginning of separatist violence) made the 
military the only lasting governmental force 
capable of dealing with separatist violence. 
When government action failed and Thai-
land faced political instability in the 1970s 
(a military coup in 1976 as well as violence 
stemming from the CPT), the government 
created the ISOC to manage separatist vio-
lence. Numerous problems emerged from 
the government’s decision to allow the mili-
tary to handle the separatist movements. The 
military did not have to follow Thai laws; 
this obviously resulted in widespread abuse 
in the southern provinces. Individuals were 
held without charges, people went missing, 
and executions would occur without trials. 
This type of military response did not tem-
per separatist groups; it only helped to fur-
ther their cause with the Malay people. Ad-
ditionally, the military abuses undermined 
the legitimacy of the Thai government and 
failed to encourage political action over 
separatist violence.  
In the Philippines, high state capacity 
worked to foster peace negotiations between 
the government and separatist leaders. As 
stated earlier, President Marcos first met 
with separatist leaders in order to engage in 
peace negotiations and a ceasefire in 1976. 
The ability for a government to effectively 
communicate and negotiate with a terrorist 
group is a large accomplishment. With the 
OIC acting as a mediator, the government of 
the Philippines was able to communicate its 
goals and stance to the separatist leaders and 
vice versa. This form of open dialogue cre-
ated a mechanism through which both par-
ties could air their grievances. Additionally, 
it institutionalized a political mechanism 
through which separatist leaders’ voices 
were heard by top government officials. This 
would establish the beginnings of political 
participation necessary for leaders from the 
MNLF to make the transition to local leaders 
in the ARMM. 
Peace negotiations and ceasefires 
were helpful tools in creating temporary 
peace in the Philippines. However, there has 
yet to be lasting peace as the separatist 
groups, namely the MNLF and the MILF 
more recently, periodically renew violent 
outbursts. This is often done in response to 
an unfavorable result in a referendum or be-
cause the Filipino government fails to act 
fast enough to their demands. The causes of 
this reaction will be discussed in the analysis 
of “moral hazard” as well as the crisis vs. 
noncrisis theory. 
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory 
Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory, as de-
signed by Stephen Haggard and Robert 
Kaufman, is used to explain democratic tran-
sitions. The theory states that economic and 
social conditions that are present in a coun-
try during its democratic transition will 
shape whether it responds in a crisis or non-
crisis manner. There are several characteris-
tics that are said to be emblematic of crisis 
and noncrisis transitions. In a crisis transi-
tion, the government will act quickly, the 
opposition powers gain greater influence in 
political decisions, and the military and 
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 communist party are weakened. 
According to the theory, a noncrisis 
response looks almost the opposite of 
a crisis response. The government re-
acts slowly to threats and power re-
mains with authoritarian figures, the op-
position has little role in government, and 
the military and communist parties are 
strong within the country (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1997, 269). The theory presented 
is based on governments in transition re-
sponding to economic crisis. Haggard and 
Kaufman use Thailand and the Philippines 
as examples of noncrisis and crisis transi-
tions, respectively, within their theory (270). 
However, these characteristics can also be 
used to explain the Thai and Filipino gov-
ernments’ responses to separatist violence 
after their democratic transitions. 
The Philippines represents a crisis 
transition. This is evident in the govern-
ment’s action toward separatist groups. The 
first criterion of a crisis transition is quick 
government response to an issue. This is evi-
dent in the Philippines in the government’s 
repeated negotiations with separatist leaders. 
Shortly after violence begins, the president 
of the Philippines reengages in negotiations 
with the MNLF leaders in order to success-
fully create a ceasefire and peace agreement. 
There have been over six peace agreements 
since Marcos’s initial dealings with the 
MNLF leaders in 1976. The second criterion 
of a crisis response is increased influence 
given to the opposition power. This is argua-
bly the Philippines largest problem in fight-
ing separatist violence. The government’s 
patterned response of going to the separatist 
leaders in order to create peace agreements 
has given disproportionate power to leaders 
of the MNLF and the MILF. The govern-
ment has already created the ARMM and 
created government positions for separatist 
leaders, and the separatist groups continue to 
demand more from the government. This has 
led to the breakdown of peace in the south as 
the separatist groups seek greater power and 
influence in the country. It appears as if the 
government’s capacity to create peace agree-
ments and ceasefires backfired due to the 
power that it has given the separatist leaders. 
The leaders of the MNLF and the MILF are 
aware that if they seek more from the Fili-
pino government, all they have to do is cre-
ate a violent backlash and the government 
will return with another peace agreement, 
including further provisions to meet their 
demands. As such there is no incentive for 
the separatist groups to uphold the peace 
agreements they enter into, as greater results 
can be garnered through violence. The last 
two criteria, a weak military and communist 
party, are characteristic of the Philippines. 
Additionally, the weakness of these two 
groups has enabled the government to focus 
on the issue of separatist violence, unlike in 
Thailand where political instability due to 
the power of the military and communist 
party has crippled the government’s ability 
to act. 
Thailand is an example of a noncrisis 
response. The government has been slow to 
respond to terrorists. This is for two reasons, 
the government’s inability to act and subse-
quent reliance on the military, and the gov-
ernment’s focus on other issues including 
violence from the communist party and po-
litical instability. Because of this, little po-
litical action was taken to temper separatist 
groups. The power in the Thai government 
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 has remained with the central gov-
ernment due to its noncrisis re-
sponse. The leaders of the BRN/BRN-
C and the PULO are not known in Thai-
land and because of the government’s 
lack of political action, there was no at-
tempt to negotiate with them in the twenti-
eth century. When recent attempts at peace 
negotiations were facilitated by the Thai 
government, the government was so un-
aware of who the separatist leaders were that 
officials met with a secondary separatist 
leader from a group that has long since been 
disbanded. Additionally, the current low ca-
pacity of the government has allowed for a 
resurgence in violence as actions taken in 
part by the government cannot be enforced 
(i.e. the re-installation of CPM 43 and the 
SBPAC). The separatist groups’ secrecy was 
fueled by the government action taken 
against the communist party (as both groups 
retreated into the hills of the southern prov-
inces) as well as by brutal military action. 
This has in part reduced membership in the 
group, as it is difficult for the groups to re-
cruit new members due to their secretive na-
ture and secluded locations. The last two cri-
teria have been shown through government 
action, and the military’s power is evident in 
its task of controlling the southern prov-
inces. The CPT clearly exhibited a great deal 
of power, as the threat of the CPT was seen 
as greater than the threat of the BRN or the 
BRN-C by the Thai government. This is evi-
dent by the government focusing its atten-
tions on the CPT as opposed to the separatist 
groups. While the Thai government’s non-
crisis response has effectively managed ten-
sions (with the exception of periodic vio-
lence) and limited the size and scope of 
separatist membership, it has not been able 
to mediate separatist violence when it does 
occur. The military has only been able to 
suppress the violence, not stop it. Once sepa-
ratist violence begins, the Thai government 
does not have the mechanisms and institu-
tions in place to arbitrate the conflict. 
Issues for Future Peace in Thailand and 
the Philippines  
 Both Thailand and the Philippines will need 
to alter their policies toward separatist 
movements, for either country to be success-
ful in ending separatist violence. In Thai-
land, the historically weak central govern-
ment has resulted in the use of military re-
sponses to separatist violence and at times 
full military control of the south. In the Phil-
ippines, the strength of the central govern-
ment coupled with international support 
from the OIC has led to multiple peace ne-
gotiations and ceasefires. However, the gov-
ernment’s failure to impose strict conse-
quences for violations of the peace agree-
ments has created a pattern of violence, 
through which the separatist groups have 
gained greater power over the central gov-
ernment. 
Issues in Thailand: Stability and 
Diplomacy 
 As noted previously, the central gov-
ernment of Thailand continues to struggle to 
establish political stability. Currently, pro-
tests rage in the capital in response to the 
recent elections. Until the government can 
create lasting stability, including open and 
free elections, the government will remain 
unable to respond diplomatically to separa-
tist threats. The Thai government’s historical 
reliance on the military to control separatist 
violence has led to widespread military 
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 abuses and has left separatist mem-
bers with no political avenues 
through which to express their griev-
ances. 
Even if the current government of 
Thailand were to sign a peace agreement 
with separatist leaders (providing the gov-
ernment could effectively find the leaders of 
the main separatist groups, the BRN and the 
PULO), the agreements may be of little con-
sequence as the government’s legitimacy is 
in question. Also, the ability of the govern-
ment to follow through on any agreement 
would be unlikely. For Thailand to establish 
political stability, greater transparency and 
institutions that are viewed as legitimate by 
the public will need to be put into place. The 
beginning of this was seen in the 1980s and 
1990s in Thailand, when there was increased 
political participation and political aware-
ness. It is not uncommon for a country un-
dergoing a democratic transition to experi-
ence increased violence and instability, as 
has been the case in Thailand. If Thailand 
could reestablish the level of progress it pos-
sessed in the 1980s and 1990s, then steps 
toward reducing separatist violence could be 
taken. This occurred briefly with the crea-
tion of the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 1981. 
Without diplomatic action, the abuses that 
occur under full military control will only 
help to further the separatist cause. Addi-
tionally, as is occurring presently in Thai-
land, when there is dissatisfaction in the 
country (protestors as well as separatist vio-
lence), the government will not have the 
mechanisms in place with which to diffuse 
the conflict. 
Issues in the Philippines: Moral Hazard 
 The concept of moral hazard applies 
to the peace negotiations between the Philip-
pines and the MNLF, and more recently the 
MILF. As earlier stated, the separatist 
groups have violated several peace agree-
ments and ceasefires in the last three dec-
ades. The reason for this can be explained 
through moral hazard. Moral hazard can be 
applied to any agreement between two par-
ties; it functions on the principle that parties 
will behave according to costs and benefits. 
When entering into an agreement, if the 
benefits of not following the contract out-
weigh the costs of breaking the agreement, 
then the party may intentionally act in a way 
that violates moral norms or the contract it-
self (Mirrlees 1999). 
In the case of the Filipino separatist 
groups, the first peace agreement, the Tripoli 
Agreement signed in December of 1976, 
there were no provisions put in place that 
would give the MNLF incentives to abide by 
the agreement. There is no mention of reper-
cussions for not following the peace agree-
ment or for breaking the ceasefire. The 
agreement outlines the concessions to be 
made by the Central Government to the 
MNLF, including the creation of an autono-
mous region in the southern provinces, sepa-
rate Sharia courts, guaranteed representation 
for Muslims in the central government as 
well as in all Filipino courts, and amnesty 
for political prisoners and separatist group 
members for crimes committed in the south-
ern provinces (Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines 1976). Concessions to be 
made by the MNLF included only certain 
areas not to be included in the autonomous 
region and a percentage of profits from min-
ing. This agreement conceded to the MNLF 
one of its largest goals, the creation of a 
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 separate autonomous region in the 
south to be governed by Muslims 
according to Islamic law. However, as 
stated, not all of the southern provinces 
were to be included in the autonomous 
region. The MNLF used this as a reason 
to break the agreement and, without penal-
ties for breaking the agreement, incited fur-
ther violence in the southern provinces. This 
led the Central Government to engage in fur-
ther peace negotiations (and concessions) 
with the MNLF and gave the MNLF the 
power and influence it wanted in the Philip-
pines. 
This is obviously problematic for the 
Philippines, despite the government’s ability 
to successfully negotiate with separatist 
leaders; the negotiations are not effective if 
the separatists have no intention or incentive 
to follow the stipulations of the ceasefire. In 
order to create lasting ceasefires that could 
result in an end to separatist violence, the 
government needs to enact stringent penal-
ties for breaking a ceasefire or peace agree-
ment. Furthermore, these repercussions need 
to be written into the peace agreements so 
that they are not merely threats, but legal 
ramifications for failure to uphold a contract. 
Additionally, if the MNLF or the MILF does 
break the peace agreement/ceasefire, the 
consequences laid out by the government 
must be enforced in the fullest capacity. 
Without these consequences, the violence in 
the Philippines will continue to escalate as 
the separatists seek greater power and influ-
ence in the country. 
The only attempt to take such action 
by the Filipino government was with the 
signing of the “Implementing Guidelines on 
the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Trip-
oli Agreement of Peace of 
2001” (Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines 2001). The guidelines estab-
lished actions taken by the MNLF or the 
MILF that would constitute criminal actions 
and violations of the agreements established 
with the Filipino government. This was a 
step forward by the Filipino government in 
asserting its authority over the separatist 
groups and establishing actions that would 
not be tolerated by the government. Addi-
tionally, the presence of U.S. military troops 
in the southern Philippines temporarily 
maintained peace in the region. However, 
the government failed to follow through on 
the guidelines set forth, as within two years 
the government was once again engaging in 
peace negotiations with the separatist 
groups, despite the failure of the separatist 
groups to uphold the guidelines. Addition-
ally, the government has recently attempted 
to sign a peace agreement that would expand 
the size of the ARMM. This only reaffirms 
the process the separatist groups create, cre-
ating greater violence to gain greater re-
wards from the government. 
There are several different ways to 
deal with the problem of moral hazard in the 
Filipino case. The government could simply 
place an ultimatum on the separatist groups, 
that if they do not comply with future peace 
agreements than the government will no 
longer negotiate with them. However, con-
sidering the track record of the Filipino gov-
ernment separatist groups may not take the 
ultimatum seriously. Additionally, if the 
government were to diplomatically cut off 
the separatist leaders, then it would only 
serve to force the separatist groups outside 
of the political system and most likely  
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 increase the violence in the south-
ern provinces. It is a benefit to the 
government that the separatist leaders 
have been able to marginally integrate 
into the political spectrum; it would be 
a mistake to alienate the leaders of these 
movements. 
The government could continue with 
the status quo, in which it is able to procure 
relative peace for a short period of time. 
However, the pattern that has been created 
by the government has already given dispro-
portionate power to the separatist leaders 
and the current position of the government 
does not provide for long‑term solutions to 
the problem of separatist violence. The third 
option available to the government is to take 
a multifaceted approach to the separatists. 
This would include both internal diplomacy, 
international support, and a military re-
sponse to noncooperation. The government 
should continue to meet with separatist lead-
ers; it is its direct link to the motivations and 
demands of the separatist groups. However, 
this does not mean that the government has 
to necessarily continue to sign peace agree-
ments and give concessions to the separatist 
leaders. Due to the creation of the ARMM, 
separatist leaders hold political positions 
through which they can participate in gov-
ernment. The Filipino government should 
encourage participation through governmen-
tal as opposed to extra‑political means. In-
ternational support is necessary due to the 
international support that the MNLF and the 
MILF hold.  Presently, international support 
has been behind the MNLF and the MILF; 
this has put the Filipino government in a de-
fensive position that has only worsened the 
interests of the Philippines in peace negotia-
tions. With the proper international backing, 
the Filipino government can present a 
stronger front at negotiations and have inter-
national backing if military force is neces-
sary against the separatist groups. This can 
also act as a preventative measure, so that 
the separatist groups understand that the 
Filipino government is serious about the 
consequences for breaking a peace agree-
ment or ceasefire. The last component, mili-
tary force, may be necessary if the separatist 
groups continue to be combative. As earlier 
stated, it would be a mistake to cut off the 
separatist groups diplomatically because of 
its important link to the groups’ goals and 
motivations. By setting out specific military 
consequences to not abiding by peace agree-
ments and ceasefires, separatists will have a 
clear understanding of the repercussions of 
violating the agreements. This is more effec-
tive than the current military action, because 
the government has not set guidelines for the 
military initiatives. Instead the military is 
sent to “hunt” down leaders responsible for 
certain events, which turns into several raids 
and deaths, but soon the government is once 
again negotiating with separatist leaders. 
There needs to be a clear plan and goal of a 
military initiative, not simply letting troops 
loose in the southern provinces, which does 
not gain separatist compliance. This last op-
tion seems the most viable for long‑term 
peace. It addresses not only the immediate 
problems of violent outbreaks with military 
intervention, but also the long‑term prob-
lems of separatist noncompliance. This is 
not to say that this plan will create immedi-
ate peace. It is likely that any new initiative 
the government takes against separatist vio-
lence will, in the short run at least, increase 
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 separatist violence. This is because 
the separatists are quite content with 
the status quo, as it benefits them and 
their goals. However, if the government 
can mitigate the short‑term violent re-
sponse and continue with a plan toward 
long‑term peace, then the Philippines will 
be able to temper and hopefully eliminate 
separatist violence. 
Conclusions and Prescriptions 
 The case studies of Thailand and the 
Philippines exemplify differing government 
responses to terrorism. Both Thailand and 
the Philippines experience separatist vio-
lence stemming from minority Muslim eth-
nic groups in the southern regions of the 
countries. However, the governments’ re-
sponses to these separatist threats have 
shaped the current security situations in the 
countries. In Thailand, the country’s low 
capacity forced a reliance on the military to 
control separatist violence. Without re-
straints on the military, few legal implemen-
tations were used in detaining or executing 
prisoners. This abuse contributed to ongoing 
separatist violence. In the Philippines, the 
government’s high capacity allowed for ne-
gotiations with top separatist leaders. How-
ever, without restraints placed on the separa-
tist groups to ensure their upholding of the 
peace agreement, the MNLF and the MILF 
continue to wreak havoc on the southern 
provinces in order to gain greater control of 
the region. 
In this sense, Thailand used only 
military means through which to subdue 
separatist violence due to the inability of the 
government to use diplomatic means; 
whereas in the Philippines, the focus of gov-
ernment action has been through diplomatic 
means (though increased military initiatives 
have been taken recently), but the lack of 
follow‑through by the government to im-
pose strict and meaningful repercussions for 
violating peace agreements has resulted in a 
cycle of violence. 
 In order for lasting peace to be 
achieved by Thailand and the Philippines 
changes, will need to be enacted. In Thai-
land, the first step toward reduced violence 
is strengthening and legitimizing the central 
government. Separatist groups in Thailand 
were largely dormant in the 1980s and 
1990s, when the government was at its peak 
effectiveness. It seems that the separatist are 
willing to accept positive change in the 
country, whether it is political, economic, or 
social. When the government focused on 
domestic issues and not military intervention 
in the south, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, separatist violence was at its lowest 
point, since its beginnings in the 1940s. 
In the Philippines, the government 
needs to create one clear message on how it 
will handle separatist violence. As it stands, 
the government has historically allowed 
separatists to break peace agreements, resort 
to violence, and then gain concessions from 
the government. Only recently has the gov-
ernment expressed what actions would vio-
late peace agreements. Even after the 
“guidelines” were presented, the Filipino 
government met again with separatist lead-
ers two more times, to offer an expansion of 
provinces in the ARMM. These mixed mes-
sages offer no incentive for separatist to co-
operate with the government. Even when the 
government threatens military repercussions, 
the separatist have been willing to deal with 
the military for a short period, knowing 
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 the government will soon offer 
new incentives and peace agree-
ments, as in the 2003 and 2008 peace 
agreements. The Filipino government 
needs to not only set repercussions for 
not following peace agreements, but to 
follow through with these consequences. 
Otherwise, the current cycle of violence and 
then negotiations, with the separatist leaders 
welding the power, will continue to plague 
the country. 
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 Throughout his time at Emperor Ja-
hangir’s court, Sir Thomas Roe, the first 
official English ambassador to the Mughal 
Empire in India, complained about the 
Mughal people, saying that “my toil with 
barbarous unjust people is beyond pa-
tience,” and that “we live in a Barbarous 
unfaithful place.”1   This type of writing is 
consistent with later characterizations of 
English superiority and of the Indian people 
under British control in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.   However, from 1615 
to 1619, when Roe was stationed in the 
Mughal court, England had little value in 
trade and no political or military power in 
the Mughal Empire.   That Roe writes of the 
inferiority of the Mughal people from such a 
strong conviction of English supremacy tells 
us something important: that English culture 
even in pre-imperial times contained those 
elements and assumptions necessary for the 
later rise of Imperialism. 
 When Sir Thomas Roe was pre-
sented to the Emperor Jahangir, the Mughal 
Empire had been a major power on the In-
dian subcontinent for almost a century and 
controlled an enormous area of land.2   Ex-
cept for a fifteen year period where control 
was taken by Afghan nobles, the Mughal 
dynasty ruled on the Indian subcontinent 
continuously, if only nominally, from 1526 
until 1756.3   The Emperor Jahangir ruled 
from 1605 until 1627, and while he was not 
“a great general, a great organizer, or a great 
builder” as his predecessors had been, his 
reign saw expansion through conquest and 
he was a great patron of the arts, particularly 
painting and architecture.4 
By the time the first part of what 
would become the Mughal Empire had been 
conquered, European traders, particularly 
the Portuguese, had been active in the In-
dian Ocean for twenty-eight years.   How-
ever, the English did not establish official 
presence in the Indian Ocean until 1601, 
and it would take seven more years until 
they made contact with the Mughal Empire. 
 On December thirty-first in the year 
1600, a royal charter was granted to “The 
Company of Merchants of London trading 
into the East Indies.”5   The most important 
reasons traditionally given for this were the 
simultaneous feelings that England deserved 
a role in international trade and concern that 
England would be barred from participation 
in this lucrative commerce.   Worries that 
Dutch presence in the East Indies would cut 
off England’s participation in this profitable 
trade spurred the creation of the English 
East India Company and the subsequent 
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 English voyages to the East Indies 
themselves.   At first, the Com-
pany’s voyages were short-term and 
experimental, but after the success of 
several fleets, the Company turned to 
joint-stock ownership, a more long-term, 
communal source of capital.   The Com-
pany was active in some fashion from 1600, 
when it received its original charter, up until 
the 1620’s. 
 On October fourth in the year 1614, 
during the debate on “sending an ambassa-
dor to the Grand Magore’s court,” Sir Tho-
mas Roe’s name was proposed.6   Appar-
ently a man of “pregnant understanding, 
well spoken, learned, industrious, of a 
comely personage, and one of whom there 
are great hopes that he may work much 
good for the Company,” Roe was also ap-
pointed official ambassador by King James 
I, indicating his mission’s dual purposes of 
securing trade and privileges for the Com-
pany and strengthening Britain’s position 
overseas.7  Sir Thomas Roe is by himself a 
fascinating character, and as the first royally 
appointed representative of England in the 
Mughal court, who also managed to leave 
behind a comprehensive journal, Roe looms 
large in the history of the English in India. 
 Sir Thomas Roe left England with a 
fleet led by Captain William Keeling on 
March sixth, 1615, and arrived after almost 
eight months at Swalley Hole near the mod-
ern city of Surat, on the northwest coast of 
the Indian subcontinent.   Determined that 
his arrival to the Mughal Empire should be 
“an occasion of dignity and splendor,” Roe 
did not leave the ship for a full week, 
mainly due to arguments over customs 
searches.8   Although he was told multiple 
times that “it was the Custom of this Coun-
try that nothing could pass but by the Cus-
tom house, and there had to be searched,” 
Roe refused to submit, saying that he “had 
thought that they had understood that free 
kings and their Ambassadors had been 
above ordinary customs” and he would by 
no means submit to this “Common and bar-
barous usage.”9   After disembarking in late 
September 1615, Roe remained in Surat for 
approximately five weeks, finally making 
the journey to Ajmir, the current location of 
the court, where he was presented to the 
Emperor Jahangir on January tenth, 1616.   
Roe lived in the Mughal Empire until Feb-
ruary seventeenth, 1619, during which time 
he followed Jahangir’s court as it moved 
from place to place.   Throughout the pe-
riod, he labored to improve England’s repu-
tation among Mughal officials and tried des-
perately to obtain a royal farman, or con-
tract, for permanent trade.  Roe’s efforts at 
the Mughal court are documented in a jour-
nal which he kept from 1615, when he left 
England, to 1619, when he departed the 
Mughal Empire.   While it is a rich histori-
cal source, Roe’s journal does present some 
problems.   Roe’s journal was intended to be 
an account of his expenses for his employ-
ers and, consequently, Roe tries to present 
himself and his actions in the best possible 
light.   This paper focuses mainly on the 
subconscious cultural attitudes expressed in 
the journal, but Roe’s work at the Mughal 
court is also reflected in the documents of 
the Calendar of State Papers, the works of 
Edward Terry, William Keeling, William 
Hawkins, and Thomas Mun, not to mention 
a broad range of histories about the Mughal 
Empire and the English East India        
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 Company. 
 Roe’s journal documenting 
his time in the Mughal court is a fan-
tastic resource not only for the factual 
details it divulges but also because of 
the cultural assumptions that it reveals.   
It has been documented by historians such 
as Michael Brown and Colin Mitchell that 
Roe was not writing with Imperialist aims in 
mind.   Despite this lack of conscious inten-
tion, Roe’s journal exposes elements of 
Roe’s society, namely feelings about Eng-
lish superiority and the inferiority of exotic 
others, that became later in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries integral parts of 
English Imperialist culture.   These ideas, 
though, and the broader ideology that Ed-
ward Said terms Orientalism, are incongru-
ous in a time where England was not a 
world power and really had very little over-
seas influence. 
 The English factors in the Mughal 
Empire in Roe’s time were completely de-
pendent on the emperor’s favor.  While 
England in the early seventeenth century 
possessed capable naval power, the English 
military was small, even by European stan-
dards, and inefficient and ill-equipped.   
However, Roe came to the Mughal court 
convinced that England was at least as pow-
erful, if not more so, than the Mughal Em-
pire.   He claimed that he would restore the 
“King’s Honor” by improving the general 
opinion of and respect given to the English 
or “lay my life and fortune both in the 
ground” in trying.10   To this end, Roe in-
sisted on receiving the courtesy he thought 
he was due, based upon European treatment 
of ambassadors, even in the face of “the 
Custom of this Country,” for example using 
his own forms of reverence when meeting 
with Emperor Jahangir.11   In his journal, 
Roe comes off as demanding, obstinate, and 
disrespectful of the emperor, the princes, 
and Mughal officials.   In both formal com-
munications with the Emperor as well as his 
daily interactions with the court, Roe tried 
very hard to assert England’s prestige, re-
peatedly saying that he was the ambassador 
of a “Mighty Prince in league with him 
[Jahangir].”12   Even after spending almost 
two years in the Mughal court, Roe asserted 
in a letter to James I that the English would 
“at last by our force teach them to know 
your Majesty is Lord of all the Seas and can 
Compel that by your power, which you have 
sought with Courtesy, which this King can-
not yet see for swelling.”13 
 At the same time that Roe exagger-
ated England’s power and prestige, he deni-
grated the Mughal court for various per-
ceived moral faults, one of these being ex-
cessive pride.   When describing the Mughal 
court in a letter to George Abbott, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Roe claimed that 
“their Pride endures no terms of equality” 
and that they are characterized by 
“barbarous pride and Customs” and “dull 
ignorance.”14   Near the end of his tenure in 
the Mughal court, Roe likewise bemoaned 
“the pride and falsehood of these people, 
that attended only advantage and were gov-
erned by private interest and appetite.”15   
Roe’s negative evaluation of the pride of the 
Mughal people is connected with his con-
ception of them as heathens.   In their sup-
posed arrogance they refuse to accept Chris-
tianity, in Roe’s eyes the one true religion.16   
Roe begrudged any “admiration of such a 
virtue in a heathen Prince,” and complained 
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 that “with envy and sorrow…we 
having the true vine should bring 
forth Crabs, and a bastard stock 
grapes.”17 
 Another facet of Mughal politi-
cal life that Roe often complained about 
was court intrigue.   As Roe wrote, “all the 
Policy and wicked craft of the Devil is not 
practiced alone in Europe; here is enough to 
be learned, or to be despised.”18   Roe stated 
as well that “all Cunning that the Devil can 
teach is frequent, even in the court, where is 
wanting no art nor wicked subtlety to be or 
do evil.”19   Roe recorded time and again 
instances of Mughal officials offering him 
verbal promises and not acting on them, 
which Roe takes as a sign of falseness.   
This continued, according to Roe, except for 
those times when he had presents to offer.   
Other forms of deception that Roe noted 
have to do with the Portuguese or their 
Mughal allies talking badly of the English in 
order to force them from the Emperor’s fa-
vor. 
 Roe complained strenuously about 
the practice of gift-giving within Mughal 
diplomacy.   In Roe’s mind, this was yet one 
more manifestation of the Mughal people’s 
contemptible vanity and desire for wealth in 
the form of jewels and novelties.   Roe’s 
thoughts about presents were established 
early on in his time in the Mughal Empire, 
as when he told the Governor of Surat that 
he “must not expect any [presents] from me 
in that kind: presents were for suitors.”20   
Two years later, Roe had occasion to lament 
how “Asaph Khan [an important Mughal 
official], for a sordid hope only of buying 
some toys, was so reconciled as to betray 
his son, and to me obsequious, even to flat-
tery; for the ground of all this friendship 
was that he might buy the Gold taken in the 
prize.”21   Asaph Khan’s greed, Roe con-
cluded, consumes him to the point that he is 
willing to give up his honor, in Roe’s mind 
his very manhood, for a bauble.   No 
Mughal official seems unaffected by such 
greed, even the Emperor Jahangir, whom 
Roe said “never takes any request to heart 
except it Come accompanied [by presents] 
and will in plain terms demand it.”22 
 Roe’s actual position within the 
Mughal court is a striking foil to his sense 
of self-worth and national pride.   In the 
eyes of the emperor, and also the Mughal 
officials, Roe was a subject of Jahangir, not 
an independent man with the powers of a 
king.   Instead of being lavishly hosted by 
the Mughal emperor, for example, Roe was 
allowed nothing by Jahangir “but a house of 
Mud, which I was enforced to build half.”23   
Roe’s journal, when read carefully, reveals 
the extent to which his Mughal hosts viewed 
him as a subject.  On October twelfth, 1617, 
Roe explained how he was taken by Asaph 
Khan, one of Jahangir’s primary advisors, to 
see Prince Khurram, the future emperor, 
about the treatment of English merchants at 
Surat.   While trying to put Khurram at ease, 
Asaph Khan mentioned that the English 
“were his Subjects.”24   This might appear to 
be a trivial incident, as Roe interpreted this 
as a phrase Asaph Khan “must use” when 
speaking with the prince, but it becomes 
more significant in light of Mughal diplo-
matic practices.25   Men such as Roe were 
incorporated into the “rank and file of 
[Mughal] nobility,” and those who were 
“staying any length of time were expected 
to express an oath of loyalty to the emperor; 
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 an envoy, in effect, served two 
masters while in a foreign court.”26   
These diplomats were regularly 
granted rank in the Mughal government 
and were rewarded with lands and titles 
if they enjoyed the emperor’s favor.27    
The ambassador’s subsequent duties in-
cluded following the rules of reverence due 
to the emperor, which Roe tried to avoid 
doing, and also offering small, personal pre-
sents to the ruler “to formalize the oath of 
loyalty,” which Roe did, though perhaps 
with different intentions.28   In all, these 
worked to underscore the foreigner’s subor-
dinate status. 
 That Roe was considered a subject 
of the Emperor Jahangir, and thus of the 
Mughal Empire, can be seen elsewhere in 
his journal.   As was custom among the 
Mughal emperors, Jahangir established what 
was essentially a personal cult based on de-
votion to the imperial throne.   On August 
seventeenth, 1616, Sir Thomas Roe was in-
ducted into this group, receiving a “medal 
of gold as big as sixpence” from Jahangir to 
signify his position as client of the emperor.   
This outwardly simple gift marked him as a 
member of the circle of nobles completely 
and utterly loyal to the emperor.   Although 
Jahangir most likely knew that Roe would 
remain loyal to the English king, this cere-
mony and the social position that went with 
it signified that Jahangir expected Roe to be, 
at least outwardly, loyal and subordinate.   
Roe did not comprehend the significance of 
this gift but acknowledged its value in the 
eyes of the Mughal court, asserting “none 
may [wear the king’s Image] but to whom it 
is given.”29 
 Roe’s journal also made it clear that 
English trade was uncertain and devalued 
by the Mughal elite.   Roe admitted on sev-
eral occasions that the quality of English 
trading goods and presents were inferior, 
even recounting a story about how Jahangir, 
upon receiving gifts from Roe asked a Jesuit 
“whether the King of England were a great 
King that sent presents of so small value.”30  
Roe’s fears that England did not have the 
requisite goods to be seen as a valuable 
trading partner are validated by the fact that 
there is almost no mention of the English in 
writings by members of the Mughal court.   
Even Emperor Jahangir, in his personal 
journal, made not a single mention of the 
English as a group or Roe as an individual, 
despite Roe’s protestation that “[Jahangir] 
appointed me a place above all other men” 
and that the emperor “more esteemed me 
than ever any Frank [a general term for a 
European].”31 
 Roe’s belief in English superiority 
seems, in matters of trade, to equate to a 
feeling that England deserved to be given 
treaties securing permanent trading rights, 
fair treatment, and other similar indul-
gences.   Initially, this was manifested in an 
immediate insistence that Mughal officials 
sign a farman guaranteeing what Roe con-
sidered to be reasonable treatment for the 
English.   Roe’s idea of reasonable han-
dling, though, included demands that could 
not be granted, such as freedom from cus-
toms searches.   As early as October ninth, 
1615, barely two weeks after landing at 
Swalley Hole, Roe was already complaining 
that “so base are our Conditions in this Port 
and subject to so many slaveries, such as no 
free heart can endure, that I do resolve ei-
ther to establish a trade on free Conditions 
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 or to do my best to dissolve it.”32   
Roe’s trade negotiations demon-
strate a sense that the English should 
be exempt from customary Mughal 
rules and procedures.   On March 
twenty-sixth, 1616, Roe submitted a set 
of “Articles to his Majesty’s Considera-
tion.”33 
 On April third, Roe received notice 
from Asaph Khan that his demands had been 
found to be unreasonable, and he immedi-
ately jumped to the conclusion that this was 
merely a bluff, and that “the king had not 
seen them, or else” the message from Asaph 
Khan was only a “bribe, to which, even to 
base and sordidness, he is most open.”34   
Roe automatically assumed that, had they 
been seen by the emperor, he, as a just and 
noble person, would have agreed to them; 
the idea that the Mughal court did not value 
English trade enough to grant them special 
privileges did not enter Roe’s thoughts.   
Roe refused to compromise on any signifi-
cant matter, even late in his embassy, and he 
accordingly failed in one of the main pur-
poses of his embassy as his determined ad-
herence to a treaty favoring England pre-
vented him from obtaining any permanent 
agreement on trade.  Roe’s long years of 
work in the Mughal Empire amounted to 
very little, financially speaking, and English 
trade was just as uncertain in 1619 as it was 
in 1615 when Roe first landed at Swalley 
Hole. 
 Roe’s journal reveals a fundamental 
loathing of the land, climate, and food of the 
Mughal Empire as well as of its people.  
Throughout, Roe complained that he en-
dured nearly unbearable circumstances, be-
ing “every way afflicted- fires, smokes, 
floods, storms, heat, dust, flies, and no tem-
perate or quiet season,” and also being sub-
ject to illness.35   When making his initial 
journey from Surat to the emperor’s court, 
Roe claimed that he was “so sick as at night 
I was past sense and given over for dead,” 
and that five other men were ill.36   Only di-
vine intervention saved him as “God raised 
[him]” from the brink of death.37   In addi-
tion to mentioning instances of European 
illness, Roe also recorded epidemics among 
the Mughal people, including one in Agra 
that lasted for several months in 1616.38 
 Roe frequently complained about the 
condition of Mughal territories while travel-
ing.   On his journey to Agra, Roe described 
“Brampore,” the home of Prince Parwiz, as 
“a miserable and Barren Country, the towns 
and villages all built of Mud, so that there is 
not a house for a man to rest in.”39   On De-
cember twenty-sixth, 1616, while following 
Jahangir’s court, Roe noted that “we passed 
through woods and over Mountains, torn 
with bushes, tired with the incommodities of 
an impassible way, where many Camels per-
ished... the king rested two days” during 
which time “thousands of Coaches, Carts 
and Camels lying in the woody Mountains 
without meat and water.”40   Roe disap-
proved not only of the conditions of the road 
but also of the way the journey was handled, 
saying that “there was not a misery nor pun-
ishment which either the want of Govern-
ment or the natural disposition of the Clime 
gave us not.”41   In sum, Roe claimed that 
the Mughal Empire “is the dullest, basest 
place that ever I saw, and makes me weary 
of speaking of it.”42 
Roe explains the cultural defects he 
perceives in the Mughal people by           
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 retreating into the language of bar-
barism.  To him, the Mughal people 
and their culture were uncivilized, 
crude, backwards, and brutal.   That 
Roe equates barbarism with both brutal-
ity and with lack of culture is seen in his 
other writings.   In a letter to King James I, 
he wrote: 
 Fame has done much for the Glory 
 of this place… But the Government 
 so uncertain, without written law, 
 without Policy, the Customs mingled 
 with barbarism, religions infinite, 
 the buildings of mud (except the 
 King’s houses and some few others): 
 that even this greatness and wealth 
 that I admired in England (reserving 
 due reverence to the Persons of 
 Kings) is here, where I see it, almost 
 contemptible…43 
Many of Roe’s records of Mughal barbarism 
are of violence and physical savagery.   
Early on, Roe noted that convicted criminals 
were sometimes put to death by being tram-
pled by elephants, and that Jahangir “some 
times sees with too much delight in blood 
the execution done by his Elephants.”44   In-
stances of cruelty also provide convenient 
occasions for Roe to explicitly state the su-
periority of English customs.   On March 
twenty-third, 1616, Roe wrote that Jahangir 
had “Condemned a Mogull on suspicion of 
felony… [and] sent him to me… for a Slave, 
or to dispose of him at my pleasure.”45   Roe 
replied that, though this was “esteemed a 
high favor… in England we had no slaves, 
neither was it lawful to make the Image of 
God fellow to a Beast” and so he would “use 
him as a servant, and if his good behavior 
merited it, would give him liberty.”46   Later 
that same year Roe recounted another story 
of how Jahangir had condemned a group of 
thieves, and “there was no way to save their 
lives, but to sell them for slaves.”47   As in 
the earlier situation, Roe replied that he 
“would not buy them as slaves, only pay 
their ransom and free them” and in doing so 
would make sure that the Jahangir “should 
not be ignorant I had more mercy than he, 
and that a Christian esteemed the life of a 
Moore above money.”48   Interestingly, most 
of Roe’s broadly disapproving comments 
concern the emperor Jahangir himself.   
Many of these focus on gender, presenting 
Jahangir as effeminate.   Roe claimed, for 
example, that Jahangir was “gentle [and] 
soft” and repeatedly asserted that real power 
at court rested with Nur Jahan, Jahangir’s 
consort, to the extent that the emperor had 
“yielded himself into the hands of a woman 
[Nur Jahan]”and so could not even control 
his family, let alone his country.49 
 The views that Roe expresses, both 
directly and indirectly, are also seen in the 
writings of other Englishmen.   Similar sen-
timents about English superiority can be 
found in the journals of contemporary Com-
pany employees, such as those of Edward 
Terry, William Hawkins, William Keeling, 
and Thomas Bonner, as well as in the de-
scriptive and business writings of Company 
members like Thomas Mun, whose essay “A 
Discourse of Trade, from England unto the 
East Indies” is particularly peppered with 
expressions of religious prejudices.50 
 In part, Roe’s observations seem to 
have been colored by a set of assumptions 
about Asiatic regimes, an outlook that Ed-
ward Said has termed Orientalism. Although 
Sir Thomas Roe lived long before the Raj 
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 and the height of the British Em-
pire in India, his evaluation of the 
people of the Mughal Empire fits 
nicely into the “’Oriental’ ideas” that 
Said suggests were integral to Euro-
pean stereotypes about Asia.51   Through-
out his journal, and particularly in the let-
ters he wrote to employers and acquaintan-
ces in England, Roe’s descriptions of the 
people he meets and the activities he ob-
serves display elements of “Oriental despot-
ism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, [and] sensu-
ality.”52   Roe frequently lamented, for ex-
ample, the fact that the Mughal Empire is 
run with “no written Law.   The King by his 
own word rules, and his Governors of Prov-
inces by that authority.”53   He also made 
sure to note, disapprovingly, the emperor’s 
sexual appetites, as when he mentioned that 
Jahangir had four wives and also that during 
festivals entertainment was provided by 
“whores” who “did sing and dance.”54 
 In discussing such things as Eng-
land’s prestige, his place in the Mughal 
court, the climate of the Empire, religion, 
greed, lasciviousness, despotism, and in-
trigue, Roe clearly positioned England and 
England’s civilization as superior to the 
Mughal Empire and its society.   In stressing 
English superiority in his writings, Roe il-
lustrates the fact that the key cultural ideas 
that allowed Orientalism and English Impe-
rialism to flourish, and which kept it so 
powerful, were present in the English cul-
tural mind even in the early seventeenth 
century.   It is important to uncover these 
ideas in the time before English Imperialism 
became a real institution because these pre-
existing attitudes informed how England 
interacted with and acted towards colonized 
populations all over the world, even into the 
twentieth century.  
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In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals 
the imitative structure of gender itself – as 
well as its contingency.  Indeed, part of the 
pleasure, the giddiness of the performance 
is in the recognition of a radical contin-
gency in the relation between sex and gen-
der in the face of cultural configurations of 
casual unities that are regularly assumed to 
be natural and necessary (Gender Trouble, 
187). 
The idea of society is a powerful image.  It 
is potent in its own right to control or to stir 
men to action.  This image has form; it has 
external boundaries, margins, internal 
structure.  Its outlines contain power to re-
ward conformity and repulse attack.  There 
is energy in its margins and unstructured 
areas (Douglass, 137). 
 
 As the discipline has been institu-
tionalized, anthropology within the academy 
has traditionally focused on the study of 
what “the West” considers to be the exotic, 
the strange, the weird, and the odd.  In the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, anthro-
pologists were interested mainly in claiming 
“a people” (often considered primitive) 
from which they could develop a profes-
sional career and academic prestige; for Ma-
linowski it was the Trobriand Islanders, for 
Boas it was the Kwakiutl, and for Lewis 
Henry Morgan it was the Iroquois.  Such 
attitudes today are highly criticized within 
the discipline for being paternalistic, if not 
blatantly racist.  The process of creating the 
“other,” however, continues today both in-
side and outside of the university, creating a 
need for scholars to deconstruct the very 
categories that are meant to define and con-
strain individuals within specific cultural 
groups.   
 In my research on drag queens in 
contemporary American culture, I have 
been interested in finding a language with 
which to deconstruct the institutionalized 
gendered and sexualized categories imposed 
on individuals in American society.  I have 
been largely unsuccessful in this endeavor.  
Rupp and Taylor had the same struggle in 
their research on drag queens in Key West: 
“Although we argue that drag queens and 
drag performances break down the bounda-
ries between woman and man, gay and 
straight, we continue to use these categories, 
however flawed they might be to identify 
people.  In part, the language gives us no 
choice” (Drag Queens, 5).  The Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, developed by Edward Sapir and 
Benjamin Whorf, speaks to the fact that as 
individuals whose cognitive categories are 
influenced by a specific language, anthro-
pologists themselves have difficulty in dis-
cussing concepts that exist beyond the 
bounds of their own culture.  How can I, as 
a native English speaker, examine concepts 
of gender that go beyond “male” and 
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 “female?”  Despite the difficulty of 
the task, new linguistic terminol-
ogies will have to be created to dis-
cuss diverse gendered and sexualized 
identities given the genderqueer and 
androgynous identity movement within 
the queer community today.  Because of 
such movements, it becomes increasingly 
apparent that standard conceptions of gender 
and sexuality no longer have complete con-
trol over the contemporary American popu-
lace.   
 My study of drag queens in Ameri-
can culture has been made increasingly rele-
vant over the past few months as queer 
voices have continued to contest the oppres-
sive sexist and homophobic structures of 
American society.  The following are just of 
few of the issues that have challenged the 
normative gendered and sexualized struc-
tures in the United States.  Most obviously, 
the November 2008 elections led to many 
important political decisions for the 
LGBTIQ community across the country.  
Proposition 8 in California passed this No-
vember, prohibiting gay marriage in the 
state.  Similar measures were passed in Flor-
ida and Arizona.  Act 1, which passed in Ar-
kansas, prevents gay and lesbian parents (or 
even unmarried heterosexual couples) from 
adopting children.  Similar measures are al-
ready in place in Utah and Mississippi, for 
example.  During the 2008 Presidential cam-
paign, the celebrated (and reviled) political 
candidates Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton 
both fought for the seats of the Vice Presi-
dent and President, respectively.  The film 
Milk, describing the politician and commu-
nity organizer Harvey Milk’s rise to power 
and assassination won two Academy 
Awards.  Katy Perry’s hit single “I Kissed a 
Girl” topped the Billboard Top 100 chart last 
summer, and was nominated for Favorite 
Song at the 2009 Kid’s Choice Awards.  
Ironically, Perry’s mother, an Evangelical 
Christian Preacher told the press that: “I hate 
the song. It clearly promotes homosexuality 
and its message is shameful and disgust-
ing…I can’t even listen to that song…when 
it comes on the radio I bow my head and 
pray” (Lyons, 1).  The LGBTIQ community 
was further angered by the selection of Rev-
erend Rick Warren to give the benediction at 
President Obama’s inauguration: “In a re-
cent interview with the Web site Beliefnet, 
Mr. Warren said that allowing same-sex 
couples to marry was no different from al-
lowing a brother and sister to 
marry” (Zeleny, 1).  More locally, on Sep-
tember 30th an anti-gay demonstration on the 
College Green at the State University of 
Geneseo, approved by Campus Scheduling, 
made people again question the limits of the 
First Amendment.  The approval of a gender
-neutral housing option on-campus at the 
State University of New York at Geneseo 
represents the gendered revolution that is 
taking place on college campuses nation-
wide.  An article in the Lamron, Geneseo’s 
college newspaper, recognizes that: “The 
current housing form, which requires all in-
coming freshmen, even those who may not 
match a socially-defined gender or biologi-
cal distinction, to identify themselves as 
‘male’ or ‘female.’  The new housing project 
will attempt to resolve that issue” (Cioffi, 1).  
Even the debate over the curriculum at the 
State University of New York at Geneseo is 
in part concerned with the representation of 
women and sexual minorities.  In his letter 
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 to the Curriculum Review Task 
Force, concerning the debate over 
the Western Humanities course, Pro-
fessor Walter Soffer argues that: “the 
humanities is the study of the great 
books left behind by the greatest 
minds” (1).  Similarly, Professor Larry 
Blackman writes: “The required works in 
Western Humanities I and II are not consid-
ered great because they were written by 
white males.  They are great books that hap-
pen to have been written mostly by white 
males” (2).  In other words, it is just coinci-
dence that all of the best works of literature, 
philosophy and history were written by male
-bodied persons.  These learned individuals 
fail to recognize the social structure in which 
these “great minds” were writing; they do 
not ask how it came to be that such males 
acquired the resources needed to be able to 
freely philosophize day and night.  Who 
washed their dishes?  Who scrubbed their 
floors?  Who cooked their meals?  Even in 
the setting of the university, often consid-
ered to be one of the most liberal institutions 
in the United States, a male-dominated, het-
eronormative discourse can run uncontested.  
Underneath all of these issues, of course, lies 
the problematic status of biological women 
and sexual minorities in the American politi-
cal sphere.  Is a woman capable of being the 
President or Vice President of the United 
States?  Should it be legal for two men to be 
married and thus be privy to the same rights 
afforded to married heterosexual couples?  
Are two mothers, two fathers, or even an 
unmarried heterosexual couple capable of 
raising foster children?  What these ques-
tions do not address, of course, are the arbi-
trary gendered and sexualized categories that 
the American populace uses from which to 
base their opinions.  Such conceptions of 
“male” and “female,” then become impor-
tant signifiers in political decisions in the 
United States.  The performances of drag 
queens speak directly to these socially-
constructed categories, and have important 
literal and symbolic relevance in the larger 
arena of American politics.   
Throughout this paper, the term 
“queer” will be used to encompass the whole 
LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans-
gender, Intersex, and Queer) community.  
The word “queer” in academia and popular 
culture is used to reclaim a term that was 
once used against the community.  The term 
is not accepted by all members within or 
outside of the community, and its use con-
tinues to be controversial.  I use the term as 
a way to find unity amongst a highly diverse 
group of individuals that have many impor-
tant shared experiences; the term is not be-
ing used in a derogatory sense.   
In studying drag performance in 
American culture, I have been careful to 
contextualize the experiences of people who 
perform in drag as an extremely diverse 
group of individuals who are beyond the 
limits of any single anthropological interpre-
tation.  As my informant Champagne stated: 
“People try to put you in a box, and I don’t 
like to be in a box – I’m claustrophobic.”  
Additionally, my analysis not only acknowl-
edges, but heavily emphasizes, the power 
structure that attempts to control the lives of 
those individuals who defy culturally-
acceptable gender practices.  Indeed, given 
the history of queer peoples living in the 
United States, drag should be seen partly as 
an act of resistance to social norms,  
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 although this by itself would be a 
very simplified explanation.   
In this paper, data collected from lit-
erature, fieldwork experiences, inter-
views, film, and social networking and 
video sharing websites will be utilized to 
examine the meaning of drag and the lives 
of those who perform in it.  Literature read 
and analyzed for this study included the cul-
tural history of drag performance, contempo-
rary gender theory, and the anthropological 
literature on drag and queer communities in 
the United States.  Fieldwork was conducted 
by watching drag performances at a small 
gay bar in Rochester, NY; interviews were 
conducted with a few select drag queens, 
and a focus group discussion on drag was 
held with a group of young queer college 
students.  Additionally, I studied representa-
tions of drag queens in popular American 
culture to gain an understanding of how the 
perception of drag queens has, and has not, 
changed over time.  Finally, I reviewed the 
personal pages of drag queens on video shar-
ing websites (such as www.youtube.com) 
and social networking websites (such as 
www.facebook.com and 
www.myspace.com).  This paper is a multi-
disciplinary piece that attempts to contextu-
alize the experiences of drag performers in 
the United States, and most importantly, 
celebrates them as a people worthy of study. 
Recently, representations of drag 
performances have entered into mainstream 
American culture through the cinema, in-
cluding such films as Priscilla, Queen of the 
Desert, Torch Song Trilogy, Tootsie, Victor/
Victoria, Birdcage, Mrs. Doubtfire, The Cry-
ing Game, Connie and Carla, and To Wong 
Foo, Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar.  
Such representations of drag performance in 
popular culture have changed dramatically 
over time, with one of the most iconic, yet 
highly problematic, representations of drag 
appearing in the 1959 film Some Like it Hot.  
Many older films that portray characters in 
drag, such as Some Like it Hot, feature het-
erosexuals who cross-dress in order to hide 
their identity and/or enter spaces that they 
would otherwise be barred from.  In newer 
films, characters identified as “drag queens” 
are at times used as an exotic feature to draw 
in the audience’s interest; in other cases, 
however, they are painted as multi-
dimensional characters, as seen in Torch 
Song Trilogy.  Overall, representation of 
drag performances in film often appear as 
one of two extremes, either in the form of 
light-hearted comedies or violent thrillers, 
typically involving the police force.   
This winter, LOGO (an American 
cable channel with programming that targets 
the LGBTIQ community) began airing Ru-
Paul’s Drag Race, a reality TV show in 
which drag queens compete to be reigned in 
as the ultimate diva.  With LOGO being 
available in an estimated 35 million Ameri-
can homes, the concept of the drag queen is 
no longer relegated to liberal, urban, indus-
trialized environments on the American 
landscape.  Increasingly, Americans outside 
of the LGBTIQ community are being con-
fronted with drag performances through 
print media, television, film, and cyberspace.  
Additionally, as members of the queer com-
munity continue to feel more comfortable 
challenging gender norms in the public 
sphere, American society will be forced to 
address those individuals who, while previ-
ously confined to the margins, are now 
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 fighting for inclusion in the center.  
Theoretical Orientation 
 The new anthropology of gen-
ders and sexualities is a dynamic sub-
discipline that integrates theory from 
the interdisciplinary fields of queer and 
performance studies, and in part focuses on 
what anthropologist Rosalind Morris defines 
as “institutions of ambiguity.”  Such institu-
tions highlight the importance of under-
standing gendered and sexualized categori-
zations as cultural constructions embedded 
in a specific historical, spatial and cultural 
context.  The primary theoretical perspective 
used in this study was Judith Butler’s con-
cept of gender performativity. By linking 
performance studies to the existing literature 
on the anthropology of genders and sexuali-
ties, one can critique the gender binary as a 
social construction that is performed, and 
more importantly, one can understand 
“normative genders and sexualities” as per-
formances in and of themselves.  Morris rec-
ognizes the fecundity of a performative 
analysis of genders and sexualities in the 
house of anthropology:  
The anthropology of gender is 
emerging under the influence of per-
formance theory resists such confla-
tions, however.  Instead, it is con-
cerned with the relationships and 
dissonance between the exclusive 
categories of normative sex/gender 
systems and the actuality of ambigu-
ity, multiplicity, abjection, and resis-
tance within these same systems.  
Oscillating between a desire to un-
seat the hegemony of sexual dichoto-
mies in the modern West through 
exemplary counter-example and a 
yearning to locate resistant practices 
in non-Western systems, much of the 
new anthropology of gender seeks…
examples of “institutional transves-
tism” such as the berdache of North 
America, the hijra of Inda, or the 
kathoey of Thailand (570).   
By studying the gendered performances of 
drag queens, therefore, one can understand 
the gendered performances that all people in 
all cultures enact on a daily basis.  Gender, 
then becomes something very fluid: “Butler 
argues that gender is not a fact or an essence, 
but a set of acts that produce the effect or 
appearance of a coherent substance…Butler 
goes further than this when she argues that, 
although gender is a set of acts, it works and 
derives its compulsive force from the fact 
that people mistake the acts for the essence 
and, in the process, come to believe that they 
are mandatory” (Morris, 572-573).  
My analysis of drag performance in 
American culture has led me to recognize 
that all gendered performance is inherently a 
drag performance in and of itself.  This theo-
retical conclusion is by no means original.  
Other gender theorists have been drawn to 
this conclusion as well.  Morris comments 
on this perspective:  
When theorists of gender performa-
tivity say that all gender is a form of 
drag, they mean that, like drag, the 
Western system of compulsory het-
erosexuality is a set of limitations.  
What is being imitated is the ideal of 
binary difference, a difference that 
only prescribes social roles but also is 
supposed to determine sexual de-
sires…In this context, cases of third 
genders and/or institutionalized 
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 tranvestism can be treated as 
framed examples of the performa-
tivity that underlies the entire logic of 
binary sexuality (580). 
In fact, in the documentary Judith But-
ler: Philosophical Encounters of the 
Third Kind, Butler notes that the strict male 
and female gender norms of Hollywood in 
the 1950s and 1960s prompted her to write 
Gender Trouble in order to make sense of 
these exaggerations (Zadjermann).  Through 
recognition of the fact all gendered perform-
ance is drag, one can create a dialogue that 
does not relegate such examinations to a 
queer, or often “othered” population.  Veri-
tably, the power of an analysis of drag per-
formance comes not only from the fact that 
it is part of a queer sub-culture, but that such 
performances critique all gendered specta-
cles as institutionalized acts with little bio-
logical import. 
It is also important to note that 
within queer performances one is always in 
a state of performing; that is to say, one is 
always being critiqued, analyzed, and judged 
for the gendered and sexualized perform-
ances that they are producing on the stage 
and in the street.  In an interview for a docu-
mentary on Judith Butler, Butler herself 
notes that while Simone de Beauvoir argued 
that one is not born a woman, but becomes a 
woman, she believes that one is always be-
coming a woman (Zadjermann).  Thus, she 
emphasizes the continued performative na-
ture of gender as something that continues 
throughout one’s lifetime and does not end 
when the curtains fall.  The anthropologist, 
however, must try to interpret such perform-
ances from both the perspective of the audi-
ence member and of the performer, both of 
which are highly diverse groups within 
themselves.  Analyzing both the audience 
and the performer allows the anthropologist 
to understand how space, behaviors, and ide-
ologies are negotiated on and around the 
stage.  Audience members come to drag per-
formances primarily for entertainment, while 
drag queens perform primarily for economic 
reasons.  However, the interactions and rela-
tions between performer and audience mem-
ber are far more diverse and dynamic than 
this generalization. 
Historical Roots of Drag Queens 
Historical particularlists, who set the 
foundation for American anthropology in the 
early 20th century, believed that cultural an-
thropologists should study each culture as its 
own entity, with its own particular history 
and developmental trajectory.  Following in 
this tradition, I believe that it is important to 
study the history of drag from its beginning 
in Great Britain to its current form in the 
United States in order to understand contem-
porary drag queen performance in American 
culture.  It is clear that contemporary drag 
performance has borrowed from cultures 
other than those that existed in Great Britain 
(or continental Europe); however, the history 
of drag performance is mainly rooted in gen-
dered performance on the European stage.  
Contemporary drag culture in the United 
States has only more recently been influ-
enced by the diverse ethnic groups that make
-up the American social landscape. 
From a European perspective, cross-
dressing was essential in British theater be-
cause of a restriction against biological 
women from acting on the stage.  Because of 
this social fact, certain actors would consis-
tently play the role of women onstage and 
would work to perfect their own gender per-
formance.  Baker notes that these actors 
were usually young boys who “would be 
expected to lead a strange and somewhat 
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 dubious life.  He would be trained 
to dress up daily as a fascinating 
young woman and parade before the 
rowdy populace in the dangerous and 
insalubrious atmosphere of the public 
playhouse” (66-67).  After Charles II 
introduced women onto the stage in Eng-
land, it became less popular for men to play 
the role of women:   
For this is what ultimately happened 
to the last of the female impersona-
tors.  They ceased to impersonate on 
the refined, serious level that derived 
from the Elizabethan period and be-
gan to burlesque their female roles.  
As they became less in demand, so 
their parts got shorter and they 
tended to make them comic.  One, a 
man called Lacy, became famous for 
his burlesque of female characters 
and here we may discern the begin-
nings of the pantomime dame tradi-
tion as we see it today (Baker, 103).   
While the sexual orientation of these early 
female impersonators is not entirely clear, 
Baker notes that “two of the most famous 
were widely known to be homosexual.  They 
were Ernest Boulton and Frederick William 
Park and both are dealt with quite fully in a 
collection of essays called The Sins of the 
Cities of the Plain, a survey of homosexual-
ity in London published in 1881” (123).  
Throughout the 19th Century in the 
United States, male-bodied drag perform-
ances were enacted by men who were per-
ceived to be heterosexual.  Their perform-
ances were purely comedic, and not meant to 
address political concerns or alternative gen-
ders or sexualities.  Later it entered into the 
theatrical arenas of burlesque and vaudeville 
at the turn of the twentieth century.  Such 
performances were sexually-suggestive, and 
had an important comic element to them as 
well: “as the nineteenth century began, men 
in women’s clothes on the professional stage 
were, with rare exceptions, dame comedi-
ans” (Chauncey, 295).   
It is not until the rise of American 
industrial urban environments that a visible 
gay culture emerges.  George Chauncey, a 
scholar of gay and lesbian histories in the 
United States, notes how the presence of a 
visible queer culture on the American land-
scape only became possible after a period of 
urbanization: 
In his hometown he had needed to 
conform at all times to the social 
conventions of the community, for 
he had been subjected to the con-
stant…surveillance of his family and 
neighbors.  But in the city it was 
possible for him to move between 
social worlds and lead a double life: 
by day to hold a respectable job that 
any queer would have been denied, 
and by night to lead the life of a fairy 
on Bowery…The complexity of the 
city’s social and spatial organization 
made it possible for gay men to con-
struct the multiple public identities 
necessary for them to participate in 
the gay world without losing the 
privileges of the straight: assuming 
one identity at work, another in lei-
sure; one identity before biological 
kin, another with gay friends (133). 
Writing in 1972, the anthropologist Esther 
Newton similarly noted that: “Homosexual 
communities are entirely urban and subur-
ban phenomena.  They depend on the ano-
nymity and segmentation of metropolitan 
life” (21).  Chauncey also highlights the ex-
periences of biological men who perform as 
women in certain social environments  
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 during the turn of the 20th century.  
Such environments included, but 
were not limited to, public parks, 
streets, bars, and prisons.  Such men 
were labeled fairies, and “were the most 
famous symbols of gay life, and the im-
pression of that life they conveyed was 
reinforced by the countless other effeminate 
men who were visible in the streets of the 
city’s working-class and amusement districts 
in the early decades of the cen-
tury” (Chauncey, 47).  Such men could be 
identified by “a limp wrist or an exagger-
ated, swivel-hipped, mincing walk – known 
as ‘swishing’ in the gay world [something 
that] was regularly caricatured on the vaude-
ville stage and occasionally seen on the 
street as a sign of the ‘true’ 
fairy” (Chauncey, 55).  Like contemporary 
drag queens, “The fairies reaffirmed the con-
ventions of gender even as they violated 
them: they behaved as not man should, but 
as any man might wish a woman 
would” (Chauncey, 57).  The Bowery, a 
small neighborhood in Manhattan, was an 
important geographic space for the develop-
ing gay culture in New York City.  Accord-
ing to Chauncey,   
The ‘female impersonators’ on dis-
play at the Bowery resorts were the 
most famous symbols of gay life, and 
the impression of that life they con-
veyed was reinforced by the count-
less other effeminate men who were 
visible in the streets of the city’s 
working-class and amusement dis-
trict in the early decades of the cen-
tury (47).   
While the fairies may have been marginally 
accepted in very specific urban spaces such 
as the Bowery, they were first and foremost 
defined by their pathology.  Up until 1973, 
homosexuality was considered a psychologi-
cal disorder in the United States.  Sexolo-
gists, beginning around the second-half of 
the nineteenth century, created an under-
standing of homosexuals as “inverts,” mean-
ing that male homosexuals had a feminine 
spirit, thus explaining why they could be 
attracted to men.  Likewise, female homo-
sexuals had a masculine spirit, thus explain-
ing why they were attracted to other women.  
In other words, the medical community rein-
forced compulsory heterosexuality because 
biological men could only be attracted to 
other biological men because one of them 
was internally a woman (in male-male sex-
ual encounters at this time, men taking the 
active role were not perceived of as a homo-
sexuals, but as “perverts” who were conven-
tionally masculine men with a “perverted” 
sex drive).  During this time period, the male 
homosexual was a marked individual.  Ac-
cording to Foucault, he “became a person-
age, a past, a case history, and a childhood, 
in addition to being a type of life, a life 
form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet 
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiol-
ogy.  Nothing that went into his total compo-
sition was unaffected by his sexuality” (43).  
Gay men, then, would often perform in a 
“feminine” manner to identify themselves as 
homosexual to others.  As Chauncey notes: 
“gay men pursued a variety of strategies as 
they negotiated their presence in the city’s 
restaurants, cafeterias and speakeasies.  
Some of them boldly claimed their right to 
gather in public, speaking loudly about gay 
matters, dancing with their friends, even put-
ting on a ‘show’ for the other customers of 
them” (176).  This gendered performance 
would be an important step in the develop-
ment of a drag queen identity. 
After the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, male-bodied drag perform-
ances became increasingly common in  
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 urban areas dominated by gay cul-
ture.  Particularly during the Prohi-
bition Era in the 1920s, drag balls and 
performances by female impersonators 
became increasingly visible within the 
gay world of New York City.  The Pansy 
Craze, which hit New York City just prior 
to the Prohibition era, embodied this cul-
tural movement.  Upper-class heterosexual 
residents of New York went “slumming” 
during this time period in American history 
to listen to African-American jazz perform-
ances; they would also go to watch male ho-
mosexual performances on stage.  Chauncey 
notes the connection between these two vo-
yeuristic pursuits:  
“The efforts of nightclub im-
presarios to cultivate and respond 
to the growing fascination of 
white middle-class club goers 
with African-American jazz and 
performance is the best-known 
aspect of this phenomenon, and in 
many ways the ‘Negro Vogue’ of 
the mid-twenties set the stage for 
the pansy craze that soon fol-
lowed it…If whites were in-
trigued by the ‘primitivism’ of 
black culture, heterosexuals were 
equally intrigued by the 
‘perversity’ of gay culture” (309). 
Pansy acts were performances given by 
highly effeminate homosexual men who per-
formed their sexual orientation on stage, 
again often to heterosexual audiences.  
Sometimes, however, such performers iden-
tified as heterosexual.  Chauncey these per-
formances to blackface, characterizing them 
as “straight actors putting on drag or stereo-
typical mannerisms to mimic and ridicule 
gay men, to the hoots and jeers of an anti-
gay audience.  This buffoonery became a 
standard feature in the burlesque and high-
class cabaret venues alike, which reinforced 
the dominant public image of homosexu-
als” (310).  They were incredibly popular, 
and embodied the daring sense of rebellious-
ness that accompanied the illegal consump-
tion of alcohol.  Performers such as Gene 
Malin became famous for their pansy acts in 
New York City. 
After the stock market crashed in 
1929 and the Great Depression Era loomed 
over American society, drag performances, 
and gay and lesbians and cultures in general, 
fell under increasingly heightened scrutiny: 
“The revulsion against gay life in the early 
1930s was part of a larger reaction to the 
perceived “excesses” of the Prohibition 
years and the blurring of the boundaries be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable public 
solidarity” (Chauncey, 353).  Gay and les-
bian bars were routinely raided by the po-
lice; if an individual should be arrested not 
only would they serve a sentence, but their 
names would be placed in the newspaper, 
often leading to loss of employment or fa-
milial ties.  In fact, by 1931 “several of the 
city’s newspapers began a campaign against 
clubs featuring female impersonators…on 
the night of January 28, 1931, they [the po-
lice] raided the Pansy Club on West Forty-
Eighth Street and the Club Calais at 125 
West Fifty-First Street.”  The next day, Po-
lice Commissioner Edward Mulrooney an-
nounced: “There will be a shake-up in the 
night clubs, especially of those which fea-
ture female impersonators” (Chauncey, 331).  
Laws were passed across the country that 
required individuals to wear at least five arti-
cles of clothing that matched their biological 
sex.  According to Senelick, even in New 
York and San Francisco in the 1960s, drag 
remained illegal (384).  Such actions were a 
way of reinforcing the very hegemonic 
structure that prevented drag performances 
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 from entering mainstream culture: 
“Prohibition culture had allowed 
gay visibility to move into the center 
of New York’s most prestigious enter-
tainment district, but in the early thir-
ties, the authorities were determined to 
return it to the city’s periphery” (Chauncey, 
333).  Ironically, however, police attempts to 
restrict gay and lesbian cultures forced them 
to perform as homosexuals themselves: 
“Since the cops often went over on the fer-
ries posing as homosexuals, the ferry owners 
always knew when raids were coming, said 
Ken Stein; the cops absurdly wore perfume 
and dressed inappropriately” (Cherry Grove, 
193).  In 1939, the Jewel Box Revue opened 
in Miami.  This would soon become the 
most famous drag venue in the United 
States.  However, “although it originated in 
a gay bar and was managed and staffed en-
tirely by homosexuals, the Jewel Box Revue 
was geared for straight audiences, aiming to 
win acceptance through comedy (Senelick, 
380).  As the first interracial drag club, the 
Jewel Box Revue broke ground for future 
performances to challenge restrictive legisla-
tive policies, and to create a more open 
(although still closeted) dialogue about plu-
ralism in American culture. 
Following the larger trends of drag 
queen performance in the United States, per-
formances prior to the disco era were usually 
meant to impersonate famous female figures, 
or they were completely comic in nature.  
Teri Warren, a drag queen who performed 
on Fire Island, told Esther Newton that: 
“when I first arrived out here, drag was not 
drag per se.  Drag was a hairy chest, hairy 
arms, moustache…which is commonly 
known now as ‘gender fucking’…and I was-
n’t into that form of drag, so I stood in the 
background” (Cherry Grove, 174).  With the 
disco era came the concept of glamour drag 
that differed from previous drag queen per-
formances: “In most glamour drag the per-
former simply mouthed, or ‘lip-synced’ to 
the words of a recorded female vocalist.  
When they did comic drag, working-class 
men tended toward broad and vulgar sight 
gags and very explicit sexual suggestions 
which offended conservative 
Grovers” (Cherry Grove, 174).  Newton as-
serts that drag played an important role in 
allowing residents, particularly gay men, to 
claim a territory as their own: “After 1950, 
witty repartee, parody, double-entendre, and 
gender reversal were used ever more openly 
and boldly to create a ‘gay reality’ – not 
only an escape from heterosexual domina-
tion on the mainland, but an evolving sub-
culture in which camp was the 
norm” (Cherry Grove, 75).  Due to constant 
police raids and the physical dangers of per-
forming in drag in a public space, gay men 
would often restrict such performances to 
private spaces.  House parties, and particu-
larly tea parties, were a popular venue for 
such performances: “Besides theatrical pro-
ductions… theme parties were the most im-
portant venues of camp representa-
tions” (Cherry Grove, 77).  Thus, drag per-
formances were (and are) enacted in private 
spaces to create social solidarity amongst 
members of the queer community. 
The cultural mosaic that makes up 
the United States is not restricted to a Euro-
pean past, despite what much scholarship 
may suggest.  While it is not completely 
clear what impact Native Americans, Afri-
can Americans, Latino Americans, and 
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 Asian Americans have had on the 
historical evolution of the “drag 
queen” in the United States, it is obvi-
ous the concept of the “drag queen” has 
been appropriated and altered within 
communities of color.  Another section of 
this paper will be devoted to how drag 
queen performances are “racialized” on the 
stage. 
Drag Queens as “Other” 
As individuals with an unconven-
tional gender performance, drag queens face 
stigma both outside of and within their own 
sub-culture.  Representations of drag in film 
often reflect this stigmatization.  In The Ad-
ventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, 
for example, one queen, Tick, faces a diffi-
cult struggle of revealing his real identity to 
his son.  Another drag queen, Bernadette, 
faces heckling from the other queens be-
cause she identifies as transgender.  The 
three drag queens face violent, homophobic 
attacks in the Australian outback, and strug-
gle to survive in a hate-filled social environ-
ment (The Adventures).  In To Wong Foo, 
Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar, three 
drag queens must go on the run in order to 
escape the grasp of an angry, homophobic 
local law enforcement official (To Wong 
Foo).  Even today, some drag queens con-
tinue to have an uneasy relationship with the 
police force.  Champagne, a drag queen 
from Schenectady, New York, noted that she 
was pulled over by a police officer while she 
was riding in her friend’s car in drag.  Her 
friend driving the car, David, was also 
dressed in drag.  Champagne stated that 
when David stuck his head out to talk to the 
cop she thought: “we’re all going to jail.”  
After being pulled over, the officer made 
them wait in their car for an extended period 
of time while other police cars drove past 
and flashed their spotlights in the car.  Fi-
nally, the policeman came back to the vehi-
cle and said “okay, you can go now” while 
laughing at David, Champagne, and their 
friends.  In response to these kinds of inter-
actions with the police, Champagne said 
“you let it roll off your back and move on.”  
Narratives on drag queens in American cul-
ture often focus on their marginalization, 
and the inability of society to accept them 
for who they are. 
Oppressed groups often feel quite 
free to oppress others, and the same is true 
within the queer community in the United 
States.  David Valentine, an anthropologist 
who specializes in transgender studies, notes 
how many queer rights organizations have 
mainstreamed their goals “at the expense of 
representing non-‘respectable’ gay men and 
lesbians – drag queens, butch women, ef-
feminate men, and the leather community – 
implicitly marking ‘gay’ as white, middle 
class, and gender normative” (227).  Rupp 
and Taylor concur, stating: “From the as-
similationist ‘We’re just like you’ tendency 
of gay and lesbian activism, from the homo-
phile movement of the 1950’s to the present, 
drag queens have been an embarrass-
ment” (Drag Queens, 185).  Like drag 
queens today, certain gay American men in 
the first half of the 20th century felt angry 
towards fairies for embodying the stereo-
types that society placed on male homosexu-
als.  Chauncey notes that:  
The resentment many gay men felt 
toward the fairies, though, may have 
resulted as much from the affinity 
they felt with them as from the  
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 affinity they felt with them as 
from the difference in their 
styles.  The fact that many men 
referred to ‘flaming faggots’ or 
‘swishes’ as ‘obvious types’ or 
‘extreme homosexuals’ suggests the 
extent to which they saw themselves 
as part of a continuum linking them 
to the public stereotype, a continuum 
on which they represented merely a 
‘less extreme’ form of the fairy 
(104).   
In her research on drag culture in the 
1960s, Esther Newton also found that drag 
queens were stigmatized within the commu-
nity: “For instance, female impersonators are 
considered by most homosexuals to be too 
overt.  They are consistently placed on the 
low end of the continuum of stigmatization, 
and one of the first things that female imper-
sonators must learn is not to recognize any-
one on the street or in any other public place 
unless they are recognized first” (Mother 
Camp, 25).  Newton goes on to note that: 
The drag queen symbolizes all that 
homosexuals say they fear the most 
in themselves, all that they say they 
feel guilty about; he symbolizes, in 
fact, the stigma.  In this way, the 
term ‘drag queen’ is comparable to 
‘nigger.’  And like that word, it may 
be all right in an in-group context 
but not in an out-group one.  Those 
who do not want to think of them-
selves or be identified as drag 
queens under any circumstances at-
tempt to disassociate themselves 
from ‘drag’ completely.  These ho-
mosexuals deplore drag shows and 
profess total lack of interest in them.  
Their attitude toward drag queens is 
one of condemnation combined with 
the expression of vast social distance 
between themselves and the drag 
queen.  Other homosexuals enjoy 
being queens among themselves, but 
do not want to be stigmatized by the 
heterosexual culture.  These homo-
sexuals admire drag and drag queens 
in homosexual contexts, but deplore 
female impersonators and street fair-
ies for ‘giving us a bad name’ or 
‘projecting the wrong image’ to the 
heterosexual culture.  The drag 
queen is definitely a marked man in 
the subculture (Mother Camp, 104). 
During this same time period on Fire Island, 
Newton notes that the social stigma of being 
a drag queen made it difficult for them to 
support themselves economically: “The 
poorest and least accomplished as perform-
ers or those with drug habits turned to hus-
tling, which compounded their stigmatiza-
tion; many of the more ambitious and tal-
ented became hairdressers as the only legiti-
mate employment that would allow them to 
supplement their incomes from female im-
personation” (Cherry Grove, 133). One of 
Cherry Grove’s star drag queens, Dick Addi-
son, “understood that the gay movement was 
hostile toward drag because ‘they don’t want 
homosexuality laughed at’” (Cherry Grove, 
241).  Chauncey also suggests that the an-
tagonism between masculine gay men and 
fairies was really a kind of class antagonism, 
as the majority of fairies were a part of the 
working class, and the majority masculine 
gay men were a part of the middle-class 
(106).  Even today, antagonism between 
mainstream gay men and drag queens  
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 persists.  Champagne, whom I in-
terviewed, stated how a former boy-
friend asserted: “no boyfriend of mine 
is going to be a drag queen.”  In his an-
thropological study of drag queens in 
Atlanta, Georgia McNeal noted that: 
“Likewise, there is an internal social hierar-
chy within the gay community in which drag 
queens literally embody the stigma of male 
homosexuality as effeminacy and therefore 
occupy a lower, more stigmatized position 
within the gay community as a 
whole” (355).  Thus, when one begins to 
analyze the political import of drag perform-
ances, one must also recognize the double 
stigma that drag queens embody.  Berkowitz 
similarly notes that: 
Drag queens comprise a community 
that is not only labeled as deviant by 
mainstream society, but is also sepa-
rated from the stigmatized groups of 
non-cross-dressing gay men and het-
erosexual transvestites.  The drag 
queen is part of a subgroup that con-
sists of the outcasts of two stigma-
tized groups, gay men and heterosex-
ual cross dressers, and thus endures 
the effects of multiple negative iden-
tities.  Furthermore, the relatively 
small number of drag queens in-
creases the likelihood that this be-
havior is perceived as unusual and 
bizarre (13). 
In their performances, then, drag queens 
must resist both heterosexual and conserva-
tive homosexual agendas that restrict their 
often sexually-explicit critiques of the gen-
der dichotomy.   
 
 
Subversive Politics: Drag as a Political Act 
The subversive power of drag per-
formances in queer communities in the 
United States has been well-documented; 
drag performances reveal the socially-
constructed nature of gender and critique the 
binary.  Anthropologist Rosalind Morris 
agrees, noting that “By making gender so 
fabulously artificial, these performances are 
said to show up the artifice of gender” (583).  
Drag performances are also linked to the 
politics of the body because:  “In such pro-
tests, the body of the performer highlights 
the social basis of gender and sexuality and 
becomes a weapon to contest the dominant 
heterosexual gender codes” (“Chicks with 
Dicks”, 116).  In other words, by confusing 
categories of “man” and “woman,” drag 
queens are disrupting one of the most impor-
tant organizing principles in all human so-
cieties: gender.  Pandora Boxx, who per-
forms in Rochester, believes that drag shows 
can reveal the socially-constructed nature of 
gender: “It is we as human beings who dic-
tated how each sex should look when it 
comes to hairstyle, makeup, [and] clothes.  
We are not born that way.  It’s a learned be-
havior.  If you look back at history some of 
what men wore as regular clothes would be 
considered drag now.  Drag makes us ques-
tion our stereotypes and our gender role as-
signments.”  Not all anthropologists believe 
that such rituals of inversion subvert cultural 
norms; some have even argued that they are 
“intended to preserve and even…strengthen 
the established order.”  From his analysis of 
African rituals of inversion, Max Gluckman 
argues that: “the lifting of the normal taboos 
and restraints obviously serves to emphasize 
them” and “by allowing people to behave 
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 normally prohibited ways, gave 
expression, in a reverse form, to the 
normal rightness of a particular kind 
of social order” (115-116).  It is, then 
“the acceptance of the established order 
as right and good, and even sacred, 
[which] seems to allow unbridled license, 
very rituals of rebellion, for the order itself 
keeps this rebellion within 
bounds” (Gluckman, 125).  While this per-
spective has some validity, it does not recog-
nize the dynamic quality of cultural systems.  
Through time and space, the very 
“established order” to which Gluckman re-
fers will evolve, changing what is and what 
is not considered acceptable behavior. 
The practice of drag performance in 
the United States has certainly evolved over 
time, yet it continues to challenge traditional 
notions of “masculinity” and “femininity” in 
American culture.  Drag queens, who can 
appear to be particularly convincing women, 
speak in low baritone voices.  They also 
make comments about their feminine bodies; 
Ambrosia Salad, a drag queen in Rochester 
informed that audience one night that: “I 
think I just lactated.”  Butler goes even fur-
ther, arguing that audience members assume 
the actor’s “true” biological gender before 
they interpret the performance: “It would be 
a mistake to take it as the paradigm of sub-
versive action or, indeed, as a model for po-
litical agency.  The point is rather different.  
If one thinks that one sees a man dressed as 
a woman or a woman dressed as a man, then 
one takes the first term of each of those per-
ceptions as the “reality” of gender” (Gender 
Trouble, xxiii).  In sum, drag performances 
are not artistic performances for art’s sake.  
Taylor and Rupp agree: “We suggest that 
drag as performed at the 801 [Cabaret] 
should be understood not only as commer-
cial performance but as a political event in 
which identity is used to contest conven-
tional thinking about gender and sexual-
ity” (Drag Queens, 2).  Pandora Boxx, who 
performs in Rochester, definitely believes 
that her performances are political: 
Anything that goes against the norm 
becomes political at some point.  I 
think because drag queens are often 
more visible is does poise drag to 
become more political and outspo-
ken.  American politics are drag in a 
way too.  Drag is all about putting on 
the appearance of someone else.  
How many politicians put on their 
own version of a drag face and go 
out and smile to the people while 
they are dealing with the devil be-
hind the scenes? 
Judith Butler emphasizes that the ar-
tistic, the performative, and the cultural have 
always been political for queer communities 
in the U.S.  Indeed, the theatrical aspect of 
gay and lesbian activism in the United 
States, particularly during the outbreak of 
AIDS in the gay male community was cru-
cial to furthering a gay and lesbian agenda: 
“To oppose the theatrical to the po-
litical within contemporary queer 
politics is, I would argue, an impos-
sibility: the hyperbolic 
“performance” of death in the prac-
tice of “die-ins” and the theatrical 
“outness” by which queer activism 
has disrupted the closeting distinc-
tion between public and private 
space have proliferated sites of poli-
ticization and AIDS awareness 
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 throughout the public realm.  
Indeed, an important set of his-
tories might be told in which the 
increasing politicization of theatri-
cality for queers is at stake…Such a 
history might include traditions of 
cross-dressing, drag balls, street 
walking, butch-femme spectacles, 
the sliding between the march (New 
York City) and the parade (San Fran-
cisco); die-ins by ACT UP, kiss-ins 
by Queer Nation; drag performance 
benefits for AIDS…the convergence 
of theatrical work with theatrical ac-
tivism; performing excessive lesbian 
sexuality and iconography that effec-
tively counters the de-sexualization 
of the lesbian; tactical interruptions 
of public forums by lesbian and gay 
activists in favor of drawing public 
attention and outrage to the failure of 
government funding of AIDS re-
search and outreach” (Bodies That 
Matter, 233). 
An example of performative resis-
tance within the gay and lesbian community 
out of drag was documented by Newton on 
Fire Island.  Heterosexual tourists would 
regularly spy on gays and lesbians in their 
homes during the 1970s.  Amelia Migliaccio 
noted that one time “a group of women, with 
husbands standing behind [said] ‘Oh, how 
cute, they’re eating!’  Whereupon Babe 
jumped up and said, ‘Come on in, your 
daughter’s here!’…And another time she 
took a can of Raid and went outside and just 
started to spray.  That was terrible.  But that 
was the attitude…’Oh, look, they’re eating.’  
You know, I mean like just a zoo” (Cherry 
Grove, 247).  Champagne, a drag performer 
from Upstate New York, noted the important 
role that drag queens have played within the 
larger gay and lesbian movement, particu-
larly during the Stonewall Riot: “it wasn’t a 
bunch of gay men and lesbians, it was drag 
queens who were pulled out and arrested… 
if it wasn’t for stonewall, a lot of gay rights 
wouldn’t be where they are today.”  The im-
portance of drag queens in the larger gay and 
lesbian movement was not lost on Taylor 
and Rupp, who noted: “their resistance has 
also been important to the organized gay and 
lesbian movement.  From Jose Sarria, drag 
queen and political candidate, to the drag 
queen chorus line challenging the police the 
night of the raid at the Stonewall Inn in 
1969, drag queens, however ambivalently 
viewed by the movement, have been 
there” (Drag Queens,186).  Drag queens 
have used their persona to enact particularly 
powerful performances of resistance.  For 
example, Gene Malin, who performed as a 
pansy (not a drag queen) in New York City 
during the early 20th Century, was not afraid 
to stand up for himself:  
After winning a prize for being the 
‘best dressed woman’ at a Green-
wich Village drag ball, he had wan-
dered into a cafeteria without hav-
ing bothered to change his 
clothes…when a part of four rough 
looking birds tossed a pitcher of hot 
water at him as he danced by, he 
pitched into them.  After beating 
three of them into insensibility, the 
fight went into the street, with two 
taxi drivers coming to the assis-
tance of the surviving member of 
the original foursome (Chauncey, 
316).   
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 Champagne also discussed how 
drag queens reacted to the introduc-
tion of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s: 
“when AIDS and HIV first came out it 
was the drag queens who were going 
out and doing benefits, giving money 
when it first was the gay cancer…trying to 
get people aware of what this was.”  This 
history is not lost on Champagne, who raises 
money for children and families affected by 
HIV/AIDS through the annual Snowball 
Benefit, which she spearheads.  It is a per-
sonal issue for Champagne, who acknowl-
edges that a lot of drag queens are no longer 
performing because they have “died of 
AIDS.”  Champagne says that as a drag 
queen performing in her benefit “you want 
to update them [the audience], you want to 
make them aware of what’s going on, you 
want to be politically aware and you know 
responsible…a lot of people don’t fucking 
know because it’s kinda like really blasé 
now – it’s [referring to HIV/AIDS] still here 
people, it still exists, we still need money, 
they are still looking for a cure.”   
An important ritual of drag perform-
ance in American culture is the Invasion of 
the Pines.  It began when Teri Warren, an 
Italian-American drag queen went to the 
Pines (a primarily upper-class, conservative, 
gay community on Fire Island) in drag to get 
dinner, but was not served because he was 
“not properly attired.”  After the incident, a 
group of gay men (and at least two lesbians) 
dressed in drag and marched to the Pines in 
protest.  Between eight and fourteen people, 
wearing “the most ridiculous drag” partici-
pated, and as they marched they sang “God 
Bless America.”  Amelia, a participant, re-
members:  
So…people …started to look and 
say, ‘what the hell is that?’…Well, 
we got out of the boat and Nick is 
carrying this big sign.  It says, “Pines 
people are plastic’ or, ‘Pines people 
don’t know how to live.’  And I’m 
saying, ‘We’re gonna die, I know 
we’re gonna die here.  They’re gonna 
kill us.”…But what happened was 
everybody started to laugh, I mean 
they thought it was really funny.  
And we just walked around and we 
went into the Blue Whale [the restau-
rant that Teri Warren was kicked out 
of] and they were so ecstatic that we 
were there they bought us a drink 
(Cherry Grove, 269-270). 
This protest became a tradition, and “by the 
late 1980s it took the largest double-decker 
ferry to carry all the invaders to the Pines, 
and the crowd awaiting them there could be 
numbered in the thousands” (Cherry Grove, 
270).  Newton argues that the ritual “insists 
on kinship and commonality…bridges in-
vidious class and generational distinctions 
and reasserts gay nationalism” (Cherry 
Grove, 271). 
A particularly poignant moment in 
my fieldwork was when I witnessed a drag 
queen perform as Sarah Palin.  The emcee of 
the show, Ambrosia Salad, asked the audi-
ence: “How many are following politics?  A 
loud set of applause then erupted out of the 
audience.  “We have a special treat for 
you…she was just debating against Biden…
she can see Irondequoit [location near Roch-
ester, NY] from her house.”  Miss Darienne 
Lake then came out onto the stage wearing 
glasses, a wig and a wardrobe similar to that 
worn by Sarah Palin.  In the performance 
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 .  she sang Meredith Brooks’ song 
“Bitch,” which emphasizes the 
multi-faceted roles and personalities 
that women sport.  Her performance 
was highly sexualized; she used a lot of 
tongue action and revealed a large bosom.  
After the performance, Ambrosia Salad said 
“she’s very folksy tonight” in reference to 
political commentators’ opinions that Sarah 
Palin’s ability to speak to the common 
American was her greatest asset.  This eth-
nographic moment was heavily steeped in 
meaning; it can be read as political commen-
tary, gender critique, and the history of 
American conservatism and the queer com-
munity.  As a social conservative, Sarah 
Palin sparked fear in the queer community, 
and represented the socially-conservative 
segment of the Republican Party that former 
President George Bush supported during his 
two terms in office.  Miss Darienne Lake’s 
representation of Sarah Palin, however, was 
highly sexualized; in a way this counters her 
socially-conservative façade and plays with 
the notion of Sarah Palin as a sexual being.  
In fact, after her performance the emcee, 
Ambrosia Salad said: “She’s a cock-sucking 
mom who loses her lipstick.”  While this 
representation is clearly problematic from a 
feminist perspective, it does point out the 
hypocrisy of a politician who supports absti-
nence-only education.  All human beings, 
even socially-conservative politicians, such 
as Sarah Palin, are sexual, and this is a 
theme that drag queens try to bring to their 
audiences. 
Often, overtly political statements 
are made as side-bar commentary in drag 
performances.  In Key West, Rupp and Tay-
lor observed drag queens “talk about the gay 
and lesbian movement, AIDS, gay marriage, 
and discrimination” (Drag Queens, 143).  I 
observed such statements during my field-
work as well; when introducing a visiting 
performer from Florida, Ambrosia Salad 
cried out: “You know the state with the 
hanging chads…maybe this is too long ago 
for some of you…You know, back when 
Gore was supposed to win.” 
Young queers as a whole seem do 
not seem to be as embarrassed by drag per-
formances as some older members of the 
community are.  In fact, it is the radical and 
rebellious nature of the performance that 
makes it so intriguing to young, queer 
Americans.  In a focus group discussion 
among queer college students and allies at 
the State University of New York at Gene-
seo, the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence were 
brought up in the conversation.  The interna-
tional organization consists of drag perform-
ers who wear the traditional attire of Catho-
lic nuns.  Their highly visible performances 
are clearly political in nature, and are of 
course a parody on the strict social conserva-
tivism present in the Roman Catholic Faith.  
As Senelick notes: “By 1981 the order con-
tained fifteen sisters and two novices, in-
cluding Sister Missionary Position, Sister 
Homo Fellatio, Sister Hysterectoria, and Sis-
ter Searching for Men.  The following year, 
Sister Boom Boom…ran for a post on the 
Board of Supervisors, San Francisco’s gov-
erning body” (466).  Their political activism 
included:  
reciting litanies and antiphonies at 
public events, for example, ‘From 
the prejudice of Ronald Regan/Let 
us protect ourselves.’  They  
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 protested the Pope’s visit to the 
city by canonizing the late Har-
vey Milk; exorcised Jerry Falwell 
and Phyllis Schalfly; gave public 
readings of The Satanic Verses, and 
conferred sainthood on such fellow-
travelers as Harvey Feinstein, Lily 
Tomlin, and Shirley MacLaine.  
They made frequent television ap-
pearances to debate political issues 
and gay rights.  By the time they 
celebrated their Decade of Deca-
dence in 1989 with a formal ADIS 
benefit there were thirty sisters, sev-
eral of them female and/or heterosex-
ual (468). 
  One student noted that: “they [Sisters of 
Perpetual Indulgence] are everywhere in the 
world, they are all over the place.”  Immedi-
ately, another student interrupted saying: 
“they’re doing missionary work.”  After a 
period of collective laugher, a third student 
asserted: “they’re recruiters,” playing off the 
assertion in mainstream heterosexual culture 
that gay men and lesbians have to “prey” on 
youth to try to convert them to a homosexual 
lifestyle. 
While drag queens emphasize the 
differences between audience members in 
their performances (in terms of gender and 
sexual orientation specifically), they also 
seem to emphasize the unity that all human 
beings share.  As Champagne emphasized, 
“we’re all people…we breath the same…we 
think the same…we go through the same 
shit.”  In my fieldwork in Rochester, I have 
found that drag performances are always 
lead by an emcee who welcomes the audi-
ence as a whole, and throughout the per-
formance tries to create a sense of unity 
amongst everyone in the bar.  In their study 
of drag queens in Key West, Rupp and Tay-
lor have also noted how drag queens try to 
emphasize the humanity of all peoples 
through their performances on the stage. 
Not all drag queens see their per-
formances as inherently political.  Cham-
pagne asserted that aside from a few politi-
cal jokes, her performances are not necessar-
ily political.  Part of the difficulty in deter-
mining whether queens view their perform-
ances political or not is the very term 
“political” itself, and it is often only read in 
its most formal sense (in reference to party 
politics, judicial systems, etc).  Additionally, 
one must acknowledge that drag queens, as 
individuals often living outside of the aca-
demic community, are often unexposed to 
the language and concepts explored in gen-
der and queer theory.  Thus, one cannot ex-
pect them to understand their performances 
within the framework of gender theory, 
which is often relegated to the ivory tower of 
the academy.  Rupp and Taylor agree: “the 
drag queens and their audiences, as we have 
seen, are unlikely to talk ‘cultural reper-
toires’ or ‘counter-hegemonic gender and 
sexual meanings’ or even ‘collective iden-
tity,’ but that does not make their perform-
ances of protest any less confrontational, 
intentional, solidarity-building, or indeed, 
any less compelling” (Drag Queens, 22).  
Whose interpretation, then wins out, the an-
thropologist’s or the performer’s?  Numer-
ous anthropologists, particularly those exam-
ining ritual studies, have noted the etic/emic 
paradox that exists in the discipline.  Victor 
Turner posits this same question: “How, 
then, can a social anthropologist justify his 
claim to be able to interpret a society’s  
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 ritual symbols more deeply and 
comprehensively than the actors 
themselves?” (Forest of Symbols, 26).  
Turner thinks that the anthropologist 
can and should interpret the symbolic 
meaning of a performance: “he [Turner 
assumes that all anthropologists are male] 
can place this ritual in its significant field 
setting and describe the structures and prop-
erties of that field” (Forest of Symbols, 26-
27).  At the same time, he acknowledges that 
the anthropologist is embedded within her/
his own “structural perspective.”  By this he 
means that the anthropologist’s “own vision 
is circumscribed by his particular position, 
or even a set of situationally conflicting po-
sitions, both in the persisting structure of his 
society, and also in the role structure of the 
given ritual” (Forest of Symbols, 27).  As a 
self-identified gay man, I think that my posi-
tion makes me well-suited for interpreting 
the meaning behind drag performance.  In 
the end, I think it is important to find a bal-
ance between these two perspectives.  Of 
course, the lives of LGBTIQ individuals are 
inherently political; their very existence is 
made political in a society where they are 
treated and represented as second-class citi-
zens.  However, the way that the anthropolo-
gist and the performer define a “political 
performance” may be vastly different.  
Overall, drag queens are not afraid to ad-
dress the discrimination faced by queer 
Americans with their sassy, dynamic, and 
feisty personalities.  When discussing legacy 
of George Bush’s presidency, Champagne 
chimed in with: “it’s like you’re trying to 
tell us who we can and cannot love and who 
we can and cannot marry…who the fuck are 
they…you are supposed to represent your 
entire country.”  
Problematic Performances: Racism and 
Misogyny in Drag 
Within some feminist circles, drag 
queens are seen as perpetuating negative im-
ages of American women; in fact some com-
pare the performances of drag queens to rac-
ist blackface performances. With their hyper
-femininity, drag queens represent a certain 
type of woman on the stage.  This woman is 
often represented as white, blonde, very at-
tractive, highly sexualized, with large 
breasts.  Perhaps one of the greatest theoreti-
cal hurdles that one must confront when 
studying drag queen performances in the 
United States is the often sexist representa-
tions that they support.  Morris describes the 
central theoretical issue that has made stud-
ies of drag problematic for scholars:  
Indeed, the theory of performativity 
has turned to drag for its metaphors, 
its exemplary instances, and its 
structural models.  The literature on 
this topic is divided between works 
that treat transvestite and transgen-
dered performances as subversive of 
the dominant sex/gender system and 
those that see them as an element 
buttressing and reconfirming binary 
opposition through an instructive but 
ultimately resolved blurring (582-
583). 
One need only look at the critiques sur-
rounding Jennie Livingston’s documentary 
Paris is Burning to understand how divisive 
this issue is amongst gender theorists (Paris 
is Burning).  bell hooks in particular has 
been critical of drag performances for per-
petuating misogynistic, racist themes 
(hooks, 214). 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
189 
195
: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009
Published by KnightScholar, 2010
 Other critics have noted incidents 
of misogyny in drag performances.  
Morris recounts an incident that 
Esther Newton describes in her ethnog-
raphy of Fire Island in which men per-
forming in drag prevented lesbians from 
participating in the experience:  
“Newton has done just that with her 
description of a conflict that arose in 
Cherry Grove, New York, when les-
bians attempted to enter a drag show 
and gay men rejected their right to 
masquerade in the feminine.  Some-
what soberingly, accounts like these 
indicate that, even when self-
consciously addressed to the matter 
of gender, drag can reinscribe domi-
nant ideology – not because it pro-
vides an exemplary resolution but 
because the subject of conscious ma-
nipulation can never fully enter into 
the realm of the unconscious” (584).   
The debate centering on drag performances 
as anti-feminist is rooted in issues of iden-
tity, identity politics, and internalized homo-
phobia.  McNeal, perhaps the only gay male 
anthropologist to have studied drag queen 
performances in the United States, notes 
painfully that  
We should remain ever cognizant of 
how individuals and groups may ex-
acerbate and even intensify certain 
oppressions at the same time that 
they attempt to reclaim and rectify 
others…Drag highlights the perfor-
mative aspects of gender, and it is 
subversive and parodic by turns.  But 
it is important that as observing ana-
lysts we do not foreclose upon any 
final interpretation of drag because 
in many ways it re-instantiates the 
hegemonic system of binary gender 
and buttresses the status quo as 
much as it subverts it.  It is much too 
simplistic to pose drag performance 
as either subversive or reaffirming of 
dominant cultural models of gender 
and sexuality… It is sobering and 
disheartening to observe attempts at 
assertiveness, empowerment, and 
transcendence through the marginal 
play of drag that resorts to re-
stigmatization and sexism (360). 
From my fieldwork experiences, I 
have seen several examples of drag queen 
performances that can be read as misogynis-
tic.  I observed one performance in Roches-
ter, NY that was particularly troubling.  In 
the performance, Miss Darienne Lake per-
formed as Rihanna, a popular female musi-
cal artist who had just recently been in the 
news for having suffered from domestic 
abuse.  Miss Darienne Lake came out on 
stage wearing make-up to simulate a bruised 
body (with a particularly dark black eye), 
and was punched, kicked and scratched on 
stage by another performer.  Later, Miss 
Aggy Dune performed as M.I.A., the preg-
nant Sri Lankan female rapper.  The drag 
queen wore an outfit similar to the one 
M.I.A. wore at the Grammys – it was made 
of black fabric, and had a black-and-white 
polka dot pattern fabric on the breasts and 
stomach (a fake pregnant stomach was hid-
den under the clothes.  At the end of the 
show, the drag queen used a coat hanger 
(handed to her from backstage) on stage to 
simulate an abortion.  Then, Miss Darienne 
Lake, who was still dressed as Rhianna, 
came out on stage and proceeded to punch 
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 Miss Aggy Dune repeatedly in her 
stomach.  Certainly such a perform-
ance can be read as being misogynis-
tic.  During another fieldwork visit, a 
special drag contest was being held for 
amateurs.  One of the categories was lawn 
attire, meaning that they had to dress in a 
lawn ornament theme.  One performer wore 
a black burqa, and carried on stage plastic 
flowers and a flamingo whirligig and lay on 
the floor to imitate a lawn.  The same per-
former came out in the same black burqa in 
the “recession gown” (cheap attire) category 
and revealed a short skirt underneath made 
from newspaper.  The emcee, Pandora Box, 
exclaimed: “code orange, code orange!” and 
the performer ran off stage.  The audience 
found both performances extremely come-
dic, if not the most comedic of all the per-
formances.  Such representations of women, 
however, “play” with the oppression of 
women.  Butler, who finds a way to mediate 
from both sides of the debate, asserts that: 
“The feminist analysis [of drag] thus makes 
male homosexuality about women and one 
might argue that at its extreme, this kind of 
analysis is in fact a colonization in reverse, a 
way for feminist women to make themselves 
into the center of male/male homosexual ac-
tivity (and thus to reinscribe the heterosexual 
matrix, paradoxically, at the heart of the 
radical feminist position) (Bodies That Mat-
ter, 127).  Coming from a lesbian perspec-
tive, Newton is able to look at male-bodied 
drag performances through both a heterosex-
ist and misogynistic lens.  She notes how 
feminist critiques of drag queen perform-
ances can be very limiting.  Using the per-
spective of psychological anthropology, 
McNeal (who self-identifies as a gay male) 
tries to understand how sexist representa-
tions of women emerge in drag queen per-
formances.  In part, gay men embrace per-
forming as women because “For these few 
moments, the ‘femininity’ attributed to gay 
men is not stigmatized and ashamed, but in 
control and assertive, retaliating against a 
hegemonic straight world” (346-347).  Thus, 
through representing women on the stage, 
performing as drag queens is an act of resis-
tance: “the symbolic inversion of the drag 
show provides catharsis for those gay men 
present who enjoy and laugh as the personi-
fication of their own stigma takes undis-
puted control over the court” (348).  Gay 
men are able to control, and indeed, reappro-
priate the femininity that has been placed 
upon them by mainstream society through 
these performances.  Therefore, “Gay men 
have responded to this situation not only by 
poking fun at the world, but also by poking 
fun at themselves and women who occupy a 
similar, though not equivalent, psycho-
cultural position in relation to men concern-
ing matters of desire” (347).  This is sup-
ported by drag queens who assert that they 
are celebrating, not demeaning women in 
their performances.  Indeed, Champagne 
sees drag performance as “an homage” to 
women.  Pandora Boxx does not believe that 
drag queens’ performances are inherently 
sexist:  
I certainly understand where that 
comes from but I think it’s ridicu-
lous.  You can’t portray something 
so amazingly if you view it in a 
negative light.  If drag queens truly 
hated women or anything like that 
they would not be able to go out on 
stage and celebrate the image of a 
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 woman.  If anything drag 
pokes fun at the image of what 
we have deemed women should 
look like and be like.  I don’t know 
if you would ever find a drag queen 
who says, I dress up like a woman 
because I hate women.  Dressing up 
like a woman comes from a place of 
love.  Love of the image of a woman, 
love of the powerful woman, love of 
our own mothers, love of femininity.   
It’s all about love. 
Similarly, Milla, a drag queen in Key 
West exclaimed: “Yes, ladies and gentle-
men, women are power.  You wouldn’t be 
here if it wasn’t for them…And that’s why 
we spend all of our time being effeminate 
and looking up to women and thinking that 
they are all that they are” (Drag Queens, 
144).  In the documentary Wigstock, two 
African-American drag queens discussed 
their opinions on the issue.  One argued that: 
“I think of myself as a butch drag queen – 
I’m paying homage to strong black women.”  
The other agreed, stating; “Women are a lot 
stronger than men generally anyway because 
since they’ve been oppressed so long…they 
are more emotionally strong, they’re more in 
touch with their spirituality” (Silvers).  Fi-
nally, McNeal acknowledges that many drag 
queen performances are indeed sexist, de-
spite any psychological explanation.  How-
ever, one way to make sense of these sexist 
representations is that such “misogyny…is 
deeply tied to gay men’s internalized homo-
phobia and culturally learned shame” (348).  
Thus, until gay men are able to fight their 
own internalized homophobia, drag queen 
performances are likely to continue to have 
many misogynistic themes.  
Additionally, the argument has been 
made within the queer community that con-
temporary drag queens are not impersonat-
ing women; instead they are performing as 
drag queens, a unique category of individu-
als unto itself.  As Champagne notes, “it’s 
really not about portraying a woman.”  In-
stead, they perform as drag queens, which 
tend to represent an extreme femininity.  Be-
cause drag queens have formed their own 
unique subculture within the United States, 
drag performances tend to have particular 
similarities in different regions of the coun-
try.  Such performances have their own es-
tablished norms and rules, which amateurs 
must accept.  As Goffman notes, “When an 
actor takes on an established social role, usu-
ally he finds that a particular front has al-
ready been established for it.  Whether his 
acquisition of the role was primarily moti-
vated by a desire to perform the given task 
or by a desire to maintain the corresponding 
front, the actor will find that he must do 
both” (27).  In other words, drag queens can-
not be said to perform as women; instead, in 
order to perform in professional venues, they 
must perform as drag queens. 
Performances of drag queens have 
also always been “raced” as much as they 
have been “gendered.”  Some contemporary 
drag queen performers actually do don 
blackface.  One student in a PRIDE meeting 
focus group at the State University of New 
York at Geneseo noted how she had heard 
about: “a blackface drag queen…the charac-
ter is a three hundred pound welfare queen 
who has nineteen kids and drives a Cadil-
lac.”  The student was troubled by this char-
acter, which clearly played off painful 
stereotypes of black femininity in American 
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 culture.  This character was not a 
myth, however.  Chuck Knipp, a 
white gay male, performs in blackface 
under the persona Shirley Q. Liquor, an 
obese African-American woman on 
welfare who has nineteen children.  He is 
well-known within drag queen circles, and 
has videos featured on YouTube 
(McCullom, 1).  Champagne stated that she 
has seen drag queens perform in blackface, 
and asserted that “I didn’t even recognize 
him until he walked up to me – I was like 
you look fabulous as a black woman!” 
On an episode of RuPaul’s Drag 
Race, a reality show competition for drag 
queens that aired in the spring of 2009, had 
an episode in which contestants were asked 
to make a drag persona inspired by Oprah 
Winfrey.  At least one of the contestants, 
Jade, took this instruction literally, and tried 
to darken his complexion for the role 
(“Queens of All Media”).  Champagne noted 
that she has seen some performers in black-
face and said that sometimes it can be very 
realistic looking.  As troubling as the history 
of blackface is, drag performances in Amer-
ica have always required performers to ex-
periment with new identities.  The ritualistic 
role reversal in drag performances makes it 
an appropriate cultural space for actors to 
“play” with the concept of racial and/or eth-
nic identity. 
Sexualizing Drag Performance 
An important function of drag is to 
highlight the sexualized experiences of 
Americans; indeed, drag performances can 
be read as a critique of the puritanical nature 
of American culture.  Sexuality is in itself, 
of course, a metaphor for power, and thus it 
is rational for drag queens to use sexual per-
formances, jokes, metaphors, acts, and innu-
endos in their shows to combat an oppres-
sive power structure.  Rupp and Taylor ex-
plain the power of bringing sexuality to the 
forefront of drag queen performances:  
“the sex talk and the public nudity 
and the groping serve as an extension 
of the way the girls challenge con-
ventional understandings of male and 
female, straight and gay.  In their 
public talk about sex and the slang 
words for body parts and sex acts 
that they bring into regular use, the 
drag queens practice what might be 
called a politics of vulgarity…In the 
same way that they blur the bounda-
ries of gender and sexual categories 
and violate traditional distinctions 
between public and private, they 
cross the line between the respect-
able and the vulgar.  Their bawdy 
talk about sex acts shocks the audi-
ence, creating an opening for the in-
troduction of ideas about gender and 
sexuality that are shocking in a dif-
ferent sense” (Drag Queens, 140). 
Indeed, an important part of the drag 
performance is its “shock factor.”  In “On 
top of all this is the fact that drag queens 
make sex, which is usually far more private, 
a very public affair…The language the drag 
queens use about sex and their constant talk 
about sex acts contribute to an environment 
in which anything goes and nothing is 
shocking” (Drag Queens, 138).  During their 
fieldwork, Taylor and Rupp observed Sushi, 
a drag queen, remind the audience that: “we 
are drag queens!  We do have dicks and two 
balls!” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 114).  In the 
field I also noticed many different  
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 performative acts that were meant 
to shock the audience.  Such acts 
would range from drag queens sud-
denly speaking in a very low, masculine 
voice, to placing the hands of audience 
members on their genitalia.  In an inter-
view with Champagne she noted that the 
point of the show is not to sexually arouse 
the audience, however, “if you do get 
aroused…meet me after the show.”  Cham-
pagne’s statement exemplifies drag perform-
ances; it combines comedy with an openly 
sexual discourse.  Even student members of 
the Pride Alliance at the State University of 
New York at Geneseo recognized the impor-
tance of sexuality in drag performances; one 
student noted how “drag is very sexualized 
in so many ways.”  Drag queens perfect their 
gender performance by learning how to 
move their bodies in a sexual manner.  
When asked how she moves when she per-
forms, Pandora Boxx stated: “Well, I try to 
dance.  I’m no professional dancer by any 
means.  I watch other entertainers like 
Madonna, Britney Spears, Pink and such to 
try and take little moves here and there and 
make them my own.  There is usually a lot 
of sexuality to my moves on stage.”  On the 
eve before Valentine’s Day, a drag perform-
ance in Rochester, NY was highly sexual-
ized; this was especially fitting given the 
date of the show.  The emcee of the drag 
show, called the Salad Bar Review, stated: 
“we’ll do a little demonstration right here, 
no that’s all extra ladies and gentlemen, 
that’s the after hours show – once the bar 
closes down we lock the door and that’s 
when the real Salad Bar Review starts.” 
Some audience members are not al-
ways comfortable with the highly sexualized 
nature of drag queen performances.  Cham-
pagne “in case you haven’t guessed, you are 
at a drag show if someone comes over to 
you and sits on your lap…its all in fun…we 
are here to entertain you…if you can’t han-
dle that then here is the door and I can re-
fund your ticket money.”  Some people have 
even pushed her away when she approached 
audience members during the show; when 
asked about who pushed her away, she said: 
“I’ve had lesbians do that, I’ve had straight 
men do that.”  The anxiety that drag per-
formances can elicit is not restricted to any 
one “category” of people.  However, it does 
seem that straight audiences, who may be 
less comfortable with drag queens, show 
higher levels of anxiety.  In her ethnographic 
research, Esther Newton observed the differ-
ent ways that gay and straight audiences in-
teracted with drag queens:  
In Chicago, one very popular per-
former came down off the stage as 
part of his act and held out his hands 
to the gay audience sitting along the 
bar.  The people in the audience virtu-
ally climbed all over each other to 
touch him.  In Kansas City, I saw the 
same performer come down into the 
straight audience, and the people at 
the tables as he walked among them 
visibly shrank back.  At one point he 
accidentally touched a woman, and 
she actually screamed ‘Get it away 
from me.’  At this point another 
woman jumped up yelling, ‘I’ll touch 
it,’ and pulled his wig.  Since the 
wigs are usually glued on fairly 
firmly, it did not come off.  The sec-
ond woman then screamed louder 
than the first, ‘It’s its own hair!’ and 
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 jumped back (66). 
Milla, a drag performer in Key West 
similarly asserted: “If you don’t like 
the show, there’s an escalator right 
there.  If it’s not turned on, just tell me, 
I’ll help you down the stairs” (Drag 
Queens, 113).  By making such statements, 
drag queens claim their space on the stage, 
and assert their dominance over audience 
members who may not be comfortable chal-
lenging traditional notions of gender and 
sexuality. 
In addition, drag queens subvert tra-
ditional definitions of sexual identity by 
achieving the sexual arousal of heterosexual 
men in their performances.  Champagne pro-
vided a specific example of when she was 
able to sexually arouse a heterosexual man 
at the request of his girlfriend: “I got down 
on my hands and knees…put the zipper in 
my mouth and got right up in his crotch and 
he was turning his head…he started to get 
hard…the girlfriend was taking pictures and 
laughing…it’s fun because they 
[heterosexual men] get kinda embarrassed.”  
Although not performing in drag at the time 
of this incident, Champagne also noted a 
time when she resisted male heteronorma-
tive culture when being bullied in high 
school:  “the kid came out in the hallway 
and started saying shit to me…and I said 
what’s wrong?  You’re girlfriend ain’t blow-
ing you the right way?  You drop your fuck-
ing pants and I’ll show you how to suck a 
cock…his mouth was gaped open and he 
couldn’t say anything…I blew him kisses 
the rest of the day.”    During a show in 
Rochester, Samantha Vegas harassed a 
young heterosexual man celebrating a 
bachelor party by saying: “I bet you’re 
Irish…Oh, well does the top match the bot-
tom [in reference to his red hair]?”  Saman-
tha then proceeded to call him “Ben-Gay” 
and asked him to “Ben-Dover.”  The other 
men in the bachelor party were very nervous 
to approach the drag queen.  However, 
Samantha Vegas told Ben that if he took off 
his shirt she would show him her breasts.  
She then preceded to hand him one of her 
fake breasts and put it under his shirt.  In 
doing so, she confused the gender identity of 
the male, heterosexual audience member.  
Joe, another heterosexual male member of 
the party was reluctant to approach the stage 
when called upon.  Samantha Vegas then 
cried out: “I bet you take it like a man but 
scream like a woman.”  At one point in the 
performance, the bachelor’s friends told him 
to “just back down.”  Samantha Vegas then 
questioned why his friends didn’t want him 
to get married: “Do you have a crush on 
him?  I bet you’re so far in the closet that 
you can’t even find the door.”  She then 
picked out one of the party members who 
was hiding in a corner and asked him to 
come and stage and dance to the music.  Sur-
prisingly, when on stage he took off his 
shirt, danced, and thrust his behind at Joe; he 
proceeded to take off his pants and lowered 
his boxers, and even received tips.  Rupp 
and Taylor also observed that drag queens in 
Key West badger straight male audience 
members: “Although the drag queens appre-
ciate their straight audiences, Kylie also 
says, ‘straight people don’t know how much 
gay people love to see us make fun of them.’  
The gay men in the audience enjoy, as one 
said the drag queens ‘get some guy up there 
trying to take his shorts off and things like 
that.  Especially because they always get 
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  the straight boys up there to do 
that.’  Another gay man com-
mented, ‘I mean, I love it when they 
hassle straight men” (Drag Queens, 
191).  A specific ethnographic event 
highlighted for Rupp and Taylor the cen-
trality of fighting male heteronormative 
structures in their performances: “Kylie 
pours right from the bottle into volunteers’ 
mouths, making comparisons to fellatio.  
When the straight man gags, Kylie gives 
him grief: ‘God.  And I bet you beg her to 
suck it until you come.  Maybe now you un-
derstand why she doesn’t want to swallow.’  
In this way, they express anti-male senti-
ments and critique male domination of 
women.  There’s a lot of hostility in the 
show directed at straight men” (Drag 
Queens, 134).  Esther Newton argues that by 
celebrating their “gayness,” drag queens can 
invert the traditional social structure in 
which something that is “so gay” becomes 
something positive, not negative:  
The drag queen symbolizes an open 
declaration, even celebration, of ho-
mosexuality.  The drag queen says 
for his gay audience, who cannot say 
it, ‘I’m gay, I don’t’ care who knows 
it; the straight world be damned.’  
‘Live’ impersonators whom I saw 
working in gay bars almost invaria-
bly ‘put down’ any obvious hetero-
sexuals who happened in, to the great 
satisfaction of the gay audience 
(Mother Camp, 64). 
In fact, drag queens can use their 
skills as comediennes to oppose dominant 
heterosexual systems.  In her fieldwork, 
Newton observed this first-hand: 
The performer was attempting to talk 
to a lady in the audience whom I 
could not see, and referred to her 
date as ‘that fat man you’re with.’  
The man shot back, ‘We’d get along 
a lot better if you’d address me as 
sir.’  This obviously angered Tris 
[drag queen], who retorted, ‘You 
paid a dollar to come in here and 
watch me; you’d better believe I 
wouldn’t pay a dime to watch you 
roast in hell.’  The man wouldn’t 
give up, but repeated his demand, 
where upon Tris replied with elabo-
rate sarcasm in his voice, ‘Sir…?’  
I’m more sir than you’ll ever be, and 
twice the broad you’ll ever pick up.’  
This drew a laugh from the audience 
and silenced the man (Mother Camp, 
66). 
Drag queens also harass heterosexual 
women in many of their performances.  
McNeal notes that one reason for this is that 
drag queens, who are most often gay men, 
are often perceived as vying for the sexual 
attention of masculine men, as are hetero-
sexual women.  He also asserts that: “If the 
drag queen – or male homosexual – manages 
to beat women at the glamour game, then s/
he has at least momentarily outwitted one 
aspect of the cultural model of compulsory 
heterosexuality” (359).  During fieldwork, 
there were several times when drag queens 
would bring heterosexual female audience 
members into their performances. During 
one drag performance in Rochester, I wit-
nessed two separate heterosexual women 
both turning fifty years old on the same 
night.  One of the women was asked by a 
drag queen to “de-boxer” a “straight” young 
man in the bathroom.  She was followed 
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 into the bathroom with this young 
man, where she proceeded to take 
off his pants.  The other woman, 
highly intoxicated, was brought on 
stage where she danced provocatively 
with the drag queen.  On another date two 
heterosexual female audience members 
were harassed by the drag queen emcee who 
asked if this was their first time attending a 
drag performance.  Upon confirmation, the 
drag queen asked the woman why they were 
holding on to their jackets and purses, and if 
they were too afraid [of a queer space] to 
bring them to coat check. 
In general, drag performances con-
fuse the sexualized identities of audience 
members themselves because they often 
combine “sex acts that are outside their cate-
gory of gender and sexual preference” (Drag 
Queens, 136).  For example, in Rupp and 
Taylor’s study,  both lesbians and heterosex-
ual women were sexually attracted to the 
drag queens in their study: “obviously, peo-
ple have different responses to the girls, but 
it is noticeable that women, both straight and 
lesbian, tended to talk about their attraction 
to those…who look most like women in 
drag” (Drag Queens, 193). 
Theatricality of Drag 
The performative aspect of drag 
shows begs for an anthropological analysis; 
indeed, it too is bounded by specific norms 
and rules that determine when and who can 
perform on stage.   From my fieldwork ex-
perience, specific lighting and musical signs 
are used to cue the audience that a show is 
about to begin.  Curtains and doors block off 
the “sacred” space in which the performers 
transform into queens and the “profane” 
space of the bar and dance floor.  McNeal 
describes the sacred space as a 
“circumscribed arena that provides a privi-
leged window into the psychic realities of 
gay men, even though they are – for dynami-
cally defensive reasons – unaware of the 
conflicts and ambivalences expressed in that 
forum” (366).  One must note that the stage 
is only sacred during the drag performances; 
between or before and after acts the stage 
can be used as a space for resting, dancing, 
or occasionally, stripping.  Thus the concep-
tion of a sacred or profane space is not sim-
ply limited to place, but time as well. 
Drag queens inhabit a liminal space 
in their performances; they are, in the words 
of Victor Turner, “betwixt and between.”  
Turner argues: “liminal entities are neither 
here nor there; they are betwixt and between 
the positions assigned and arranged by law, 
custom, convention, and ceremonial.  As 
such, their ambiguous and indeterminate at-
tributes are expressed by a rich variety of 
symbols in the many societies that ritualize 
social and cultural transitions.  Thus, limi-
nality is frequently likened to death, to being 
in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to 
bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an 
eclipse of the sun or moon” (Ritual Process, 
95).  Drag queens are not necessarily 
“male,” nor are they “female.”  Similarly, 
they inhabit a space in which individuals are 
allowed to explore, and challenge the con-
fines of their gender.  This is both a power-
ful place and a dangerous place.  It is within 
this space that they challenge the status quo. 
In her ethnography Mother Camp, 
Esther Newton notes that: “In fact the distin-
guishing characteristic of drag… is its group 
character; all drag, whether formal, informal, 
or professional, as a theatrical structure 
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 style.  There is no drag without an 
actor and his audience, and there is 
no drag without drama (or theatrical-
ity)” (37).   As an artistic endeavor, 
drag performances require queens to 
have a solid command of the stage, and 
by extension, of the audience.  In their arti-
cle, Rupp and Taylor note the affinity that 
many drag queens have to the theater: 
“Being a drag queen also means embracing a 
theatrical identity, and many of them have 
background in theater.  Scabola has been 
involved in theater since elementary school 
and always loved it…Although for Milla 
being a drag queen is more profound, she 
also identifies as a performer.  She, too, was 
in theater groups from a young age.  What 
she loves is being able to use her feelings, to 
evoke the pain and anger and love that audi-
ence members have felt in their own lives…
R.V. had been in professional summer stock 
theater as a boy…Inga has been in the thea-
ter since she was ten, and she, too, loves per-
forming.” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 123).  In 
my interview with Rob (who performs as 
Champagne in Schenectady, New York), he 
made it clear that his experience with the 
theater in high school made him more com-
fortable performing on stage in drag:  “with 
acting in high school and everything we had 
to do classes in watching people and study-
ing their mannerisms.”  Champagne also 
stated that “I was involved in drama in high 
school and I looked at it as an acting role…
Rob was always the shy person where if I 
was Champagne I could say anything I want 
to.”  Experience within the theater allows 
drag queens to get into and develop a per-
sona, a topic that will be examined in the 
following section.  Taylor and Rupp found 
that the majority of the drag queens that they 
studied in Key West also had familiarity 
with the theater: “With their theatrical ex-
perience, the drag queens engage in street 
theater – both in the cabaret and literally on 
the streets - in a way that brings their work 
into alignment with their identity poli-
tics” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 125).  In their 
ethnography, Taylor and Rupp also note that 
many drag queens became familiar with us-
ing makeup through their theater experience 
(Drag Queens, 13).  One student in the 
PRIDE focus group noted that the collectiv-
ity found among a group of drag queens is to 
be expected, as it mirrors the experience of 
many who are a part of a theatrical cast:  
“any performance, any group that you’re 
seeing everyday you’re going to have that 
sisterhood.”  Drag queens tend to be very 
critical of their work.  After all, for most of 
them performing is an economic activity, 
and better performances mean better tips.  
Champagne noted that: “I’ll like have a 
videotape and come back home that night 
and I’ll watch the show…I’ve very critical 
of my own performances” and stated that 
she treated drag “like a career.” 
By attending amateur drag perform-
ances in Rochester, I learned to appreciate 
the artistic and performative talent of profes-
sional drag queens.  Often amateurs are not 
self-confident enough to act as professionals, 
and will occasionally forget to or mess-up 
their lip-synching.  Berkowitz notes that 
“amateur drag queens have limited status 
and are the ones subject to the most overt 
discrimination by their gay peers.  Although 
it was at this amateur bar that we witnessed 
the most interactions between the drag 
queens and mainstream gay men, much of 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
198 
204
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 this contact was characterized by 
disrespect and vulgarity, rather than 
appreciation” (29). 
There are specific theatrical perform-
ances that are common throughout dif-
ferent drag queen performances in the 
United States.  From my fieldwork, I have 
noticed that a common line for drag queens 
to use to start a show is “the more you drink 
the prettier we look.”  Ambrosia Salad, an 
emcee drag queen at a gay bar in Rochester 
called this the “rule number one.”  Cham-
pagne said that she used the same saying: “I 
made the announcement: ‘the more you 
drink the prettier we look’ so of course eve-
ryone is running up to that bar.” 
Forging A New Persona 
Drag queens create persona(s) from 
which to express themselves as female-
bodied.  Professional performers cling to a 
specific persona as a way of making them-
selves identifiable to returning audience 
members.  Indeed, Pandora Boxx argues that 
“If you don’t have some sort of personae, 
then you are not an entertainer.”  The line 
between the drag queen’s everyday self and 
their drag persona, however, often becomes 
blurred.   Roger claims that his persona, 
Champagne, was very different from him.  
Champagne was confident, whereas he was 
shy; Champagne was bold, whereas he was 
calm.  However, with time he has found that 
both sides of his life (Roger and Cham-
pagne) have learned from one another, and 
have in many ways merged into one being: 
“Rob and Champagne have slowly morphed 
or learned from one another.”  Taylor and 
Rupp recorded similar experiences in Key 
West: “This theatrical identity involves, just 
as in traditional theater, taking on a new per-
sona.  ‘Sushi is different than Gary,’ says 
Sushi.  Even Margo, who became a drag 
queen late in life, describes David as ‘an en-
tirely different person’ from Margo, al-
though ‘now they are coming together more 
and more” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 124).  
Drag personas are highly dramatized, and 
are representative of an extremely sexually-
charged female body.  In his analysis of gay 
male culture in New York City just after the 
turn of the 20th Century, Chauncey notes that 
the self-identified “fairies” would speak, 
move, and gesture like prostitutes, whether 
they were selling themselves or not.  Simi-
larly, Taylor and Rupp note that the drag 
queens they observed in Key West like to 
“hassle the straight men.”  “If some of this 
behavior sounds masculine, they view it 
more as ‘acting like hookers,’ deploying the 
kind of sexual aggressiveness of female 
prostitutes” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 124). 
The creation of a persona can have a 
very real psychological effect upon a per-
former.  Champagne noted a shy male friend 
who went out in drag on Halloween (which 
is, of course, a holiday during which all 
Americans play with new roles and perso-
nas), and “as soon as he had the body suit 
on…he was like a totally different person…
you would never know that it was him inside 
that costume.”  Indeed, many drag queens 
note how their performances can be, in 
Champagne’s words: “kind of liberating…
there’s a sense of freedom…you’re still the 
same person but you have a sense of free-
dom.”  Pandora Boxx has also found drag 
performance to be a positive experience: 
“Drag can give you a sense of empower-
ment.  All eyes are on you for the brief mo-
ment on stage and to see that you’ve  
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 affected people, even in a small 
way, can really be truly powerful.”  
Champagne also asserted that her per-
sona has taught her: “not to take any 
crap form anybody…if you can’t love 
yourself, how are you gonna love some-
body else?”   
Drag queen personas, it then seems, 
have the ability to increase self-confidence 
and self-respect in ways perhaps unattain-
able for gay men living in a homophobic 
world.  Analyzing the human mind however, 
is not what anthropological analysis is best-
suited for, and I would leave this interpreta-
tion up to the psychologists, even given their 
problematic relationship with the queer com-
munity in America. 
Globalizing Identities and Drag Culture  
Ted Lewellen, among many other contempo-
rary cultural anthropologists, stresses the 
importance of understanding processes re-
lated to globalization in order to contextual-
ize ethnographic studies.  He states: “The 
subjects of anthropological globalization 
studies are less likely to be communities or 
cultures than translocalities, border zones, 
migrations, diasporas, commodity chains, 
transnational corporations, foreign aid agen-
cies, tourists, refugees, cyberspace, the influ-
ences of television and other communica-
tions media, the international processes of 
science or commercialized art” (57).  One of 
the most important conclusions that can be 
drawn from globalization studies is that indi-
vidual actors are not simply helpless victims 
of Westernization, but interact with techno-
logical processes to achieve personal 
agency.  Drag performers are no different, 
and with the growing importance of video-
sharing websites such as www.youtube.com 
and social networking websites such as 
www.facebook.com and 
www.myspace.com, it is clear that they are 
creating identities that exist as mutable be-
ings in cyberspace. 
As professional drag queens, these 
performers use the internet to advertise their 
personas and exhibit their work.  On the 
video sharing website YouTube, this can be 
easily done by creating a username profile 
that holds videos of a single performer to be 
linked to one another.  Drag performances 
from a specific contest, such as Miss Syra-
cuse or Miss Rochester are also posted 
online and threaded to one another on the 
related videos link.  This allows viewers to 
go from one drag video to another, shifting 
between performers or looking at the varied 
performances of a single performer.  Most of 
the drag queens that I observed in Rochester 
had pages on Myspace, although I was un-
able to find their pages on Facebook.  Cham-
pagne asserts that Myspace is “better in 
some aspects.” The drag queens on Myspace 
featured images of them with audience 
members and fellow queens.  Their pages 
were also quite political, with at least one 
drag queen posting an image used in Barack 
Obama’s presidential campaign that featured 
a rainbow with the words “Obama Pride.”  
Miss Darienne Lake featured her picture 
dressed as Sarah Palin as her profile picture.  
Myspace pages can also be used to legiti-
mize the person who performs in drag as a 
“normal,” educated American.  For example, 
Samantha Vegas notes that she holds a Mas-
ter’s degree in biomedical engineering from 
the University of Massachussetts – Boston, 
and both Ambrosia Salad and Pandora Boxx 
define themselves as a “college graduate.”  
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 Facebook has several groups de-
voted to drag queens, including 
“Drag Queens Rock My Socks Off,” 
through which I met my informant, 
Champagne.  The group, as of May 12, 
2009 has 953 members, with 12 different 
discussion topics, 145 wall posts, 497 
posted pictures, and six posted videos. 
As cyberspace continues to become 
an increasingly important aspect of Ameri-
can culture in particular, drag queens will 
probably continue to use the internet to sell 
their personas and showcase their work.  
Any dynamic, contemporary study of drag 
queens, or any other identity group that tran-
scends political boundaries, is incomplete 
then without an analysis of this performance 
space as well. 
Conclusion 
 The very nature of drag performance 
is one of illusion. Indeed, on some level all 
male-bodied drag queens do attempt to make 
the audience believe that they are biologi-
cally female.  As Goffman asserts: “When 
an individual plays a part he implicitly re-
quests his observers to take seriously the im-
pression that is fostered before them” (28).  
Drag queens do just that.  In addition, drag 
queens tend to portray American women in a 
highly exaggerated manner, in part as a way 
of critiquing the clearly defined gender roles 
in American culture.  It is important to note, 
however, that the performances of drag 
queens are very ambiguous within them-
selves; without soliciting information from 
the performer, one can never be sure if the 
individual is truly male-bodied or female-
bodied.  In fact, the power of the perform-
ance rests upon the fact that the audience 
may not be able to definitively identify the 
biological facts of the performers.  Certainly 
in this new technological age where body 
modification, including gender reassignment 
surgery, is not unknown, it becomes difficult 
to define what exactly is “male-bodied” and 
what is “female-bodied” in the first place.  
These elements of illusion, parody, satire 
and ambiguity, make it very difficult to draw 
any concrete conclusions from my study of 
drag queens in contemporary American cul-
ture.  Yes, drag queens challenge gender 
norms and act as agents of resistance by put-
ting forth a new kind of public transcript; at 
the same time, however, a paradox remains 
in that they often reproduce the same stereo-
typical performances of women that Ameri-
can society has formed.  Gluckman would 
argue that by showing an extreme femininity 
on stage, drag queens reinforce, not subvert, 
the gender dichotomy.  Such arguments do 
not acknowledge the fact that drag queens 
are themselves, a particular category, and 
community, of individuals who create their 
own social norms, and therefore impose 
boundaries on their own members’ perform-
ances.   
What does the future hold for drag 
queens in American culture?  Without 
prompt, Champagne stated: “I don’t think 
that drag queens’ or drag kings’ history are 
quite yet done because their still gonna play 
an important part in the future – what future?  
I don’t know yet but I think that it’s going to 
be part of our society.”  Rupp and Taylor 
share an optimistic perspective by suggest-
ing that “drag can serve as a catalyst for 
changes in values, ideas, and identities in 
twenty-first century American soci-
ety” (Drag Queens, 6).  With new identities 
evolving in the LGBTIQ community such 
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 as “genderqueer” and 
“androgynous,” as well as practices 
such as “genderfucking,” drag per-
formances highlight the importance of 
gender-bending in queer communities 
in American culture.  Overall, however, 
drag queens reveal the hidden truth that all 
Americans, especially those who identify as 
heterosexual and “gender normative,” are 
putting on a gendered performance at all 
times and in all spaces.  Indeed, we are all 
performing in drag. 
Reflections 
As a queer student of anthropology, 
my study of drag queens in American cul-
ture has given me the opportunity to act as a 
native anthropologist and study those within 
my own community.  Unlike queer anthro-
pologists who study in “mainstream” cul-
tures or focus on non-queer topics, such as 
many of those described in the ground-
breaking text Out in the Field (edited by 
Ellen Lewin and William Leap), I easily ma-
neuvered between the queer, or native com-
munity and academic anthropological com-
munity, both of which have their own cul-
ture, and thus their own norms, values, and 
beliefs.   
From this unique vantage point, I 
have attempted to interpret drag queen per-
formances from the objective, analytical per-
spective of an anthropologist and from the 
subjective, emotional perspective of a queer 
American.  The harmony of these two per-
spectives has deepened this experience, and 
if nothing else, calls out for more native an-
thropology to be conducted.  Unfortunately, 
many within the discipline see native anthro-
pologists as “trapped” within their own com-
munity, making them unable to impartially 
analyze it.  I ask, with both membership in a 
community and “objective” training in an-
thropological theory and methodology, who 
is better suited to represent a culture than a 
native anthropologist?  Given the postmod-
ern concern that all anthropologists are sim-
ply bias-filled outside observers, caught in 
their own, often Western, worldview, native 
anthropologists can mediate between these 
two positions and provide new insights into 
the paradox of the emic and the etic views 
within the discipline.   
More broadly, native anthropologists 
call into question many of the central dilem-
mas of the discipline:  Who has the right, or 
the privilege, to speak for a given commu-
nity or describe a given culture?  Who 
should speak for whom?  Whose interpreta-
tion is correct, or at least considered more 
authoritative, the anthropologist’s or the na-
tive’s?  Or more critically, given the fluid 
nature of identities, what makes one a 
“native” and one an “anthropologist” in the 
first place?  My study of drag queens on the 
American landscape reveals, if nothing else, 
that native anthropologists occupy a critical 
and unique space in anthropological inquiry. 
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Introduction: 
Possession of abundant oil reserves 
is often referred to as a “trap” or even a 
“curse” for developing countries.1 
Despite oil being one of the most valuable 
commodities in the world today, very few 
petro-states have been able to successfully 
convert large oil revenues into long-term 
national development.  In studying why so 
many oil-rich countries have been unable to 
bring about much needed economic and so-
cial development through large oil revenues, 
analysts noticed a pattern known as the 
petro-state curse that oil-rich countries are 
prone to follow.  Historically, numerous 
petro-states have fallen into this oil trap, 
including Iran in the 1970s2, Nigeria in the 
1980s, and Venezuela in the late 1980s3 and 
early 1990s.4  Large oil revenues are easily 
mismanaged and often lead to the two main 
components of the oil curse: “Dutch dis-
ease” and the “absorption” problem. 
Dutch disease refers to a common problem 
of resource-rich countries wherein a sudden 
increase in the value of a resource causes 
the value of the exporting country’s cur-
rency to increase in relation to other coun-
tries’ currencies.5Consequently, other sec-
tors become less profitable as non-oil ex-
ports become less competitive in global 
markets and as increased oil revenues bring 
in more imported goods.  The result of 
Dutch disease is, therefore, increased de-
pendency on oil and a significant decrease 
in economic diversification.  The 
“absorption” problem refers to the initial 
effect of an oil boom when large increases 
in revenue give petro-state administrations 
the impression that they can afford to fund 
multiple, capital-intensive policies and pro-
jects, such as large-scale development pro-
jects, military upgrades, social programs, 
and job creation.6 In addition, increased oil 
revenues often fuel corruption amongst gov-
ernment officials.  However, this grandiose 
spending limits the development of non-oil 
sectors of the economy while creating an 
overly large non-tradable sector.  Further-
more, the absorption problem leads petro-
states to spend too much money to fund im-
mediate projects and policies rather than 
saving or investing it in sustainable devel-
opment, such as improving oil infrastruc-
ture, thereby leaving them financially ill-
equipped to adapt to a sudden price drop. 
Unfortunately, under the leadership 
of President Hugo Chávez, it looks as 
though Venezuela is once again headed to-
ward suffering from economic and political 
instability as a result of his heavy spending 
throughout the oil boom of the 2000s.  
Chávez won the 1998 presidential election 
by appealing to Venezuela’s impoverished 
masses and by promising to replace the 
flawed Punto Fijo system with a new gov-
ernment and constitution based upon his 
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 leftist ideology of equality.7 When 
he came into office in 1999, oil 
prices were low as each barrel sold for 
only about $10 per barrel (see Figure 1).  
Furthermore, during his first year as 
president, Venezuela’s economy was 
weak as a result of mismanagement of fi-
nances under the Punto Fijo system.  There-
fore, Chávez maintained good relations with 
the United States and other western powers 
to encourage investment in Venezuelan oil 
and continue the flow of foreign money into 
the economy. 
 However, oil prices soon began to 
rise and Chávez used that opportunity to 
consolidate control over Venezuela’s na-
tional oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela 
Sociedad Anónima (PdVSA), and to push 
foreign investors out so that the government 
could collect more revenues from the Vene-
zuelan oil industry.  Chávez took several 
steps toward taking over PdVSA by replac-
ing company employees with individuals 
who were loyal to him, most notably in 2002 
when he fired the then-president of PdVSA 
and attempted to change the company’s 
board of directors.8   His actions resulted in 
the temporary overthrow of Chávez in an 
April 2002 coup d’état attempt, as well as a 
strike at PdVSA, beginning in 2002 and end-
ing in 2003, which led to a decrease in 
Venezuela’s oil output that has yet to be re-
stored.9  However, Chávez used this oppor-
tunity to permanently install his supporters 
into essential PdVSA positions, thus con-
solidating his administration’s control over 
the company. 
With complete control over PdVSA, 
Chávez has also gained control over its reve-
nues, which he has used to fund an array of 
costly, large-scale policies and projects.  
Throughout the recent oil boom, he has com-
mitted billions of dollars, not only to domes-
tic development, but also to a series of ex-
pensive foreign policy initiatives throughout 
Latin America.  Analysis of Chávez’s re-
gional foreign policy reveals that it is waste-
ful in that these expensive initiatives fail to 
achieve his goals.  However, with unusually 
large oil revenues coming into Venezuela 
throughout this oil boom, Chávez was able 
to continue to fund his policies despite inef-
ficiencies.  Now that oil prices have de-
creased dramatically and suddenly, the flaws 
and the wasteful nature of Chávez’s foreign 
policy are likely to be exposed, once again 
leaving Venezuela susceptible to the petro-
state curse.  As a current example of a petro-
state that spent heavily throughout an oil 
boom and must now adjust to the subsequent 
oil bust, Venezuela under the leadership of 
Chávez serves as an interesting case study to 
test the effects of the petro-state curse and to 
predict what can be done to prevent eco-
nomic collapse in Venezuela. 
This paper will analyze Chávez’s use 
of Venezuelan oil revenues to fund his for-
eign policy in Latin America and the effects 
that the end of the oil boom is likely to have 
on his efforts.  The first section of the paper 
will discuss Chávez’s various initiatives in 
Latin America and analyze their success in 
accomplishing his main goals of establishing 
Venezuela as a strong regional power and 
diminishing western influence in the region.  
The next section will examine the implica-
tions that Chávez’s foreign policy has had in 
Latin America as his initiatives have contrib-
uted to both political and economic instabil-
ity in the region.  The third section of the 
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 paper relates Chávez’s expensive 
foreign policy to the theory of the 
oil curse in order to determine 
whether his heavy spending is likely to 
lead Venezuela’s economy to fall vic-
tim to “Dutch disease” and the 
“absorption” problem or whether Chávez 
will be able to overcome these symptoms 
and navigate his country through the oil 
bust.  I predict that due to Chávez’s focus on 
funding costly agreements and projects 
rather than save high percentages of Vene-
zuelan oil revenues, Venezuela will only be 
able to avoid economic collapse for a short 
period of time unless oil prices rebound, 
thereby forcing Chávez to alter and elimi-
nate many of his regional policies and pro-
grams.  Finally, the conclusion builds upon 
the analysis of Chávez’s Latin American for-
eign policy to extract lessons from Chávez’s 
decisions and to establish general guidelines 
that should be kept in mind by petro-state 
leaders as they decide how to allocate oil 
revenues, particularly during oil booms 
when leaders are prone to a misleading sense 
of economic security. 
 
Foreign Policy in Latin America: 
 Chávez’s foreign policy in Latin 
America can best be described as a counter-
dependent foreign policy.  This type of for-
eign policy is exercised by leaders, like 
Chávez, who are fed up with their country’s 
dependence on other countries and, thus, 
want to minimize that dependence.10 To 
achieve his foreign policy goals, Chávez has 
used a combination of hard power, most of-
ten through the use of economic means to 
strongly influence the decisions of foreign 
governments, as well as soft power by pro-
moting his Bolivarian ideology throughout 
Latin America in order to attract support.11 
Using these tools, Venezuelan foreign policy 
throughout Chávez’s presidency has focused 
largely on providing development assistance 
and on fostering a sense of solidarity 
throughout the countries of South America, 
Central America, and the Caribbean.  
Chávez has developed numerous bilateral 
and multistate initiatives in Latin America 
aimed toward goals such as economic devel-
opment and energy security.  In recent years, 
promising billions of dollars in aid each 
year, Venezuela has surpassed the United 
States in the amount of direct aid provided 
throughout Latin America.12  By spending 
large amounts on development efforts 
throughout Latin America and establishing 
trade agreements on preferential terms with 
countries in the region, Chávez seeks to ful-
fill two main goals: to strengthen Vene-
zuela’s position in Latin America through 
the creation of alliances in the region and to 
minimize Latin American dependence on the 
West. 
Strengthening Venezuela’s Position in Latin 
America: 
One of Chávez’s major goals is to establish 
Venezuela as an influential regional power 
in Latin America.  Chávez seeks to spear-
head the spread of “twenty-first century so-
cialism” that he feels is an improved, more 
sustainable leftist agenda that will encourage 
equality in the region, though it is, thus far, 
an ill-defined concept.13  As such, in order to 
gain crucial support for his radical policies 
and ambitions in the region, Chávez has 
dedicated large portions of Venezuelan oil 
revenues to his efforts to form alliances with 
neighboring countries in Latin America.  In 
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 addition to trying to gain the sup-
port of Latin American leaders, he 
tries to win over the support of Latin 
Americans through the use of public 
diplomacy, which can be defined as “a 
government’s diplomatic efforts that tar-
get citizens, the press, and other constituen-
cies in other countries rather than their gov-
ernments.”14 His economic and oil incen-
tives have earned him some support in Latin 
America for his regional ambitions, however 
he has only had limited success in achieving 
his goal of broadening his influence in Latin 
America.   
Chávez has used oil and its revenues 
to strengthen important alliances in the re-
gion, most notably with former Cuban Presi-
dent Fidel Castro and Bolivian President 
Evo Morales.  Cuba has arguably been 
Venezuela’s most important ally throughout 
Chávez’s presidency.  According to Max 
Azicri, the strong relationship that Chávez 
has cultivated between Venezuela and Cuba 
operates on three levels: Chávez and Castro 
have established a personal friendship, they 
have arranged for the exchange of goods and 
services, and they have joined together in the 
pursuit of common goals for Latin America 
in the name of the Bolivarian Revolution.15  
The personal friendship between the two 
leaders is very evident as it is often high-
lighted in the media.  However, it is the lat-
ter two exchanges that are of great interest to 
analysis of Chávez’s regional foreign policy. 
 First of all, each country is able to 
fill a void for the other, as Cuba needs to 
import about 100,000 barrels of oil daily and 
Venezuela requires individuals with special-
ized skills and services to fulfill Chávez’s 
plans for domestic social growth, which in-
clude educating Venezuela’s population and 
providing medical care to impoverished ar-
eas of the country.16 Therefore, in many 
ways, Venezuela receives immediate benefit 
through the Cuban-Venezuelan alliance that 
has been cultivated under Chávez.  Since 
Chávez came into power, there have been 
numerous exchanges between Venezuela 
and Cuba, beginning with the Cuban-
Venezuelan Petroleum Pact signed on Octo-
ber 30, 2000 stating that Venezuela would 
provide Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil 
daily on preferential terms, and in turn re-
ceive services from Cuban doctors, sports 
trainers, and experts in a range of indus-
tries.17 The agreement also allowed Vene-
zuelans to travel to Cuba to receive training 
to become doctors or to receive free medical 
treatment.  The Barrio Adentro mission, a 
social program initiated by Chávez in April 
2003, builds upon this exchange of Cuban 
health professionals and medical supplies by 
extending free health care services to about 
seventeen million Venezuelans, many of 
whom had never received medical care prior 
to this program.18 By 2005, over twenty 
thousand Cuban doctors and health experts 
had relocated to Venezuela where they pro-
vided basic and even specialized health care 
to poor populations in needy neighbor-
hoods.19  In addition to medical exchanges, 
Venezuela and Cuba have reached a number 
of agreements throughout Chávez’s presi-
dency, including forty-nine agreements in 
2005 alone ranging from lowering tariffs to 
“the creation or improvement of rail infra-
structure in both countries.”20 
 In addition to the immediate benefit 
derived from close ties between Venezuela 
and Cuba, Chávez connects with Castro on 
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 an ideological level.  According to 
Michael J. Bustamante and Julia E. 
Sweig of the Council on Foreign Re-
lations, Castro has served as a role 
model and a mentor to Chávez, as the 
two share similar socialist and anti-
hegemonic views.  On one hand, due to his 
ability to hold onto power despite Cold War 
pressures, numerous United States-backed 
assassination attempts, and years of eco-
nomic sanctions, Castro is in many ways 
symbolic of defiance against the United 
States, and Chávez is certainly well-aware 
that his alliance with Cuba contributes to 
unease amongst United States policymak-
ers.21 On the other hand, Castro, like Chávez, 
has focused much of Cuba’s foreign policy 
on public diplomacy, most notably by send-
ing Cuban doctors and health professionals 
to developing nations around the globe.  
Bustamante and Sweig claim that Castro has 
better mastered the ability to gain interna-
tional legitimacy through actions of public 
diplomacy.22          
If Bustamante and Sweig’s claim 
were accurate, then having the support of 
Castro could help Chávez gain the support 
and trust of some countries where he might 
otherwise have difficulties.  However, 
Chávez’s and Castro’s public diplomacy 
campaigns have not succeeded in winning 
over public support in Latin America.  Lati-
nobarómetro polls, which were conducted 
every year between 2005 and 2008, show 
that both Castro and Chávez are among the 
least popular world leaders as evaluated by 
pollsters in eighteen Latin American coun-
tries and Castro is, in fact, regarded more 
negatively than his Venezuelan counterpart 
(See Table 1).  Table 1 shows that not only 
were Castro and Chávez ranked similar to 
American President George W. Bush, as the 
three leaders comprise the bottom three 
world leaders every year except for 2008, 
but support for both Castro and Chávez has 
declined since Latinobarómetro began ask-
ing pollsters to evaluate a list of world lead-
ers.  Therefore, although Venezuela’s alli-
ance with Cuba may give Chávez legitimacy 
in some leftist countries, it is not helping 
him gain legitimacy and may even be hurt-
ing his image in Latin America. 
Chávez has also established close ties with 
Bolivia’s current president, Evo Morales.  
Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous presi-
dent, is a leftist leader who also holds anti-
neoliberal and anti-United States views quite 
similar to those of Chávez.  During a visit 
Morales paid to Venezuela in 2006, Chávez 
“offered $30 million in assistance for social 
programs and pledged to supply Bolivia 
with 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel in ex-
change for agricultural products.” 23 Further-
more, Chávez promised to contribute $1.5 
million to a Bolivian social project that will 
broadcast a literacy program to rural areas 
via the radio, thereby promoting literacy 
among Bolivia’s poor indigenous popula-
tion.24 Morales has demonstrated his willing-
ness to stand by Chávez on many of his ac-
tions.  For example, in 2006, Morales joined 
the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
(ALBA), an agreement which will be dis-
cussed later, which was originally signed by 
Chávez and Castro in December 2004.25 The 
three leaders began calling their pact the 
“Axis of Good.”26 
 However, Bolivia may also be 
viewed as one example of how counterpro-
ductive Chávez’s anti-Western policy can 
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 be.  Bolivia relies much more on 
foreign aid than Venezuela does, 
despite its large reserves of valuable 
natural gas.  Morales’ actions have con-
sequently been somewhat more re-
served than Chávez’s when it comes to 
attacking the United States.  Yet, in recent 
years, Morales has appeared to grow more 
confident in his alliance with Chávez and his 
commitment to extend aid and agreements to 
Bolivia.  For example, in 2006, Colombia 
was considering a free trade agreement with 
the United States that would have affected 
its importation of Bolivian soy.  Morales 
assured Bolivian soy producers that Vene-
zuela would purchase their soy, despite the 
fact that the Venezuelan market probably 
lacked the economic strength to import as 
much soy as Colombia did.27  With this in-
creased confidence, Morales has taken more 
of Chávez’s advice and adhered to his pro-
posed policies, for example, by nationalizing 
the hydrocarbon industry in Bolivia.  This 
decision alienated one of Bolivia’s most im-
portant trade partners, Brazil, which im-
ported about $700 million worth of Bolivian 
products at the time.28 It also impeded for-
eign investment which could have made Bo-
livia’s hydrocarbon industry more produc-
tive and more profitable.  Therefore, in the 
case of Bolivian nationalization of the hy-
drocarbon industry, Chávez’s advice hurt 
Bolivia which is rich in resources like natu-
ral gas, yet still lacks the means to maximize 
its economic return for these resources with-
out foreign investment. 
 Chávez can usually count on support 
from his close “Axis of Good” allies who 
have proven useful to an extent.  For exam-
ple, Morales stood alongside Chávez in 
threatening to withdraw from the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN) if any of the 
other three Petroandina countries signed a 
free trade agreement with the United States. 
29 Yet the support of Chávez’s allies is often 
not enough to persuade neighboring coun-
tries to accept his proposed policies.  Despite 
their threat, all three of the countries contin-
ued free trade talks with the United States 
with both Peru and Colombia signing free 
trade agreements with the United States in 
2006.30 Chávez did follow through with his 
threat by withdrawing from CAN, however 
Bolivia, which is in a less secure financial 
position than Venezuela, remains a member 
of the organization.31 
 In 2006, Rafael Correa, a leftist who 
received his Ph. D in Economics in the 
United States, was elected president of Ec-
uador.  In many ways, his win represented a 
win for Chávez as well.  When Correa won 
the election, Chávez sent him a replica of 
Simon Bolívar’s sword as a sign of solidar-
ity and friendship.  Chávez also attended 
Correa’s swearing-in ceremony in January 
2007 where the new Ecuadorian president 
stated that his government was Bolivarian 
and he announced his support for Chávez’s 
notion of “twenty-first century socialism.”32  
Correa has taken several actions that reflect 
some of Chávez’s moves when he came into 
office.  For example, similar to Chávez who 
passed a referendum to approve his Boli-
varian Constitution in Venezuela, Correa 
passed a referendum shortly after being 
sworn in as president that proposed the crea-
tion of a national assembly to draft a new 
constitution in Ecuador.33 Furthermore, he 
opted not to renew an agreement with the 
United States that grants its forces the 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
210 
216
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
 to use Ecuador’s Manta air base in 
the American war on drugs, similar 
to Chávez who denied the United 
States use of Venezuelan territory for 
the same war.34  The two leaders have 
had a friendly relationship and they have 
seen eye to eye with each other on many 
issues.  Since Correa came to power, Vene-
zuela and Ecuador even negotiated a joint 
agreement to build a large refinery in Ecua-
dor.35  
 However, Correa is not as close an 
ally to Chávez as Cuba and Bolivia are as he 
has been much less radical in his actions.  
For example, although he set up an “excess 
profit tax” for foreign oil companies in Ec-
uador, he does not intend to nationalize the 
Ecuadorian oil industry as Chávez and Bo-
livia did with their hydrocarbon industries.36  
Furthermore, as will be discussed later, 
Chávez put Correa in an uncomfortable 
situation in 2008 after Colombia sent mili-
tary troops to attack a FARC camp on Ecua-
dorian territory.  In response to the action, 
Chávez sent Venezuelan troops to the border 
of Colombia, however his inflated response 
to the event that did not even occur in Vene-
zuela placed pressure on Correa to have a 
large response since the incursion had been 
onto his country’s territory.  As such, Correa 
also ordered Ecuadorian troops to go to the 
border of Colombia before all of the coun-
tries settled the dispute diplomatically.37      
Though he supports some of Chávez’s poli-
cies and ideas, Correa attempts to balance 
Ecuador’s relations with both Venezuela and 
the United States as many Latin American 
leaders choose to do. 
 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
of Brazil has also cooperated with Vene-
zuela quite a bit under Chávez.  When Lula 
won the 2002 presidential election in Brazil, 
Chávez hoped that the new president would 
work with him to resist neoliberalism in 
Latin America.  Chávez publicly expressed 
his support for Lula, extending his congratu-
lations as well as a replica of Simón 
Bolívar’s sword.38 Shortly after Lula’s vic-
tory in Brazil, Chávez requested that Lula 
send oil experts to Venezuela to assist in re-
suming oil production during the 2003 lock-
out of PdVSA, a request which Lula agreed 
to.  Lula’s decision to send Petrobrás spe-
cialists to Venezuela reflects not only Bra-
zil’s dependence at the time on Venezuelan 
oil imports to fulfill its national energy 
needs, but also Lula’s interest in Chávez’s 
idea of “regional energy self-sufficiency.”39 
Since then, in addition to building and im-
proving refineries together, the two countries 
have explored for oil near the coast of Vene-
zuela.  Chávez has offered about $273 mil-
lion toward funding the paving of a major 
highway and building a sports complex and 
civic center in Brazil.40     
 Despite Lula’s cooperation on sev-
eral issues and projects, the Brazilian presi-
dent has not stood unequivocally alongside 
Chávez.  For example, in 2004 after Haitian 
President Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted 
from office, Chávez refused to officially rec-
ognize the newly-instated regime, whereas 
Lula sent troops to Haiti to protect the new 
administration.41Lula’s decision to recognize 
and protect the new government in Port-au-
Prince reflects Brazil’s desire to maintain 
good relations with the United States, which 
is a known opponent of Aristide and is often 
accused of involvement in the Haitian coup 
d’état.  Furthermore, the major discovery of 
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 the Tupi oil field in Brazil in 2007 
may affect relations between Lula 
and Chávez.  The oil field is estimated 
to carry between five billion and eight 
billion barrels of oil which is enough to 
render Brazil self-sufficient in terms of 
energy.  Furthermore, Petrobrás believes it 
has discovered three more deep-water wells 
which, if proven to possess significant 
amounts of oil, could make Petrobrás an “oil 
giant,” comparable to PdVSA.42  These oil 
discoveries decrease Brazil’s dependence on 
Venezuela compared to 2003 when Vene-
zuelan oil imports were filling the gap in 
Brazilian energy needs.  As such, Lula has 
more autonomy to challenge Chávez’s poli-
cies and actions. 
The Caribbean is of particular inter-
est to Chávez in his quest for increased re-
gional influence as the countries that com-
prise the region carry particular weight in 
the Organization of American States (OAS).  
A 2007 article analyzing Venezuelan policy 
in the Caribbean notes the strategic impor-
tance of the region to Chávez: 
[Chávez] recognizes that Cari-
com countries represent almost half of 
the 34 votes in the OAS, where de-
bates on the hemispheric political 
situation are played out; and they are a 
solid bloc in the Latin American and 
Caribbean group at the UN.  If he 
could get them on his side, his poli-
cies could influence significantly the 
discourse of these bodies.43 
 
Indeed, when Chávez was seeking to 
win a United Nations Security Council seat 
for Venezuela in 2006, the Caricom nations, 
which comprise the majority of Petrocaribe 
(an agreement which will be discussed 
later), publicly lent their support to Vene-
zuela.44 On some levels, then, Chávez’s for-
eign policy has been successful in gaining 
support for his ambitions as demonstrated by 
his ability to gain the support of the Carib-
bean in his bid for a Security Council seat.  
However, Venezuela did not win the seat, 
which suggests that even where Chávez’s 
foreign policy decisions earn him some sup-
port, he is still unable to win over the sup-
port of crucial majorities to achieve many of 
his ambitions. 
Chávez seeks to acquire allies and 
rally support throughout Latin America in 
order to further his leftist goals and policies 
in the region.  Chávez is in pursuit of allies 
who share his ideologies and will implement 
policies similar to his, along with new trade 
partners to diversify Venezuelan markets.  
He has also mentioned the possibility of 
military alliances within Latin America.  To 
attract allies, Chávez has exploited Vene-
zuela’s large supply of oil and high revenues 
from the recent oil boom to carry out an ex-
tensive and very costly foreign policy that 
focuses on providing oil, money, and fund-
ing for development projects in neighboring 
countries.  Through his foreign policy, he 
has been able to earn conditional support 
from some countries and leaders in Latin 
America, however analysis shows that his 
efforts have been counterproductive in some 
countries in the region. 
 Chávez has also attempted to gain 
regional allies by publicly supporting politi-
cal candidates in national elections in 
neighboring countries.  Throughout 
Chávez’s presidency, there have been many 
accusations of him funding foreign  
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 elections.  For example, he has 
been accused of financially backing 
Morales when he was a candidate in 
the 2002 Bolivian presidential elec-
tion.45 Chávez actively supported Sand-
inista candidate Daniel Ortega in the 
Nicaraguan presidential election of 2006 by 
providing subsidized oil to Sandinista politi-
cians to distribute throughout Nicaragua to 
help Ortega gain support.46  Whether or not 
Chávez’s oil shipments had an effect on the 
election outcome, Ortega, who Chávez so 
clearly supported, won the presidential elec-
tion and took office in 2007. 
 Yet Chávez’s efforts have not always 
been successful in influencing foreign elec-
tions in his favor.  In the 2006 Peruvian 
election, for example, his fervent support for 
leftist candidate Ollanta Humala, who many 
expected to win the election based on polls 
taken before the election, proved to be coun-
terproductive.47  A win for Humala would 
have been a key victory for Chávez because 
it would have given Venezuela strong influ-
ence in the Andean region.  Though he did 
not fulfill his rhetoric through action, 
Chávez went so far as to threaten to end 
Venezuela’s diplomatic ties with Peru if 
Alan Garcia became president.  Yet this 
threat did not stop the Peruvian population 
from electing Garcia as their new presi-
dent.48   In fact, many argue that support for 
Humala declined as a result of Chávez’s 
support, making Humala’s defeat a loss for 
Chávez as well.49 Therefore, it is clear that 
Chávez’s support for political candidates 
abroad has met with only limited success. 
Decreasing Dependence on the West: 
With hopes of challenging the current hege-
monic global structure, Chávez’s foreign 
policy throughout Latin America has fo-
cused largely on aid and agreements that are 
meant to minimize countries’ dependence on 
the West and on western-based international 
financial institutions (IFI).  Venezuela man-
aged to pay off its IFI debts five years early, 
completing the last of its debt payments to 
the World Bank in April 2007 and having 
already paid off its debts to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 50 However, Latin 
America is not yet free from debt to western-
based IFIs as these institutions are still pro-
viding loans to countries in South America, 
Central America, and the Caribbean (see 
Figure 2).  Furthermore, in light of the 
global financial crisis, IFI loans taken out by 
Latin American countries increased, particu-
larly loans from western-based institutions 
like the World Bank, and IFI lending to the 
region is expected to continue to increase 
(see Figure 2).51  
In addition to debt, these countries 
often import resources and goods that they 
could potentially produce themselves given 
the vast natural resources that are found 
throughout Latin America.  This is largely 
because agricultural subsidies in western 
countries make western imports cheaper 
than domestic products.  As imports become 
cheaper than domestic products, a cycle is 
created that hurts Latin America: the devel-
opment of potential productive sectors is 
limited in Latin American countries because 
imports outcompete domestic products, 
causing dependence on the West.  However, 
if the price of imports increases, the sectors 
that could have produced the product are 
less equipped to fulfill the country’s needs, 
thereby forcing them to continue importing 
goods and perpetuating western  
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 dependence.  Noting these two 
trends, one of the major goals 
Chávez seeks to address through his 
foreign policy in the region is to dimin-
ish dependence on the West and to 
make Latin America as self-sufficient as 
possible. 
 One of the ways Chávez has used 
increased oil revenues is by providing coun-
tries with the economic means to pay off 
part of their IFI debts.  Although estimates 
vary as to the exact amount Chávez has 
spent offering loans to and purchasing bonds 
from Latin American countries to permit 
them to settle their IFI debts, he has doubt-
lessly spent billions of dollars on these ef-
forts.  According to Terry Gibbs, Venezuela 
extended loans of $300 million to Ecuador 
and $500 million to Argentina to be used to 
pay back part of their IFI loans.52     In a 
more recent article, Michael Dodson and 
Manochehr Dorraj state that Chávez bought 
$3.5 billion worth of bonds that permitted 
Argentina to finish payments on its debt to 
the IMF.53  Amongst other countries to 
which Chávez has offered loans to pay back 
IFI debts is his close ally, Bolivia, to which 
he extended an offer of $1.5 billion.54 Offer-
ing this much money to pay these high IFI 
debts is extremely costly, however Chávez’s 
efforts have significantly limited the IMF’s 
presence in Latin America.  In February 
2007, Bloomberg reported that “IMF lending 
in the area has fallen to $50 million, or less 
than 1 percent of its global portfolio, com-
pared with 80 percent in 2005.”55In this way, 
Chávez’s policy has succeeded in diminish-
ing Latin American dependence on western-
based IFIs and, consequently, in limiting the 
ability of IFIs to exert influence over gov-
ernment policies in the region.  However, his 
policy does not eliminate debt.  By offering 
loans to Latin American countries to pay off 
their IFI debts essentially, Chávez is merely 
redirecting their indebtedness from multi-
state IFIs to one nation, Venezuela.  This 
redirection of debt may create new, and risk-
ier, dependence for impoverished Latin 
American countries, an issue which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
One of the major goals that Chávez 
stresses in his Bolivarian Revolution is the 
solidarity of Latin America in order to pro-
mote self-sufficiency in the region and to 
challenge Western dominance.  Chávez has 
come up with numerous ideas for integrating 
Latin America economically.  For example, 
one ambitious suggestion of Chávez’s is to 
create a Bank of the South that could pro-
vide loans to Latin American countries who 
need money rather than taking out a loan 
with the IMF and being forced to abide by 
its conditions.56 This proposal has yet to 
come to fruition, however Chávez has made 
some steps toward regional integration and 
self-sufficiency. 
 The Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA) was proposed by Chávez 
as an alternative to neoliberalism that is 
based, instead, upon regional integration and 
unity.  Chávez feels that the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), which was heavily 
encouraged by the Bush administration, 
would continue to serve the interests of mul-
tinational corporations, while doing little to 
promote national development and growth in 
the poorer countries of the hemisphere.57  
ALBA, on the other hand, is a multistate 
agreement intended to integrate Latin Amer-
ica by establishing a Compensatory Fund 
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 that will be used to develop the 
poorer nations of the region in order 
to lessen economic disparity and 
strengthen the region.58  According to 
Chávez, this agreement encourages 
Latin American countries to “…integrate 
with an eye toward solving the problems 
we have in common… Together we can do 
so much more than anyone can do alone.”59  
ALBA, thus, focuses on region-wide issues 
such as combating poverty and marginaliza-
tion, endogenous development, and ending 
dependence on western-based institutions.60   
However, with one of the key premises of 
the proposal being a redistribution of wealth 
to the more impoverished countries of Latin 
America, it is of little surprise that the only 
countries that have shown enthusiastic sup-
port for the proposal are Chávez’s close al-
lies and poor, leftist countries, most notably 
Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.61   Although 
very few countries have signed onto ALBA 
thus far, Chávez bases much of Venezuela’s 
foreign policy on ALBA principles and he 
hopes that others will join his cause. 
 With large oil and gas reserves in 
Venezuela and several other Latin American 
countries possessing natural energy re-
sources, Chávez has seen more success in 
sparking cooperation between states through 
the promotion of regional energy integration.  
Between 2004 and 2005, Chávez signed 
three regional oil cooperation agreements: 
Petrosur, Petrocaribe, and Petroandina.  The 
most important of these agreements is Petro-
caribe, which was signed in June 2005 by 
fourteen Caribbean countries, including 
Cuba.62  With most of the countries in the 
Caribbean lacking oil reserves of their own, 
Chávez has committed Venezuela to provide 
the region with 198,000 barrels of oil 
daily.63 Petrocaribe aims to provide Carib-
bean countries with natural energy resources 
so that leaders can pursue development poli-
cies geared toward the needs of their popula-
tion.  Petrocaribe countries do not receive 
subsidized oil, but rather the agreement of-
fers them a type of loan wherein countries 
receiving oil shipments must pay sixty per-
cent of the bill within three months.  Then 
the remaining cost is to be paid over a period 
of approximately twenty years at an interest 
rate of one percent, or two percent if the 
price of oil falls below $50 per barrel.64  Oil 
shipments received through Petrocaribe can 
be exchanged for goods and services if 
countries are unable to pay with money.65   
Unlike the other two regional agreements, 
Petrocaribe set up a collection of savings 
meant to finance development programs and 
projects in the Petrocaribe states, known as 
the ALBA Caribe Fund.  According to the 
PdVSA website, Venezuela has donated 
$100 million to the ALBA Caribe Fund and 
nine Petrocaribe countries have already been 
able to draw from the fund to finance devel-
opment projects.66  Although PdVSA may 
be exaggerating the success of the ALBA 
Caribe Fund, there is no doubt that Petro-
caribe is the most elaborate and successful 
energy integration agreement that Chávez 
has established. 
 Petrosur and Petroandina are cur-
rently less developed than Petrocaribe and 
they have taken little meaningful action.  
Petrosur, developed in late 2004, was the 
first regional oil integration agreement to be 
signed in Latin America and it was signed 
by Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Uru-
guay.67   The Petroandina agreement was 
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 signed in July 2005 by Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Vene-
zuela. 68  The goal of these agree-
ments is to ensure that the signatories 
meet their energy needs by minimizing 
extra costs, extending preferential financ-
ing options, and permitting countries to pay 
for oil shipments through goods and ser-
vices.69 Thus far, the result of Petrosur and 
Petroandina has mostly been the discussion 
of potential projects rather than taking the 
necessary action to begin them.  For exam-
ple, through Petroandina, Ecuador is work-
ing on negotiations to send some of its crude 
oil to be refined in Venezuela, an arrange-
ment that could save the country part of the 
$1 billion it spends annually on importing 
fuel, but the project has yet to begin.70   
 Chávez hopes that one day these 
three regional energy cooperation agree-
ments will merge into one large entity 
known as PetroAmérica.  Firstly, Chávez 
envisions that this agreement will include 
the distribution of energy as the three re-
gional agreements already aim to achieve.  
Secondly, he hopes that PetroAmérica will 
facilitate large-scale infrastructure projects 
such as a gas pipeline that would run more 
than half the length of South America from 
Venezuela’s northern coast to Argentina.71 
Finally, Chávez hopes that this integration 
agreement will make Latin America self-
sufficient with more resources than just en-
ergy.  For example, he wants Venezuela and 
Colombia to produce wood pulp regionally 
to make paper rather than being forced to 
spend the extra money to import wood pulp 
from abroad.72 The implementation of this 
agreement would help to shift the global 
structure away from the current hegemonic 
global structure, making Latin America a 
largely self-sufficient region and, conse-
quently, limiting the amount of influence 
western powers could exert over regional 
affairs.  However, with the oil boom over 
and global recession setting in, it is doubtful 
that Chávez will have the resources to set up 
and gain support for PetroAmérica in the 
near future. 
Even if Chávez were able to success-
fully set up PetroAmerica, it is unlikely that 
the agreement would be able to succeed in 
the long-term.  First of all, the construction 
of pipelines and other equipment would be 
extremely expensive just to launch this con-
tinent-wide energy integration.  It could very 
quickly drain Latin American resources and 
drive countries in the region further into 
debt.  Furthermore, leaving oil fields open to 
foreign investment would be wiser than es-
tablishing government control over all of 
Latin America’s hydrocarbons, as experi-
enced foreign oil companies have proven to 
be most able to keep oil production at its 
maximum level.  After Chávez consolidated 
government control of PdVSA following the 
2003 strike, oil production in Venezuela has 
decreased significantly from about 3.5 mil-
lion barrels per day in 1997 to about 2.7 mil-
lion barrels in 2007 (see Figure 3).  Finally, 
trying to become a self-sufficient continent 
would severely limit the system’s long-term 
sustainability.  International trade allows 
countries to specialize in the production of 
certain products and then trade with other 
countries to obtain any other goods that they 
require.  Limiting trade to Latin America 
would decrease efficiency in the region since 
other countries may be able to produce 
goods at a lower cost, making products 
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 cheaper for Latin American con-
sumers.  It would also throw off the 
market balance, as regional demand is 
likely to be limited for a given product, 
but internationally there will probably 
be large, profitable markets with high de-
mand. 
Effectiveness of Chávez’s Policies in Achiev-
ing his Goals: 
Although counterdependent foreign 
policies may meet with success in some in-
stances, they often fail to achieve their goals 
as these strategies often anger more power-
ful states and, consequently, alienate the 
country.73    Furthermore, much of Chávez’s 
foreign policy is based on economic incen-
tives which sometimes produce a desired 
outcome, however they are a “less precise 
instrument” for state leaders.74  In other 
words, the recipient of economic incentives 
does not always take the action that the pro-
vider of economic incentives wants them to 
take.  As such, analysis of Chávez’s policies 
reveals that his regional foreign policy has 
been unsuccessful in reaching his goals of 
establishing Venezuela as a major regional 
power and minimizing Latin Americaan de-
pendence on the West.   
First of all, he has been unsuccessful 
in his attempt to strengthen Venezuela’s po-
sition in Latin America, largely due to his 
inability to establish strong alliances in the 
region.75   His strong relationship with Cuba 
brings some direct benefit to Venezuelans in 
the form of quality medical care, but this 
exchange of medical services for oil is very 
costly and arguably brings more benefit to 
Cuba than to Venezuela.  Most other Latin 
American leaders, such as Lula, are pursuing 
a delicate balance between relations with 
Venezuela and with the United States.  Even 
countries with left-wing leaders such as Bo-
livia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua lack the finan-
cial strength to stand unfalteringly with 
Chávez in all of his policies. Some of 
Chávez’s attempts to gain allies in the region 
have outright backfired as in the case of Hu-
mala’s defeat in the Peruvian election.  As 
such, Chávez’s attempts to build alliances 
have brought him only conditional support 
as most Latin American leaders prefer to 
weigh the benefits and the risks of support-
ing Chávez. 
This lack of reliable support has 
largely inhibited Chávez from spreading his 
policies and furthering his goal of making 
Venezuela a major regional power.  Al-
though he has won the support of some 
countries on certain issues, he has still had 
trouble gaining enough support to achieve 
his many ambitions, such as winning a 
United Nations Security Council seat.  Fur-
thermore, Chávez is not well-received by 
Latin Americans who do not hold positions 
of power as demonstrated by the fact that he 
was ranked one of the worst world leaders 
according to a Latinobarómetro poll taken in 
2008 (see Table 1).  There is little doubt that 
Chávez’s involvement in the domestic af-
fairs of other countries is a major factor in 
this aversion to Chávez.  Failing to receive 
widespread support from both Latin Ameri-
can government officials and Latin Ameri-
cans, many of Chávez’s policies have been 
ineffective or counterproductive.  Therefore, 
by involving himself in other countries’ af-
fairs and by offering countries incentives, 
Chávez has failed to make his country a re-
spected and influential power in Latin Amer-
ica. 
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 Furthermore, he has not succeeded 
in ending Latin American depend-
ence on the West.  Although he may 
have minimized some individual coun-
tries’ debts to western-based IFIs, he 
has not eliminated Latin America’s de-
pendence on the West.  The West, particu-
larly the United States, maintains a strong 
presence in the region and even though the 
country is not popular amongst Latin Ameri-
cans (see Table 1), they are forced to accept 
their need for Western-based assistance pro-
grams.  As such, most countries in the re-
gion are not even interested in ending rela-
tions with the United States.  In addition, 
two of the three regional energy agreements 
that Venezuela has signed have prompted 
very little action.  Latin America is, there-
fore, still dependent on the western govern-
ments, non-governmental organizations, and 
western-based multi-state organizations such 
as the IMF. 
As Chávez’s goals of strengthening 
Venezuela and minimizing western influ-
ence in Latin America have had only limited 
success, there are now two separate forces 
working in Latin America.  On one hand, the 
neoliberal model is promoted by numerous 
Latin American countries, such as Mexico, 
and also by the United States which main-
tains a strong presence in the region.  On the 
other hand, Chávez encourages the adoption 
of his Bolivarian model by his Latin Ameri-
can neighbors.  These two clashing models 
have led to much controversy throughout 
Latin America as support for neoliberal and 
socialist models varies as leaders support 
policies that they expect to be in their best 
interest at the time.  The next section will, 
thus, analyze the conflicts and the instability 
that has arisen as a result of Chávez’s poli-
cies in the region. 
Implications of Chávez’s Policy through-
out Latin America: 
Analysis of Chávez’s foreign policy 
decisions and their effects throughout Latin 
America shows that his policies are not in 
the best interest of countries in the region or 
of Latin America as a whole.  As discussed 
in the previous section, Chávez has had only 
limited success in accomplishing his goals 
of strengthening Venezuela’s role in the re-
gion and minimizing regional dependence 
on the West.  First of all, many countries are 
beginning to distance themselves from 
Chávez due to waning support for him in the 
region and a pragmatic understanding of the 
continued necessity to cooperate with the 
West.76  Chávez’s strong attitudes and rheto-
ric are even contributing to conflict in the 
region, despite increased economic and tech-
nological cooperation.  Furthermore, the 
similarities of Chávez’s development poli-
cies to Latin America’s failed experiment of 
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) 
pose a great threat to the stability of the re-
gion.  Chávez’s foreign policies, therefore, 
are not unifying Latin America meaning-
fully, but rather they are contributing both to 
political and economic instability in the re-
gion. 
Political Instability Resulting from Chávez’s 
Foreign Policy: 
Chávez has become a controversial 
figure both regionally and internationally.  
This is largely due to his aggressive rhetoric 
against those who disagree with him, com-
bined with the hasty decisions he has been 
known to make and retract.  As Table 1 
shows, Latin American opinions of Chávez 
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 between 2005 and 2008 decreased 
more overall than any other world 
leader that Latinobarómetro polled 
individuals about, with the exception of 
George W. Bush.  These statistics sug-
gest that Chávez is not the highly es-
teemed leader that he hopes to be in Latin 
America.  As Chávez and Bush became two 
of the most negatively perceived leaders ac-
cording to Latin Americans and two of the 
most prominent figures in the region, there 
emerged a major divide in Latin America 
over their policies and influence.  As such, 
Chávez’s policies have not been well re-
ceived across all of Latin America and pol-
icy differences have led to political conflicts 
within the region rather than facilitating the 
regional integration and cooperation that 
Chávez wishes to see. 
 First of all, support for Chávez has, 
in many ways, become a “liability for politi-
cians in Latin America,” meaning that politi-
cians who have connections to Chávez may 
now run the risk of losing the support of 
their populace.77Indeed, as previously dis-
cussed, this was the case in the 2006 Peru-
vian elections when Chávez publicly backed 
Humala who then lost the election, in part as 
a result of Chávez’s support.  Despite the 
economic catastrophe that Alan Garcia was 
remembered for from his first presidential 
term between 1985 and 1990, his slogan of 
“Peru or Chávez” attracted many in the 
population who were against Chávez’s in-
volvement in Peruvian affairs.78   In other 
Latin American countries, exposing and ac-
cusing politicians of having ties to Chávez 
has become a tactic used by candidates to 
defeat the opposition in elections.  In the 
Nicaraguan election of 2006, although Or-
tega ultimately won the election, his oppo-
nent used Chávez’s shipments of oil to 
Sandinista leaders as a tactic to criticize Or-
tega’s supporters.79 Even in Mexico’s 2006 
election, presidential candidate Felipe Cal-
derón accused his opponent Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador of having ties to Chávez, an 
accusation that Obrador denied. 80Following 
Calderón’s ad campaign, Obrador lost his 
lead in the polls and Calderón won the elec-
tion by a margin of less than one percent.81 
Chávez’s involvement in numerous 
national elections in 2006 may help to ex-
plain why approval ratings among Latin 
Americans suddenly dropped from an aver-
age of 4.9 on a scale of 10 to 4.5, as shown 
in Table 1.  The trend in both Peru and Mex-
ico of support for the leftist candidate shift-
ing to their opponent following accusations 
of political ties to Chávez clearly demon-
strates that significant percentages of the 
Latin American population are against 
Chávez’s involvement in domestic affairs.  
For support of leading candidates to decline 
so definitively following Chávez’s backing 
for leftist candidates, the threat of his influ-
ence must have been perceived as a more 
important concern for a significant portion 
of voters than other domestic issues that 
were guiding their decision in earlier polls.  
It is very likely, then, that Chávez’s interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of other coun-
tries contributed to this large drop in Latin 
American opinion of the Venezuelan presi-
dent. 
 In addition, tensions arose in Latin 
America as a result of Morales’ 2006 deci-
sion to nationalize the hydrocarbon industry 
in Bolivia, and frustration was once again 
felt toward Chávez who supported Morales’ 
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 decision and offered him advice on 
carrying it out.82Argentine-Spanish 
company Repsol YPF and Brazil’s 
state oil company Petrobrás were both 
heavily invested in Bolivia’s hydrocar-
bon industry and, therefore, were nega-
tively impacted by the nationalization of 
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry.  Argentina, 
which imported significantly less oil than 
Brazil, was able to strike a deal with Bolivia 
rather quickly by agreeing in 2006 to pay $5 
per billion BTU as compared to the $3.18 it 
paid before Bolivian nationalization.83Brazil, 
on the other hand, was much more invested 
in the Bolivian hydrocarbon industry with 
more than 50% of Brazilian gas and 75% of 
gas consumption in São Paulo being im-
ported from Bolivia.84 Lula spoke very dip-
lomatically of Morales’ decision to national-
ize Bolivia’s gas reserves, however he re-
fused to meet with Morales to negotiate aug-
mented gas prices.  It was not until October 
28, 2006, after Lula developed a firmer 
stance in favor of Brazilian national interest, 
that Brazil and Bolivia reached a deal that 
would allow Petrobrás to continue its opera-
tions in two Bolivian gas fields.85       
Although Lula has remained diplo-
matic in his relations with Venezuela, some 
analysts believe that Brazil began loosening 
its ties to Chávez in light of Bolivian nation-
alization of gas reserves which was encour-
aged by Chávez.  It is important to note that, 
as discussed in the previous section, Lula 
was never an absolute supporter of Chávez’s 
policies.  That being said, Brazil’s support 
for some of Chávez’s policies that it had 
once supported has waned even more in re-
cent years.  For example, following the hy-
drocarbon conflict, Petrobrás officials 
sounded less enthusiastic about plans to 
build the $20 billion pipeline that Chávez 
envisions and that would begin in Vene-
zuela, traverse Brazil, and end in Argen-
tina.86 More explicitly, the Brazilian press 
criticized Chávez for his involvement in en-
couraging and assisting Bolivia to national-
ize its hydrocarbon industry. 
One country with which Chávez has 
had particularly rocky relations is its 
neighbor to the west, Colombia, though 
Chávez has periodically shown signs of 
wanting to cooperate with its neighbor.  
Prior to Chávez’s taking office, Colombia 
and Venezuela, under the administrations of 
former presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and 
Rafael Caldera, followed a policy of 
“degulfisation,” meaning that the two coun-
tries focused on pursuing trade relations and 
downplayed political tensions, such as terri-
torial disputes.87 However, throughout 
Chávez’s presidency, relations with Colom-
bia (which is known to have close ties to the 
United States) have been dynamic, alternat-
ing between pragmatic cooperation between 
the two countries and Chávez’s use of ag-
gressive rhetoric and actions toward Colom-
bia. 
 When Chávez first came to power in 
1999, he experienced good relations with 
then-Colombian President Andrés Pastrana 
as the two leaders worked together to ad-
dress issues surrounding the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist 
guerilla group in Colombia to which Chávez 
is sympathetic.88 However, their relations 
quickly worsened, particularly after Pastrana 
adopted Plan Colombia, a plan wherein Co-
lombia receives $1.3 billion from the United 
States to train its military to eliminate drug 
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 trafficking.89  Chávez opposes Plan 
Colombia, believing that this drug 
eradication plan wrongfully targets 
the livelihood of Latin American coca 
farmers rather than Western drug abus-
ers.  In 2002, having recently been re-
stored to power following the short-lived 
coup d’état that temporarily ousted the 
Venezuelan president, Chávez showed a 
more cooperative attitude toward Colombia 
as its current President Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
took office.  However, relations between the 
two countries worsened, once again, and 
have remained poor due to policy differ-
ences. 
 Relations between Venezuela and 
Colombia came closest to a military con-
frontation in 2007 when Uribe ordered Co-
lombian military troops to attack a FARC 
camp on Ecuadorean territory.    Chávez re-
sponded to this by “closing the Venezuelan 
embassy in Bogotá, expelling the Colombian 
ambassador in Caracas, sending 10 battal-
ions of troops to the border with Colombia 
and threatening to deploy Russian fighter 
bombers.”90  As previously mentioned, 
Chávez’s exaggerated response to the incur-
sion into Ecuador pressured Correa into 
sending troops of his own to the Colombian 
border.  Chávez’s response was criticized 
regionally and internationally.  Even Castro 
and Lula, who have enjoyed good relations 
with Chávez in many situations, discouraged 
the prospect of war between Colombia and 
Venezuela.  Chávez quickly called back 
Venezuelan troops, however his rash deci-
sion to mobilize his troops over an incident 
that did not even occur on Venezuelan terri-
tory demonstrates how Chávez’s actions of-
ten create controversy and could even lead 
to military conflicts.  Although Chávez and 
Uribe agreed to meet to reestablish diplo-
matic ties following the conflict, tensions 
between Venezuela and Colombia remain.91 
 Another major political concern 
within Latin America is that Chávez may be 
starting a regional arms race.  In 2006, 
Venezuela struck a major arms deal with 
Russia by purchasing assault rifles, fighter 
jets, and helicopters for the price of nearly 
$3 billion.92  Since then, Chávez has struck 
even more weapons deals with Russia, as 
well as with Brazil, Belarus, China, and 
Spain.  Chávez maintains that these pur-
chases are merely intended to update Vene-
zuela’s outdated arsenal, however there have 
been implications that these arms deals were 
a response to the United States’ arming Co-
lombia through Plan Colombia and the sub-
sequent Patriot Plan.93 Since then, several 
other Latin American countries have begun 
to significantly increase military spending.  
Lula, for example, requested that the Brazil-
ian Congress set aside about $5.6 billion to-
ward the countries 2008 military budget.94     
Chile’s military expenditures are also note-
worthy, spending about 3.8 percent of its 
GDP on national defense.95 Some countries 
have expressed concern over these increases 
in military spending throughout the region, 
for example, Peru feels threatened by 
Chile’s heavy investment in its military due 
to a border dispute between the two coun-
tries.96 As more Latin American leaders feel 
threatened by the level of military spending 
in surrounding countries, it is very plausible 
an arms race will escalate in the region, 
thereby causing more instability and divide 
in Latin America.   
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 The Path to Economic Instability: 
Chávez wants integration of Latin 
America to occur under his terms and 
according to his Bolivarian ideology, 
however his plan for the economic inte-
gration of Latin America resembles the 
failed policy of import-substituting industri-
alization (ISI).  ISI is a policy that provides 
an alternative to capitalism and was tested in 
Latin America beginning in 1930 and ulti-
mately failing by the early 1980s.97 The 
book Modern Latin America describes the 
theory behind ISI growth: 
In contrast to the largely lais-
sez-faire policies of nineteenth-
century England and the United 
States, Latin American governments 
actively promoted industrial growth.  
They did so in various ways: erecting 
tariff barriers and raising the price of 
imported goods to the point where 
local industrial firms could success-
fully compete in the marketplace; 
creating demand by favoring local 
producers in government contracts 
(involving, for example, purchases 
for the military); and, most impor-
tant, establishing government-run 
companies and investing directly in 
industrial firms.  Through protection 
and participation, the state in Latin 
America furnished critical impetus 
for the regions industrial growth.98 
 
ISI failed during this period in Latin Amer-
ica due to three key shortcomings.  First of 
all, it failed to eliminate foreign dependence 
in Latin American countries.  Latin Ameri-
can countries hoped to become self-
sufficient through industrialization and 
manufacturing their own goods.  However, 
rather than make Latin America self-
sufficient, it made these countries dependent 
on the West for expensive goods, such as 
machinery to manufacture products, rather 
than the finished products themselves.99  
Next, ISI limited local demand for manufac-
tured products as they were manufacturing 
industrial goods, such as refrigerators.  
Many locals could not afford such goods 
and, given the nature of the products, those 
who could afford them did not need large 
quantities.  Furthermore, there was little 
trade between countries so companies were 
forced to accept market demand within their 
country.100 Finally, the use of advanced tech-
nologies limited job production as they re-
placed much manual labor.  With machines 
performing tasks that could have otherwise 
been done by humans, unemployment rates 
increased and few people could afford to 
buy the finished products.101 
Chávez is encouraging Latin Amer-
ica to become self-sufficient by promoting 
the integration and solidarity of the region.  
Chávez’s policy of regional integration re-
sembles ISI in that it encourages national 
development by giving preference to local 
products over foreign imports. 102          
However, Chávez claims that the key differ-
ence between ISI and his policy is that the 
latter focuses on sovereignty and the individ-
ual needs of a specific country.103 His policy 
of endogenous development is not intended 
to stop all trade as Chávez relies on oil reve-
nues to carry out his domestic and foreign 
policies.  Yet as previously discussed, he 
wants Latin American dependence on the 
West to be as minimal as possible.  Despite 
Chávez’s belief that Latin American  
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 integration and endogenous growth 
will promote sustainable develop-
ment in the region, analysis of 
Chávez’s foreign policy suggest that 
countries that become too closely en-
twined in Chávez’s economic and devel-
opment plans will be susceptible to one of 
the shortcomings of Latin America’s twenti-
eth-century experiment with ISI, which is its 
failure to eliminate dependence on the West.   
As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, Chávez’s attempts to minimize Latin 
American dependence on the West only re-
direct Latin America’s foreign dependence.  
One major problem with ISI growth in twen-
tieth century Latin America is that in order 
to industrialize, these countries had to pur-
chase products such as technology and in-
dustrial equipment from the West, thereby 
altering the goods that Latin America was 
dependent on importing.104 As Chávez has 
flexed his power in Latin America through 
oil diplomacy, he has already begun to make 
Latin American countries dependent on 
Venezuela.  For example, in recent years, 
Morales has shown signs of “drifting away 
from Washington’s orbit” as his close rela-
tions with Chávez have provided Bolivia 
with aid and support from Venezuela.  How-
ever, if Chávez cannot afford to continue to 
help Bolivia financially, Bolivia will be in a 
precarious situation.  The Petrocaribe coun-
tries would be particularly susceptible to in-
stability if Chávez were forced to abandon 
his foreign policy in the region as Venezuela 
is now the primary energy supplier in the 
Caribbean.  Prior to Petrocaribe, Trinidad 
and Tobago was the primary provider of en-
ergy in the Caribbean, however they allowed 
for Venezuela to step into that role.  Despite 
the decision to permit Venezuela to replace 
Trinidad and Tobago as primary energy sup-
plier of the region, Prime Minister Patrick 
Manning has made it clear that his country 
would sell their oil in new markets and be 
unable to fill the regional energy void if for 
any reason there were to be a disruption in 
oil supply.105 If decreasing oil revenues and 
rising debt force Venezuela to alter its pol-
icy, the Petrocaribe nations will have few 
back-up options. 
The new dependence that Chávez’s 
foreign policy creates is potentially more 
worrisome than dependence on IFIs because 
rather than multiple countries contributing to 
loans, Venezuela is the sole country respon-
sible for many of the loans Chávez has pro-
vided in recent years.  First of all, this cre-
ates dependence on Chávez’s decision to 
continue any agreements that are reached for 
Latin American countries that accept 
Chávez’s loan and trade offers.  Chávez can 
use loans that Venezuela provides unilater-
ally as a form of hard power to coerce loan 
recipients to abide by certain conditions.  
Chávez has persistently criticized IFIs for 
using loans as a means of hard power to co-
erce developing world governments to adopt 
mandatory conditions in order to receive 
loans.  However, there is a good chance that 
Chávez will use Venezuelan loans in this 
way if he believes it will further his goals.  
Furthermore, Chávez’s foreign policy in the 
region renders Latin American countries de-
pendent upon his ability to perpetuate the 
numerous and costly agreements that he has 
reached.  IFIs like the IMF and the World 
Bank are institutions that draw funds from 
multiple states, therefore if one contributing 
state runs into financial trouble, money will 
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 still be available due to the finan-
cial contributions of other states.  
With Venezuela as the sole lender, 
loan recipients become dependent on 
the economic and political stability of 
Venezuela.  This dependence is particu-
larly problematic for many Latin American 
countries because oil prices vary greatly and 
are unpredictable, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The biggest danger for Latin Amer-
ica is the fact that all of the agreements and 
projects that Chávez has committed to are 
dependent on high revenues from one natu-
ral resource, oil, of which the value is diffi-
cult to predict.  Figure 1 shows that through-
out most of Chávez’s presidency, he has 
benefited from significant increases in the 
price of oil, with prices rising from as low as 
$8.85 per barrel in December 1998 to a peak 
of $137.98 per barrel in July 2008.  Since 
then, prices fell as low as $32.06 per barrel 
on December 26, 2008 and, in recent weeks, 
they have been hovering at about $50 per 
barrel.106 With so much of Venezuela’s oil 
revenues going toward advancing Chávez’s 
political agenda as opposed to investment in 
Venezuelan oil infrastructure, PdVSA’s oil 
production is not as high as it could be (see 
Figure 3) and the addition of decreased de-
mand in the context of the global crisis will 
drive Venezuela toward unsustainable debt.  
With the oil boom ending and global reces-
sion setting in, Chávez will be forced to 
make many changes to his policies through-
out the region, which is likely to have nega-
tive effects that will be felt throughout Latin 
America. 
 
 
 
The Effects of Falling Oil Prices on 
Chávez’s Foreign Policy: 
 Although Chávez has, thus far, been 
able to use high oil revenues to fund his for-
eign policy, analysis of his policies and pro-
grams reveals that, with Venezuelan oil 
prices hovering at about $40 per barrel, he, 
too, may be headed toward the downward 
slope of the petro-state trap.  However, de-
spite his strong rhetoric, he has proven 
throughout his presidency to be a rational 
politician and to have a pragmatic side in 
making his decisions.  In January 2009, in 
light of the decrease in oil prices, Chávez 
allowed Western oil companies to make bids 
on Venezuelan oil fields. 107 Furthermore, in 
March 2009, he announced plans to revise 
Venezuela’s 2009 budget, basing it upon oil 
prices of $40 per barrel rather than the $60 
per barrel that it was originally figured 
around. 108 By taking the proper actions to 
adjust to decreased oil prices and by manag-
ing Venezuela’s international reserve sav-
ings of $42.2 billion wisely, Chávez may be 
able to resist Venezuela’s succumbing to the 
oil curse this year.  However, if oil prices do 
not continue to rise, budget cuts will be nec-
essary that are likely to have negative rami-
fications both for Venezuela and for 
neighboring countries in Latin America.109 
Venezuela, Chávez, and the Oil Curse: 
 When analyzing how Chávez’s poli-
cies are being affected by the oil bust, it is 
helpful to consider the policy weaknesses of 
the Punto Fijo system or puntifijismo, which 
was the political system that preceded 
Chávez.  The Pact of Punto Fijo was a 
power-sharing agreement signed in 1958 
which was said to protect democracy in 
Venezuela by respecting elections.110  
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 Elected officials were to work with 
members of the other political par-
ties that signed the pact and consider 
differing viewpoints in forming govern-
ment policy.  In practice, this agreement 
limited political power to the two main 
political parties of Venezuela, Acción De-
mocratica (AD) and COPEI, intentionally 
shutting the Communist Party out of the po-
litical system.111  The system was strong in 
Venezuela for about thirty years until eco-
nomic and political instability ensued in the 
1980s, largely as a result of the end of the oil 
boom.  Puntofijismo officially ended in 1999 
when Chávez took power and created his 
Bolivarian Constitution.112 
 The downfall of the Punto Fijo sys-
tem can be primarily attributed to the effects 
of the oil curse.  For about a quarter of a 
century, oil wealth masked many of the 
flaws of puntofijismo, however when oil 
prices plunged in the 1980s, the trends of the 
oil curse began to appear, thereby exposing 
the weaknesses of the system and paving the 
way for political instability.113  Chávez took 
advantage of this instability by rallying sup-
port among the poor and working classes 
and promising to overturn the Punto Fijo 
system, which ultimately led him to win the 
1998 Venezuelan election.114  Yet, despite 
Chávez’s rhetoric about creating a better po-
litical system in Venezuela, analysis of his 
economic policy reveals that he, too, may be 
headed toward the two main destabilizing 
trends of the petro-state curse by replicating 
several fundamental weaknesses of the 
Punto Fijo system.  To prevent an economic 
collapse through this indefinite period of 
decreased oil value, Chávez must attempt to 
diversify his government’s sources of reve-
nue and cut down on unnecessary expendi-
tures. 
 First of all, as a major oil exporter, 
Dutch disease has been a constant concern 
for Venezuela.  Under the Punto Fijo sys-
tem, Venezuela enjoyed two oil booms be-
tween 1960 and 1980 that contributed to 
rapid economic growth, a higher quality of 
life compared to the rest of Latin America 
(as measured by health, education, and 
wages), and, consequently, political stabil-
ity.115 The government was dependent on oil 
revenues as the high value of the Venezue-
lan bolívar with relation to other countries 
suppressed non-oil production sectors within 
Venezuela.  As such, when oil prices 
plunged in the 1980s, the Venezuelan gov-
ernment could not fall back upon other 
sources of export revenue, forcing it to take 
out foreign loans and artificially control its 
currency, which ultimately caused the pro-
gress that had been made during the oil 
booms to regress.116 
 Dutch disease has continued to have 
an adverse effect on the non-oil sector under 
Chávez’s leadership as his policies also rely 
almost entirely on oil revenues to finance his 
policies.  As was the case under puntofi-
jismo, Venezuela’s non-oil sectors have been 
unable to develop because large oil revenues 
strengthened the value of the bolívar with 
relation to other currencies, making imports 
cheaper and lowering the competitiveness of 
Venezuelan products.  Analysis of the export 
and import rows in Table 2 illustrates the 
escalating problem of Dutch disease in 
Venezuela between 1998 and 2007.  As oil 
revenues increased following the end of the 
2003 PdVSA strike, the value of goods be-
ing imported into Venezuela skyrocketed, 
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 reaching an unprecedented $29.5 
billion.117  On the other hand, while 
oil revenues rose consistently follow-
ing the 2003 oil strike, the amount of 
money gained through non-oil exports 
decreased between 2005 and 2006.118   
Data compiled in 2009 shows that Vene-
zuela’s non-oil sector continued in this 
downward trend, shrinking by about 5 per-
cent annually over the past three years.119 
 With the value of oil being less than 
one-third of its value at the peak of the oil 
boom, Dutch Disease stands out as a particu-
lar threat to stability in Venezuela.  Similar 
to problems faced by administrations under 
puntofijismo, Chávez has been unable to 
provide Venezuelans with sustainable 
jobs.120 Chávez’s Vuelvan Caras mission 
attempts to create jobs and expand the non-
oil sector by assisting Venezuelans in setting 
up cooperatives.  However, this mission is 
not enough to create long-term jobs and no-
tably expand the non-oil sector as many co-
operatives fail shortly after the government 
stops providing them with resources.121 Fur-
thermore, Chávez’s decision to set an over-
valued fixed exchange rate of 2.15 bolívares 
to the dollar has contributed to high inflation 
in recent years, reinforcing Dutch disease 
trends by making imports artificially cheap 
while exports become more expensive and 
less competitive in global markets.122 
 To stave off the effects of Dutch dis-
ease, Chávez must find a way to broaden his 
government’s sources of revenue so that it is 
less dependent on oil revenues which could 
be done by increasing non-oil taxes.  Ac-
cording to Venezuela expert Terry Lynn 
Karl, ever since the Hydrocarbons Law of 
1943, which increased taxes on oil compa-
nies so that profits would be split “fifty-
fifty” between the companies and the gov-
ernment, there has been “a permanent temp-
tation to cut into the profits of foreign com-
panies as a means of sustaining oil-
subsidized activities while avoiding the taxa-
tion of domestic groups.”123  Failure to ade-
quately collect non-oil taxes proved to be a 
major downfall of the Punto Fijo system 
which, between 1977 and 1979, was receiv-
ing 70.3 percent of Venezuelan tax revenues 
from corporate income taxes, primarily from 
oil companies.124 Chávez appears to recog-
nize that this was a major weakness of pun-
tofijismo and he, consequently, announced 
along with his 2009 budget cuts his plan to 
increase sales taxes in Venezuela as well.125  
The increase will allow Chávez to diversify 
his sources of government revenue so that it 
may be less dependent on unpredictable oil 
revenues. 
 The fall of puntofijismo was also due 
in large part to ill handling of the absorption 
problem by Venezuelan presidents during 
the oil booms between 1960 and 1980.  Un-
der this system, oil revenues were spent irre-
sponsibly as military loyalty was largely 
purchased through incentives, corrupt lead-
ers mismanaged funds, and the government 
spent a significant amount of money on so-
cial programs, whether or not they proved to 
be effective.126 The Venezuelan government, 
thus, spent large amounts of money to fund 
its policies during this period, yet it was re-
lying primarily on oil revenues to do so.  
When the second oil boom ended in the 
1980s, rather than implement more taxes in 
Venezuela, presidents opted to borrow 
money internationally and artificially control 
the bolívar’s exchange rate, causing debt to 
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 accumulate and reinforcing symp-
toms of Dutch disease.127     
 Chávez’s foreign policy is a 
testament to his unwise use of govern-
ment funds to finance often ineffective 
policies and, as he spends that money, he 
is replicating many of the mistakes made 
under the Punto Fijo system.  Similar to 
presidents under the Punto Fijo system who 
purchased new arms as incentives for the 
military, Chávez has committed billions of 
dollars to upgrading Venezuela’s military.  
As previously discussed, Chávez has made 
multiple major weapons purchases from sev-
eral countries, agreeing to buy over $4.4 bil-
lion worth of weapons from Russia alone.128  
Furthermore, as discussed throughout the first 
section, Chávez has also spent billions of dol-
lars on aid and development projects through-
out Latin America, despite evidence that his 
regional foreign policy has had only limited 
success in achieving his goals.  Chávez has 
spent billions of dollars on capital-intensive 
programs and projects that depend on oil 
revenues, including an estimated $12 billion 
on “oil assistance handouts” last year 
alone.129The fact that Chávez has committed 
such large sums of Venezuelan money to 
fund various policies around Latin America 
shows that, like other petro-states, the high 
revenues from oil exports have given him a 
sense of economic stability, and even infalli-
bility.  Empowered by the influx of oil reve-
nues, he has pursued a variety of costly poli-
cies to further several goals that were only 
indirectly related to benefiting Venezuela’s 
population, such as encouraging Latin Ameri-
can countries to break away from western-
based IFIs.  
 Furthermore, Chávez’s missions, 
which are comparable to social programs im-
plemented during the Punto Fijo era, have 
been one of his largest expenditures, requir-
ing billions of dollars to finance, yet their 
success has been debatable.  As previously 
mentioned, the Vuelvan Caras mission has 
only had limited success in creating success-
ful cooperatives and sustainable jobs in 
Venezuela.  It is doubtful that the Robinson 
mission (which aims to educate Venezuela’s 
rural population) actually succeeded in teach-
ing 1.5 million Venezuelan adults to read and 
write as Chávez claims it did, however even 
if they did reach this goal, it came at a high 
price as the government spent $50 million to 
fund the mission.130 This equates to about 
$536 per adult that successfully became liter-
ate through this program, a very high cost 
when compared to the average per pupil cost 
of $47 in Sub-Saharan Africa, $30 in Asia, 
and $61 in Latin America.131 The Barrio 
Adentro mission, which was previously dis-
cussed, is also very costly for Venezuela, as 
in addition to supplying Cuba with fuel, it 
involves transporting patients to and from 
Cuba if medical treatments are not available 
in Venezuela.The operating budget for this 
mission is $5 billion each year.132 These are 
only three of Chávez’s missions, yet as we 
can see, they are very expensive social pro-
grams with only a limited rate of success. 
 The fact that Chávez has borrowed 
money in recent years to help fund his poli-
cies could be somewhat alarming for Vene-
zuela now that the oil prices have decreased 
so much.  Taking out loans during an oil 
boom can be particularly troublesome for 
petro-states.  As long as oil prices remain 
high, banks are willing to lend these states 
money, however when the value of oil  
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 decreases, banks become unwilling 
to continue lending and petro-states 
must quickly pay back their loans at a 
time when less oil revenues are coming 
in.  Nigeria became an infamous exam-
ple of a petro-state failing as a result of 
this pattern as it borrowed large amounts of 
money during a 1980s oil boom to fund ex-
pensive, wasteful projects, and then found 
itself in debt and unable to adjust to the sud-
den plunge of oil prices in 1986.133 Loans 
also deepened the financial troubles of Vene-
zuela under the Punto Fijo system as the later 
administrations, reluctant to raise non-oil 
taxes, took out loans which led the country 
further into debt.134 
 Throughout Chávez’s presidency, 
Venezuela’s external debt rose from about 
$27.9 billion when he was elected in 1998 to 
a peak about $47.1 billion in the second half 
of 2005 (see Table 2).  Following this peak, 
Venezuelan debt steadily decreased, however 
the C.I.A. World Factbook reports that in 
2008, external debt increased to nearly $48 
billion as Chávez has taken out several new 
loans.135 For example, in February 2008, 
China agreed to furnish Venezuela with a $4 
billion loan which Venezuela is to pay back 
in shipments of refined oil, rather than in 
cash.136   In September 2008, Russia also 
agreed to loan Venezuela $1 billion to help 
Chávez fund his massive arms purchases.137  
Yet, despite the fifty percent increase from 
the 1998 figure in dollar amounts, at its cur-
rent rate, debt is unlikely to cause economic 
instability in Venezuela as it did in Nigeria 
because it represents only 14.7 percent of 
Venezuela’s GDP, a manageable percentage, 
particularly when compared to other coun-
tries. 138 Although oil prices are currently at 
about $48 per barrel, unlike Nigeria and the 
Punto Fijo administrations, Chávez has a sig-
nificant amount of money saved in interna-
tional reserves to temporarily supplement the 
oil revenue that Venezuela is able to generate 
during this oil bust.139 
 Analysis of Chávez’s mismanage-
ment of oil revenues with relation to the 
common trends of the petro-state curse raises 
the question of how long Venezuela can sus-
tain itself through this oil bust.  This analysis 
shows that his economic policies have repli-
cated several common weaknesses that have 
led other petro-states to the point of eco-
nomic collapse.  Norway has been one of the 
most successful petro-states, in large part due 
to its Government Pension Fund—Global 
(formerly the Government Petroleum Fund) 
which is a stabilization fund established in 
1990 to help offset the effects of future de-
clines in the value of oil.140 Venezuela also 
has a stabilization fund, known as the Fund 
for Macroeconomic Stabilization, though it is 
only valued at about $800 million compared 
with Norway’s fund which is worth about 
$326 billion.141 Venezuela’s international 
reserve savings may insulate the country 
from some of the effects of the oil price drop, 
however these reserves can only prevent the 
economic decline for a limited amount of 
time.  Chávez will need to make wise adjust-
ments to his budget in order to avert com-
plete destabilization in Venezuela as a result 
of the petro-state curse.  
To prevent the absorption problem 
from rapidly destabilizing Venezuela’s 
economy without squandering its savings, 
Chávez must look carefully at each of his 
policies, evaluate their effectiveness, then 
improve the efficiency of those that are  
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 crucial and eliminate those that are 
not absolutely necessary.  As re-
vealed through analysis in the first 
two sections of the paper, Chávez’s 
policies throughout the region have 
only earned him conditional support for 
his ambitions and they have not achieved 
his intended goals.  For example, Chávez’s 
missions need to be reconsidered too as their 
effectiveness has been severely limited as 
demonstrated by the Vuelvan Caras, Barrio 
Adentro, and Robinson missions.  These 
types of ineffective policies and programs 
must be changed or eliminated so that 
Chávez is not squandering Venezuelan 
funds. 
By expanding the government’s 
sources of non-oil revenue and altering or 
eliminating ineffective policies, Chávez will 
be able to forestall economic collapse in 
Venezuela, however he will not be able to 
prevent economic decline completely.  With 
regards to Venezuela’s current situation, 
Karl stated, “Regardless of intentions no 
[previous] regime has been able to manage 
these booms to overcome poverty.  The end 
result is the shortages, inflation and slowing 
of economic growth that we’re seeing 
now.”142 Venezuela is likely to face balance 
of payment problems with its high imports 
and lower revenues.  Its inflation rate is cur-
rently the highest in Latin America at 30.7 
percent, and economic growth has slowed 
significantly.143 Indeed, if oil prices do not 
continue to rise as they have been since the 
middle of February (see Figure 1), then 
Venezuela could be slated for economic in-
stability within several months.  However, 
throughout 2009, Venezuela is likely to fore-
stall economic collapse as long as Chávez 
handles government funds responsibly.  Un-
fortunately, Venezuela does not have ade-
quate funds to avoid economic decline if the 
oil bust lasts several years and any policy 
changes that are made may come at the ex-
pense of some of Latin America’s most im-
poverished countries. 
Changes to Chávez’s Latin American For-
eign Policy: 
 The threat of economic and political 
instability resulting from decreased oil reve-
nues will force Chávez to focus on improv-
ing conditions within Venezuela, especially 
after his referendum to eliminate limits on 
the number of terms that elected officials 
can serve passed in February of this year.144  
In making foreign policy decisions, leaders 
are always involved in a “two-level game” 
meaning that their policies must “satisfy si-
multaneously both their domestic audience 
and their counterparts in other countries.”145 
Seeking to win the 2012 presidential elec-
tion in Venezuela and serve a fourth presi-
dential term (including his brief first term 
before his reelection under the Bolivarian 
Constitution), Chávez cannot risk alienating 
his supporters by allowing the oil bust to 
exacerbate Venezuela’s domestic problems.  
As a rational leader, Chávez will be forced 
to reevaluate his policies and programs in 
Latin America to ensure that his political 
actions are effective and directly benefit 
Venezuela, resulting in a turn away from 
Chávez’s current ideological influence and 
goals in the region. 
First of all, many of Chávez’s pro-
grams and agreements that offer cheap 
loans, credit, and oil to countries around the 
region will be among those policies that he 
will have to alter or eliminate.  Given the 
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 cost of maintaining such programs 
compared with their effectiveness in 
achieving his goals, Chávez will have 
to make budget cuts and improvements 
to these agreements to keep from over-
spending Venezuela’s limited revenue.  In 
January of this year, Chávez already altered 
Petrocaribe, which is one of the most impor-
tant agreements he has reached in Latin 
America.  When the agreement was first 
signed in 2005, countries purchasing oil 
through Petrocaribe only had to pay for forty 
percent of the oil up front, and then pay the 
difference over the next 25 years at an inter-
est rate of one percent.  With significantly 
lower oil prices, the conditions of the agree-
ment now require that countries pay fifty 
percent of the cost of oil up front.146  Chávez 
will inevitably have to make many similar 
adjustments to his policies around the re-
gion, for example by limiting funding for 
development in other countries. 
Furthermore, Chávez’s large-scale 
energy integration plans will have to be put 
on hold as long as the price of oil remains 
low.  With oil worth less than one-third of 
its value at the peak of the price boom and 
Chávez needing to keep his Venezuelan con-
stituency content to win the 2012 election, 
he will be unable to fund the numerous large
-scale projects, such as refineries and pipe-
lines, that he has promised to help build in 
neighboring countries.  As of January 2009, 
Chávez was already reconsidering his coun-
try’s ability to fund the development of oil 
refineries that had been planned for Nicara-
gua and Ecuador.147 Although he has at-
tempted to give the impression that such 
projects will still be carried out as promised, 
Venezuela currently lacks the extra funds 
that are necessary to fulfill Chávez’s prom-
ises.  Therefore, it is unlikely that much pro-
gress will be made toward the completion of 
these large-scale energy infrastructure pro-
jects throughout Latin America because the 
oil bust will force Chávez to prioritize Vene-
zuela’s domestic affairs. 
 The result of these budget adjust-
ments will be a reverse of Chávez’s foreign 
policy goals of establishing Venezuela as a 
strong regional power and minimizing west-
ern influence in Latin America.  Throughout 
Chávez’s presidency, most Latin American 
leaders have attempted to balance their rela-
tions between Venezuela and the United 
States.  However, with Venezuela’s econ-
omy lacking the strength to continue the 
very policies that have won Chávez condi-
tional support throughout the region, Latin 
American leaders are likely to move closer 
to the United States and other western coun-
tries which tend to be more stable than de-
veloping countries like Venezuela.  Figure 2 
shows that the amount of IFI loans being 
taken in Latin America increased signifi-
cantly in 2008 when the global financial cri-
sis began and this trend is likely to continue 
through 2009 as the crisis worsens.  Latin 
American countries including Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Jamaica, Colombia, and Mexico 
are all beginning to take out new IFI loans in 
light of the economic crisis.148 Ecuador, too, 
which maintains good relations with 
Chávez, is looking to take out $2.6 billion in 
credits which Correa would prefer to receive 
from regional multilateral lenders including 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
Andean Development Corporation, and the 
Latin American Reserve Fund.149  Given the 
fragile state of the world economy, even 
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 countries that maintain amicable 
relations with Chávez are likely to 
pursue policies that improve their re-
lations with the West in order to en-
courage foreign investment along with 
other incentives that could come from 
maintaining good relations, such as aid.   
Chávez’s foreign policy budget cuts 
will most hurt the impoverished Latin 
American countries that have become de-
pendent on Chávez’s policies, pushing many 
of them closer to the West as well.  For ex-
ample, the ten percent increase of money 
Petrocaribe countries must pay up front for 
oil may affect the amount of oil that some of 
the poorer Caribbean countries can afford to 
buy and it is very possible that Chávez will 
be forced to alter the agreement even more.  
Although it is likely that Chávez will con-
tinue Petrocaribe, the countries of the Carib-
bean will continue to maintain strong rela-
tions with the United States as it provides 
them with necessary aid.  Cuba and Bolivia 
have become particularly dependent on 
Chávez’s assistance to their countries.  
Chávez is likely to continue the oil for medi-
cal care exchange that is set up by the Barrio 
Adentro mission between Cuba and Vene-
zuela because it brings direct benefit to 
Venezuelans in the form of health care.  
However, Chávez still may be forced to limit 
the amount of oil sent to Cuba and the free 
medical services that Venezuelans are pro-
vided if Venezuela’s economy becomes too 
weak.  Bolivia, on the other hand, is likely to 
suffer heavily from budget cuts that Chávez 
will be forced to make as the country is al-
ready extremely dependent on foreign assis-
tance and Morales has opted to receive aid 
and loans from Venezuela over the West 
when he could.  As a result, he has accumu-
lated over $100 million in debt to Venezuela 
that Bolivia will be unable to pay back in the 
near future if Chávez finds that he needs 
those funds.150  With the global economic 
situation worsening, if Venezuela loses the 
financial strength to continue its aid and pro-
grams in the country, then Morales will be 
forced to pursue policies that are in accor-
dance with western interests because Bolivia 
is dependent on foreign aid that industrial-
ized western countries will most likely be 
able to provide. 
 Given Venezuela’s economic fragil-
ity due to the oil bust, Chávez himself may 
be forced to pursue improved relations with 
the United States.  Similar to Chávez’s first 
year in office when financial mismanage-
ment under the Punto Fijo system left Vene-
zuela’s economy weak, the oil bust has led 
Venezuela to once again face many of the 
same economic problems today that it faced 
then, including “recession, confronted infla-
tion, capital flight, and low oil prices.”151  In 
a move that reflects his recognition of the 
fragile state of Venezuela’s economy in this 
post-oil boom period, Chávez invited west-
ern oil companies to make oil bids on Vene-
zuela’s oil reserves in January of this year.152  
This suggests that Chávez will once again 
pursue better relations with the West, includ-
ing the United States, in order to attract for-
eign revenue. 
Although increased foreign invest-
ment in Venezuela’s oil industry would be 
beneficial in maximizing its oil production, 
the necessity to improve relations with the 
United States would limit Chávez’s ability 
to act definitively against American interests 
and to influence neighboring countries to 
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 do the same. Furthermore, it is very 
likely that western companies will 
be wary of investing in Venezuela 
given his actions to remove foreign in-
vestors from Venezuela’s oil industry 
and consolidate government control over 
PdVSA.  Foreign investors may fear that 
when oil prices rise, Chávez will once again 
attempt to regain control over their oil fields.  
Due to concern over Chávez’s past actions, 
foreign oil companies may look toward other 
oil fields to invest in, such as those that were 
recently discovered in Brazil.  As such, in-
viting foreign investment in Venezuela’s oil 
industry would greatly limit Chávez’s free-
dom to pursue his policies, especially as he 
will need to find a way to regain the trust of 
foreign investors so that they feel that Vene-
zuelan oil is a worthwhile investment. 
 
Conclusion: 
As we have seen, Chávez has fallen 
into the same petro-state trap that led to the 
downfall of puntofijismo and other petro-
state administrations around the world by 
attempting to capitalize off of an oil boom 
by using the money to fund lavish and 
wasteful policies throughout Latin America.  
Despite saving $42.2 billion in international 
reserves, his management of Venezuela’s oil 
wealth shows little foresight for the price 
plunge that inevitably followed the sudden 
oil boom.  Oil prices are constantly fluctuat-
ing, therefore large oil booms are always 
accompanied by price busts that history 
shows can have devastating effects on a 
petro-state if the government does not ade-
quately plan for such market changes.  The 
oil bust of 2008 was particularly sudden and 
drastic, however petro-states must do their 
best to prepare for such sudden changes in 
oil prices.  Analysis of Hugo Chávez’s for-
eign policy throughout the boom-and-bust 
cycle of oil prices offers many lessons that 
should be noted by other petro-state leaders 
who face the challenges that accompany 
natural resource management, particularly 
when that resource is the country’s primary 
source of revenue. 
First of all, petro-state leaders must 
understand that increased revenues from an 
oil boom do not make an oil-dependent 
country rich, because oil prices can plunge 
as quickly as they rise.  Chávez’s foreign 
policy serves as an example of what petro-
state leaders should avoid in managing their 
budget during an oil boom.  Chávez spent 
much of Venezuela’s oil revenues on costly 
programs throughout Latin America that did 
not directly benefit Venezuela in the long-
term and, furthermore, were ineffective in 
accomplishing the goals that they set out to 
achieve.  This is not to say that petro-states 
must completely neglect foreign policy, but 
rather they should prioritize domestic affairs 
and pursue only policies that will further the 
primary goals of their country.  For example, 
Chávez’s Barrio Adentro mission provides 
Venezuelans with health care, an important 
service that was lacking for most Venezue-
lans prior to the mission’s creation, therefore 
it is a program worth pursuing through 
Venezuelan foreign policy.  However, the 
program is currently expensive and ineffi-
cient due to the large oil shipments and the 
range of medical treatments that are offered 
to Venezuelans.  As such, it is likely to un-
dergo changes, for example, by decreasing 
the amount of oil that is shipped and offer-
ing fewer medical services, which would 
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 make the program more efficient 
and economically sustainable.  As 
long as such policies and programs 
are cost-effective, efficient, and geared 
toward the direct, long-term benefit of 
the public (for example, through coupling 
such a program with an educational ex     
change program to train domestic workers), 
then they may be worth pursuing by petro-
state governments. 
Furthermore, petro-states must not 
chase away foreign investment in the oil in-
dustry as large, experienced oil companies 
have proven to be most effective in ensuring 
peak oil production.  Chávez’s decision to 
consolidate government control over PdVSA 
in 2003 proved to be one of the greatest mis-
takes of his presidency as Venezuelan oil pro-
duction dropped by about 800,000 barrels of 
oil per day (see Figure 3).  Venezuela has un-
doubtedly lost billions of dollars in potential 
oil revenues that could have provided Vene-
zuela with more money and jobs throughout 
the oil boom.  Furthermore, if oil production 
were at its peak in Venezuela, then the coun-
try would be bringing in more revenues now 
that oil prices are low.  For petro-state leaders, 
the easiest policy option may appear to be 
heavy taxation of the oil industry, or even 
complete control of it to increase the govern-
ment’s budget, and low taxation of other sec-
tors to please the population.153  However, 
foreign investment is key to maintaining the 
upkeep of a country’s oil infrastructure and 
keeping its oil industry at peak production.  
Petro-states must, therefore, allow at least 
some foreign investment in their oil industry 
and also diversify their sources of revenue by 
promoting and taxing non-oil sectors of the 
economy. 
 Finally, it is essential that petro-state 
leaders exercise great prudence by saving 
large amounts of money to offset the detri-
mental effects of future oil busts.  The $42.2 
billion that Chávez managed to save may help 
Venezuela get through this year, however it is 
little compared to the $326 billion that Nor-
way has saved in its Government Pension 
Fund.154  Due to resource depletion, petro-
states must maintain very high rates of sav-
ings and investment throughout oil booms to 
generate real wealth and to secure economic 
stability in the event of an oil bust.155  Norway 
has been one of the most stable petro-states in 
the world due to responsible management of 
its revenues.  As such, other petro-states 
should follow Norway’s lead in establishing a 
strong stabilization fund that is not to be 
touched unless their economic situation re-
quires it.  Many petro-states are beginning to 
set aside large portions of their resource reve-
nues to create stabilization funds, including 
Russia, Brazil, and even Libya.156  Chávez, on 
the other hand, has not invested heavily in 
Venezuela’s stabilization fund, choosing in-
stead to squander large amounts of oil reve-
nues through his costly foreign policy.  Other 
petro-state leaders can, thus, learn from his 
mistake. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Vene-
zuela, Chávez’s management of oil revenues 
throughout the oil boom-and-bust cycle has 
made his country susceptible to economic de-
cline as a result of the oil curse.  If oil prices 
remain low or drop even further, Venezuela’s 
economy will quickly destabilize due to 
Chávez’s decision to spend more money im-
mediately and to save less for an emergency.  
Furthermore, his wasteful spending will 
negatively impact poor Latin American 
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 countries that have come to depend 
on his foreign policy.  However, 
through the combination of wise ad-
justments to Venezuela’s budget and 
luck in the form of rising oil prices, 
Chávez may have the chance to learn 
from his mistakes and prepare Venezuela to 
be secure in the event of a future oil bust.  It 
is important, then, that he and other petro-
state leaders, both present and future, under-
stand the mistakes that allowed Venezuela to 
quickly transform from an economically se-
cure country that was purchasing allies and 
regional influence into a country that runs 
the great risk of suffering from economic 
instability.  In order to promote the eco-
nomic security of their countries throughout 
the duration of the oil boom-and-bust cycle, 
petro-state leaders must refrain from waste-
fully spending oil revenues on immediate 
projects, and instead encourage foreign in-
vestment and a diversified source of reve-
nue, and save large amounts of money to 
ensure economic security despite the unpre-
dictable nature of market prices. 
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 Appendices 
Figure 1: Weekly Prices of  
Venezuelan Crude Oil, 1978-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graph shows the weekly prices of Venezuelan crude oil between January 1978 and March 2009.  Prices from 
the recent oil boom hit their peak in July 2008 at a price of $137.98 per barrel and they have declined dramatically 
since then. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Weekly Venezuela Tia Juana Light Spot Price FOB,” Offi-
cial Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government (Washington D.C.: April 29, 2009). 
 
Table 1: Evaluation of Leaders, 2005-2008 
 
Q92ST. I’m going to list a number of foreign leaders. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means a “very bad” evaluation and 10 means “very good”. Or do you not know enough to give an opinion? 
Source: Latinobarómetro 2008 
  2005 2006 2007 2008       
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.9 
King Juan Carlos I 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.7 
José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.5 
Michelle Bachelet   5.4 5.4 5.5 
Fernando Lugo       5.5 
Álvaro Uribe   4.9 4.9 5.2 
Rafael Correa     4.7 5.0 
Felipe Calderón     5.0 5.0 
Tabaré Vásquez   4.6 4.6 5.0 
Evo Morales   4.9 4.9 4.8 
Cristina Kirchner       4.7 
Alan García   4.6 4.6 4.3 
Hugo Chávez 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.3 
Fidel Castro 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 
George W. Bush 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.2 
Daniel Ortega       4.0 
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 Figure 2: IFI Lending to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graph shows the amount of money being loaned to Latin America and the Caribbean by the Andean Devel-
opment Corporation (CAF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) each year be-
tween 1997 and 2008.  The amount of loans furnished by the western-based IFIs, the World Bank and the IDB, 
was down significantly until about 2006 from their peak in the late 1990s, while the amount of loans from the 
CAF was increasing since 1999.  However, as illustrated in the graph, between 2007 and 2008, loans from all 
three IFIs increased significantly. 
Source: Center for International Policy 
Vince McElhiny, “Global Crisis is Good News for IFIs in Latin America,” Americas Program Report. 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, January 27, 2009). 
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 Figure 3: Venezuela’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1987-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graph illustrates the varying trends of Venezuela’s oil production and consumption between 1987 and 2007.  
In 2007, Venezuela only produced about 2.7 million barrels of oil, significantly down from the approximately 3.5 
million barrels of oil that the country was producing around 1997. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Venezuela: Oil,” Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government 
(Washington D.C.: January 2009). 
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 For me The West Wing will be pri-
marily remembered as compelling entertain-
ment, but the experiences from this class 
have proven that a political education can be 
gleaned from the episodes. Although ex-
tracting that knowledge is not an easy task, 
and is one that requires further study as the 
DVDS of this show could be a useful sup-
plement to any political science program. 
 In terms of educating a student The 
West Wing should either be used as a base 
from which to build or it should be a final 
capstone in a curriculum so that students 
can see theories and concepts applied in a 
meaningful and relatable way. My experi-
ence has essentially been a combination of 
the two approaches, as I began watching the 
show in high school and have rewatched 
every episode in the second half of my final 
year at SUNY Geneseo.  
 The first approach, using the show 
as a foundation for a political education is 
promising but would seem to have draw-
backs. The main drawback is that it presents 
an idealistic and optimistic world that isn’t 
always indicative of reality, and would in-
still a sort of naiveté in a young student who 
doesn’t know anything beyond what he’s 
learned from television. But while the show 
may present unrealistic outcomes, the sce-
narios and challenges they lay out to poli-
ticking and governing are very real, and are 
of a relevant interest to anyone with a desire 
for a well rounded political education. 
 Many of the lessons that can be 
learned from The West Wing come in a very 
elementary fashion, so that if this was the 
primer for an education it would be ade-
quate. Aaron Sorkin was writing for a gen-
eral audience, and as such, many of the 
characters go to great lengths to explain 
what they’re dealing with, the history of the 
issue, and present all sides of the issue. The 
history and various viewpoints that are pre-
sented are the most compelling reasons why 
this show could be extremely useful at a ru-
dimentary level. At points you feel like 
you’re in a classroom when you watch the 
show, as they delve into statistical sampling, 
explain Senate procedural rules, and debate 
the role of the media.  
These conversations serve as an ex-
cellent starting point for any political educa-
tion, and for me they made my textbooks 
much more comprehensible. I was able to 
imagine pocket vetoes in terms that didn’t 
seem so abstract or have an added apprecia-
tion for how hard reforming social security 
actually is. 
 Beyond added comprehension from 
the show was an inspired love of politics 
that might have been equally as important as 
any quantifiable knowledge gained. The fact 
that the show was entertaining, and that it 
presented the political realm in a worth-
while light made the whole adventure  
Submitted by David Lombardo 
The West Wing 
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 appealing to me, which is why I 
became more involved in politics 
and eventually sought a B.A. in politi-
cal science. Thus, while the romanti-
cism of the show may take away from its 
grounding in fact, it serves an ulterior 
purpose by driving people, like me, to ex-
plore the issue further and hopefully reach-
ing their own understanding of issues and 
events. It’s this drive that is instilled in peo-
ple that makes The West Wing a very useful 
starting tool, as if it was an energy bar be-
fore a big race. It keeps you motivated, in-
trigued, and aware of the fact that there is a 
world outside of lectures and sometimes in-
accessible books. 
 The second way to utilize The West 
Wing, as a culmination of theories and his-
tory, would most likely not have the same 
effects as if the show was used for a starting 
point. It’s most useful capacity in terms of 
cementing an education would be as a frame 
of reference from which to debate things, 
probably in a manner similar to our Thurs-
day discussions. The idea would be for a 300 
level class of upper classmen to view how 
certain issues are covered and prepare to de-
bate the validity of how things play out on 
The West Wing. Presumably they would be 
able to utilize their earlier knowledge from 
other classes to ensure an informed debate 
that would arise over how the show deals 
with issues like funding legislation, cam-
paigning, and polling.  
 An upper level class most likely 
would be able to have a higher appreciation 
for the show than a general audience, and 
would benefit from the political profession-
als that worked on the show. The list of con-
tributors with respectable political creden-
tials includes George Stephanopoulos, Dee 
Dee Meyers, and Lawrence O’Donnell. 
Their role on the show, of providing their 
own stories and creating new storylines, 
gives the show a high level of legitimacy. 
The new storylines they create could serve 
as test cases for students to debate, as they 
could muse about events that haven’t come 
to fruition and could espouse their own pre-
dictions compared to the happenings on The 
West Wing.  
It would also serve as a way to com-
pare similar events from the show to history, 
and contemplate why they turned out differ-
ently. Two good examples would be the 
shutdown of the Federal Government in sea-
son five and the Presidential election in sea-
son four. The former would be applied to the 
standoff between Gingrich and Clinton, 
while the latter would be comparable to the 
Presidential election of 2000. With regards 
to both elections you can analyze the public 
strategies utilized by both campaigns, which 
in terms of the 2000 election would present 
itself as an interesting opportunity to assess 
Gore’s terrible strategy and execution. 
There is no downside to this ap-
proach of using The West Wing for upper 
level students, which is why I would recom-
mend it. I think a class full of engaged stu-
dents could really benefit from certain epi-
sodes and certain clips, cut in a fashion simi-
lar to the way I presented my GREAT Day 
video.  
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 If I had to choose between the two 
approaches I would say that the lat-
ter is more effective and realistic. My 
own experience with The West Wing, in 
which it served as the base for my edu-
cation, is probably impossible to repro-
duce in a classroom setting since I had the 
time to watch every single episode. With 
that understanding though, I would still rec-
ommend utilizing The West Wing for lower 
level classes as well as upper level classes. 
I would recommend using the show 
in conjunction with both classes because it 
can work for a general audience or a more 
specific crowd. In terms of a general audi-
ence, which is what you have in an Ameri-
can Government class (110), there are spe-
cific episodes that could make certain 
themes more accessible and that’s why I 
think those clips could be shown intermit-
tently through lecture. The difficulty that 
arises is in understanding the fictitious world 
and its characters, but mandating they watch 
the first episode would provide enough un-
derstanding that no one would be lost after 
that.  
That first episode could also be used 
in the higher level class to debate the role of 
the religious right in politics, as the White 
House contemplates appeasing the religious 
right over a perceived slight. Ideally a more 
specific audience, consisting of upper level 
students, would appreciate this dilemma for 
the White House, and it would serve as fresh 
way to approach politics. 
Finally, the accessibility of The West 
Wing is derived from the fact that it is enter-
taining. I know academics don’t like to think 
that a video can do their job or that enter-
tainment has a role in a rigorous academic 
life, but I think there’s no reason artificial 
borders should be placed that would prohibit 
this show from educating students.  
Frankly, I think it would be easier for 
students to learn if they were entertained 
with the source material. Since The West 
Wing is entertaining while remaining infor-
mative it should be used as a tool to supple-
ment a political education, in terms of culti-
vating an interest and knowledge amongst 
beginners and honing the ideas of more sea-
soned students. 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
250 
256
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 47
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/47
Martin Luther King Jr’s “Letter from 
a Birmingham Jail” shares remarkable simi-
larities with the books Hosea, Jonah, and 
Amos from the Old Testament. By compar-
ing these writings, we discover not only 
what makes a prophet and why they arise, 
but we also discover the general pattern that 
prophets follow in their efforts to bring 
about change. The prophets of old, such as 
Hosea, Jonah, and Amos were the messen-
gers of God, and were usually “outsiders” 
with an innate calling to reform social and 
moral injustice. At first, the prophets of old 
appeared reluctant because they were under-
taking a dangerous journey; however, with 
the help of God, they brought the message 
that all people could earn forgiveness and 
salvation if they changed their ways. Martin 
Luther King Jr. can be seen as a modern 
prophet, and perhaps he recognized this be-
cause he likens himself to the prophets of 
old. King reminds us that prophets are still 
needed to fix the injustices and immorality 
of contemporary society. 
Humans have inhabited the Earth for 
millions of years, and, unfortunately, uni-
versal human rights are still not guaranteed 
to all people. Freedom is not “ringing” eve-
rywhere, not even in modern times. Within 
the past century, the world has witnessed 
some of the worst dehumanizing events, in-
cluding the repression of women, the op-
pression of African Americans, and the vic-
timization of people during the Holocaust.  
In 1948, the United Nations introduced the 
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 
an attempt to create a standard, whereby all 
human beings can be treated with respect 
and dignity (1). Yet, human rights violations 
still occur today. This can change. The an-
swer is in speaking out against discrimina-
tion and cruelty. Conditions cannot change, 
if people remain silent. Ultimately, human 
rights and human flourishing come through 
the tireless efforts of people willing to put 
their lives on the line to combat injustice. 
These people are prophets. They are people, 
like Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, 
Nelson Mandela, Henry David Thoreau, and 
Martin Luther King Jr.—people who exer-
cised their freedom of speech to rise above 
injustice. They appear in the eighth century 
B.C., and they still appear today.  
 Marvin Perry, author of Western 
Civilization: A Brief History, conveys that 
prophets are “outsiders” that bring messages 
of social change and “attack oppression, 
cruelty, greed, and exploitation” (29). In 
other words, prophets are “outside” of the 
corrupt, immoral, and faithless population—
whether it is because they come in from a 
foreign area or because they are not taking 
part in the sins or violations of the majority. 
Perry asserts that prophets, “often emerge in 
times of social distress and moral confu-
sion” and “plea for a return to the covenant 
Submitted by Geoffrey Griffiths 
Tomorrow Will Shine 
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 and law” (29).  Prophets are 
needed when things are not going 
well or when people have strayed 
from morality. The prophets of old 
emerged, when people sinned against 
God by disobeying the Ten Command-
ments. It was the job of the prophets of old 
to educate people about their sins and to 
bring an end to decadence. In contemporary 
society, to follow God’s way is analogous to 
being morally good in thought and action. 
No religion is required to do what is not 
only good for you, but also to do what will 
benefit others. To borrow an idea from the 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant, we should 
“treat everyone as an end in themselves, and 
not a means to an end.” More simply, all 
people should be treated with respect. 
Hosea, Jonah, and Amos are three of 
the prophets of old, and they represent some 
of the earliest human and civil rights activ-
ists. The prophet Hosea comes from the 
north and entered the southern population of 
Israel because the people have been show-
ing “no faithfulness or kindness and no 
knowledge of God in the land; there was 
swearing, lying, killing, stealing, and com-
mitting adultery” (Revised Standard Ver-
sion, Hos. 4.2). Hosea used an analogy of 
his personal life to convey the message of 
God. Hosea’s wife, Gomer, has committed 
adultery and has “played the harlot,” just as 
the people of Israel have “left their God to 
play the harlot” (Hos. 1.2). A second 
prophet, Jonah, also represents an 
“outsider,” when he is commanded by God 
to “go to Nineveh that great city and cry 
against it, for their wickedness has come up 
before me” (Jon. 1.2). Jonah tried to escape 
on a ship, but God “hurled a great wind 
upon the sea” to prevent him. This reminds 
us that the prophets of old were doing the 
work of God and that God remained in con-
trol as the ultimate moral judge of humans 
(Jon. 1.15). More universally, no person has 
the authority over anyone else. People must 
act responsibly, and must consider the con-
sequences to other people before acting. 
Amos, a shepherd from Judea, 
brought the sins to the attention of the peo-
ple of the different villages of Israel. He re-
layed God’s message to Damascus, Gaza, 
Tyre, Judah, and several other villages that, 
“God will not revoke the punishment” for 
their “transgressions” (Amos 1.3). Amos 
declared that the people have forsaken their 
humbleness before God and have adopted a 
life of self-indulgence.  They have become 
people who “oppress the poor, who crush 
the needy” in favor of materialistic needs, 
such as alcohol and wealth (Amos 4.1). This 
criticism originates from the transition from 
tribal society to settled civilizations that oc-
curred in Israel during the Eighth Century 
B.C. The transition resulted in class distinc-
tions.  With this development, the wealthy 
Hebrew Kings began to mistreat the poor 
(Perry 29). For the prophets, this type of 
“national misfortune was an opportunity for 
penitence and reform” (Perry 29).  
Prophets have an innate calling—
whether from God or within themselves—to 
undertake the dangerous job of being the 
“gadfly” according to Socrates, and to speak 
out against injustice. According to Perry, 
prophets are people who “felt compelled to 
act as God’s messengers” (29).  The proph-
ets sought something beyond the law, they 
sought “a deeper spiritual insight or a zeal 
for morality in daily life” (Perry 30). Hosea 
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 loved Israel and felt compelled to 
carry the word of God throughout 
the land to deliver the land that he 
loved so much from the “deep corrup-
tion” (Hos.  9.3). Hosea was “the 
watchman of Ephraim [Israel]” (Hos. 
9.8). As the “watchman,” it was his job to 
prevent corruption from sweeping across 
Israel. It was his job to cry out against injus-
tice, and to stand in the way of the oppres-
sors of the weak. 
Similarly, God called upon Jonah to 
“proclaim the message that I tell you” to the 
city of Nineveh on several occasions (Jon. 
3.2). However, Jonah illustrates that proph-
ets may not be fully prepared to carry out 
their calling; they need the guidance of God, 
or some other moral judge. After the first 
call of God, Jonah set sail on a ship and ig-
nored his calling, which caused God to send 
a treacherous storm to remind Jonah of his 
purpose (Jon. 1.13). Along the journey, 
prophets can stray from their noble cause, 
and adopt a selfish lifestyle, leading to the 
emergence of false prophets. True prophets 
are altruistic, and seek the betterment of hu-
mankind, not just themselves. Just as Jonah 
was “thrown into” being a prophet, he was 
thrown into the sea, swallowed by a fish, 
and delivered to Nineveh to continue his 
role (Jon. 1). The prophet Amos also felt a 
moral obligation to relay God’s message to 
the people of Israel. In chapter three, Amos 
called for the people to “hear this word that 
the Lord has spoken against you.”  It was 
his duty to warn the people that their sinful 
lifestyles and mistreatment of the poor 
would result in punishments from God 
unless they changed their ways (Jon. 3.5). 
Being a prophet is a dangerous job. 
In the Eighth century B.C., Hosea, Jonah, 
and Amos faced persecution, imprisonment, 
ostracism, and other atrocities for speaking 
out against the sins of the majority. In other 
words, they spoke out against human rights 
violations. What if people did not embrace 
the messages of the prophets? Would God 
protect the prophets and punish the people 
as was described? These questions may 
never be fully answered; yet, in many cases 
the prophets did face persecution. Hosea, 
Jonah, and Amos may have remained rela-
tively unscathed in the end; however, others 
may not have been so fortunate. Prophets 
fulfill their role no matter what the conse-
quences are—perhaps it is because they are 
“caught up by the Zeitgeist,” or the spirit of 
the time, especially during times of crisis as 
Martin Luther King Jr. illustrates (King 5). 
Prophets bring a message of forgive-
ness, salvation, and hope for the future. If 
the people follow the message of the proph-
ets, then God will have mercy on them. Ac-
cording to Perry, the prophets believed that, 
“life on earth could be improved, that pov-
erty and injustice need not be accepted as 
part of an unalterable natural order, and that 
the individual was capable of elevating him-
self or herself morally and could respect the 
dignity of others” (Perry 30). The denial of 
human rights can be reversed, the mistreat-
ment of people can be stopped, and the con-
ditions of society can change with some ef-
fort. In Hosea, God revealed that he “would 
heal their faithlessness” if the people re-
pented (Hos. 14.5).  Hosea conveyed that 
God “would be as the dew to Israel; he shall 
blossom as the lily, he shall strike root as 
the poplar” (Hos. 14.6). In Jonah, after the 
people repented and had “turned from their 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
253 
259
: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009
Published by KnightScholar, 2010
 evil way,” God did not punish 
them, and instead commended them 
on their actions (Jon. 3.10). Amos 
also related that, “as the shepherd res-
cued from the mouth of the lion two 
legs, or a piece of an ear, so shall the 
people of Israel who dwell in Samaria be 
rescued” (Amos 3.12). In other words, Ho-
sea, Jonah, and Amos illustrate that change 
can occur and that good behavior will be 
rewarded.   
Similar to the prophets of the Old 
Testament, Martin Luther King Jr. repre-
sents the “outsider” bringing messages to a 
sinful population when he travels to Bir-
mingham and throughout the entire South. 
James A. Colaiaco relates that, “King 
[actually] compares himself to the prophets 
of the Old and New Testaments of the Bi-
ble” (4).  In the third paragraph of the 
“Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King states 
that he is “in Birmingham because injustice 
is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth 
century B.C. left their villages and carried 
their ‘thus saith the Lord’ far beyond the 
boundaries of their home towns” (King, 1). 
Although, Martin Luther King Jr. may be 
called an “outsider” to Birmingham, he is 
“in Birmingham by affiliation and by invita-
tion” with the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference to “participate in nonvio-
lent efforts to secure equal rights for 
blacks” (Colaiaco 4). King may not live in 
Birmingham, but he belongs there because 
Birmingham is the center of injustice, and it 
his calling to end it. 
Martin Luther King Jr. is a prophet 
who is responding to racial injustice and the 
mistreatment of African Americans, as well 
as all people of color. King calls for an end 
to the immoral practices of segregation. In 
fact, King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” 
was written in response to a document pub-
lished by “Alabama clergymen charging 
that the recent direct actions in the city had 
been ‘unwise and untimely’” (Colaiaco 2). 
The Alabama clergymen refer to the recent 
“anti-segregation” demonstrations and boy-
cotts led by Martin Luther King Jr. and 
other civil rights activists (Colaiaco 1). King 
and others were left with few options except 
to undertake a nonviolent campaign to com-
bat the segregation, brutality, and “grossly 
unjust treatment in courts” of African 
Americans (King 1). Civil disobedience, 
similar to that of Mahatma Gandhi, was the 
best option because a violent campaign 
would only escalate the problems. Perhaps, 
the only right that should be denied to peo-
ple is the right to harm others. Treating oth-
ers with brutality because of their appear-
ance or beliefs benefits no one. 
Martin Luther King Jr. adamantly 
pronounces his moral calling to rise up 
against justice when he writes that, “there 
comes a time when the cup of endurance 
runs over, and men [and women] are no 
longer willing to be plunged into the abyss 
of despair” (King 3). King asserts that the 
injustices occurring in Birmingham have 
continued far too long and believes that it is 
his duty, as well as the duty of everyone af-
fected by racial discrimination to speak up 
against it. Colaiaco supports King’s asser-
tions when he writes, “As long as blacks 
throughout the nation were denied justice 
and equality, the dream embodied in Amer-
ica’s Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution would remain unfulfilled” (3).  
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  In addition to the civil laws 
of a society, there are “higher laws” 
that apply to every community, relig-
ion, and government. They are the 
moral laws, such as treating people 
equally. That is why “segregation is not 
only politically, economically, and socio-
logically unsound, it is morally wrong and 
awful” (King 3). King’s calling extends far 
beyond any law or written rule and it delves 
into a moral obligation.  As is written in the 
“Declaration of the Independence of the 
United States of America,” everyone in 
western society is given certain “inalienable 
rights” for “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” and everyone in western society 
is protected by natural laws against mis-
treatment, discrimination, and enslavement. 
These are the very rights being denied in 
Birmingham through the practice of segre-
gation. Martin Luther King Jr. “cannot sit 
idly by in Atlanta,” while this is occurring 
because “injustice anywhere is a threat to 
justice everywhere” (King 1).  Injustice in 
Birmingham stands in the way of justice in 
other places. The oppressors in Birmingham 
must be dealt with, otherwise oppression 
will continue indefinitely.  As Immanuel 
Kant writes in Perpetual Peace, “A trans-
gression in one place is felt every-
where” (119). Mistreatment and denial of 
rights of people based on race, color, gen-
der, ethnic background, or appearance is felt 
by all people. 
The role of a prophet is a struggle, 
but change often “comes through the tireless 
efforts of men [and women] willing to be 
coworkers with God” (King 5). Martin Lu-
ther King Jr. and many of his contemporar-
ies during the Civil Rights Movement faced 
unimaginable horrors during their nonvio-
lent campaigns and acts of civil disobedi-
ence (Colaiaco 6).  Homes of African 
Americans and white sympathizers were 
burned to the ground, prominent Civil 
Rights leaders were shot down, and families 
were torn apart. During some of the 
“freedom rides,” many men and women 
“suffered savage beatings” (Colaiaco 6). 
Even King was jailed about a dozen times 
for bringing the message of peace and de-
manding an end to suffering, just as the 
prophets before him had done. 
Although immediate results may not 
be seen, positive change likely prevails with 
the efforts of prophets. Tragically, Martin 
Luther King Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 
1968, before he could see the full result of 
his efforts. King eventually was victorious 
in Birmingham, and his efforts represent a 
“turning point in the battle for civil rights, 
after which the forces of segregation in the 
South began to crumble” (Colaiaco 1). In 
1964, the Civil Rights Act came into frui-
tion and outlawed segregation. Then, in 
1965, the Voting Rights Act outlawed dis-
crimination in voting. We can only imagine 
the smile that would have spread across 
King’s face after Barack Obama was elected 
President of the United States of America 
this year, and we can only guess at King’s 
satisfaction of seeing the diversity of the 
candidates running for the 2008 election. 
Times have changed and conditions have 
improved from the effort of people, such as 
Martin Luther King Jr. However, in King’s 
attempt at creating unity among people, 
many of the human rights violations not in 
the public spotlight were forgotten and 
many of the struggles of people in poor 
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 neighborhoods were ignored. 
Many of these problems persist 
today. 
 As Socrates would argue, so-
ciety is always in need of the “gadfly,” 
or dissenter, but prophets are much more 
than dissenters; they speak up against 
injustice and serve as messengers of moral-
ity for the people (The Apology). Through 
the efforts of prophets, great changes are 
made. Evil can be converted to Good, im-
morality can be changed to morality, and 
injustice can be restored to justice. Martin 
Luther King Jr. emerged in a time of racial 
injustice and applied the same practices of 
Hosea, Jonah, and Amos from thousands of 
years ago. Martin Luther King Jr. helped 
end segregation in the United States, but he 
was not the only one. Thousands of other 
civil and human rights activists did their 
part too. Society needs prophets to expose 
the injustices of society, but prophets would 
not be successful, unless they received the 
support of their peers.   
Today, we are closer than we were 
before to guaranteeing universal human 
rights; however, more work must be done. 
For example, why did the Apartheid segre-
gation in South Africa endured into the 
early 1990s? In the United States, Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954) outlawed segre-
gation, but segregation in America’s educa-
tion systems still exists today, as Jonathan 
Kozol argues in his book, The Shame of the 
Nation. This is something that King did not 
get a chance to combat, and it is something 
that another modern prophet, Jonathan Ko-
zol, brings to our attention. Perhaps, society 
will always need prophets to speak up for 
the oppressed.  Who will be the Hoseas, 
Jonahs, Gandhis, and Kings of the future? 
Whoever they may be, tomorrow will shine 
with their help. 
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The report is the pinnacle of the Diamond 
certificate.  Please answer the following 
questions in your report: 
Name: Jesse Parent, Rejoyce Owusu, and 
Ben DeGeorge  
Title of Project: The Ghana Project  
Dates of Project from beginning to com-
pletion or still in progress 
The project began September 20, 2008 
and it is an on gain service learning project 
under the center of community at SUNY 
Geneseo. The Ghana Project originally 
started off as a service learning/civic en-
gagement/ volunteering project through the 
GOLD department.  The Ghana Project is 
focused on spreading Ghanaian culture 
through cross culture dialogue amongst stu-
dents that have studies abroad in Ghana and 
students that are thinking about service 
learning opportunities on campus.   
Through the efforts of SUNY Geneseo 
students we want to create global awareness 
on campus. Specifically, we want to create 
awareness and establish a connection with a 
University in Ghana. We have successfully 
had educational programming, community 
partnerships, fundraising efforts and a 
GREAT Day presentation every year on 
campus. 
Our main goals for this semester were 
the cultural dinner, T-shirt advertisement, 
the 5K race and our Great day performance.  
All these events were fantastic.  
Inspiration: What was your inspiration 
for doing your project? 
The Ghana Project was created in 
Fall 2008; it was born out of GOLD’s 
“Diamond Civic Engagement” certificate. 
GOLD Mentor Rejoyce Owusu developed 
the idea as a way to share her homeland of 
Ghana. Joined by fellow GOLD Mentors 
Jesse Parent and Ben DeGeorge, the found-
ing members The Ghana Project began 
working together to establish a group based 
on civic engagement and service learning, 
focusing on Ghana and its culture and in-
creasing global awareness. A major long 
term goal of the project is helping to build 
or establish a school in Ghana. While the 
first year of the Project has been about es-
tablishing and creating awareness, already 
raised significant funding and made valu-
able connections to help in pursuing this 
goal. 
Funding: Did your project require fund-
ing?  How did you go about acquiring 
these funds? 
        Major fundraising for The Ghana Pro-
ject has been sponsored T-Shirts. Thanks to 
a combined effort with SUNY Geneseo’s 
Educational Department groups – Council 
for Exceptional Children (CEC), Elemen-
tary and Secondary Educational Association 
(ESEA), and The Young Children’s Council 
(YCC) – The Ghana Project has been able 
to raise over $1,000 in one week’s time.  
Submitted by Jesse Parent, Rejoyce 
Owusu, and Ben DeGeorge  
Diamond Certificate Report: 
The Ghana Project 
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 Upcoming fundraisers also include 
a Walkathon / 5K race in mid-April. 
“Geneseo Moves for Ghana” will be 
another means to raise funding for the 
long term goal of building a school in 
Ghana. The Ghana Project has received 
wide recognition, support, and great public-
ity. It has appeared in the student-run news-
paper, The Lamron, frequently over the 
course of it’s short existence. 
Community Contacts, Collaborators & 
Partners: Names of organizations and in-
dividuals who you worked with in the 
community and/or on campus to make 
your project a reality? Please include con-
tact information for future reference.  
Since the launch of the Ghana Project in 
the Fall of 2008, we have collaborated with 
multiple student groups on campus that also 
concentrate on bringing awareness to the 
issues in Africa and created a committee to 
ensure that we are working together and 
sharing the resources on campus. The 
amount of people that have been reached 
through the project is simply amazing. We 
have a growing facebook group of over 720 
people, a mailing list of over 100 people, 
and we have a partnership with students in 
the Brockport, Robert Wesleyan, Cornell, 
Buffalo, and Syracuse   campus.  
In November ‘08, the Project held its 
first major event, an educational model 
about Ghana. Speakers included Dr. Osman 
Alawiye, Dean of School of Education, Dr. 
Dennis Showers. Guests from SUNY Brock-
port shared their stories. March ‘09 was the 
first ever Ghana Gala. The event included a 
traditional Ghanaian dinner, dancing, model-
ing Ghanaian clothing, and other activities. 
Speakers included Dr. Osman Alawiye, 
Prof. Wes Kennison, (International Studies) 
and Prof. Owusu-Dapaa, from Nkrumah 
Technical University, Ghana. Special thanks 
to Wyoming Hall for hosing the event, espe-
cially Area Coordinator of Wyoming and 
Putnam hall, Yolany Gonell. 
The Ghana project has had individuals 
that has help sponsor the project such as 
Tom Matthews, Leadership Education, De-
velopment & Training and David Parfitt, 
Teaching & Learning Center, Dean of the 
School of Education, Yolany Gonell,  Mark 
Scott Director of Campus A Services,  and 
all other supporters including GOLD, Res-
Life, CAS, CEC, YCC, and ESEA. 
On April 21, 2009 The Ghana Pro-
ject conducted a dance performance in the 
Union Ballroom Stage introduced by Presi-
dent Christopher Dahl. Our dance was a 
three and half minute long dance - a combi-
nation of African hip hop music. The lyrics 
of the song are African-French, and the 
moves will be exciting and energetic. It will 
be a celebration of African culture. We will 
be wearing traditional Ghanaian clothing. 
The members of the team include: Abigail 
Boateng, Dalia Calix, Deon Edwards, 
Heather Ford, Kerisha Hawthorne, Theona 
Hudson, Rejoyce Owusu, Jesse Parent, and 
Angela Snook 
Timeline: What were the different steps 
to completing your project? 
The heart and soul of The Ghana Project 
is sharing Ghanaian culture. From teaching 
group members the Ghanaian handshake to 
working on major culture events, the Project 
seeks to welcome others into warm Ghana-
ian culture. The project was introduce to the 
community through educational program-
ming and educating students about our 
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 cause and getting students excited 
about joining the cause.  
Last semester the Ghana Project held 
an informational program in Wayne 
Hall and we were happy to have Wes 
Kennison from the International Studies 
department, Dr. Alawiye, Dean of Educa-
tion, and study abroad student Ben 
De’George present on their experience in 
Ghana. Members of the Brockport Ghana 
Project were in attendance along with vari-
ous community members that had an interest 
in Ghana.  
Recently, the Ghana Project sponsored a 
Ghana Gala in Wyoming Hall. At the Gala 
we had Wes Kennison, present on the cus-
toms of the Ghanaian people during his visit 
to Ghana. Dr. Alawiye, and Professor 
Owusu-Dappa, who teaches in the Faculty of 
Law at the Kwame Nkrumah University of 
Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana 
were both in attendance and shared some 
words with the audience about the issues in 
Ghana.  Overall, the Ghana Gala was a fan-
tastic success, with traditional Ghanaian 
food, music, dancing, clothing, modeling 
and other decorative display of information 
of various tribes in Africa. To say the least, 
the event had full capacity attendance, and 
many people spoke highly about it. We were 
even featured in the student newspaper, The 
Lamron.  
Challenges: What challenges did you fore-
see in executing your project?  What chal-
lenges did you actually encounter? 
       We have encountered many challenges 
dealing with the direction of the project and 
combining all three Gold mentors’ leader-
ship styles. We also had to deal with work-
ing with the college policies, especially in 
regards to fundraising at the college. We had 
to be aware of the student association rules 
and be careful not to break these since we 
were not a campus organization. One of the 
major problems we encounter was the mis-
communication between other organizations 
on campus. We have learned that through a 
large civic engagement project such as this 
managing every detail aspect of the project 
is very important. We had to inform all col-
lege officials on campus so the communica-
tion was smooth because everyone on cam-
pus is concern with activities taking place on 
campus. Another important thing we learn 
was learning how to delegate responsibilities 
to influences students to take upon them-
selves roles they thought they could have 
done.  
Benefits: What are the short-term and 
long-term societal benefits to your pro-
ject? 
          The long term benefit of the project is 
to establish a partnership in Ghana and to 
contribute a school building in Ghana. We 
also hope students would be citizen diplo-
mats across the world and gain more experi-
ences through civic engagement project such 
as the Ghana Project.  We also want to con-
tinue to encourage students to try something 
new and challenge their leadership skill on a 
different level.  We hope that through the 
GOLD program we could bring enough 
awareness of the issues in Ghana to build a 
school in Ghana and have students from 
Geneseo continue to conduct their internship 
there. 
Future: How could this project be repli-
cated in the future? 
 In the future, we hope this project will 
be an ongoing service project that students 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
259 
265
: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009
Published by KnightScholar, 2010
 will be passionate about and con-
tinue to expand their knowledge 
through other countries. This project 
hopefully will help Geneseo network 
with the global world and connect stu-
dents with various internship opportuni-
ties. This project can be replicated in many 
different ways through forming connections 
with other countries and working towards 
the goal of doing that nation a service.  
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